Dear editors,

In Issue 2 of the magazine for 2008, the article by E. Yu.Sergeev "The diplomatic revolution of 1907 in relations between Russia and Great Britain"drew attention to itself. The article, while informative and useful in itself, contains a number of inaccuracies and controversial points that call into question both the concept and the author's conclusions. The positive assessment, especially the idealization of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 and Russia's entry into the Entente, raises serious doubts.

1. The second Eastern question. It is more logical to consider the problems raised in the article in the context of the Second Eastern Question - a direct continuation of the First one. The concept of the Second Eastern Question was introduced by the leading geopolitician of Russia in the first half of the 20th century, Lieutenant General of the General Staff Service A. E. Snesarev , a military Orientalist, intelligence officer, commander, hero of the 1st World War. It is to him that we owe detailed and truthful assessments of both the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 and the price paid by Russia for participating in the Entente and for saving it during the World War [Snesarev, 1908; Snesarev, 1926].

If the First Eastern Question meant the struggle of the great powers of the XIX century for the Middle Eastern approaches to India-the pearl of the British Empire, then the Second implies the struggle for the Middle Eastern approaches to it, namely Iran and Afghanistan [Snesarev, 2002, pp. 25-27]. London saw the annexation of Central Asia to Russia as an aggressive advance of the Russian Empire to the Hindustan borders. The British authorities began to take proactive measures long before the annexation of Central Asia actually took place. There are many examples of this.

The Entente of 1907 was a continuation of the Franco-Russian 1890 and Anglo-French 1902 alliances; in this context, it was very difficult for Russia to avoid its conclusion. Difficult, but still possible. Russia, as a first-class great Power, was capable of neutrality, devaluing any Entente-type bloc. "A strong neutral state is independent in its policy," emphasizes Gen. A. G. Elchaninov [Elchaninov, 1912, p. 37]. (In recent times, this truth has been repeatedly proven by China's foreign policy.)

1904 was indeed "unfavorable" for the Anglo-Russian negotiations on the union. To prevent the entry of England into the war on the side of Japan, Russian intelligence had to conduct a special operation, which made the British fear for the fate of India. The operation was most likely carried out by Captain A. E. Snesarev ( later a general and hero of World War I), an intelligence officer of the Turkestan Military District (see [Zotov, 2001, p. 155]). It was he (later I. M. Reisner's teacher at the Red Army Military Academy) who in 1907 was the first to speak out against the slyly dangerous "agreement" with England-an opponent, not an ally, whose hands the agreement untied, while Russia's hands were tied. As the chief of the General Staff Department, he had at his disposal a memorandum obtained by intelligence from British General Charles MacGregor with the original plan of the 1st World War (the main enemy is Russia, Germany is an ally) [McGregor, 1891; Snesarev, 2002, p. 214]. Realizing the impracticability of the MacGregor plan, England made an ingeniously simple move: an alliance with the enemy (Russia) and a war with a future ally (Germany). A calculation was made for the exhaustion of Russia in the war and its enslavement to war debts with subsequent division (like China). These calculations were exposed by the general's group headed by Snesarev (in the collection "Who is the debtor? " Moscow, 1926).

Adequate assessment of the collection " Who is the debtor?" it is hardly feasible outside the context of the entire century preceding World War I, when the main global contradictions - the prerequisites of both world wars-were maturing. In them, Russia was not really equal

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She was an ally of the Western Powers; she was both their ally and their enemy. The topic of Russia's debts to Western creditors is overgrown with myths and conjectures, and their financial claims are rooted not so much in economic ties as in the geopolitical contradictions of modern and contemporary history.

Local wars are present in the cycles of global conflicts as an integral part of them. The 1st Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 takes its place in the deployment cycle of the 1st World War, three companies of the 2nd Russo-Japanese-1938 (Khasan), 1939 (Khalkhin-Gol) and 1945. (Manchuria) - within the cycle of the 2nd World War. For a long time, one cardinal mistake was made in assessing the causes, course and outcome, and the very nature of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905: it was taken as a purely local conflict (as it was externally), outside the context of global geopolitics. In fact, it was not a Russo-Japanese conflict: all the great powers participated in it in one way or another - solving their global problems, not local colonial ones. Russia and Japan were not the main pair of actors here; Japan was not the main opponent of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war at all, just as Germany was the main opponent of Russia in the 1st and 2nd World Wars.

For the same reason, it is necessary to consider the problems of Russia - Entente relations in the 60-year context of the maturation and development of two world wars-from the Second Afghan War to the Anglo-French disaster in Dunkirk (1880-1940), from the British plan gen. McGregor until the end of World War II and the full deployment of the Cold War (1889-1949).

Even the Romans realized that sub nominee pacis bellum latet (under the guise of peace lies war). It's about the underlying (and long-standing) causes and goals of the war. The cause of world wars is not only the centuries-old great power of Russia or the fact that it is twice as rich as any of the major great powers. Much more important, Russia-the only great Power in modern and contemporary history-has never been completely conquered. On the contrary, Germany has long been fragmented and subordinated to its neighbors. France-defeated and occupied in 1940; England, having lost its colonial empire, can even be considered defeated in the Second World War. As for the United States, it was only two centuries ago that they emerged from the British "diapers", then they were saved on an isolated continent. Japan and China were occupied (see Lukyanovich, 2003, p. 242).

Rival powers never forgive anyone for such historical advantages as Russia's.

2. The Union of sworn friends. Until now, the fact that the world wars of the twentieth century were directed against Russia has escaped attention, although for obvious reasons, attention was not focused on this. The First World War began to be prepared (which is confirmed by the British plan of the Quartermaster General of the British troops in India, Charles MacGregor) [MacGregor, 1891, Part 1, pp. 146, 161-164] after the defeat of the Afghan clients of England in Kushka (1884). In other words, the Eastern Question and the Big Game in India were discussed in the following sections. Central Asia began to take on a global scale and accelerated the formation of the prerequisites for World War II. H McGregor offers, based on an Alliance with Germany, Austria and Turkey, to bind Russia and France in Europe, and in Asia in cooperation with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China to achieve "the dismemberment of the Russian Empire". All these measures are supposed to be implemented by Charles MacGregor "without declaring war, whether they are carried out secretly or publicly" [ibid., p. 167, p. 210-221]. Anticipating, however, that this kind of war is an excessively risky business and that the absence of at least one member of the anti-Russian alliance will make the balance of power unfavorable for England, MacGregor foresees the possibility (and even the necessity)of a war of this kind. "to reach any agreement with Russia "(literally: "entente"). However, he does not see the possibility of achieving such an "agreement" with Russia by purely diplomatic measures: it is necessary, he believes, "to shake Russia to a serious extent" [ibid., part 2, p. 98, 101 - 105, 108, 109, 113 - 115].

Then Russia was drawn into the Entente, made a "dray horse" of the 1st World War and planned its dismemberment according to the terms of the Versailles Peace (the intervention of 1919-1920 took place in the channel of Versailles).

3. The weighty word of A. E. Snesarev. It was A. E. Snesarev who in 1907 opposed Russia's annexation to the Entente [Snesarev, 1908], and after the end of the World War, exposed the latter's financial claims to Russia as an alleged "debtor" (the true debtor was the Entente itself, saved by the self - sacrifice of the Russian army). A. E. Snesarev asks the question in advance of the war: "What will we get from England in return for our huge sacrifice? ... As you can guess from the English newspapers, we will be content with a smile." And then

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warns you: "Europe is smart: it will always be able to come up with a thick blindfold for us that will make us blind... Russia adheres to the policy of endless thanksgiving and constant concessions... At present, the conductor of Europe is England, while the rest - like France and our Russia - are in tow" [Snesarev, 1908; Snesarev, 1926; Snesarev, 2003; pp. 113, 122-123, 125]. In words, the British are friendly, Snesarev clarifies, but as soon as we talk about business, they become just as sincerely hostile to the Russian allies and their legitimate interests.

It is simply unthinkable to talk about any "freedom of action" of Russia after the conclusion of the Entente treaty. A similar state of affairs (in many ways similar to the post-perestroika) gen. Snesarev considers it dangerous and unacceptable.

4. Pseudo-allies and pseudo-opponents. The Entente was created to make pseudocounts Russia, and Germany - pseudopotential; in the Versailles of 1919, Russia was divided into spheres of influence as a "European China" (the China was divided in the nineteenth century). Then England and the United States arming Germany against the Soviet Union. Defeated at Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor, the West recognized the USSR... again, a pseudo-ally. It is not surprising that after 1945, the United States fought the second part of World War 2 with nuclear weapons, but after Vietnam they were forced to move on to the first part - now World War 3.

The process and qualitative evolution of the two world wars allow us to identify the characteristic features of the third. World War 1 was a territorial-resource war, and World War 2 was an energy-mobile war. The Third World War, which began in 1975, was immediately defined as an unusual, political, informational and psychological one. Modern speculations about Russia's "debts" are an integral part of psychological influence in the hope of political dividends of war (the essence of the basic law of strategy), nothing more.

It is incorrect to assume that the entire military leadership of Russia in 1907 supported Russia's entry into the Entente. Supported by the General Staff-the high adjutant service, which is not very competent in geopolitics. The Main Directorate of the General Staff-represented by the Chief of the General Staff General F. Palitsyn, even more specifically-the "part" of the 3rd Chief of Quartermaster (armed forces of the states of the East) and, finally, the head of the Central Asian (Central and South Asia) office, Lieutenant Colonel Snesarev-opposed it.

The fundamental and essential difference between the Main and General Staffs was also embodied in the symbolic details of the officer's uniform. Officers of the General Staff (including adjutant departments-office management of military staffs) and the General Staff could not be confused even on the street: the Main Staff was assigned red bands, buttonholes and "gaps" on silver shoulder straps, the General Staff-black (aiguillettes, "immortalized" by K. Prutkov, they also had a completely different pattern). In other words, the two Headquarters were separated organizationally, functionally, and even "formally", heraldically. (Being in the system of the General Staff of the Asian part of the Turkestan military Administration does not change anything here.)

References to the General Staff's expert assessment of the Eastern question are no more correct than to ...assistant to the Head of the Foreign Ministry Chancellery N. Bazili - without any understanding of his (a) range of official duties and (b) real level of geopolitical competence.

5. The great strategic dash. Gen. K. Clausewitz wrote not for nothing that in strategy reality does not put an end to it, but stretches out the dash. The Eastern question refers to this kind of "dash". The question of approaches to rising China is the Third Eastern question in a row. If the Great Game of the nineteenth century was a struggle between the Russian and British empires for the center of Asia, now it is a struggle in the Russia-China-USA triangle for the same object.

The participants of the Big Game have changed, but the Game continues on an expanded scale of the struggle for the Greater Middle East (See: [Drozdov and Markin, 2007, p. 83-85; Drozdov, 2008, p.10].

6. Conclusions for modern Russia.

1) "Joining European democracy" is rather a means of manipulating Russian Westerners.

2) The Entente, in principle, could not prevent a world war, since it was created for its conduct.

3) Neither" entante "nor" detante" did Russia any good: the "partners" invariably held it for "enfant"; A. E. Snesarev defines Russia's diplomacy at that time as "gullibility"and" political unreason".

4) He also defines the 1907 agreement as a "bad peace" and not at all as an entente cordiale.

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5) Idealizing the 1907 agreement is inappropriate and reckless in the light of the recent geopolitical situation.

Senior Researcher of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences O. V. ZOTOV

list of literature

Drozdov Yu. I. Geopoliticheskie shakhmaty [Geopolitical chess]. 5 Dec. 2007.

Drozdov Yu. I., Markin A. G. The Impudent Eagle-2007 (intelligence and war in the US system). Moscow, 2007.

Elchaninov A. G. Strategiya [Strategy], St. Petersburg, 1912.
Zotov O. V. The Great Theory of the Impossible (A.V. Suvorov, M. I. Dragomirov and A. E. Snesarev on the possibilities and criteria of higher strategy). / Dragomirov Mikhail Ivanovich: warrior, scientist, teacher, military-political figure, Moscow, Military Academy of the General Staff, 2001.

Lukyanovich N. P. Geopolitical position of Russia in the XX century. Moscow, 2003.

MacGregor Ch. Defense of India / / Collection of geographical, topographical and statistical materials on Asia. Issue 43, St. Petersburg, 1891.

MacGregor Ch. Defense of India / / Collection of materials on Asia. Issues 43-44. St. Petersburg, 1891.

Snesarev A. E. Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 St. Petersburg, 1908; Snesarev A. E. Post-war calculations of the Entente powers // Who is the debtor? Moscow, 1926.

Snesarev A. E. Afghanistan, Moscow, 2002.
Snesarev A. E. Afghan Lessons, Moscow, 2003.

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