On the outskirts of one of the oases of the Tunisian Sahara, Ksar Gilyan, there is a modest obelisk, the inscription on which says that the "L" Unit under the command of F. arrived from Chad. Leclerc defeated German troops here.

This unusual story began at the end of July 1940, when General Sh. A French captain came to de Gaulle, introducing himself as Philippe Leclerc and declaring his desire to join the Free French Army. Count Philippe de Hautlocq (this was his real name) was born on November 22, 1902, in the family estate near Amiens, in a family belonging to an old noble family. Philip, whose family considered service to their country as a tradition, duty and vocation, became a military man. In 1924, he graduated from the Saint-Cyr Special military School and joined the army. War F. de Hautelocke met with the rank of captain in the 4th Infantry Division. On June 15, he was seriously wounded and taken prisoner, escaped from a concentration camp, was captured, escaped again, and on June 25 arrived in Paris, where he learned about the draft of Sh. de Gaulle's call for continued resistance. After visiting his wife and six children in the vicinity of Bordeaux, F. de Hautlocq made his way to Spain and from there, via Portugal, arrived in London on July 25 [General...]. While still in Spain, he adopted the pseudonym Leclerc in order to protect the family remaining in France from reprisals.

He was always a smart man, with a thin brush of mustache and light eyes, and he had all the qualities a good officer needs: the ability to analyze deeply, the courage to make decisions, and the desire to avoid unnecessary losses. His credo was expressed in one of his speeches to the Free French fighters under his command: "Who are we? People who are ready to do anything, do not think about the chances of success, capable of any madness, if only it is necessary to defend the honor of France." He is the author of the famous phrase repeated many times by Charles de Gaulle: "The French do not know the word 'impossible' "[Privalov].

Position of Sh. It was not easy for de Gaulle and his supporters at that time. "During this period," stated British Prime Minister W. Churchill, " the warriors of Free France... they were a band of exiled heroes who took up arms against the government that ruled their country... Over their leaders hung a death sentence "[Churchill, vol. II, 1955, p. 454]. Charles de Gaulle saw a way out in attracting the French colonies to his side, which would make it possible to use the French troops stationed there, the human and material resources of these territories in the fight against Germany and Italy. It is not without reason that in his famous appeal to the French on June 18, 1940, he emphasized:: "France is not alone! She's not alone!

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She's not alone! Behind it stands a vast empire " [Proclamation...]. The hopes of the leadership of Free France for the support of overseas territories were not without reason. According to W. Churchill, a significant part of the French in the African colonies " ... did not fall into despair. They were shocked by the collapse of France, but... they were not at all inclined to capitulate. To them, General de Gaulle shone like a star in the dark of night. Distance gave them time, and time promised them opportunities" [Churchill, vol. II, 1955, p. 450].

However, the first attempt was not very successful. When on June 24, 1940, the day after the French capitulation, Charles de Gaulle appealed to the governors and commanders of the troops in the colonies to join Free France, only Generals P. Koenig and Lejeuntilhomme responded to this call, but they were unable to lead the administration and troops of Indochina and French Somalia under their control., and these colonies remained under Vichy rule. But already in July, a ray of hope shone - the Governor of Chad F. Eboue refused to accept the French surrender and declared that he would defend himself in the event of an Italian or German invasion. A favorable situation seemed to be developing in French Cameroon, but the representative of the Vichy government, Admiral Plato, who arrived there, prompted the Governor-General of this territory, Bruno, to declare his submission to the authorities of the mother country.

In order to reverse the unfavorable development of the situation, Charles de Gaulle decided to send to Lagos, as his special representatives, F. de Gaulle. Leclerc (who was promoted to Major), R. Plevan, A. Paran and C. de Boilembert. With the task of achieving the annexation of Cameroon to Free France and its approval in Chad and the Middle Congo, on August 28, 1940, F. Leclerc and 17 people accompanying him entered the port of Douala on three pirogues [Telegram of Colonel Leclerc...; Goutard, 1968, p. 1318]. Fortunately, it was raining heavily, prompting the guards to take shelter in the guardhouse. The group disembarked unhindered at the pier and reached the safe house without hindrance, where underground fighters were waiting for them. F. Leclerc introduced himself to them as a colonel (he then explained this self-elevation in rank to Sh. de Gaulle's need to ensure success) [Telegram from Colonel Leclerc...]. And here it turned out that the supporters of Free France were not ready to speak out. They advised the arrivals to sail back and return to Douala in eight days. In response to this, F. Leclerc stated: "I am in Douala, and I will stay here. If I leave the city, it will only be by being carried out feet first." The captain of the mecharists (camel cavalry), who had been sitting in a corner in silence, got up from his seat and went to the exit. F. Leclerc, blocking his way, asked where he intended to go. "I," Captain Dio replied, "understand everything, and now I will bring my company here" [Goutard, 1968, p. 1318]. At 7 o'clock in the morning, his mekharists occupied administrative offices without firing a shot and established control over Douala. Then F. Leclerc went with two companies by train to Yaounde, where Bruno handed over his authority to him without any resistance (Goutard, 1968, p. 1318).

At the same time F. Eboue confirmed Chad's accession to Free France, demonstrating, according to Sh. de Gaulle's " remarkable determination, setting an example of duty and signaling the revival of the entire French Empire "[Gratitude...]. On August 28, the Governor of the Middle Congo, Jusson, transferred his powers to Colonel de Larmina, appointed by Sh. de Gaulle "High Commissioner of French Equatorial Africa" (FEA). At the same time, a telegram arrived from the Governor of Saint-Mar from Bangui, informing him of the addition of Ubangi-Shari to Charles de Gaulle. However, Gabon remained loyal to Vichy. French West Africa also remained on the side of the mother country. Charles de Gaulle convinced W. Churchill of the importance of establishing control over this territory, which, as he hoped,,

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It will lead to the accession of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to Free France. On September 23, 1940, a powerful British squadron approached Dakar, escorting transports with 2.7 thousand French and 4.2 thousand British soldiers on board [Pemsel, 1979, p. 120]. However, the governor of the Federal District, P. Boisson, refused to obey Charles de Gaulle and ordered to open fire on the British ships. The operation failed, and on September 25, the squadron set a return course.

Sh himself. de Gaulle went to Cameroon, and from there to FEA. Despite his failure at Dakar, he was greeted with enthusiasm everywhere, and, in his own words, became convinced that he could "lead the French on the wings of a dream" (Molchanov, 1980, p. 165). The general's prestige was fully restored by the accession of Gabon to Free France. However, the first attempt made by Dio's mecharists ended in failure. After analyzing the course of the operation, Charles de Gaulle came to the conclusion that it was necessary first of all to disable the Vichy aviation at the airfield in Libreville by air strikes, and sent a corresponding instruction to F. de Gaulle, who was in Cameroon. Leclerc [Telegram of General de Gaulle to Leclerc..., 1940]. On 27 October, two companies under Leclerc sailed from Douala, bound for Libreville. This time, the Free French were lucky. After several small skirmishes, in which his units lost 20 men killed, F. Leclerc established control over Gabon by November 9 (Goutard, 1968, p. 1318).

At the same time, Charles de Gaulle took political and organizational steps designed to consolidate the military successes of Free France. On October 27, he established the Council of Defense of the Empire, which was entrusted with the task of " representing the country and the Empire fighting for their existence "[Manifesto...]. It included anti-fascist governors of the French colonies, including F. Leclerc. Now, after the annexation of Gabon, Free France controlled the entire FEA - a huge territory of 2 million square kilometers. However, its population was only 3 million people, including 2 thousand French [Carrier, 1965, p. 176]. Nevertheless, strategic success was evident. "In general," stated Sh. de Gaulle - although not all the objectives of our African enterprise were achieved, at least a solid base was created for our military efforts, stretching from the Sahara to the Congo and from the Atlantic to the Nile basin " [De la colonne Leclerc...]. Equatorial Africa and French Cameroon became the focus of the forces of Free France. From here they were transferred to Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to participate in operations against German and Italian troops in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The British, in turn, organized the transfer of aircraft across Central Africa from Takoradi on the Gold Coast to Egypt to make up for the losses suffered there by the Royal Air Force.

Even more important, the establishment of control over the FEA created a barrier to the spread of German influence on the continent. Prime Minister Smuts of the Union of South Africa will later say to Charles de Gaulle :" If you, de Gaulle, had not annexed Equatorial Africa, I, Smuts, would not have retained South Africa. If the capitulatory mood prevailed in Brazzaville, the Belgian Congo would also fall, and after that, elements who condemned our participation in the war on the side of the British would inevitably gain the upper hand and cooperate with the Axis powers. From Algeria to the Cape of Good Hope, German hegemony would be established. Its shares in Chad and [Average] "You have done the coalition a great service" [de Gaulle, 1956, p. 23-24].

Now there was a question of further actions. It was possible, of course, to try to seize the FZA, but this would require considerable time and, in addition, the French would have to fight the French. Charles de Gaulle decided to strike at Fezzan, opening another theater of military operations in the desert, and in the future-missile defense-

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fight through the Sahara to the Mediterranean. The task of implementing this plan was assigned to F. Leclerc.

The forces he had at his disposal were not impressive. He had at his disposal 89 small trucks, which were equipped in a makeshift way with devices for installing machine guns and mortars. The problem was that most of them were very ordinary, and not all-wheel drive cars. There was no need to think about climbing into the dunes with them, but even crossing the regs (sand-covered flat spaces) could create considerable difficulties. There were also a pair of armored vehicles, each armed with a single machine gun, and two 75-mm guns [Goutard, 1968, p. 1318-1319; War and Game...].

The personnel was also small - about 400 people, a quarter of whom were French, and the rest were so-called Senegalese riflemen, formed, despite their name, from FEA residents [Goutard, 1968 p. 1318]. Soldiers recruited from the local population were eager to fight. How can this be explained? What did they seem to care about the clash of France and England with Germany and Italy? But they hated the Germans: in Central Africa, they did not forget about their atrocities in Cameroon (which was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1916), about the merciless suppression of anti-colonial uprisings by the Germans. As for the Muslim Arabs of Northern Chad, they were eager to take revenge on the Italians for the extermination of the Libyans who had not submitted to the conquerors. The hopes that France would grant the colonies independence in return for their participation in the war, which were unfortunately not fulfilled in the future, played a role. At the same time, a serious problem arose - neither the French nor the "Senegalese riflemen" knew the desert, were not prepared for life and war in it. The exception was, however, the mecharists, but their number is small - only 120 people [Goutard, 1968, p. 1318].

In Italian Libya, they had to face units of "Sahariana", specially trained to conduct combat operations in the desert. British Major R. Bagnold, who had the opportunity to observe them in the 1930s, highly appreciated the training, adaptability to life in the desert, and equipment of the Sahariana [Tasseli].

The first raid in Fezzan was carried out, however, not by the fighters of Free France, but by the British. They also began to prepare for combat operations in the Sahara long before the war. R. Bagnold then conducted research and topographic surveys of the Libyan desert, including on the territory of Libya. He became the first European to cross the Great Sandy Desert. The British created warehouses in the Libyan Sahara hidden among the sands with reserves of fuel, canned food, spare parts. In June 1940, R. Bagnold formed special forces units - long-range desert groups, perfectly prepared for the war in the Sahara and superbly equipped. Their first operation was a raid on Murzuk.

On December 26, 1940, 76 men in 24 vehicles drove out of the gates of Cairo's Abbasiyya barracks, heading west. The group was led by Captain P. Clayton, who had served for 18 years in units patrolling the Libyan desert and knew the Sahara very well. The British crossed the dune chains of the Great Sandy Desert and, after covering 2 thousand km, came to the town of Taanoa, located to the north of the Chadian oasis of Auzu [Tasseli]. Here on January 7, 1941. They met up with a small French detachment led by the military governor of Chad, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Claude. d'Ornano, who brought fuel and food on camels [War and Game...]. From Taanoa, the British and French moved north to Mourzuk.

Approaching the oasis on January 11, P. Clayton divided his detachment into two groups, one of which was to attack the airfield, and the second-the fort, where the garrison was located (about 300 people). The Allies were lucky - a convoy was expected to arrive in Murzuka

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with fuel and took the squad cars for it. The group intended to attack the fort passed through the streets of the village without hindrance. When meeting Italians, the British raised their right hand in a Fascist salute. The open gates of the fort were crowded with soldiers waiting for the convoy to arrive. P. Clayton's cars burst into the courtyard, pouring machine-gun fire on the Italians. Meanwhile, the second group attacked the airfield, the defenders of which soon threw out a white flag. The British and French burned down three planes that were there, fuel and ammunition depots, a radio station, and a repair shop [Tasseli]. Italian casualties were 10 killed, 15 wounded, and 25 prisoners (23 of whom were released) [Raids in the Fezzan]. The Allies lost 2 men killed and 3 wounded [Tasseli]. One of those killed was J. d'Ornano... On the way back, the group tried to attack the oasis of Umm al-Araneb, but, met with heavy machine-gun fire, was forced to retreat.

In mid-January, P. Clayton's detachment safely reached Chad, from where it had to return through the desert to Egypt.'Ornano, the military governor of Chad, suggested that the British take part "along the way" in the planned capture of the Kufra oasis by Free France. At the disposal of F. Leclerc had two armored cars, 53 vehicles, 100 French officers and non-commissioned officers, and 300 mecharists and Senegalese riflemen [Gover-Collins; La bataille...; War and Game...]. They had to cover 1.5 thousand km and gain experience in combat operations in the Sahara [De la colonne Leclerc...].

It was a war in the desert, with its wadis with steep banks that formed insurmountable obstacles, with razor-sharp rocks that split the wheels of cars, with treacherous fash-fash (quicksand), in which cars instantly get bogged down, with sudden samums, cold nights and a scorching sun that literally ignites the icy air in the morning, finally, with a constant feeling of thirst generated by the scarcity of water in the diet. And of course, sand, sand everywhere: in the air, in food, in carburetors, penetrating which, as the commanders of British units stated, "created a much more serious problem than the Italians" [Carrier, 1965, p. 190]. The burden on the human body was such that the Germans imposed an age limit for soldiers of their Afrika Korps - upon reaching the age of 35, they were transferred to Europe [Carrier, 1965, p. 190]. The war in the Sahara developed a special type of fighter-independent, self-confident, able not to retreat in the face of difficulties, always ready, even at the cost of his own life, to save his comrades.1
1 One of the most famous detachments was the Demolition Squadron No. 1, which operated in Northern Sahara on the left flank of the British 8th Army and was formed mainly from Russians, commanded by Major V. Penyakov. They destroyed the airfield near Tobruk, where 20 enemy aircraft were destroyed, roads were mined in the rear of German and Italian troops, fuel and ammunition depots were blown up, and prisoners of war were released from concentration camps. Having learned about the brutal executions of Libyans suspected of collaborating with the British, who were hung by the jaw on a hook and left to die in the sun, V. Penyakov sent a letter to the commander of the Italian troops in Cyrenaica, General Patti, warning that for every tortured Arab he would shoot one Italian officer, and the executions stopped [Zherlitsyna, Sologubovsky, Filatov, 2006, pp. 81-82].

The Russians fought not only in Fighter Squadron No. 1. In the late 1960s, the author, who was then working in Algeria, had to deal with people of an unusual fate-elderly Russians who came from time to time to the consular section of the USSR Embassy. During the Civil War, as junior officers, they fought in the ranks of the White armies. Once in exile, they joined the French Foreign Legion. They continued to hate the Bolsheviks and the Soviet government, but on June 22, the main thing for them was that their Homeland, Russia, was attacked by Germany. After deserting the Legion, these former white officers joined the Free French Army. After the victory, they were granted Soviet citizenship for their participation in the war with the Nazis. After their retirement, many of them stayed in Algeria. They lived in ANDR, receiving a pension from the French government as former legionnaires, and at the same time having Soviet passports...

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It was decided that the British, better equipped and specially trained for desert warfare, would be in the vanguard of the Kufra raid. On January 26, 1941, P. Clayton's detachment left the town of Faia, crossed the border with Libya and occupied the Sarra oasis (which did not have an Italian garrison). There the detachment split up: one group remained in Sarra to await the French approach, while P. Clayton, with 30 New Zealanders, moved 11 vehicles northeast to Kufra [Raids in the Fezzan]. But here his luck failed him. On 31 January, his group was discovered by an Italian reconnaissance plane and then attacked by a 40-strong Saharian force with two armored cars and five vehicles supported by three Gover-Collins aircraft. The Italians, commanded by Captain Moreschini, a veteran of the Sahara War, were very skilful, and the British had to retreat. P. Clayton himself was wounded and, along with two New Zealanders from his unit, was taken prisoner. Otherwise, the losses were not so significant - one killed and three burned cars [Gover-Collins]. Four other people were still missing. But they survived, even though their truck was destroyed. The four were faced with the dilemma of surrendering to the Italians or marching south, trying to get out of the desert, which was almost tantamount to suicide. The New Zealanders decided to prefer death to captivity and went south. Fortunately, they were discovered and rescued by a French patrol [Raids in the Fezzan]...

The failure of P. Clayton and the receipt by the Italians with his capture of maps with a plan of operation applied to them forced F. to leave the city. Leclerc decided to postpone it, although he decided to conduct a reconnaissance by combat. The British set out for Cairo, where they arrived on February 9, having crossed the Sahara for about seven thousand km [Tasseli], while 60 French men in 22 vehicles moved on February 5 to Kufra. They managed to enter the oasis unnoticed, unexpectedly attack the airfield, destroying two aircraft on it, and return to Chad without losses [Goutard, 1968, p. 1319].

The second attempt to seize Kufra was made in early February. Along with the French, Mekharists and Senegalese riflemen, Libyans who joined the Free French also took part in it.

The attack was preceded by a bombardment of the oasis by F.'s troops. Leclerc 18 aircraft of the Brittany air group, which, however, did not cause serious damage to the enemy [La bataille...]. February 16 squad F. Leclerc ran into the Sahariana, which tried to block his path, and after a short battle forced the Italians to retreat. On February 19, the French entered Kufra and occupied the oasis and airfield. However, the Italians, who were holed up in the fort, surrounded by massive walls with four bastions, on which cannons and machine guns were installed, continued to resist. The siege began. Realizing that the enemy was much better armed than his squad, F. Leclerc began to bluff, trying to create the impression that the superiority of forces was on his side. The Italians lost their nerve, and on March 1 they surrendered. 59 Italian officers and non-commissioned officers and 273 askers (the so-called Libyans mobilized to the Italian army) were captured. Impressive trophies were captured: four anti-aircraft guns, 53 machine guns, six motor vehicles, and eight tracked tractors (Goutard, 1968, p. 1319-1320). 2 March F. Leclerc gathered his squad in the courtyard of the fort, where his soldiers made a famous oath: "We will continue the campaign and will not stop until the French flag is raised on Strasbourg Cathedral "[Saves]. Heard thousands of kilometers away from France, surrounded by palm trees and sand, under the scorching African sun, these words could seem fantastic... The capture of Kufra, which was returned to Chad by F. Leclerc handed over to the British, removed the threat of an Italian invasion of Upper Egypt. The enemy lost an intermediate airfield, without which it was impossible to carry out air traffic between Libya and Italian East Africa.

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Three weeks later, Free France achieved another success - this time in the Northern Sahara: on March 21, 1941, its units, together with the British, occupied the Jaghbub oasis, which removed the danger of enemy raids across the Western Desert to Lower Egypt. Leclerc, who received the rank of brigadier General for the capture of Kufra, was tasked with preparing for the capture of Fezzan. However, this goal would have been achieved only when the British 8th Army would have reached the borders of Tripolitania, and it, having occupied Cyrenaica, stopped. Summer was approaching with its heat, when the air temperature in the Central Sahara often exceeds 50°, which makes it impossible to conduct military operations there.

1942 came, and in January the commander of the German-Italian African Army, Colonel-General E. Rommel, suddenly went on the offensive. To help the British, F. Leclerc launched a raid on Fezzan from February 2 to March 15, trying to draw off the enemy forces. Four combat groups with a total of 400 men and 100 vehicles with one gun participated in the raid [Goutard, 1968, p. 1321]. The French drove the enemy out of the oases of Gatrun, Temessa, Wau al-Kabir, Tejere, cut the road to Burak, bypassing Sebha, and then retreated to Chad.

In February 1942, the 8th Army, retreating under the blows of E. Rommel, managed to gain a foothold in Cyrenaica on the line from Al-Ghazali on the Mediterranean coast to the Vir Hakim well located in the desert. A stronghold was created there, which was a triangle with an area of 16 square kilometers, covered with 50 thousand mines. The 1st Free French Brigade, which numbered 3.5 thousand men with 88 guns and 44 mortars and was under the command of General P. Koenig, was ordered to defend it [Cartier, 1965, p. 349].

On May 27, the African Army went on the offensive again. E. Rommel expected to encircle the main British forces and occupy Tobruk within two days [Churchill, vol. IV, 1955, p. 361]. According to this plan, several hours were allotted for the capture of Vir Hakim. But here the Italians, advancing on the right flank of the African Army, unexpectedly encountered stubborn resistance. The Ariete panzer division that attacked the stronghold was forced to abandon further assault attempts after losing 50 tanks [Cartier, 1965, p. 352]. Lost in the desert, the well suddenly acquired an important operational and tactical significance. E. Rommel's tanks, which broke through the British minefields, needed fuel and ammunition to continue the offensive, which had to be delivered by a roundabout route until Vir Hakim was taken. E. Rommel brought up the German 15th Panzer and 90th Light Infantry divisions and the Italian "Trieste" division. The stronghold was subjected to fierce attacks by the Luftwaffe, as well as the Royal Air Force, which mistakenly dropped bombs on French positions three times [Irving, 2006, p. 201]. But they continued to stubbornly resist. Only on the night of June 9-10, p. Koenig gave the order to abandon the position, which he was forced to do by lack of water. Two-thirds of his brigade managed to link up with the British [Cartier, 1965, p. 352].

On the scale of World War II, the battle for Vir Hakim was a minor episode. But this episode has become for the North African theater of operations a pebble, the fall of which generates an avalanche. The German delay at Wir Hakim gave the 8th Army an opportunity to slip out of the tightening ring around it. It was also important that the attacks on this stronghold took precious fuel, the lack of which soon forced E. Rommel's tanks to stop 60 km from Alexandria at a small village called El Alamein... No less important was the moral and psychological aspect. For the first time since the capitulation, the French met the Germans in a major battle, demonstrating that they were once again their serious opponents. "The cannons under Wir Hakim announced everything

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to the world about the beginning of the revival of France, " - so assessed the incident Sh. de Gaulle [Molchanov, 1980, p. 192].

Summer was approaching. There is a pause in the fighting in Central Sahara. By order of Sh. F. Leclerc began to prepare his troops for transfer to England, so that they would take part in the landing in France. Many concerns were also connected with the transfer of reinforcements to the Allied armies in the Near and Middle East and East Africa through Fort Lamy. In total, from 1941 to 1943, about 4 thousand aircraft were sent through Chad to Egypt. 17.5 thousand FEA volunteers joined the Free French forces, most of whom took part in the battles in the north of the Sahara as part of the 8th Army [Sagop]. The Allies received meat, oil, and leather from Chad, cotton from Ubangi-Shari, and gold, diamonds, and precious woods from Gabon.

Meanwhile, it turned out that the Americans and the British did not intend to open a second front in 1942, and Charles de Gaulle returned to plans for the invasion of Fezzan. In September 1942, he conducted an inspection of the F Brigade at Fort Lamy. Leclerc found her fully prepared for desert combat. On September 22, the head of the Fighting France (as Free France became known on July 1, 1942) presented F. Leclerc received a "secret personal instruction" with instructions to seize the Saharan oases, form a French administration there, and then move on Tripoli. The operation was to begin after the 8th Army had driven the enemy out of Cyrenaica and entered Tripolitania. The column of F. Leclerc was supposed to be subordinate to Generals X after joining the British. Alexander and B. Montgomery [de Gaulle, 1956, p. 40].

The forces allocated for the invasion of Fezzan numbered about 600 French and 2.7 thousand "Senegalese riflemen" and mecharists with several armored vehicles, 350 vehicles and 10 guns. Air support was provided by 18 aircraft of the Brittany Air Group (Goutard, 1968, p. 1321). It was necessary to occupy an area equal in area to France, and to overcome 3 thousand km of desert separating Fort Lamy from Tripoli [De la colonne Leclerc...]. It was necessary to ensure the supply of fuel, ammunition, water, food to the units. It was necessary to coordinate the pace of the desert offensive with the advance along the Mediterranean coast of the 8th Army.

On December 16, F. Leclerc's column moved north. On December 26, Colonel Dio's group, bypassing Gatrun, whose garrison showed stubborn resistance, headed north, on December 28, the Saharian attack was repulsed, and on January 3, 1943, after five days of fighting, they occupied the oasis of Umm al-Aranib. On January 6, Lieutenant Colonel R. Delange's group took Gatrun. On January 6, a small detachment of Captain Aloran entered Burak, bypassing Sebha. On January 8, a new success - Captain Gena took Murzuk without a fight. The garrison of this rather large settlement tried to leave the oasis and make its way to Sebha, but, being overtaken by the French, surrendered.

Fezzan's capital, Sebha, remained. F. Leclerc knew that it would not be easy to take it. Dominating the oasis, the massive fortress was surrounded by an anti-tank moat and three rows of barbed wire. Next to the oasis was an airfield where military aircraft were based. A strong garrison with 18 tanks and 12 guns was stationed in the city (Goutard, 1968, p. 1321). Fortunately for the French, the Brittany air group managed to disable the airfield on December 26 and destroy the aircraft on it. On January 12, R. Delange approached the fortress and found ... that it was abandoned by the garrison. With the occupation of Sebha, the entire central part of Fezzan fell into the hands of the French, who captured 700 people, 18 tanks and 40 guns during the campaign [Goutard, 1968, p. 1323].

In the hands of the Italians, another large oasis remained - Gat. It is separated from Sebha by 500 km, and F. Leclerc did not have fuel to cover this distance. I had to turn to Fran, who was in Algeria and joined the allies-

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On January 24, Captain Muzhno's mecharista company occupied Oasis after a three-day battle. Finally, on January 27, Captain d'abzac, who commanded the Borcou group, entered Ghadames, located on the border between Fezzan and Tripolitania, after covering 600 km in three days [Goutard, p. 1323]. Charles de Gaulle praised the success of F. Leclerc, publicly stating that such success "does not mean anything it is inferior to the most beautiful events of our great history "[De la colonne Leclerc...].

Against the background of military victories, a political problem arose. The British insisted that the administration of the territories occupied by F. Leclerc should be carried out by the British administration for the occupied territories, and then the whole of Tripolitania should be united under the rule of the British [Telegram of General Leclerc, 28.11.1942]. Charles de Gaulle strongly rejected these claims, stating that "the operation in Fezzan was undertaken from French territory, by French troops, under the leadership of the French. Therefore, the French command, and only it, must ensure the management of enemy territories..."[De Gaulle telegram..., 02.12.1942]. In another telegram to F. Leclerc, he frankly explained what caused his intransigence. "Fezzan," wrote Charles de Gaulle, "must become France's share in the battle for Africa" [de Gaulle's telegram..., 01.12.1942]. The head of the Fighting France proceeded from the fact that the occupation of Fezzan by the French would be a serious trump card in the hands of Paris when it comes to the post-war fate of Libya, especially if the question of its division between the allies arose.2
Meanwhile, the Fezzan campaign was drawing to a close. On January 21, Dio's detachment, having barely overcome Hamada al-Hamra, unexpectedly appeared at Mizda and after a short battle occupied the oasis. On January 23, Dio emerged from the desert and joined two platoons in Garjan, which had been abandoned by the Italians (Goutard, 1968, p. 1323-1324). On January 25, the vanguard of the French column arrived in Tripoli. Battered trucks with mortars and machine guns mounted on platforms, loaded with camouflage nets, barrels of water and fuel, boxes of ammunition and food, attracted everyone's attention. At 16 o'clock, a plane carrying F. Leclerc landed on the airfield littered with the wreckage of German and Italian planes. He hugged his soldiers. The general's breath caught in his throat with joy, and he could only utter two words: "Bravo, gentlemen" (Goutard, 1968, p. 1324). On January 26, F. Leclerc received B. Montgomery, who received his unit. The commander of the 8th army ordered the column of F. Leclerc, called Compound "L", to act on the left flank of the British, covering it from the Sahara. The French received from the British arsenals 16 anti-tank guns with tracked tractors and warm uniforms [Goutard, 1968, p. 1324]. They were given units of sappers. The main thing is that their cars, worn out after crossing the desert, were equipped with new engines.

During the unfolding offensive on Tunis, where E. Rommel's African Army retreated, Compound " L " was assigned the task of occupying and holding Ksar Gilan, providing the flank of the 8th army. February 23 dowry of F. To Leclerc, the scouting company of the Greek "Sacred Battalion" has entered the oasis. One of the patrols tried to move further north, but when they encountered German outposts, they were forced to withdraw. On February 25, to clarify the situation, the Germans sent 5 armored cars to Ksar Gilan, which, having come under fire, retreated north to the Bir Sultan well [Gandini, 2000, p. 55-56]. Meanwhile, the main forces of Compound "L" approached Xar Gilan from Ghadames. F. Leclerc ordered to immediately organize a defense, carefully masking the positions occupied. The defensive line created by the French had the shape of a crescent. Its left wing rested on the dunes, and the right-on the ska-

2 These calculations were not justified: in accordance with the resolution of the IV session of the UN General Assembly adopted on November 21, 1949, Libya gained independence in December 1951.

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leafy hills, which made it impossible to bypass the flanks. On March 9, B. Montgomery reported to F. Leclerc was informed that it would be attacked the next day by units of the German 90th Infantry Division, and suggested that he withdraw. The commander of Compound " L " refused to do this, but asked to provide him with air support.

On the morning of March 10, the German infantry offensive began, supported by armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. Bombs and shells exploded, sending up geysers of sand that covered the battlefield. Spitfires appeared in the sky, and a fierce battle between British and German fighters unfolded over the heads of the combatants. The attacks followed one after another. The French were saved by a good disguise of their positions, which forced the Germans to launch bombing and artillery strikes blindly. By evening, the battle subsided, and the units of the 90th Division withdrew, leaving 12 armored cars, 10 guns, and 40 cars on the battlefield. When Montgomery learned of the results, he telegraphed F. Leclerc: "Well done!" [Goutard, p. 1324]. The commander of Compound " L " in the order issued by him assessed the incident as follows:: "The Boche wanted to take Ksar Gilan. They attacked with 50 armored vehicles. The Chadian troops, supported by our Greek and English comrades-in-arms, defeated them and forced them to suffer heavy losses ... The first clash with the Boche ended in victory, which will be followed by others. Long live General de Gaulle! Long live France! "[Gandini, 2000, p. 55-56].

The success of Xar Gilan became, like the defense of Bir Hakim, a pebble whose fall caused an avalanche. By mid-March, the 8th Army, advancing along the coast, reached the "Mareth Line". At one time, this fortified strip was built by the French to protect Tunisia from a possible Italian invasion from Libya. Now the Italians and Germans were using it to stop the British and French from invading Tunisia from Libya. The Germans carried out significant work on the modernization of the "Mareth Line", which turned into a serious obstacle for the advancing 3. It was extended for 45 km along the northern steep bank of Wadi Zigzau from the coast to the Matmata mountain range. The long-term artillery and machine-gun emplacements, full-profile trenches, concrete casemates and dugouts forming it were covered by 25 km of anti-tank ditches, 110 km of wire fences and 45 thousand mines. The Maret Line was defended by a German-Italian army corps of 76 thousand people with 110 tanks, 1200 guns and 200 mortars [Gandini, 2000, p. 52].

On March 20-23, Montgomery tried to break through the fortifications, but after losing 150 tanks, he was forced to abandon the frontal assault [Gandini, 2000, p. 53]. And here the victory of F. Leclerc, who managed to hold Ksar Gilan, was very useful, which opened up the possibility of bypassing the "Mareth Line" from the flank. The command of the 8th Army decided to move the direction of the main attack from the coast to the desert. But to do this, it was necessary to find a passage through the Matmata Mountains. "The main point of my plan," B. Montgomery later wrote, " was to bypass the enemy's flank from the west of Matmata... The problem has become one: is it possible to find a way through the sands?" [Montgomery, 2004, p. 157]. And the passage was found by the fighter squadron of V. Penyakov!

3 It is more than likely that these works were carried out by Rommel's "white slaves" - Soviet prisoners of war used in the African Army in the construction of military infrastructure, as well as as porters. The fact that the memory of them has been preserved is due to A. Z. Yegorin, Deputy Director of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who discovered this almost unknown page of the Second World War [Yegorin, 1998, p. 80]. Of the 22,000 prisoners sent to North Africa, about a third died unable to bear the inhumane conditions of detention. The survivors were taken by the Allies to Novorossiysk after the end of the war. But when the Germans retreated, many managed to escape, take refuge in oases and dissolve, converting to Islam, among the local population...

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The 10th Army Corps, 1st Armored and 4th Indian Divisions crossed the mountains through it.

Compound L was now assigned the task of capturing the only pass in the Malab mountain range that covered the approaches to Al-Hamma. F. Leclerc, taking two companies with him, made a march to the north and attacked the enemy positions on the move, without waiting for the entire compound to approach. The blow was unexpected for the Italians, who retreated, leaving 40 prisoners in the hands of the French. Having occupied the dominant peaks, the soldiers of the compound were able to see an avalanche of 200 tanks and 27 thousand New Zealand soldiers rushing towards Al-Hamma. The flanking maneuver was successful, and the African Army was forced to abandon the "Mareth Line" and start withdrawing to the north (Goutard, 1968, p. 1324).

On March 29, the soldiers of the Fighting France, following in the vanguard of the 8th Army, entered Gabes. The struggle for North Africa was coming to an end. On May 7, 1943, the Germans surrendered, and on May 12, the Italians surrendered.

But there were still two years of fierce fighting ahead. On the night of August 24-25, 1944, the soldiers of the former compound "L", which formed the backbone of the French 2nd armored division, entered Paris, where F. Leclerc, who had become a divisional general by that time, accepted the surrender of the German garrison. And on November 23, 1944, the veterans of the Sahrawi epic, having liberated Strasbourg, raised the French flag on the cathedral, fulfilling the oath they had taken four years ago in Kufra.

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Irving D. Erwin Rommel. Hannibal of the twentieth Century, Moscow: Publisher Bystrov, 2006.

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Gandini J. Pistes du Sud Tunisien а; trovers l'histoire. Calvisson: Extrem'Sud Editions, 2000.

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General Philippe Francois Marie Le Clerc de Hautecloque // http://worldatwar.net/biography/l/leclerc/index.html.

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