The Great October Socialist Revolution on the Southwestern and Romanian fronts took place in a difficult situation. Far removed from the centers of the revolutionary struggle in Petrograd and Moscow, these two fronts were politically backward in comparison with the Northern and Western fronts.

The Northern Front, which was closest to Petrograd, the center of the armed uprising in October 1917, learned of the latter on the morning of October 25. Of the three armies (I, V, and XII) that were part of the Northern Front, the XII Army was in the immediate vicinity of Petrograd. It consisted of two brigades of Latvian riflemen, Bolshevik-minded.

At the congress of Latvian Riflemen, which opened on October 20 and was attended by a representative of the Bolshevik Central Committee, it was decided to prepare for an armed struggle for Soviet power. The Congress created a military revolutionary committee headed by Comrade S. M. Nakhimson1 .

The Military Revolutionary Committee was located in Wenden. Having learned of the uprising in Petrograd and relying on the military organization of the Bolsheviks, he declared himself the authority of the entire XII Army. Measures were immediately taken to ensure that no reinforcements could be sent from the front to the Provisional Government; the most important railway and postal and telegraph stations were occupied by the troops of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and the enemy's path to Petrograd was cut off.

Against the Bolsheviks of the XII army, the command of the latter, led by the commander General Yuzefovich (later, during the Civil War, an associate of General Denikin), and in alliance with the army committee, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary Kuchin, took up arms. The Army Committee (Iskosol), in order to delay time, started negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and then created the "committee for the salvation of the motherland and the revolution", which became the mainstay of all the counter-revolutionary forces of the XII Army. However, the compromisers of the "salvation committee" failed to lead the mass of soldiers in the army. After a short struggle in mid-November, the Bolsheviks at the army Congress, having the overwhelming majority of delegates, became the head of the army committee.

The Provisional Government was also unable to get help from the First Army, which occupied the center of the Northern Front. Although the army committee of the First Army showed considerable hesitation in the October days (its majority was left-SR), nevertheless, under pressure from the Bolsheviks and the mass of soldiers who followed them, it immediately declared that it would not provide any assistance to the Provisional Government. On October 20, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front, General Lukirsky, reported on

1 Tov. Nakhimson died in 1918 in Yaroslavl during a counter-revolutionary uprising raised by the SRS.

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direct wire to General Dukhonin at Headquarters: "The I and V armies have declared that they will not follow the government, but will follow the Petrograd Soviet. I am informing you of the decision of the army committees." When the leaders of the compromisers, Avksentiev, Gotz, and others, sent a telegram to the troops asking for help to Kerensky and General Krasnov, who were advancing on revolutionary Petrograd, the Congress of the First Army, at which the Bolsheviks played the leading role, unanimously decided not to send a single soldier to help Kerensky.

One of the first to take the side of the Soviet government was the V Army. It occupied the left flank of the Northern Front, with its headquarters in Dvinsk. As soon as the Bolsheviks of the Fifth Army learned of the beginning of the October Uprising, a revolutionary committee was immediately formed there, which on October 26 informed the Petrograd Soviet of the readiness of the Fifth Army to send armed units to support the uprising.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Fifth Army, General V. G. Boldyrev (a future active participant in the counter-revolutionary organizations that fought with arms in their hands against the Soviet government) , and his chief of staff, General Popov, took all measures to comply with Kerensky's demand for the transfer of troops to his aid; on October 30, they ordered the dispatch of an armored car division to help Kerensky. The latter marched along the highway from Dvinsk to Rejitsa, and from there went by rail to help the counter-revolutionary troops advancing on Petrograd. The Army Committee formed a small detachment, which, led by one of the committee members, the Bolshevik Meren, was sent to Rezhitsa to detain the armored car division. In Rejica, Meren's detachment released the revolutionary soldiers who were sitting in the brig and, having armed them, delayed the departure of the armored division. The division team went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The armored vehicles were sent back to Dvinsk. Relying on the Bolshevik soldiers, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Fifth Army took power into its own hands.

In Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front and army establishments with a large number of officers were located, the situation was not entirely favorable for the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets. Although the Bolsheviks still had strong support from individual military units, the local soviet was still dominated by Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries at the beginning of the October Uprising.

Pskov was the most important railway station; the troops sent by Stavka to help Kerensky were to pass through it. Kerensky, who had escaped from Petrograd under the cover of an American flag, also arrived here. Although General Cheremisov, who commanded the front, could not give him any real help, since parts of the Pskov garrison and most parts of the front refused to support Kerensky, nevertheless the Menshevik commissar of the front, Voitinsky, tried to organize a struggle in Pskov against the victorious revolution. He organized the "committee for the salvation of the motherland and the revolution," accompanied Kerensky and Krasnov on the march to Petrograd, and tried to promote Cossack echelons in the direction of Petrograd.

The military revolutionary committee, which was organized in Pskov in the first days of the October Revolution, relying on Bolshevik-minded units, did not allow Voitinsky and others to use the troops of the Northern Front against revolutionary Petrograd. On November 3, General Cheremisov reported to General Dukhonin at Headquarters that

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The local Pskov garrison "is completely at the mercy of extreme revolutionary organizations and is in contact with the Military Revolutionary Committee of Petrograd."

Of the greatest importance to the victory of the Proletarian Revolution was its victorious march on the Western Front. This was the closest front to Moscow. There were three armies on the Western Front: III, X and II. The Second Army, which occupied the left flank of the Western Front, learned of the uprising on October 26. The Bolsheviks demanded that the army Committee immediately take power into its own hands. The Army committee refused. Then the Bolsheviks withdrew from its membership, dispersed to the army units, and began fighting for the immediate re-election of the committees in order to have a majority on their side. The Grenadier Corps was particularly revolutionary: the Corps Congress adopted a Bolshevik resolution of no confidence in the compromisers and support for the Soviet government. The congress of the corps took place on October 29 at the forward position, in a vast dugout-the staff club. A Bolshevik corps committee was elected, which took power in the corps into its own hands. During the congress, there was a strong battle between the Grenadier Corps and the Germans. All attacks of the latter were repulsed by the corps. The Bolshevik-minded soldiers knew that they were no longer defending the overthrown Provisional Government, but the power of the Soviets.

The other corps of the Second Army also re-elected their corps committees at their congresses. Military-revolutionary committees were formed, headed by the Bolsheviks, who took power into their own hands. On November 1, the army congress opened. He elected a military revolutionary committee and dismissed the commissar of the Provisional Government. The "salvation committee" created by the compromisers was declared a traitor to the motherland and the revolution.

The same events occurred in the X and III armies. Compromisers were removed from all the army committees, and the mass of soldiers placed the Bolsheviks at their head. The Bolshevik army military revolutionary committees imposed control over the orders of army commanders. If the army command tried to fight against the Bolshevik military revolutionary committees, the latter eliminated it. Thus, on November 18, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Third Army dismissed the army Commander, General Parsky, and his chief of Staff, General Lebedev, for refusing to start peace negotiations. The Bolshevik Second Lieutenant Anuchin, chairman of the Army Committee, was appointed commander of the army.

The headquarters of the Western Front was located in Minsk. On October 25, as soon as information about the uprising in Petrograd was received, the Minsk Soviet, by Order No. 1, announced the transfer of power into its hands. The soldiers arrested by the Kerensky government were released from the Minsk prison. They, together with the 37th Regiment and detachments of the Red Guard, formed the armed support of the Minsk Soviet. The next day the Bolshevik military Revolutionary Committee was organized, headed by Comrade A. Myasnikov. The commander of the Western Front, General Baluyev, and the Commissar of the Provisional Government on the Western Front, Zhdanov, relying on the compromisist front committee, tried to resist. They summoned Cossack units to Minsk. Thanks to this, the armed forces of the counter-revolution turned out to be more significant than the armed forces of the Minsk Council. To avoid defeat and gain time, the Bolsheviks decided to come to an agreement with the"committee for the salvation of the revolution". They sent their representatives there, otpra-

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Viv also sent representatives to the front at the same time, in order to summon revolutionary units from there to Minsk. The latter approached Minsk in a few days, and the preponderance of forces was on the side of the council. On November 2, the Minsk Soviet recalled its representatives from the "salvation committee" and created the military revolutionary committee of the Western Front and the region, and on the same day, in the evening, the Minsk Council on the report of com. Myasnikov decided to organize in the area of Soviet power.

Thus, on the Northern and Western Fronts, power passed into the hands of the Soviets in the very first days after the outbreak of the uprising in Petrograd.

This was not the case on the Southwestern and Rumanian fronts: here the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution, relying on the monarchist generals loyal to it, tried to create a springboard for the struggle against the proletarian revolution that had won in the center of the country. The course of the revolutionary struggle on the Southwestern and Rumanian fronts has brilliantly shown that even in the most backward parts of the front, the Bolsheviks were able to win back soldiers from the counter-revolution and lead them along.

After the July days, repressions were rampant in the armies of the Southwestern Front, and the death penalty was introduced. The Bolshevik press didn't get here. Kornilov, Savinkov, Filonenko, and others fought on the Southwestern Front. After the defeat in the October days, the defencists and compromisers rushed here from Petrograd. The two Roumanian armies and the Czechoslovak corps and Ukrainized units concentrated on the Southwestern and Roumanian fronts made it possible for the counter-revolutionary front command to somewhat delay the victorious march of the Great Proletarian Revolution, and when the October storm began to roar in the trenches of these fronts, it was already more difficult for it to scatter the strengthened nests of counter-revolution. The struggle for Soviet power here had to be waged not only against the generals and officers ' commanding staff, but also with the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Romanian authorities hostile to the Soviet government.

The Executive Committee of the South-Western Front, having received news of the events in Petrograd, decided to fight the Bolsheviks by all means and to side with the Menshevik-SR Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Provisional Government. He strenuously called on parts of the front to stand up against the Bolsheviks, against their "criminal and insane" uprising.

The committee's decision did not reflect the Bolshevik sentiments of the broad masses of soldiers. This is clearly indicated by the events that took place in the days of October in the nearest rear of the South - Western front-in Vinnytsia, in the 2nd Guards Corps. There was a strong Bolshevik organization in Vinnytsia. The local Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies was entirely on the side of the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were also followed by a large garrison. Events began to take shape even before the outbreak of the Petrograd uprising. Meetings and meetings were held in military units. The resolutions adopted called for the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets. In view of the "dangerous mood", the command ordered the most Bolshevized units, including the 15th Reserve Regiment, to be withdrawn to the front within three days. In response, the regiment approached the building of the Vinnytsia Council, and its delegates said that without the order of the council, the regiment would not go to the front and that it was ready to stand on the protection of the council. After the rally at the council building, the regiment returned to barracks 1 in good order .

1 "News of the Army Committee of the 8th Army" No. 170 of November 6, 1917.

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The performance of the 15th Regiment aroused sympathy in other parts of the garrison. Revkom was created. It was decided to delay the dispatch of the 15th regiment to the front and not to issue weapons without the knowledge of the Revolutionary Committee. The air squadron stationed in Vinnytsia also went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and, under the guise of training flights, decided to monitor the approaches to Vinnytsia. Commissar of the South-Western Front Jordansky, having received information about the performance of the 15th regiment on October 24, sent a detachment with armored cars to Vinnytsia under the leadership of his assistant Kostitsyn and Colonel Avramov. An attempt by Kostitsyn's detachment, which arrived in Vinnytsia on October 25, to remove weapons from the front-line warehouses located in Vinnytsia, was not successful. Kostitsyn was forced to enter into negotiations with the Revolutionary Committee and the Soviet. At a meeting of the Revolutionary committee and the executive committee of the Soviet, Kostitsyn suggested that the 15th Regiment should be immediately sent to the front, that weapons should be handed over from front-line depots, and that persons who "bring confusion to the troops"should be arrested. The issue was transferred to the plenum of the council, which almost unanimously (with 4 against) adopted the resolution proposed by the revkom on non-compliance with the requirements. Members of the Council demanded the immediate replacement of all the Provisional Government commissars in the city, the arrest of Kostitsyn and the disarmament of his detachment. Kostitsyn called for reinforcements, and on the same day cadets with armored cars and artillery were at his disposal. Having received a report that Kostitsyn had sent armored cars to the soviet building, and the cadets were preparing for action, the revkom ordered the military units to move out. Approaching armored cars with cadets opened fire on the council building. The battle began, which lasted for three whole days: October 27, 28 and 29.

Under the onslaught of rebel soldiers and revolutionary workers, who also had armored cars, the junkers retreated at first, but on the morning of October 29, having received reinforcements and opened artillery fire on the city, they launched an offensive from the railway station. The rebels built barricades, and the junkers did not stop smashing the city with artillery. The Vinnytsia garrison and the workers put up a stubborn resistance, but the junkers had a significant advantage. The revolutionary troops and workers were forced to retreat, and late on the night of October 29, they announced their desire to enter into negotiations. Kostitsyn, by direct wire, asked Jordansky for instructions, the latter replied that "since they shed fraternal blood, no one will negotiate with them, the rebels must surrender, of course." 1 After that, part of the rebel garrison dispersed to the surrounding area, some were disarmed. Individual detachments still offered stubborn resistance for some time, but they were also forced to lay down their weapons. The uprising was suppressed. An investigative commission was sent to Vinnytsia for reprisals and "restoring order". On October 30, representatives of the city council expressed their gratitude to Assistant Commissioner Kostitsyn "for the firmness and lack of hesitation that are so rare among representatives of the authorities in our time" .2

However, the Vinnytsia uprising greatly disturbed the Stavka: on October 29 and 30, General Dukhonin requested the headquarters of the South-Western Front via direct wire about the progress of suppressing the uprising.

The uprising of the Vinnytsia garrison found responses and support in other military units as well. The 2nd Guards Corps was stationed in the vicinity of Zhmerinka. Representatives of Vinnytsa rev-

1 "News of the Army Committee of the 8th Army" No. 170 of November 6, 1917.

2 Ibid.

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The Koma turned for help to the artillery brigade of this corps located closest to the city. At the meeting of the brigade, representatives of the revolutionary committee and the Vinnytsia non-party soldier spoke, who, after telling about the bombing of Vinnytsia by Kostitsyn's detachment, about the stubborn resistance of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, asked the brigade to help them cope with the enemy. The brigade expressed its full readiness to support the insurgent garrison of Vinnytsia. Immediately, at the same meeting, a troika was selected to organize the speech. The neighboring infantry regiment decided to march with the brigade.

Delegates of the Vinnytsia Revolutionary Committee went to other parts of the building. In some regiments, the delegates themselves had to assemble the soldiers, since the regimental committees, which were dominated by the SRS, declared that they would not allow any meetings or speeches of the regiment. But contrary to their wishes, meetings were held at which soldiers made combat decisions about immediate action to help the rebels. About one such meeting gives a vivid idea of the story of the participant:"...The audience looked around anxiously, and when, at the beginning of our report, a member of the regimental committee - an officer, a right SR - galloped up, the soldiers obligingly took his horse and held it by the bridle during our report and his speech... During the meeting, the mood of the audience changed dramatically: sarcastic remarks were made about those holding the horse's bridle, and the second speech of the socialist-revolutionary was met with obvious hostility... His speech was interrupted by angry laughter and shouts of "Get out of it, ""I've got it, ""That's enough," and at the moment when he left the podium and went to his horse, the retainers let the horse go, stretching it out with their whips, and amid loud hooting the lieutenant, confused and pale with rage, trudged silently after the galloping horse. a rider by a horse " 1 .

The next day, all parts of the corps were ready to move. Delegates from all parts of the corps gathered. The performance plan was discussed. We decided to perform in two directions: Vinnytsia - Zhmerinka, Kiev-Bars. A revkom was chosen to lead the speech. They appointed commissars. The next day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the corps moved according to the planned plan. Part of the corps ' command staff who refused to join the soldiers was arrested. The Kexholm regiment marched out with the entire command staff and the regimental commander at its head.

On the same day, an artillery brigade, the Kexholm and Volhynia regiments, entered with the banners "All power to the Soviets!"flying. and the orchestra in Zhmerinka. They occupied the railway station, changed the guards, stopped the movement of trains with the troops of the Provisional Government to Moscow and sent part of their units to Kiev, and the artillery to Vinnytsia. All this was done with the full support of the railway workers.

The performance of the 2nd Guards Corps was of great revolutionary significance, but it was too late and could not save the position of the rebellious garrison. The uprising in Vinnytsia was suppressed.

In the" Special Army", whose headquarters was located in the city of Rovno, on November 2, the executive committee, with the participation of representatives of the Congress of Ukrainians, the "Special Army" and the "Committee for saving the revolution of the city of Rovno", formed the " joint committee for the protection and salvation of the revo-

1 Proletarian Revolution No. 11 (23), 1923, p. 64.

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lucia". The latter began to act in agreement with the Ukrainian Central Rada. All political power in the area of the" Special Army " passed into the hands of the army commander and the "joint Committee for the Defense and Salvation of the Revolution". In its appeal, the committee announced that "there are no more Bolsheviks or Mensheviks, but only one united family of Russian democracy, a family that embraces both Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and socialist revolutionaries... there is no Jew, no Greek, no Ukrainian, no Cossack, no Pole, but only one sacred, fraternally united revolutionary democracy. " 1

In mid-November, on the initiative of the compromisers who headed the front-line organizations, an Emergency front-line Congress of the armies of the South-Western Front was scheduled to be convened; the hopes of the congress organizers that it would support the government being formed at Headquarters were not fulfilled. During the preparation of the congress, and then at the congress itself, this idea was overturned. All parts of the front handed their delegates clear instructions, from which it is clear that the majority of the soldiers were on the side of the proletarian revolution. 150 military units, 2 armies, 2 corps, 1 garrison and 1 division headquarters supported the power of the Soviets and the recognition of the Council of People's Commissars. For the united Socialist power-102 units, 3 corps, 1 division and 1 garrison. All the orders demanded the immediate transfer of all the land to the land committees, an immediate truce and the conclusion of peace. On November 11, the 55th Infantry Division decided to send a delegation to Petrograd, to the Council of People's Commissars, with greetings, instructions, and notification that peace negotiations had begun. A delegation of soldiers from the Southwestern Front visited Petrograd and made a report to the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The Military Revolutionary Committee decided to send representatives to the congress.

The Extraordinary front-line Congress of the armies of the Southwestern Front opened on November 18 in Berdichev. It was attended by about 700 delegates with a decisive vote, which included 267 Bolsheviks, 213 Social Revolutionaries, including about 50 Leftists, 47 Mensheviks and 73 Ukrainians. The remaining 100 delegates present at the congress used an advisory vote.

Attaching great importance to this congress, the SR center and Stavka sent their best forces to the congress. At the meeting of the Socialist-Revolutionary faction, even before the congress opened, Avksentiev, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had specially arrived, made a speech. Having caused a split by his speech in the faction and having met with the obvious lack of sympathy of a part of the Socialist-Revolutionary faction, he did not dare to appear and speak at the congress itself. Central Committee members Weinstein and Troyanovsky came from the Mensheviks to attend the congress.

The work of the congress began with local reports. These reports once again showed that the majority of the soldiers are on the side of the revolution that has taken place. Of the 25 speakers who delivered their instructions, 14 demanded the organization of Soviet power, while the remaining 11 supported the creation of a homogeneous socialist government responsible to the Central Election Commission and based on the platform of the decisions of the Second Congress. The overwhelming majority of the Congress voted for the re-election of the all-Army, front-line and army committees (18 mandates). An immediate truce was demanded by 16 punishs2 .

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 42 of November 7, 1917. Rumcherod is the Executive Committee of the Councils of the Romanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Odessa region.

2 Soldatskaya Pravda No. 93 of December 1, 1917.

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Many orders called for the trial of the organizers and leaders of the counter - revolution-Kornilov and Kerensky, the abolition of the home-based military government, and the disbanding of the shock battalions. A heated two-day debate took place over Rumcherod's telegram announcing the movement of the troops of the Commander-in-Chief, Comrade Stalin. Krylenko on Mogilev. In this telegram, Rumcherod called for all possible assistance and assistance to the all-Army committee, which is preparing to give an armed rebuff to the revolutionary troops. Despite the combined efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, they failed to win support for the all-Army committee at the Congress. The Congress recognized that the General Army committee did not respond to the sentiments of the broad masses of soldiers, and demanded that it immediately resign its powers. The Congress immediately selected representatives of the South-Western Front for the new All-Army Committee and invited all other front-line army and national army associations to choose their representatives for the new all-Army Committee. The Congress invited the Commander of the South-Western Front to immediately begin negotiations with representatives of the Central Ukrainian Rada and representatives of the Congress on an armistice between all the belligerent Powers along the entire front.

The issue of power was discussed for three days. Weinstein spoke on behalf of the Menshevik Central Committee. His speech was directed against the Bolsheviks, who, in his opinion, are leading Russia to the abyss by concluding a separate peace. Bulat spoke from the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose speech caused laughter throughout the hall. An irreconcilable struggle broke out at the Congress over the resolutions. Three of them were proposed: the first-from the bloc of Social revolutionaries with Mensheviks, the second - from the bloc of left Social revolutionaries, Ukrainians and non-Partisans, and the third-Bolshevik. The resolution of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc failed, and in order to prevent the adoption of the Bolshevik resolution, the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc supported the resolution of the left Social Revolutionaries and Ukrainians, which was adopted by the Congress. The Bolshevik faction categorically refused to participate in any further discussion of it. The left Social Revolutionaries were in the minority, and the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks succeeded in making several defensive amendments to it.

The vacillations of the left srs jeopardized the entire future work of the Congress. When the resolution on power was voted on, as amended by the Socialist-Revolutionary - Menshevik bloc, the latter was rejected by the votes of the Bolsheviks, the non-party members who joined them, and the authors themselves, the left Social Revolutionaries. Thus, it was impossible to agree on a common resolution. The Bolshevik faction left the Congress. It was followed by the left Social Revolutionaries and non-partisans. Many soldiers from the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc also left. The congress was threatened with disruption. On the following day, November 24, an agreement was reached between the factions to organize a provisional revolutionary committee and to convene a new front-line congress. In the evening of the same day, the Congress elected a military revolutionary committee, which was given all the highest power at the front. The military revolutionary committee consisted of 18 Bolsheviks, 9 right and 5 left SRS, 2 Mensheviks and 1 non-party 1 . The Ukrainian faction stated that it obeys only the orders of the Central Ukrainian Rada, and therefore refused to join the Military Revolutionary Committee.

November 26 signed by the chairman of the congress-elected military-

1 Soldatskaya Pravda No. 93 of December 1, 1917.

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The Revolutionary committee of the Bolshevik Razzhivin issued Order No. 1, in which it was declared that the highest authority in the country is the Council of People's Commissars, and the highest authority in the army is the supreme commander - in-Chief, Comrade. Krylenko. The order ordered the immediate release of all political prisoners and the termination of all cases on charges of agitating against the offensive and for non-compliance with military orders. At the same time, the military Revolutionary committee announced in this order that "any opposition or non-compliance with its orders and those of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will be considered as a crime against the revolution, and the perpetrators will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the laws of the revolution."1

Thus, the attempt of the counter-revolution to draw the South-Western Front into the struggle against the Soviet power failed. The October Revolution won, and all power in the front units passed to the corresponding electoral organizations.

On the eve of the Great Proletarian Revolution, the Romanian Front was in an extremely tense state. The mood of the soldiers of the Rumanian Front on the eve of the October events, like that of the soldiers of other fronts, is primarily characterized by an irrepressibly growing thirst for peace, for peace at all costs. Under the influence of this all-embracing thirst for peace, military discipline was increasingly declining and falling, which greatly worried Front Commissar Tiesenhausen.

In his reports to Stavka Commissar Stankevich, he anxiously reported that the confidence of the mass of soldiers in the command staff was falling, that discipline was sharply declining, and with it the combat capability of the soldiers, that combat orders were not being carried out and cases of desertion were becoming more frequent.

On October 23, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 38th Regiment of the 4th Siberian Corps refused to go to work, citing the lack of boots, poor nutrition and the presence of a large number of patients. The persuasions of the command staff and deputies did not lead to anything .2 In the IV army, three companies of the "death battalion "of the 8th Rifle Division decided at a general meeting to stop classes, as they were"sufficiently trained". This incident caused the personal intervention of the commander of Division 3 . Desertion took on threatening proportions. In a week on the Romanian front, according to the report of the assistant commissar of the front Sytin, 907 soldiers fled from the front4 . Reinforcements arriving from the rear were strongly opposed to the war and further increased the decomposition of front-line units.

Despite the relative weakness of the Bolshevik party organizations at the front, their influence among the soldiers grew uncontrollably. "Fighting these people is almost impossible," complains Front Commissar Tiesenhausen. "Enjoying the broad confidence of the masses, they remain invulnerable." 5 The command staff and the institute of commissars, which was entirely in the hands of the Social Revolutionaries, were exhausted in order to prevent the growth of Bolshevization of the soldiers. But it was all in vain. The Bolsheviks waged a successful struggle for the mastery of the mass of soldiers, which they stubbornly prepared for the upcoming battles for peace, for the overthrow of the bourgeois-Democratic state.-

1 Central Military Historical Archive (TSVIA), n 287-041, p. 77.

2 TSVIA, d. N 2075, l. 204-232.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., d. N 1957, l. 27.

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As a result of Bolshevik agitation, "Bolshevism has penetrated even the division headquarters teams," Sytin, the assistant commissar of the front, notes with horror in his report. Indignation grew in all parts of the front. Under the direct influence and leadership of the Bolsheviks, all these sentiments took the open form of a struggle for peace, for land, and for the overthrow of the Provisional Government.

However, the front-line, army, corps, and divisional committees still remained in the hands of the compromisers. Hand in hand with the command, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are fighting the growing influence of the Bolsheviks. But the mass of soldiers, becoming more and more imbued with the Bolshevik spirit, is waging an irreconcilable struggle with the compromising upper classes through their lower company committees. The activity of regimental and divisional committees provokes stubborn resistance from the soldiers. So, in the 196th regiment of the 49th Division, a meeting of the company and regimental committees, under the influence of Ensign Zhigur's agitation, issued a resolution to overthrow the Provisional Government. In the same regiment, fraternization took on such a large scale that the command used artillery to stop it. The commander of one fraternizing battalion was unexpectedly visited by a deputation of soldiers, who demanded an immediate cessation of firing and stated that "all the soldiers have joined the Bolsheviks and do not want to continue fighting." 1 The battalion commander refused to stop firing, and on the night of October 25, bombs were thrown into his dugout and the dugout of the chief of trench guns by "unknown persons". The attitude towards the top command staff was no better. General Brusilov's speech at the Moscow Conference on August 13, in which he called for organizing a struggle against the growing proletarian revolution and for a "strong government," aroused the strongest indignation in the front units and ordered his immediate arrest and trial.

In order to prevent the organization of counter-revolutionary forces, " the mass of soldiers demanded a military revolutionary trial of Kornilov and his associates. Assistant Commissar of the front Sytin in his report noted that the riots and the fact of the murder of the chief of the 7th Rifle Division, General Ziborov, in the 26th Rifle regiment caused direct sympathy of the soldiers, and that the 7th Uhlan regiment, called to establish order in this regiment, refused to take active actions against the openly rebellious soldier mass.

To influence the rebel regiments that refused to move to the front lines, "allies"were invited. An American ambassador arrived at the 283rd Regiment, calling on the soldiers "to work together with the allies in combat." In response to the remonstrances of the American ambassador, the soldiers declared their unwillingness to continue the war and demanded the conclusion of peace, at all costs. The response was accompanied, Sytin wrote in his report, by "extremely sharp attacks against the regimental commander and other superiors." 2

The remoteness of the front from Petrograd and Moscow deprived the mass of soldiers of direct connections with the centers of the revolutionary movement. The communications apparatus was in the hands of the command. The soldiers were kept away from events. Central newspapers, even such as Russkoe Slovo, rarely got to the front, getting stuck in the hands of the command staff. The front was fed on the meagre army "messengers", "bulletins", etc., which carefully concealed from the soldiers the events taking place in the country and on the fronts. The mass of soldiers fed on rumors. Ok-

1 TSVIA, d. N 2075, l. 204-237.

2 Ibid.

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By the end of October, the front-line units were increasingly turning to the Petrograd workers and the Soviet of Soldiers 'and Workers' Deputies as an organ of struggle against the bourgeois Provisional Government, for land and for peace. Having not yet received any news of the outbreak of the insurrection, on October 26 a joint meeting of all the regimental committees of the 32nd Division of the 4th Corps decided to send a telegram to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies with the following content: "The 32nd Division welcomes the true fighters for freedom, for land and peace, informs that in the event of If the government plans to stage a bloody massacre of the working people this time, then the entire armed forces of the 32nd Division are at the disposal of the Bolsheviks. Executive Committee of the 32nd Division " 1 . On the same day, the 165th Division of the same corps sent a telegram to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies, which leaves no doubt about the feelings of the mass of soldiers and their decision: "We, the representatives of the military organizations of the 165th Infantry Division, at a joint meeting of all regimental and company committees on October 26 of this year, decided to declare that we will not give any support to the bourgeois Provisional Government, which is clearly going against the wishes of the people, and that we will fully support that part of the revolutionary democracy which is striving for an early end to the predatory war. We send our warm greetings to the true defenders and champions of freedom, revolution and peace - the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. We declare that by force of bayonets we will support his desire and aspiration. Chairman of the divcom of the 165th division Danshin, secretary Kunoyenkov " 2 .

A significant role in the growing process of Bolshevization of the military units of the front was played by soldiers ' delegations returning from Petrograd, who revealed to the soldiers the true state of affairs and the significance of the events taking place.

As soon as the front headquarters in Iasi became aware of the outbreak of an armed uprising in Petrograd, a "military revolutionary committee" of the Rumanian Front was formed on the initiative of Front Commissar Tiesenhausen, together with the front department of Rumcherod and the front command staff. It consisted of front commissar Tizenhausen, his assistant Andrianov, from the front department of Rumcherod - Lordkipanidze I. N. and Hadji-Lazar A. N., right Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks-Veselkov, Manochinenkov F. G., Podlygach G. K. and Baranov P. I., from the front headquarters - Lieutenant Colonel Dubyaka. This "military revolutionary committee" was nothing more than a kind of counter-revolutionary "committee for the salvation of the motherland and the revolution" on the Romanian front. Under the guise of an external revolutionary uniform and the name "military revolutionary committee", the mere name of which became synonymous with the struggle against the Provisional Government for the mass of soldiers, this "military revolutionary committee", blessed by the generals and commanders of the front, began to save the front from revolution.

First of all, the "military revolutionary committee" of the Rumanian Front declared that all power at the front belonged to it, and proposed to immediately organize similar committees in the armies, corps, and divisions of the front, which would undertake to establish control over the telegraph in order to combat circulation

1 TSVIA, d. N 2075, l. 204-232.

2 Ibid.

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unwanted rumors and "contradictory" telegraph messages, "prevent unauthorized actions" and take decisive measures to suppress "all kinds of outrages and anarchies both at the front and in the rear." To this end, it was decided, with the assistance and recommendation of the army and party (of course, anti-Bolshevik) organizations, to form a "free revolutionary division of three kinds of weapons, made up of the most reliable and devoted people to the cause of the revolution." 1

Together with the creation of a punitive detachment, which, in essence, was to be the so-called "revolutionary division", the notorious "military revolutionary committee" also made an attempt to enlist the broad support of the soldiers ' masses, with the aim of which it was decided to convene an emergency front-line congress in the town of Romani, the location of the headquarters of the Fourth Army, on October 30. discussion of "current events" and the issue of the Constituent Assembly.

Special attention was paid to the formation of the "revolutionary division". On October 26, an urgent telegram is sent to all commanders and commissars of armies and corps, signed by the front commander-in-chief, the famous monarchist General Shcherbachev, the chairman and organizer of the "military revolutionary committee" of the front, Lordkipanidze, and secretary Manochinenkov, which refers to the formation of a "revolutionary division". The telegram leaves no doubt as to the true aims of the tsarist monarchist general, Socialist-Revolutionary, and Menshevik who have gathered together to "save the revolution." The order of formation was to ensure that the division was composed of the "most reliable and loyal" people to fight the revolution...

Each army corps was supposed to allocate one company of 250 people, and the selection of personnel of each company was directly carried out by the corps committee. Each company was assigned 2 machine guns, 10 trained grenade throwers with a supply of grenades, communication equipment-2 telephone sets and 2 versts of telephone cable 2 . The selected companies were reduced to separate battalions, with the attachment to each of them of a squadron of cavalry, a team of scouts, a platoon of sappers, etc., up to and including the baggage train of the 1st and 2nd categories. Individual battalions were reduced to a division, which, in addition, was to include a cavalry regiment, a horse-artillery division, an armored department and a railway company. According to a pre-planned plan, the battalions were concentrated by the evening of October 30 in the areas specifically indicated by them. This shock fist, in the opinion of the monarchist-Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders of the front, was to deal with all attempts at insurrection at the front and in the rear, and to prevent the front and support the insurrection in the proletarian centers of the country...

By recruiting a counter-revolutionary unit to deal with the revolution, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, together with the counter-revolutionary officers, decided to place it in a particularly privileged position. The order stated that " all ranks assigned to the formation of these battalions were maintained according to the positions they held at the front and according to the salaries established for combat units."3

Formation of the armored Fist of the Counterrevolution of Russia-

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 33 of October 27, 1917.

2 Central Archive of the October Revolution (CAOR), f. 357, d. N 12, l. 362.

3 CAOR, f. 347, d. N 12, l. 363.

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There was strong resistance from the mass of soldiers, who correctly understood the true meaning and purpose of the "revolutionary division". Under the influence of the resolute protests of the soldiers against the creation of a" revolutionary division", a number of army committees refused to participate in the formation of this division. So, for example, the army committee of the VI Army was forced to abandon the formation of a separate battalion for the combined division due to sharp discontent among the soldiers and fear of excesses.

A few days later, when the news of the victorious October Uprising had already become known, the mass of soldiers on the front came out even more sharply against the formation of a "revolutionary division." Expressing direct sympathy for the Bolsheviks, the masses vigorously protested against the preparation of a civil war front by the counter-revolutionary command. The Joint Meeting of the divisional and Regimental Committees of the 191st Infantry Division, after hearing the question "concerning the Bolshevik insurrection", adopted a resolution: "Considering as our slogan the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time, we nevertheless believe that an internecine war will lead to the collapse of the revolution. Therefore, if we accept the Bolshevik movement as an accomplished fact, we believe that it should not be suppressed by armed force... We are deeply convinced that the revolutionary division being formed will not be used for a fratricidal war, i.e., against the Petrograd Bolsheviks. " 1

The congress of peasants ' deputies of the Romanian Front, which was taking place in those days, representing millions of peasant soldiers, also strongly protested against the attempts being made to withdraw troops from the front to participate in the civil war against the rebellious workers and peasants. The Congress resolutely opposed the formation of a division on the Rumanian Front to be sent to Petrograd 2 .

According to the front Commissar Tiesenhausen, the dominant mood among the soldiers was the desire for peace, at all costs, on any terms. This mood manifested itself in all cases of the soldiers ' lives and became especially dangerous in connection with the Bolshevik action. Only a few days remained before the opening of the emergency front congress, scheduled for October 30, and all these days the counter-revolutionary leaders of the front tried to suppress the revolutionary mood of the soldiers.

In order to dash any hopes of peace among the soldiers, Tiesenhausen considered it necessary to publish a special decree of the Provisional Government on the inevitability of a winter campaign. "Only then, and only after the Constituent Assembly has dashed its hopes for an immediate conclusion of peace, is it possible to finally eliminate this mood and strengthen the combat power of the army." 3 This was the true counter-revolutionary program of action of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as a whole and its representatives in the army - to declare the need for a "democratic" peace and to continue the war, to continue "to the bitter end". The recipe for strengthening the combat power of the army, i.e., eliminating peaceful sentiments by a decree of the Provisional Government and a resolution of the Constituent Assembly on the need for further war, of course, was not openly expressed before the mass of soldiers, but found its expression in a secret report to Stavka Commissar Stankevich of October 29, 1917.

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 42 of November 7, 1917.

2 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 44 of November 9, 1917.

3 TSVIA, d. N 1957, l. 30.

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The Army Committee of the Fourth Army, headed by Commissar of the Army Sr. Alekseyevsky, adopted a resolution in October asking the Provisional Government and the Soviet of the Russian Republic to take the most decisive measures to eliminate anarchy in the rear and to mercilessly suppress all attempts to delay or discredit the Constituent Assembly. This resolution was entirely designed in the tone of " everything for war, everything for victory." It demanded that the soldiers stop "peddling, drunken revelry, and hiding in the rear under the hypocritical declaration" we are saving the revolution"; that the workers work harder for the defense of the country and the revolution; that the" peasant brothers " work harder for the grain supply; that the propertied classes work harder for money and active participation in the revolution. saving freedom and the country. The resolution proclaimed the slogan "Soldiers to the trenches, workers to the machines" .1

On October 31, the day of the opening of an emergency front-line congress in the town of Romani, which took place a week after the victorious uprising and the overthrow of the Provisional Government, after it was fully determined that the soldiers were not in the mood to support the Provisional Government, when it became clear that it would not be possible to call them to fight against the Bolsheviks, he expressed his attitude to the events that took place in the country. Along with condemning the insurrection, it stated that " (1) the insurrection must be liquidated, (2) arbitrary local power grabs must be stopped, and (3) the Provisional Government must be immediately replaced by a homogeneous democratic government."2

Rumcherod paid great attention to the Emergency front-line Congress: he was associated with hopes that the front, "voice from the trenches", would unconditionally support all measures against the "crazy Bolshevik action". "We are passing through a moment when we must act quickly and decisively," wrote the newspaper Izvestiya of Rumcherod's Front Department on the opening day of the congress, " but no action, however rapid, can take place if there is a danger that it may meet with condemnation among the masses themselves... if the actions that have been taken so far by the military revolutionary committee are approved by the Congress, if the voice of the Congress does not differ from that of the army organizations, then we can look with hope and confidence to the future and to all the harm that the Petrograd uprising has done to the country... it will decrease significantly. " 3

The fears of the compromisist leaders of the front to meet with a protest and struggle against their activities at the congress were fully justified.

By the beginning of the Congress, 145 delegates had gathered, including 80 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 40 united Social-Democrats - Mensheviks, and 25 Bolsheviks. The Congress was welcomed by the Commander of the Fourth Army, General Ragoza, the chairman of the Army Committee of the same army, an officer (SR), and Army Commissar Alekseyevsky. All three of them expressed in one voice that love for the motherland and freedom will bring the country to the Constituent Assembly, which will give its decisive word. SR Lordkipanidze was elected Chairman of the Congress. There were only two questions on the agenda: the first was the current moment

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 35 of October 29, 1917.

2 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 36 of October 31, 1917.

3 Ibid.

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and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and the second-the formation of the"revolutionary division".

Andrianov, a representative of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, assistant commissar of the Romanian Front and a member of the "military revolutionary committee", delivered the program speech at the congress. In this speech, he strenuously stressed that the Bolsheviks ' action was a challenge to all other parties, that the most decisive and merciless struggle was necessary against the Bolsheviks, that they must be isolated from the broad masses and destroyed. Concluding his speech with a call for a boycott of the Bolsheviks, Andrianov said that anyone " who joins them is liable to responsibility as for the gravest state crime. We, the socialist-revolutionaries, openly declare that we will not join them. " 1 Then Andrianov sharply opposed the slogan " All power to the Soviets!", because he understood that in the current conditions, the implementation of this slogan is tantamount to the transfer of power into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The demands of the Social Revolutionaries were as follows: 1) the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time, 2) a decisive struggle for peace, but without fraternization or armistice, 3) the transfer of land into the hands of land committees, 4) the abolition of the death penalty, 5) the abolition of revolutionary military trials at the front, and b) the implementation by the Government of the declarations announced earlier.

Andrianov, on behalf of his party, called on the Congress to protect all counter-revolutionary forces from the blows of the victorious proletarian revolution: "We cannot deal mercilessly with: ideological representatives of those trends who come out with weapons in defense of their ideas. Only history can judge them." It is not difficult to guess what people and ideas Andrianov was talking about. Trying in every possible way to preserve the head of the counter-revolution, its living forces, and weapons for these forces, the Social Revolutionaries openly fought for a bourgeois government. They even rejected the formula "homogeneous socialist government". "The government should not be uniformly socialist, but uniformly democratic," he said at the conclusion of his speech .2 This juxtaposition of a "uniformly democratic" government with a "uniformly socialist" government was undoubtedly intended to continue the policy of coalition with the bourgeoisie under the banner of uniting "democratic forces". A representative of the Bolsheviks who spoke at the congress pointed out the regularity and necessity of an uprising against the Provisional Government and stressed that "if the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik social-Democrats suppress this movement, they are in danger of being on the other side of the barricade, where the bourgeoisie is also located." Another delegate, a Bolshevik, spoke in the same spirit.

Reports from the field indicated that the mood of the soldiers ' masses was not in favor of the congress organizers. Even anti-Bolshevik speakers were forced to admit that the sympathy of the soldiers ' masses was on the side of the Bolsheviks.

A representative of the 3rd Turkestan Division, a doctor, a Menshevik, admit in your speech that the division is entirely Bolshevik and that, in the speaker's opinion, the Tsaritsyn reinforcements have broken it up. "The Petrograd Bolsheviks,"he said," had to choose a cultural method of struggle, but they chose pre - revolutionary methods. " 3 Osuj-

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 37 of November 1, 1917.

2 Ibid.

3 "News of the front department of Rumcherod" No. 38 of November 2, 1917.

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While giving the speech of the Bolsheviks, the speaker simultaneously admits that it is impossible to suppress this speech with the help of weapons. Another representative of the same division, Sinelnikov, remarked that the action in Petrograd was a struggle of the proletariat "for its rights, for liberation from the yoke of capital. The division will not provide any support to the Provisional Government."

The Chairman of the Congress, SR Lordkipanidze, said in his speech that the" honor "of the massacre of the rebellious proletariat should belong to the"socialists". "We must not," he said, " let go of the liquidation of the Bolshevik movement. We are not going to drown this movement in blood, but in order not to be crushed by the right, we must take measures to eliminate it ourselves. " 1

In the resolution adopted by the Congress, along with the item on the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly, with the demand for the construction of a uniformly democratic government, etc., on the question of the Bolshevik action, it was stated:: "The Front-Line Congress considers the Bolshevik action to be a revolutionary act, but untimely and unacceptable." 2 This formulation ran counter to the speeches of the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, who tried to convince everyone of the counter-revolutionary nature of the October Socialist Revolution, which they called "Bolshevik action."

The atmosphere of the congress was extremely tense. Disagreements over the composition of the military revolutionary committee became sharp and tense. It was proposed to organize a military revolutionary committee on a parity basis, so that the SRS, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks would each have 3 representatives. The Social Revolutionaries, seeking to preserve the military revolutionary committee as an organization of counter-revolutionary forces, and not wishing to lose the leadership of it from their own hands, proposed that 4 Social Revolutionaries and 4 social democrats should be elected to the committee - 2 representatives each from the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The proposal of the Social Revolutionaries caused a storm of indignation. The Bolshevik faction announced its immediate withdrawal from the Congress. A break was announced. At the joint factional meeting of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, it was decided that if the SRS did not withdraw their proposal, both factions would leave the congress and continue their work separately. Then the Social Revolutionaries tried to maneuver and proposed a new combination: they agreed to equal representation, but demanded 3 seats to be given to the Ukrainians, in the hope that it would be easy to get the same Social Revolutionaries from the Ukrainians to join the committee. However, the SRS ' calculations failed. Their proposal was accepted, but with the proviso that the Ukrainians should include one Bolshevik, one Socialist-Revolutionary, and one Menshevik .3

The question of a" revolutionary division "was resolved positively, and the" military revolutionary committee " was instructed to form one. After that, Lordkipanidze introduced an "amendment" to condemn the October Uprising. The Bolshevik faction declared that if the amendment was adopted, it would immediately leave the congress. In response to this statement of the Bolshevik faction, the Chairman of the Congress sharply opposed the Bolsheviks. A representative of the Bolshevik faction was prevented from speaking. Repeatedly interrupted by the chairman and remarks from the Socialist-Revolutionary faction, he placed all responsibility for what was happening on the SRS. Bolshevik faction of the poki-

1 "News of the front department of Rumcherod", No. 38 of November 2, 1917.

2 Ibid.

3 "Warrior-citizen", organ of the VI Army, No. 184 of November 9, 1917.

page 96

nula congress. The amendment condemning the proletarian revolution was adopted.

At the end of its work, the Congress elected a new "military revolutionary committee", the composition of which was no different from the old one. It included the following persons: Andrianov, Lordkipanidze and Hadji Lazar from the Socialist - Revolutionaries, Veselkov, Manochinenkov and Podlygach from the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks and Ukrainians refused to give their representatives to the committee.

An emergency front-line congress in the town of Romani was conceived by the Social Revolutionaries to mobilize forces against the impending uprising at the front and to help the counter-revolution in the rear. But the planned plan was not implemented. Despite the external majority and its "success," the Congress showed the weakness of the position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks at the front. The gap between the top of the front and the mass of soldiers was increasing every day. The upper ranks, represented by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik "military revolutionary committee", were linked to the General Army committee, which was located at Headquarters and was fighting the Soviet government; the soldiers ' mass was becoming Bolshevized every day and openly supported the Bolsheviks.

Almost 2 weeks have passed since the socialist Revolution won in Petrograd. Petrograd, Moscow, and other proletarian centers passed into the hands of the working class. The revolution began its triumphal march across Russia. A new government was created - the Council of People's Commissars. A number of important decrees, including those on peace, land, and workers ' control, have already been published. Real steps had been taken towards an immediate armistice and the beginning of peace negotiations, but the counter-revolution still dreamed of relying on the Socialist-Revolutionary "general army committee".

II

On November 9, the" military revolutionary committee of the front "together with the front department of Rumcherod discussed a telegram from the" all-army committee " about its initiative in organizing a new government with a representative office... "from the Bolsheviks to the people's Socialists". The central figure of the new government was planned to be the Socialist-Revolutionary leader Chernov, who was to take the post of minister-chairman in it. The joint meeting decided to welcome the "initiative of the all-park committee" and ... Chernov's candidacy for the post of minister-chairman of the parliament."

A few days later, the" military revolutionary committee " became aware of the negotiations by direct wire between the Soviet government and the Stavka on the question of an immediate armistice and the appointment of a commander-in-chief of Comrades. Krylenko. Appeal of the All-Russian Committee for "Saving the Motherland and the Revolution" and the All-Army Committee on the non-recognition of com. Krylenko became supreme commander-in-chief, and found support from Rumcherod and the "military revolutionary committee". Under pain of "revolutionary" responsibility, the latter categorically demanded that all soldiers and officers of the Rumanian Front not execute any orders issued by the Council of People's Commissars from Petrograd.

Lenin's appeal on behalf of the Government of the Russian Republic, published in Radio Liberty on November 10 (23), calling on the soldiers to immediately select representatives "for formally entering into negotiations on an armistice with the enemy" 1 prompted the soldiers-

1 Lenin, Soch. Vol. XXII, p. 73.

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The entire mass of the front was sent to fight openly against the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders, who were trying to hide this radio message from the soldiers. In the 26th Corps, the news of the Bolshevik successes and the proposal to immediately conclude peace "destroyed the remnants of consciousness in the units about the need to work to strengthen their positions," Voronov, the general on duty of the Romanian Front, reported to the Headquarters. "The 27th Rifle Regiment is definitely on the side of the Bolsheviks, where a resolution was passed a few days ago: 1) upon disbandment, distribute the economic sums to the soldiers, 2) take the messengers from the officers, " 1 - he reported further. The revolutionary mood of the soldiers affected the congresses that were taking place at that time in the front units. In one of the corps of the VI Army, a military revolutionary committee was organized, which took the point of view of the Soviet of People's Commissars.

At the extraordinary congress of the 48th Division of the IV Army on November 17, issues of recognition of the Council of People's Commissars and elective leadership in the army were put on the agenda. The Congress took place in a different setting. The speeches of the Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and counter-revolutionary officers were drowned out by boos, boos, and curses. Insignia were being destroyed. On the day of the end of the divisional congress, the head of the division, General Novitsky, was arrested and Kuznetsov, elected by the congress, took command of the division. The Congress was held under the leadership of the Bolsheviks.

A vivid picture of the events that took place at the front in these days is given by the IV Army. At its head in the days of October was General Ragosa, who called himself a supporter of the Constituent Assembly and considered himself a Socialist-Revolutionary. The ideological leadership was in the hands of the Commissar of the army, SR Alekseyevsky. The Army committee was also Socialist-Revolutionary. The Bolsheviks, the organizers and leaders of the congress, and the soldiers of the 48th Division took over the leadership of the coup in the Fourth Army.

Having arrested and changed the command of the 48th division, the Bolsheviks immediately moved with a detachment of machine-gunners to the headquarters of the 24th corps (Comanesti village). For the formation of the corps Revolutionary Committee, Bolshevik soldiers were separated from the divisional revolutionary Committee. Meeting no resistance, by 6 a.m. on November 20, the detachment captured and disbanded the corps committee, in which there was not a single Bolshevik, arrested the corps commander, General Nikolaev, and occupied the telegraph office, radio, and garage. Having appointed a new commander, the Bolsheviks contacted other divisions of the corps. An attempt to liquidate the uprising caused by the Cossack regiment did not lead to anything, since the regiment went over to the side of the rebels. In the evening of the same day, a telegram was received from the headquarters of the IV Army from Army Commissar Alekseyevsky, who suggested that "the self-styled comkor should hand over the post back to General Nikolayev, the self-styled committee should be dissolved, and the instigators should be sent to Romani"2 . But the SR command also miscalculated here: the order remained unfulfilled. Upon receiving this telegram, a detachment of 70 machine-gunners of the 48th Division, participants in the coup in the 24th corps, moved to the town of Romani, to the location of the headquarters of the IV army. This detachment also took with them members of the future army committee and even the future commander of the IV Army Protopopov. Arriving at the town of Romani, the garrison of which consisted of 6 thousand people with artillery, this small detachment divided into parts and went to occupy the most important points: headquarters,

1 CVI, Foundation of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Romanian Front, N 295.

2 Proletarian Revolution No. 10 for 1922, p. 430.

page 98

print shops, radio stations, etc. The squad met no resistance. The first to be arrested was the army commander, General Ragosa. A small group of soldiers came to his apartment. There's a sentry at the gate.

"Comrade, take turns, go back to your room." "I'm listening." The sentry shouldered his rifle and started walking. Just " 1 .

Army Commissar Alekseyevsky was not arrested. He called in shock battalions, a Cossack regiment, and an artillery division. A small detachment led by the Bolsheviks was threatened with a bloody clash with an enemy exceeding its strength. We had to maneuver, negotiate, and release the army commander and the army committee from custody. In the evening of the same day, a meeting of this committee was held in the presence of a thousand-strong audience of soldiers. From the mouths of the members of the army committee and the Commissar of the Army, familiar, long-tired words poured out... "the Bolsheviks are traitors, sold out to the Germans... the Bolsheviks are impostors... Constituent Assembly" , etc., etc.

Nevertheless, Army Commissar Alekseyevsky, frightened by the rumor that two regiments of the 24th Corps were approaching Romani, was forced to hand over written obligations to the Bolsheviks: "1) immediately leave the borders of the Rumanian front, handing over the affairs to the provisional military commissar; 2) immediately summon 2 representatives from each corps, and 6 representatives from the 24th corps, who form the provisional military commissar; 3) do not interfere in word or deed with the coup that is taking place at the front in order to recognize the Council of People's Commissars and glavkovorkha tov. Krylenko; 4) publish this statement tomorrow in the army Bulletin " 2 .

During these events, a peace agreement was signed in Romani, on the site of the 24th corps.

The new composition of the Military revolutionary committee of the IV Army, after discussing the events in the 24th Corps, where the corps commander and division chief were displaced, decided "to recognize the actions of the military revolutionary committee of the corps as correct. Invite the other corps of the IV Army to follow the example of the corps and start democratizing the command staff from bottom to top on an elective basis. " 3 In all parts of the army, re-election of all committees, from company to corps inclusive, was immediately initiated: a commission was created to democratize the command staff, control over headquarters departments was established, and the corps courts were suspended. Instead of General Ragoza, Baev 4 was appointed Chief of Staff and temporary commander of the IV Army by the resolution of the Army Military Revolutionary Committee .

The further struggle for Soviet power on the Romanian front, as well as on the Southwestern one, became more complicated, taking on the character of an open civil war. The Romanian authorities, relying on the counter-revolutionary monarchist officers, with the direct support of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which opposed the Soviet government, tried to stifle the proletarian revolution. But even here the counter-revolution had no support among the masses of soldiers who were on the side of the new government. The Proletarian Revolution also won here.

1 Proletarian Revolution No. 10 for 1922, p. 481.

2 Ibid., p. 435.

3 Bulletin "Bulletin of the 4th Army" No. 124 of November 29, 1917.

4 Bulletin "Bulletin of the 4th Army" No. 128 of December 3, 1917.

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