The study of the transformation of the Persian Cossack Brigade into the most efficient military unit of the Iranian regular army at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries is of considerable scientific interest not only for further research of the military and political history of the country, but also for highlighting many fundamental issues of Russian-Iranian relations.

The Persian Cossack Brigade, organized in 1879 under the leadership of a Russian General Staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel A. Domantovich, faced a real threat of disbanding already in the early 1890s. At such a fateful moment for the brigade, Colonel V. Kosogovsky took control of it, who was able not only to preserve the brigade and actually re-form it, but also to increase its combat capability, as well as its military and political significance at the shah's court.

The purpose of this article is to study the reasons that contributed to the strengthening of the Persian Cossack Brigade as an effective tool of Russian influence in Iran, against the background of the dynamics of the growing Anglo-Russian economic and political confrontation in Asia. The active activity of V. Kosogovsky was largely due not so much to his personal qualities as a combat commander, which only all researchers paid attention to, but to the cardinal changes that occurred in the economic and foreign policy life of Russia in the 90s of the XIX century. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the change in the balance of power in the Shah's entourage in favor of the all-powerful Prime Minister (Sadraz) Ali Asghar Khan Amin os-Soltan, a supporter of the pro-Russian orientation.

Keywords: Persian Cossack Brigade, Colonel V. A. Kosogovsky, Anglo-Russian rivalry, Iran.

In the mid-80s of the XIX century, after the annexation of Central Asia, Russia began to directly border not only with Iran, from the Transcaspian region, but also with Afghanistan. The latter, however, like Iran, was given the role of a buffer by Britain in protecting its colonial possessions in India.1 As I rightly remarked at the time

1 At one time, M. I. Venyukov gave the following assessment of India's place in Anglo-Russian relations: "Russia and England in our time are in Persia, as well as in Asia in general, competing powers. And it is not that the dispute is about the direct domination of the British or Russians over the sadly desolate Iran, but the root of the ill-will of the former towards the latter is hidden outside this country and consists in the fear of England losing Hindustan, where the road from the north-west lies through Persia " [Venyukov, 1877, p. 15].

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According to A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "any movement of Russia in the direction of Central Asia caused deep concern to England" [Lobanov-Rostovsky, 1961, p. 161-162]. After the demarcation of the Russian-Afghan border in 1885, the growing crisis was resolved peacefully [Cambridge History..., 1971, p. 187-191]. As a result, Britain retained its monopoly on Afghanistan. Iran was actually already divided by Russia and Britain into spheres of influence. The entire north of the country was under Russian influence, while the south and southeast were under English influence.

Because of the weakness of Russian capitalism back in the 80s of the XIX century. In its trade and economic activities in Iran, Russia took the position of a defensive party, trying to prevent foreign capital from entering its sphere of influence. The crowning achievement of this policy was Russia's ban on railway construction in Iran in 1890. However, already in the 1890s, as a result of the rapid development of capitalism in Russia, which was greatly facilitated by large French financial injections into the Russian economy, Russia's trade, economic and political activities sharply intensified. Russia, which for many decades constantly had a chronic negative trade balance with Iran, was able to increase its trade turnover with Iran by two and a half times over the period 1894-1903, becoming for the first time the leading trade partner of this country [Popov, 1926, p.137].

The rapid growth of capitalism in Russia has put on the agenda the search for new markets in Iran for the Russian manufacturing industry. As a result of the rapid growth of Russian-Iranian trade, Russia's eyes also turned to the Persian Gulf. In 1897, Russia opened its consulate in Isfahan. "By establishing it, the imperial ministry," as reported from the Russian mission in Teheran, "undoubtedly had in mind to subject the vast region along the Persian Gulf and the Karun River to closer observation, which has long attracted the special, intense and jealous attention of our constant rivals, the British" (AVPRI, p.415). Russian merchant and military vessels are increasingly visiting the Gulf ports.

The expansion of Russia's political and economic influence in Iran has led to an aggravation of the Anglo-Russian confrontation in this country. And the American researcher Robert McDaniel is right when he states that "if any period could be characterized by the predominance of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, then it could be the last years of the nineteenth century" (McDaniel, 1974, p. 10).

The strengthening of the position of the Persian Cossack Brigade in Iran turned out to be directly related to the intensified Anglo-Russian rivalry. For the first time, the brigade began to play a prominent role in the social and political life of Iran, becoming an active conductor of Russian politics in this country.

At one time, the desire of the first brigade commander, Colonel Domantovich (1879-1881), to create a serious combat Cossack unit in Iran, as well as his desire to obtain the official status of a military agent and thereby free himself from the guardianship of the Russian diplomatic mission, cost dearly not only to the brigade organizer himself, but also to his brainchild. The fact is that military and political circles in Russia were not interested in creating an effective military force in Iran at that time [Kuropatkin, 1902, p. 25]. That is why after the departure of A. Domantovich in 1881, the brigade was in a prolonged decline.2
On March 7, 1894, Colonel of the Russian General Staff V. A. Kosogovsky was appointed commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, which faced a real danger of disbanding. The ruler of Iran, Naser ed-Din Shah (1848 - 1896), lost all interest in it, and the Minister of War - the third son of the Shah, Prince Kamran Mirza Naib

2 For this period in the history of the Persian Cossack Brigade, see [Rabi and Ter-Oganov, 2009].

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os-Saltane 3, an Anglophile who was nominally subordinate to the brigade, was hostile to it. Therefore, he suggested to his father to abolish it altogether. Nevertheless, the Shah, fearing discontent on the part of the Russian government, did not give his consent [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 395] 4.

Arriving in Tehran on May 11, 1894, Colonel Kosogovsky found the Persian Cossack Brigade in deep decline. According to him, the local authorities did not like the brigade and were very reluctant to pay for its maintenance, which "almost brought it to its last gasp" [Persia..., 1923, p. 449]. In such a difficult situation, with some inertia of the Russian diplomatic mission 5, when the fate of the brigade was being decided, Colonel Kosogovsky proved to be a capable and energetic commander. First of all, he set about streamlining budget issues.

Having taken command of the brigade, Kosogovsky was faced with the problem of "dead souls". It turned out that many of the Cossacks who were on leave at that time were no longer alive, but they were listed in the lists, and the regimental commanders received half a salary for them [Kosogovsky, 1923, p.395].

One of the most difficult problems, on the solution of which the future fate of the brigade largely depended, was the question of the privileges of the Mohajer6, who formed its backbone. Since the formation of the brigade, they have enjoyed greater privileges than volunteers. So, they could leave the team, for which they did not bear any disciplinary responsibility. Since they were under the protection of the Minister of War and the Shah himself, the brigade commanders not only did not punish the guilty mohajers and accepted them back into the brigade, but sometimes even rewarded them! [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 397]. To correct the situation, Kosogovsky equalized the rights of mohajers and volunteers, both privates and officers.

The brigade commander also drew attention to the excessive number of officer ranks in the brigade. In order to prevent an unnecessary increase in the number of officers, as well as to eliminate the vicious practice of obtaining an officer rank by inheritance, patronage, and even by bribes that had already taken root in the brigade, by his order, the sons of Mohajers and non-mohajers who wanted to receive an officer rank were now required to start military service with the non-commissioned officer rank. By doing this, the brigade commander, firstly, opposed the volunteers to the Mohajers and, in the person of the latter, created a strong support for himself within the brigade and, secondly, managed to restore order in the training of officers.

Kosogovsky's success in strengthening the brigade was not to everyone's taste. According to his statement, foreigners and" high-ranking Persians " put up all sorts of obstacles for him. According to Kosogovsky, an English military agent, Colonel Henry Pico, "openly traveled through the ranks during inspections and counted how many people the colonel brought to the review in order to report his observations on os-Saltan" [Kosogovsky, 1923, p.398]. Among the obstacles they caused, according to Kosogovsky, was the deliberate postponement of the date of the brigade review in order to disrupt it from September 15 to September 2. However, this subterfuge did not prevent him from showing the fruits of his three months of tireless work: already on September 2, 1894, a review was held in the presence of the Shah

3 Naib os-Saltaneh was the favorite son of Naser ed-Din Shah. As early as 1858-1859, he became Minister of War, and in 1860-1861, the post of governor of Tehran was added to this post.

4 The behavior of Naser al-Din Shah is not surprising, since, according to Nazem ol-Eslam Kermani, the Qajar Shah was afraid of the Russians, whom he tried not to contradict, which later made itself felt in the question of choosing the heir to the throne [Kermani, 1376, p. 127].

5 As can be seen from Kosogovsky's words, there were tensions between the brigade commander and the Russian diplomatic mission, the reason for which was that its members "continued, as under previous brigade commanders, to give their instructions", which the obstinate Kosogovsky did not like very much [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 396; Persia..., 1923, p. 448].

6 Mohajers are descendants of Muslim immigrants from Transcaucasia.

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The commander of the brigade exceeded all expectations - under his command were 500 equipped and trained mounted Cossacks (Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 395).

The abolition of privileges so affected the interests, as well as the self-esteem of the Mohajers, that they could not stand it and rebelled. On May 5, 1895, the Mohajers left the brigade, taking with them their inherited pensions (amounting to 20 thousand tumans), i.e. part of the brigade's budget. They were followed by many volunteers. As a result of this riot, the brigade was in grave danger. Meanwhile, Naib os-Saltane, an ardent opponent of the brigade, was already celebrating his victory. Taking advantage of the actual disintegration of the brigade and wanting to " kill "the Russian "brigade", on May 9, he organized a separate so-called Persian Brigade from the deserting Cossacks of the brigade, which he handed over to his son-in-law Majd od-Doula and mirpyanj (lieutenant general) of the Cossack brigade Ali Khan (Kosogovsky, 1923, p.398).

The division of the brigade, as might have been expected, was highly desirable for the British. This is evidenced at least by the fact that immediately after the start of the riot, Naib os-Saltane began negotiations with the British military attache Henry Pico on the issue of inviting British military instructors to join the brigade. This is exactly what S. Lomnitsky had in mind when he wrote:"...until recently, the British gentlemen offered their own colonel and officers for the command of the Cossack brigade, and even took on all the costs of their maintenance" [Lomnitsky, 1902, p. 150]. There was a real threat of the brigade falling into the hands of the British. Naib os-Saltane decided not only not to renew the contract with the Russian government, but also to finally wrest the brigade from the hands of Russian instructors immediately after the expiration of Colonel Kosogovsky's term of service.

Predictably, the division of the brigade, as well as the British attempt to capture it, convinced Kosogovsky of the precarious position of Russian training officers and their legal status. After all, it was about changing the Russian instructor staff to English. Realizing the seriousness of the British intentions and, consequently, the whole drama of the current situation, the Russian diplomatic mission came into action, which, through the Minister of the Press, the well-known Iranian chronicler Etemad os-Saltane , an obvious supporter of Russia [Kia, 2001, p. 114-115], addressed the Shah with an urgent request: immediately put an end to the "existence of a Russian state". two brigades." The Shah granted the request of the Russian side, but in response demanded that Kosogovsky pardon the guilty Mohajers. The brigade commander gave his consent, but, in turn, set him a counter-condition: The Shah accepts the 27 points of the "Regulations of May 24, 1895" developed by him personally [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 397].

The crisis in the brigade clearly showed Kosogovsky the weakness of the legal framework for the activities of Russian training officers in Iran. Therefore, he decided to obtain for Russian officers-instructors the exclusive right to train the Persian Cossack Brigade, as well as an increase in the prerogatives of its commander. This basic idea was laid down in the aforementioned "Position" of Kosogovsky.

According to one of the points of this document, the Iranian government undertook to invite only Russian instructors to the brigade, regardless of whether the Iranian authorities were satisfied with the identity of the commander. Thus, the Shah had to recognize Russia's exclusive right to control the brigade. The "regulations" established de facto equality between mohajers and volunteers. It should be noted that after reading the Persian text of the "Regulations", the Shah accepted all its points without objections or amendments and handed them over to the Prime Minister Ali Asghar Khan Amin os-Soltan and the Minister of War Naib os-Saltan who were present there. As Kosogovsky himself testifies, the prime minister signed it without objection, enclosing his seal, while Naib os-Saltane categorically refused to sign it. And only the shah's threat to remove him from his post-

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However, the Minister of War was forced to give his consent, which was also signed and sealed. Thus, the 16-day existence of the second, so-called Persian Brigade was put to an end.

The "regulation" made significant adjustments to the status of the Head of training of the Persian Cavalry, i.e., the brigade commander. According to the "Regulations", the" Manager " was already formally assigned the rights of a combat commander [Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 399]. But the main thing was that from now on, the brigade commander had to report directly to the Prime Minister.7 Thus, the brigade was removed from the control of the Anglophile Minister of War Naib os-Saltan and subordinated to the Russophile Prime Minister Ali Asghar Khan Amin os-Soltan, 8 who later played a significant role in strengthening the brigade's influence in Iran. At the same time, the "Position" strengthened the status of Russian instructors in the brigade [Kosogovsky, 1923, p.399].

Thanks to this document, even the possibility of capture or collapse of the brigade by the British was excluded. The" regulation " finally equalized the rights of mohajers and volunteers. Securing unlimited rights for the brigade commander objectively contributed to the transformation of the Persian Cossack Brigade into an effective military and political tool of tsarist Russia, which the British were so afraid of. Apparently, taking into account the requirements of this "Regulation", on the same day, May 24, 1895, the" Convention between Russia and Persia on the sending of Russian officers to manage the training of Persian Cavalry " was concluded, signed by the Russian envoy Byutsov and the Shah's Prime Minister Amin os-Soltan.

The Convention consisted of five points and included almost all the main provisions of the traditional contract for the hiring of Russian instructors, concluded every three years between the Russian diplomatic mission and the Iranian government. The most important point from the point of view of strengthening Russian influence over the brigade was the 1st point, according to which Russian officer instructors were henceforth to be guided both in combat and in economic terms by the statutes and rules that existed in the Russian army [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 6949, l. 163-164].

Later, as a result of the adoption of the "Regulations" stipulated by the above-mentioned convention, significant changes occurred in many areas of activity of the Persian Cossack Brigade. They touched upon the terms of service of the brigade commander and constables, the recruitment of new recruits, as well as the procedure for appointing Persian officers.

Whereas usually, according to the contract, the term of service of the commander, as well as Russian officers and constables, was determined in three years, from now on the term of service of the commander was determined by the Russian government.9 Uryadniki could also serve without term limits. As for the training officers, they, as before, according to the contract, had to serve for three years.

If earlier, when forming the Persian Cossack Brigade, the Iranian government itself determined the ethnic composition of recruits and their number, now the commander at his own discretion, without the participation of the Iranian government, recruited recruits for the brigade. The recruitment of recruits was mainly made among the Turks of Azerbaijan and

7 Reza Rais Tousi states that "The powers of the Russian commander of the formation increased in 1895, when he became responsible only to the Shah and the Prime Minister" [Tousi, 1988, p. 219].

8 Ali Asghar Khan Amin os-Soltan has held this position since 1893. Later, during the reign of Mo-zaffar ed-Din Shah, he managed to regain it again. See: Farmayan, 1983, p. 344. Amin os-Soltan and Naib os-Saltane wrote open hostility towards each other, and each of the parties considered the other an obstacle in their path. See: [Omid, [b. g.], p. 80].

9 After General Kosogovsky left Tehran, none of the subsequent brigade commanders served for more than three years.

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Qazvin, as well as from nomads who lived in the neighborhood of Tehran, Qom and Casein. A certain number of recruits were also recruited among the Persians and Gilyans [BD, 1985, p. 228].

A significant increase in the potential of the brigade, as well as the authority of its commander, coincided with the reign of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah (1896-1907). As is known, on April 19, 1896, when the pan-Islamist Reza Kermani fatally wounded Naser ed-Din Shah in the mosque of Shah Abdol-Azim, Amin os-Soltan assigned responsibility for the inviolability of the Shah's throne, as well as the protection of order in Tehran, to two Iranian nobles and Colonel Kosogovsky [Kosogovsky, 1960, p. 19]. Before the arrival in Tehran of the heir to the throne Mozaffar ed-Din Mirza, Colonel Kosogovsky was the absolute master of the capital. He and his brigade ensured the new Shah of Iran's peaceful and unhindered entry to Tehran, for which Mozaffar ed-Din expressed his personal gratitude at the Tehran gate on May 26, 1896. A Cossack convoy accompanied the Shah all the way to the palace [Kosogovsky, 1960, pp. 52-53].

In this regard, the Caucasian military authorities were informed that Colonel Kosogovsky took "an outstanding part in maintaining law and order among the Teheran population during the alarming period of time that came immediately after the assassination of Nasr al-Din Shah and lasted until the accession to Teheran for the reign of the current Mozaffar al-Din Shah" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 35].

After his coronation, the Shah did not forget about the service rendered to him. According to his first decree of July 18, 1896, the brigade was henceforth to be under the command of the Prime Minister, which confirmed one of the main points of the "Regulations of May 24, 1895". In accordance with the second decree, the prime minister had to communicate on Cossack affairs not with the Minister of War, as it was before, but directly with Mokarrab ol-hakan, i.e. with the commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade [RGVIA, f. 446, d.48, l. 25-25].10. From now on, he was advised to pay more attention to the affairs of the brigade. Later, in September 1896, Mozaffar ed-Din Shah further strengthened the power of the Russian commander by his next decree [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 48, l. 61]. According to the report of Colonel Averyanov, the clerk of the General Staff, Mozaffar ed-Din Shah granted the Russian colonel-instructor the rights of an authorized brigade commander [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 6949, l. 165ob.].

Subordinating the brigade directly to the Prime Minister ultimately meant raising its military and political status. Taking into account the foreign policy orientation of Amin os-Soltan, his favorability towards Russia, one can understand why this step largely contributed to a sharp increase in Russian influence in the country. It should be noted that Abdallah Mostoufi in his memoirs clearly indicates the role of Amin os-Soltan in expanding the powers of the Russian brigade commander [Mostoufi, 1377, p. 259]. During the years of Amin os-Soltan's rule, the brigade actually became the most organized military force in Iran, a force that faithfully served the interests of the Qajar monarchy. 11
Meanwhile, opposition within the country's political elite grew. On November 24, 1896, opponents of Amin os-Soltan's authoritarian rule, led by opposition leader Abdol Hossein Mirza Farman Farma, supported by the future Prime Minister, liberal Mirza Ali Khan Amin od-Doule, and the greedy "Tavriz retinue" of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah, succeeded in removing the all-powerful Amin os-Soltan from office. The departure of Amin os-Soltan from the political scene was a great loss for Russian diplomacy, while for the British it was the fulfillment of a long-awaited dream.

10 According to the regulations on the Safavid administration of Tazkirat al-Muluk, Mokarrab ol-hakan was considered a person close to the Shah's person. See: [Tadhkirat al-Muluk, 1980, p. 55-66].

11 On January 1, 1897, Colonel Kosogovsky was awarded the Order of St. Anna, 2nd class, for his services to Russia. And a month before this event, in December 1896, four cannons with full equipment for one mounted demi-battery, presented by the Russian emperor to the Shah for the needs of the brigade, were delivered to Tehran [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 36; as well as AVPRI, l. 6].

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As a result, two key positions were occupied by pro - English politicians: Farman Farma was appointed to the post of Minister of War, and Mohber od-Doule was appointed to the post of Minister of the Interior, whom the British envoy Durand called "best friends in Persia" [Kazemzadeh, 1968, p. 302 - 303].

Mosaffar ed-Din Shah also appointed an Anglophile, Amin od-Doule, as Prime Minister. To correct the increasingly deteriorating economic situation of the country, the new prime minister began to implement a number of reforms, which immediately did not appeal to the former allies in the opposition - the palace clique, as well as some ulema [Kermani, 1376, p.129].

According to the report of the Russian envoy, once at the head of the military department, "Farman Pharma tried to seize unlimited power over the Shah with the help of a cabal of "Tavrizians" and eliminate those of his colleagues who could interfere with his activities " [AVPRI, l. 45-45ob.]. Like his predecessor, Farman Pharma fought for the establishment of strict control on the part of the Ministry of War over the brigade and its Russian commander, as well as over its budget [Farmayan, 1983, p. 346]. According to Kosogovsky, Farman Pharma cut the brigade's budget, and also tried to reduce its personnel stationed in Tehran in various ways [Kosogovsky, 1960, p. 132]. However, as further events showed, all his attempts to establish control over the brigade were in vain.

Meanwhile, the Russian envoy, E. K. Byutsov, cleverly took advantage of the favorable situation created at that time to resolve the urgent issue of determining a permanent source of funding for the brigade. As it turns out from the report of January 23, 1897 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the envoy set an indispensable condition for the Iranian prime minister: to continue the activities of Russian instructors, open a loan for the annual estimated expenses of the Cossack brigade in one of the European banks [AVPRI, l. 30-30ob.].

In the context of the difficult financial situation in Iran, when abuses in the military department of Farman Pharma began to take on unthinkable proportions, 12 the authorities realized that in the event of a social explosion, they could not count on the help of a completely disorganized "regular" army [AVPRI, l.46, pp. 139-140]. The brigade was the only combat-ready unit that the Shah could rely on. It is no accident that after Farman Farma13, "distinguished by his English sympathies", was dismissed from the post of Minister of War in September 1897 at the insistence of the first Minister, Amin od-Doule, Mozaffar ed-Din Shah took over the main "leadership of the military department of Persia" [AWPRI, l. 140]. In this regard, S. Lomnitsky stated: "The Cossack brigade is directly subordinate to the Shah, and no military authorities, not even excluding the Minister of War, have the right to interfere in the affairs of the command or in its internal regulations" [Lomnitsky, 1902, p.151].

The unusually increased influence of Kosogovsky at the shah's court often forced the nobles and the government to turn a blind eye to many of the brigade commander's antics, even when he openly interfered in the internal affairs of the country. It is known, for example, what position Kosogovsky took in relation to Amin os-Soltan, who was dismissed from office and exiled to Qom. Kosogovsky took the disgraced prime minister under his protection [Amin od-Doule, 1341, p. 229], assigning him a guard of Cossacks disguised in civilian clothes. Colonel Kosogovsky refused the demands of the Shah's government to abandon the unauthorized protection of Amin os-Soltan.

12 According to Colonel Kosogovsky, Farman Farma's hands were pretty hot as a result of the infantry camp he organized near Tehran in the summer of 1897. As it turned out, 9/10 of the 100 thousand tumans released by the Shah "were brazenly stolen and sold out, and the lion's share fell to Farman Pharma. The Shah was outraged that Farman-Farma had deceived him on the expense account, assuring him that the entire camp would cost no more than 5-6000 tumans. " See: [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 48, l. 23ob.]

13 In mid-1897, Amin od-Douleh was appointed to the post of Prime Minister, but on June 5, 1898, he relinquished it. See [Farmayan, 1983, p. 349].

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During what Kosogovsky called "two weary years," the Cossack detachment guarded Ali Asghar Khan until Mozaffar ed-Din Shah pardoned him and returned him from Qom to Tehran on June 30, 1898. Already on July 30, Amin os-Soltan was again granted the position of the first official of the state [Persia..., 1923, p. 448], which, according to the British envoy Sir Durand, Amin os-Soltan was obliged to the Russian envoy Byutsov [BD, 1985, p. 143-144].

Meanwhile, events in Tehran were developing in such a way that, thanks to speculation in the grain market, which was widely engaged in both ministers and landowners, the capital was in danger of starvation. The poorest strata of the population, as well as soldiers of the so-called regular army, began to express open dissatisfaction with their situation. The treasury was so empty that Mozaffar ed-Din Shah could not afford to travel even on a normal summer trip around the country.14
Given the worsening domestic political and socio-economic situation in Iran, Colonel Kosogovsky could hardly count on financial support from the authorities. In his diary, he wrote the following: "And our Russian cause, apparently, was collapsing, dying. And it would have perished inevitably if help had not come from a direction from which no one expected it in any way " [Persia..., 1923, p. 449]. It came from the direction of Amin os-Soltan. According to Kosogovsky: "Sadr Azam, with his bright mind, realized that the Cossacks under my command were his only support, and for the sake of common interests, while preserving his own skin, he thereby played into the hands of the Russian cause and, despite the inaction of Russian representatives, the intrigues of "crafty courtiers", the intrigues of the Austrians and, in particular, the Germans, etc. the British, corrected and returned to the Russians what the Russians themselves had spoiled and missed out of their hands" [Persia..., 1923, p. 449].

Filled with gratitude for the support provided to him, Amin os-Soltan did not remain in debt. On his advice, on March 1, 1899, the Shah ordered Kosogovsky to increase the size of the brigade by a thousand people, which was completed as soon as possible. Already "on April 10," as the new Russian envoy, secret adviser Argyropulo, reported, "the Shah reviewed the troops, and the Persian Cossack brigade with its artillery appeared as part of more than a thousand people on horseback and on foot" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 9].

Recognizing the merits of Kosogovsky in strengthening the brigade, the Minister of War A. N. Kuropatkin gave the following instruction to the General Staff: "It is necessary to encourage the service of Colonel Kosogovsky with some sign of attention. Please figure out what exactly. Kuropatkin" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 8ob. - 10]. It should be assumed that this encouragement was the assignment of the rank of Major General to Colonel Kosogovsky in 1900 [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 73]. According to the report of the British envoy Cecile Springrais to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Salisbury dated August 23, 1900, Colonel Kosogovsky attributed his promotion to the influence of Amin os-Soltan in St. Petersburg [Iran..., 1997, p. 649].

Less than five months after the last review, on August 31, 1899, V. A. Kosogovsky presented 1,500 combat Cossacks to the shah for a new review. As expected, the reinforcement of the brigade did not please the British diplomatic mission. "The English envoy," wrote S. Lomnitsky, " did not attend the review, saying that he was not well. This malady is of a special nature - "febris russica", which torments all Englishmen and most strongly affects the English embassy in Tehran. A Russian general commanding a Cossack brigade in Teheran is a thorn in the side of the British ambassador" (Lomnitsky, 1902, p. 150).

Later, in one of his reports, Colonel Lyakhov emphasized Kosogovsky's contribution to tripling the size of the brigade's budget and expanding it

14 To do this, he had to turn to the services of the Russian Accounting and Loan Bank [Iran Political Diaries, 1997, p. 578].

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He wrote: "General Kosogovsky, having accepted from his predecessor 620 horsemen and a budget of 82,000 tumans, 15 during the 9-year command, brought the brigade's staff to 1,500 people with a budget of 229,000 tumans That is, it increased the staff of the unit by two and a half times, and its budget by three times" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. I, d. 6949, l. 142]. The increase in the brigade's budget for the first time allowed Kosogovsky to replenish the brigade with an infantry unit consisting of 480 foot Cossacks.16 According to the report of the Argyropoulo envoy, a further increase in the brigade was planned: "Sadrazam," the envoy wrote, "has for some time been fond of the idea of increasing the number of brigades at all costs, in order to increase the prestige of power, both in the capital and in the province" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 9ob.]. In turn, the Shah ordered the prime minister to ask the Russian envoy to testify to the emperor "his highest approval of the excellent service of the colonel", which he ordered to bring verbally to the attention of the emperor himself [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 25].

Meanwhile, popular discontent was growing in Tehran due to the artificial high cost of bread, arranged by the Iranian government itself and supported by the" main mullahs " [Iran..., 1997, vol. 1, p. 641]. Fearing grain riots in the capital, the authorities intended to use the Persian Cossack Brigade to suppress them. However, Colonel Kosogovsky flatly refused to participate in punitive operations [Iran..., 1997, p. 640].

The increased prestige of the Persian Cossack Brigade is evidenced by the fact that all the governors who received appointments in the province applied to the government for the provision of Cossacks as a convoy and protection at their disposal. Even the ruler of the distant province of Arabistan, Prince Ain od-Doule, had 50 Cossacks at his disposal. At the same time, it should be noted that the head of the brigade himself chose officers and Cossacks for such business trips [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d.279, l. 9-10]. It is noteworthy that the Russian envoy considered the practice of seconding officers and combatant Cossacks to different provinces very useful. He believed that "the service of the Cossacks, even Persian Ones, in such remote regions of Persia will have a good impact in that it will acquaint their semi-savage populations with the Russian name, and, in part, with the Russian order" [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d.279, l. 9-10].

Special attention should be paid to this aspect of the activities of the Persian Cossack Brigade, such as the collection of agent information. So, according to the certificate compiled by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the situation of Russian officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade, its commander was required to regularly deliver military intelligence information. For this purpose, he received 1,500 rubles a year from the amount released by the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District for intelligence [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. I, d. 6949, l. 203]. Consequently, the Russian commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade also served as a military agent in Iran.17 Depending on the tasks assigned to him, Kosogovsky personally chose officers, and also recruited combat soldiers for business trips in the provinces, and he took special care about the proper distribution of maintenance to business travelers [RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d.279, l. 10]. While on business trips, the brigade's Iranian officers often collected strategic military materials for their Russian commander, who regularly sent them to the headquarters of the Caucasus Military District

15 It should be noted that the brigade budget, for example, for March 1882 - March 1883 was 66,536 tumans (Teymuri and Tehran, 1332, p. 310).

16 The brigade commander intended, following the decline in prices for grain and fodder, to re-form the infantry part of the brigade into a cavalry one in the future. See: [BD, 1985, vol. 1, p. 226].

17 According to one archival source, unlike the British mission, the Russian diplomatic mission in Tehran did not have an official military agent, but its functions were performed by the Head of training of the Persian cavalry, i.e. the commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, subordinate to the Caucasian Military District [Archive of the Institute of Manuscripts of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, f. 39, d. 27, l, 75].

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[RGVIA, f. 76, on. 1, d. 188, 192, 202, 267, 374; f. 400, op. 4, d. 279]. According to an English diplomatic source, business trips to remote provinces were also cleverly used by the brigade commander to remove "doubtful persons" from the capital [Iran..., 1997, vol. 1, p. 649].

Russian loans of 1900 and 1902 played a huge role in strengthening the positions of the Persian Cossack Brigade. First loan in the amount of 22.5 million rubles. it was issued to the Iranian side on the security of revenues from its northern customs offices, provided that in the future it receives a loan only from Russia. A year later, the Shah's government received a second loan from Russia in the amount of 10 million rubles. As a result, Iran was completely financially dependent on tsarist Russia. Thanks to these two Russian loans, the Persian Cossack Brigade was financed by the" Russian Accounting and Loan Bank", which directly received revenues from the northern customs offices. It is possible that the secret agreement on the first loan may have stipulated the terms of financing the brigade.

It will not be superfluous to note that the budget and regulations of the brigade were developed during the same period. According to this charter, from now on the brigade commander was directly subordinate to the Shah [Pavlovich, Iransky, 1925, p. 85-86; Kayem Makami, 1326 gh, p. 94]. Thus, the Persian Cossack Brigade gradually turned into the Shah's Guard, which even more closely linked its fate with the Qajar monarchy.

Meanwhile, Russian loans, as well as the conclusion of the Persian-Russian customs convention in 1901, which infringed on the trade interests of England, caused open discontent on the part of the British [Sonnenstral-Piskorsky, 1931, p.185]. Simultaneously with these events in the south of Iran, in particular in Isfahan and Shiraz, representatives of the clergy (mullahs and seyids) began to speak out against the expansion of Russian influence and talk about" Persia sold to Russia " [Iran..., 1997, vol. 1, p. 662]. It should be noted that dissatisfaction with Russia's policy in Iran was widely used by British diplomacy to achieve its goals. According to the American researcher Firuz Kazemzadeh, "step by step, a secret alliance was formed between the British mission and the clerical leadership in Tehran, Isfahan and everywhere else" [Kazemzadeh, 1968, p. 396]. There is no doubt that, given the huge influence of the Shiite clergy on the daily life of Iranians, the British have made a bet on it. It will not be superfluous to add that the British also skillfully used the religious factor in the struggle against the Persian Cossack Brigade during the Constitutional Movement in Iran (1905-1911) [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 6949, l. 1]. Against the background of general discontent that engulfed Iran, another voyage of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah and Amin os-Soltan to Europe in the summer of 1902 so aggravated the internal political situation in the country that the clergy began to openly speak out against the latter's return to Iran [Iran..., vol. 2, 1997, p. 75].

In September 1903, under pressure from the opposition, Amin os-Soltan was forced to resign. "By and large," the British mission reported, "the country considers his fall a victory for British diplomacy" [Iran..., vol. 2, 1997, p. 201].

Indeed, the fall of Atabeg Amin os-Soltan was a very sensitive blow for Russian policy in Iran, the consequences of which were reflected in the Persian Cossack Brigade. After coming to power, the new Prime Minister, Ayn od-Doule, first of all changed the status of the brigade commander, subordinating him again to the Minister of War - Wajihullah Mirza. Along with the change in the status of the brigade commander, the size of the brigade also changed. Nevertheless, according to Colonel Lyakhov, Kosogovsky nevertheless strengthened the position of the brigade, "which in his time became the closest protection for the Shah in Tehran and supported his power throughout Persia" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 6949, l. 142ob.].

We can only assume that the excessive growth of the brigade commander's influence once again raised the question of the commander's control over the Russian envoy.

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On this basis, a conflict arose between the envoy Argiropulo and General Kosogovsky, as a result of which the brigade commander was first recalled, and then, at the insistence of the Russian Minister of War, Adjutant General Vannovsky, and the envoy himself [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.6949, l. 204]. In March 1903, General Kosogovsky was replaced by Colonel Chernozubov [Iran..., vol. 2, 1997, p. 204]. The years of Chernozubov's command coincided with the beginning of mass fermentation in Iran, which directly affected the future fate of the Persian Cossack Brigade.

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