The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany has gone down in history as the greatest event of our time. Its results were the defeat of the striking force of imperialism-German fascism, the salvation of European and world civilization. During the Great Patriotic War, the invincibility of the world's first socialist state and the invincibility of socialism were proved.

The war of the Soviet state was a truly national, just, patriotic war. A vivid evidence of its nationwide character was the struggle of Soviet patriots in the rear of the German fascist troops, which resulted in a mass partisan movement. This struggle has acquired an unprecedented scale in the history of wars, and has become one of the most important strategic factors in the victory of the Soviet people. The partisan war led by the Communist Party caused great damage to the German-Fascist troops and accelerated the victory of the Soviet Union over the enemy. "Soviet partisans and underground fighters made a significant contribution to the Victory over the fascist invaders, "the CPSU Central Committee resolution" On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 " notes. 1

Trying to distort and falsify the results and lessons of the Great Patriotic War, bourgeois scientists pay close attention to the Soviet partisan movement. After the Second World War, hundreds of works were published, covering the role of the partisan movement in the temporarily occupied Soviet territory from a bourgeois-class perspective. Their number increased especially in the 1950s and 1960s, when imperialist circles were confronted with the broadest scope of the national liberation movement in the world, during which peoples often used partisan methods of struggle. An increased interest in the history of the partisan movement was also caused by attempts to develop the "doctrine of anti-partisan warfare" in order to use it to suppress national liberation revolutions.

So, in the 50s, the American military command organized a study of the partisan movement in the USSR during World War II, based on German materials available in the United States (reports of fascist punitive groups, protocols of interrogations of partisans, etc.). As a result, in 1964, a weighty volume (over 800 pages) was published "Soviet documents". Partisans in World War II " edited by J. Armstrong. In the same period and later, major works were published by A. Dallin, C. Dixon, O. Heilbrunn, I. Kamenetsky, W. Havemann, V. Redelis, K. Maxey and others.-

1 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

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which attempt to distort the nature, scope and role of the partisan movement in 1941-1944 2 .

Since the mid-70s, bourgeois historiography has once again become increasingly interested in the history of the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. This is due, first, to the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism and the intensification of its reaction in all areas, to the preparation of a new "crusade" against the Soviet Union and all revolutionary forces, to the deployment of a "psychological war" against the USSR and the countries of the socialist community, to the intensification of ideological sabotage on the part of imperialism, in which one of the most important First, the falsification of Soviet military history; second, the fulfillment of the social order of imperialist circles for the "theoretical" justification of the concept of" fighting international terrorism", aimed at launching a broad offensive against the revolutionary and national liberation movement and using anti - partisan actions. "Terrorism in our time continues in the form of guerrilla warfare," writes Professor of Political Science S. Handel (USA)3; third, the NATO command sees in the study of the Soviet partisan movement specific tasks of finding ways to secure its rear in the event of a war that is now being intensively prepared by imperialism. Thus, the British military specialist K. Simpson admits :" Despite the historical difference, the German experience during the Second World War proves the obvious connection with the problem of the security of rear communications on the central front of NATO today " 4. fourth, bourgeois falsifiers are making strenuous attempts to distort and downplay the historical significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War in in connection with its 40th anniversary, to erase from the consciousness of the world community the truth about the immortal feat of the Soviet people in defeating fascism and thereby contribute to the ideological preparation of a new world war.

All these circumstances significantly contributed to the fact that in the 70s and early 80s, a new stream of literature about the Great Patriotic War, and in particular about partisan struggle in the rear of the German troops, was splashed out on the shelves of Western bookstores, primarily in the United States and England .5 This literature is mostly repeated-

2 A detailed critique of these works is given in the works of Soviet scientists: Ivanov A. G. Exposing the bourgeois falsification of the Soviet Partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War, the role of the CPSU in its organization and development. - Scientific works of Kuban State University, Krasnodar, 1972, vol. 150; Marushkin B. I. The Great Patriotic War in anti-Marxist historiography. In: Critique of the Bourgeois Historiography of the Soviet Society, Moscow, 1972; Volkov N. Partisan movement in the assessments of the German-fascist command. - Military Historical Journal, 1973, N 2; Kardashov V. I., Samukhin V. P. Zapadnogermanskie istoriki i memoiristy o sovetskom partizanskom dvizhenii [West German historians and memoirists about the Soviet partisan movement]. In: Critique of Bourgeois concepts of the history and Politics of the CPSU, L. 1974; Volynets V. V. On the issue of exposing by Soviet historians Anglo-American falsifications of the leading role of the CPSU in the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. In: Voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk [Questions of Social Sciences]. Kyiv. 1978; Gridnev V. M. The struggle of Soviet peasants with the occupation regime (1941-1944) and bourgeois historiography. - Voprosy istorii, 1978, N 7; Mertsalov A. N. Zapadnogermanskaya bourgeois historiography of the Second World War, Moscow, 1978; et al.

3 International Terrorism in the Contemporary World. Westport (Conn.), 1978, p. 11.

4 Simpson K. The German Experience of Rear Area Security on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945. - Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. Lnd., December 1976, N 4, vol. 121, p. 39.

5 Hawes S., White R., eds. Resistance in Europe, 1939 - 1945. - Lnd. 1975; Foot M. R. D. Resistance: an Analysis of European Resistance to the Nazism, 1940 - 1945. Lnd. 1976; Helmdach E. Uberfall? Der sowjetisch-deutsche Aufmarsch 1941. Neckargemunud. 1976; Baldwin H. W. The Crucial Years 1939 - 1941. The World at War, N. Y. 1976; Simpson K. Op. cit.; Bethell N. Russia besieged. Alexandria (Virg.).

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It reflects the previous biased assessments of the Soviet partisan movement, and uses most of the arguments used earlier, which were convincingly refuted by Soviet authors at the time. At the same time, it should be noted some features associated with an attempt to" in-depth " study of the nature of the partisan movement, its socio-political motivations, as well as distorted coverage of the Marxist-Leninist theoretical foundations of the partisan struggle, the use of more Nazi documents and testimonies of traitors and traitors to the Motherland with their pathological hatred of everything Soviet.

These features are related to the general attitudes of reactionary bourgeois historiography that have emerged in recent years, which corresponds to the nature of the information and propaganda intervention currently being undertaken against the Soviet Union and socialist countries, as discussed at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee .6
The bourgeois literature of the last decade devoted to the history of the Soviet partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War has not yet been subjected to a thorough critical analysis. In this article, the authors seek to fill this gap to a certain extent, to reveal the inconsistency of new attempts to falsify the glorious pages of the history of the Great Patriotic War, undertaken in connection with the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory.

The history of the national partisan struggle in the rear of the German troops during the Great Patriotic War is sufficiently fully covered in Soviet literature, the scale and scope of the partisan movement and its significance in the defeat of the Nazi invaders are revealed on a large factual basis, the impact of socialist ideas, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism as motivating motives in the Soviet Resistance movement is the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party in organizing armed struggle behind enemy lines 7 .

1977; Irving D. Hitlers war. N. Y. 1977; Buss P. H., Mollow A. Hitler?s Germanic Legions: an Illustrated History of Western European Legions with the SS (in Russia), 1941 - 1943. N. Y. 1978; Cooper M. The German Army, 1933 - 1945, its Political and Military Failure. Lnd. 1978; ejusd. The Phantom War: the German Struggle against Soviet Partisans 1941 - 1944. Lnd. 1978; Salisbury H. E. The Unknown War. Lnd. 1978; Hillgruber A. Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege. Gottingen. 1979; Lucas J. War on the Eastern Front 1941 - 1945: the German Soldier in Russia. Lnd. 1979; Nollan G., Zindel L. Gestapo ruft Moskau. Sowjetische Fallschirmagenten in 2. Weltkrieg. Munchen. 1979; The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II. N. Y. 1980; Young P., ed. The Almanac of World War II. Lnd. 1981; Collier R. 1941. Armageddon. Lnd. 1981; Aschenauer R. Krieg ohne Grenzen: Der Partisanenkampf gegen Deutschland 1939 - 1945. Loeni a/Starnbergersee. 1982; Thomas D. The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939 - 1982. - Journal of Contemporary History, October 1983, vol. 18, N 4, etc.

6 See Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, June 14-15, 1983. Stenogr. otch. M. 1983, p. 30.

7 Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945]. Vol. 1-6. Moscow, 1960-1965; Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza. Brief History, Moscow 1970; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vol. 5, book 1, Moscow 1970; History of the USSR from ancient Times to the present day, Vol. X, Moscow 1973; History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, Vol. 4-9, 12, Moscow 1975-1983; World War II. Brief History, Moscow, 1984; Voina v tylu vraemy [War in the rear of the enemy]. On some problems of the history of the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. Issue 1. Moscow, 1974; The Party at the head of the People's Struggle behind enemy Lines. 1941-1944, Moscow, 1976; Podvig naroda, Moscow, 1981; and others. For a historiographical review of literature on the partisan movement, see: Aziassky N. F., Knyazkov A. S. Armed struggle of Soviet patriots in the occupied territory of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (Historiographical review). In the collection of articles: Historiography of the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1980; Yudenkov A. F. Kommunisticheskaya partiya-organizer and leader of the partisan movement. (Historiography of the issue). - In the same place.

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Diametrically opposite positions are taken by bourgeois historical science, which fulfills the social order of reactionary circles of imperialism. For the most part, it grossly distorts the achievements of Soviet historical science, and by subjectively biased selection of sources, it tries to create a picture of the armed struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines that pleases the bourgeoisie, in order to disorient public opinion and belittle the world-historical contribution of the Soviet Union to the defeat of fascism. An example of such a biased approach is the book of the English historian M. Cooper "The Ghost War": in the list of references, he cites only one Soviet work - A. Fedorov's book "The Underground Regional Committee operates" (Moscow 1952).8 This approach distinguishes many works of bourgeois historians.

Although bourgeois historical literature is diverse, and its authors take different positions in their views (from extreme right-wing, conservative, to liberal, objectivist), the dominant line they lead is falsification of the history of the Soviet partisan movement. V. I. Lenin described such writings of bourgeois writers as follows: "There are a lot of shades among this public, but they have no serious significance from a political point of view, because they are reduced to how hypocritically or sincerely, crudely or subtly, clumsily or skilfully they perform their lackey duties in relation to the bourgeoisie."9
The most important place in the modern historiography of the problem is occupied by the recent tendency to distort Marxist-Leninist theoretical propositions about the partisan movement and its role in the revolutionary liberation struggle. Some authors put forward the thesis that Karl Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin never attached any importance to the guerrilla war, considering it "simply as one of the unimportant aspects of the revolutionary war." The famous English historian W. Laqueur, for example, states that " all of Lenin's propositions on partisan warfare without exception... they were negative in nature." Lenin was "opposed to all forms of irregular military action involving partisans," according to D. Thomas and G. Legette (USA).10
It is well known that the founders of Marxism-Leninism attached great importance to the partisan struggle and its role in the realization of revolutionary liberation goals. A great theoretical contribution of Karl Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin was the formulation and elaboration of the question of the forms and methods of the partisan movement, its socio-class essence ,as well as of partisan warfare as a specific form of struggle against the aggressor. 11
The founders of Marxism-Leninism regarded guerrilla warfare as a just, natural and natural act of any nation fighting for its national independence and social liberation. They exposed the untenability of the views of those who claimed that guerrilla warfare was "illegal" and taught how to use it.-

8 See Cooper M. The Phantom War.

9 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 39, p. 139.

10 Laqueur W. The Guerrilla Reader. A Historical Anthology. Lnd. 1978, p. 152; Thomas D. The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939 - 1982, - Journal of Contemporary History, October 1983, vol. 18, N 4, p. 699; Legett G. The Cheka. Oxford (Calif.), 1982, p. 331 - 335.

11 For more information, see: Pavlov Ya. S. V. I. Lenin and the Partisan movement. Minsk. 1975; Andrianov V. V. I. Lenin on partisan actions. Military-Historical Journal, 1976, No. 10; Makarov N. I. Implementation of Marxist-Leninist ideas about partisan struggle during the Great Patriotic War. - Voprosy istorii CPSU, 1980, N 6.

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the loss of the "peaceful" population in the fight against foreign invaders is a violation of the rules of warfare, equivalent to robbery. Engels wrote: "The people who want to win their independence should not be limited to the usual methods of warfare. Mass insurrection, revolutionary war, partisan detachments everywhere " 12-this is the path to victory.

Showing great sympathy for the struggle of the French people against the Prussian invaders in 1870-1871, Engels assessed the nature of the partisan struggle in France as follows: "With their atrocities and cruelties, the Prussians not only did not suppress the popular resistance, but doubled its energy.. the guerrilla war is becoming more and more widespread every day. " 13 Marx and Engels believed that genuine popular resistance in the form of partisan struggle had won the right to be considered a method of warfare. 14
The experience of partisan warfare summed up by Marx and Engels was generalized and developed by Lenin in the new historical conditions. He repeatedly pointed out the justice and legitimacy of partisan struggle in liberation wars. Defining the partisan struggle as an armed uprising of the people, Lenin sharply criticized the views of Western European opportunists and Mensheviks, who declared the revolutionary partisan war to be anarchism, blankism, terrorism, and a movement of isolated individuals. He emphasized that "partisan actions are not revenge, but military actions" 15 generated by the creativity of the masses.

In support of Lenin's "negative" attitude to the partisan war, Laqueur cites his article "Partisan War", written in September 1906, and sees in it only an assessment of the unsuccessful experience of the revolutionary events of 1905-190616 . Meanwhile, Lenin in this article convincingly refutes those who underestimate the partisan war .17
Bourgeois authors, in order to support the untenable thesis that Lenin has a "negative" attitude towards the partisan movement, often refer to his negative attitude towards "partisanship" in the construction of the armed forces of the victorious proletariat. Therefore, writes the American military expert D. Thomas, "in the civil war, the Bolsheviks refused to encourage guerrilla warfare." 18
On the contrary, during the years of the civil war, the Communist Party, leading the struggle of the Soviet people against the interventionists and White Guards, gave the partisan movement an ideological and organized character and developed it in accordance with the goals and objectives of the Soviet state. At the same time, the party attached the greatest importance to the creation of regular armed forces of the socialist state.

Analyzing the solution of the military question at various stages of the struggle for the creation and consolidation of Soviet society, Lenin in April 1919 said:: "I will allow myself to touch on several different epochs in relation to our military tasks. Our first military task, which faces us, was solved by the same irregular partisan insurrection, as the comrades there are now solving in the Ukraine. There we have not so much a war as a partisan movement and a spontaneous uprising." But the conquest of power by the proletariat is based on-

12 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 6, p. 416.

13 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 188.

14 Ibid., vol. 10, pp. 455-456; vol. 17, p. 170.

15 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 12, p. 181.

16 Laqueur W. Op. cit., p. 152.

17 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 14, p. 9.

18 Thomas D. Op. cit., p. 699.

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the source of military power should not be irregular forces and the corresponding partisan means and forms of struggle, but the regular army, which is "characteristic of the consolidated power of every class, including the proletariat" 19 .

Revolutionary practice has fully confirmed the conclusion of the classics of Marxism-Leninism that the regular armies of the victorious proletariat play the main role in defending the gains of the revolution, but even in these conditions, a partisan movement can have great political and military significance. This conclusion was convincingly confirmed during the Great Patriotic War.

Attempts by Sovietologists to distort the essence of the Marxist-Leninist propositions about the role and significance of the partisan struggle are primarily aimed at emasculating the class character of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War, distorting the role of the Communist Party in leading the armed struggle of Soviet patriots behind enemy lines.

Since, anti-communists claim, the ideological leaders of the Communist Party had a "negative" attitude towards the partisan movement, the party and Soviet leadership during the war also did not support the partisan struggle and did not prepare for it. "The Soviet partisan movement was unplanned"," there was no real plan for a partisan war in the occupied territory", - M. Cooper, H. Baldwin and T. Dupuy assure 20 . Some bourgeois historians go even further, claiming that the Soviet government was "wary" of a partisan movement that "could easily be used against both Hitler and Stalin." 21 For example, the City of Salisbury states: "When the war was unleashed, the central partisan headquarters was created under the leadership of P. K. Ponomarenko, a long-time Belarusian leader. The headquarters was established in July 1941, but Ponomarenko did not give permission to start operations until July 1942."22
The Communist Party was the leading and guiding force of Soviet society during the Great Patriotic War, which raised the entire nation to repel the enemy. Drawing on the vast experience of leading the partisan movement and underground struggle during the civil war, the party enriched this experience during the war, making extensive use of the invaluable arsenal of Marxism-Leninism on the issues of the people's liberation struggle. Following Lenin's instructions that partisan actions should be carried out under the control of the party , 23 in the first days of the war, the CPSU(b) developed a clear and precise program of actions of the Soviet people behind enemy lines, and carried out extensive preliminary work on the creation of partisan detachments and underground organizations. In the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of June 29, 1941, the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions were invited in the areas occupied by the enemy "to create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight enemy army units, to incite partisan war everywhere and everywhere to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, arson create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices in the occupied areas, pursue and destroy them at each stage.

19 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 38, pp. 286-287.

20 Cooper M The Phantom War, p. 12; Baldwin H. W. Op. cit., p. 349; Dupuy T. N. An Analysis of the War. In: The Russian Front. Germany?s War in the East, 1941 - 1945. Lnd. 1978, p. 85.

21 Simpson K. Op. cit., p. 41; Salisbury H. E. Op. cit., p. 164.

22 Salisbury H. E. Op. cit., p. 165.

23 See: Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 12, p. 229.

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take every step, disrupt all their activities " 24 . The speech of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, J. V. Stalin, broadcast on the radio on July 3, 1941, called for partisan struggle behind enemy lines in the spirit of the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of June 29, 1941.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of July 18, 1941 "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops"was of the greatest importance for the organization and development of the movement. It emphasized that the most important condition for the development of the people's struggle behind enemy lines is party leadership, and in accordance with this, the task was put forward: "To deploy a network of our Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to direct all actions against the fascist occupiers." For the organization of partisan detachments, it was proposed to allocate " experienced combat and completely loyal to our party, personally known to the leaders of party organizations and proven comrades." Party organizations were focused on ensuring that the struggle behind enemy lines "received the full scope of direct, broad and heroic support for the Red Army fighting German fascism at the front." 25
Following the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Central Committees, regional committees and district Committees of the Communist Parties of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelia, and the regions of the RSFSR that were under occupation adopted resolutions on the organization and development of partisan struggle in the rear of the advancing enemy.

As in the years of the civil war and the imperialist intervention, Communists who were left behind enemy lines, as well as sent there through the front line, led the national struggle in all its forms in the temporarily occupied territory of the Nazis. Thus, more than 30 thousand communists fought in the partisan detachments of the occupied regions of the RSFSR, and 22 thousand communists fought in the occupied territory of the Byelorussian SSR. About 40 thousand communists were engaged in the development of the people's struggle against the invaders in Ukraine .26 Political and organizational work on the creation of partisan detachments and the expansion of all forms of popular struggle was carried out by the Communists of Moldavia, Karelia, and the Baltic republics.

The thousands of Communists behind enemy lines raised and led the masses of the people to defeat the fascist invaders. Overcoming the most difficult conditions of the occupation regime, the Communists showed great endurance, steadfastness and heroism in the struggle. They were the bearers of the party's political experience, the exponents of its deepest devotion to the cause of the working people and socialism.

The party's call to launch a nationwide war behind enemy lines found a warm response among the population. All its layers engaged in a deadly battle with the invaders. The miscalculation of the leaders of fascist Germany in assessing the partisan movement did not consist in the fact that, as some bourgeois historians claim, they did not allocate enough punitive forces to destroy it. The failure of the aggressive policy of German fascism against the Soviet Union was predetermined by ignoring its socialist system. The invaders were opposed not by individual groups of Soviet patriots, but by the entire Soviet Union.

24 CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. Ed. 8-E. T. 6, p. 19.

25 Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

26 Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. Vol. 3. Kiev. 1975, p. 414; Underground party organs of the Communist Party of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1944). Minsk. 1975, p. 251; Makarov N. I. Nepokorennaya zemlya Rossiiskaya, Moscow, 1976, p. 314.

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people. It was the popular support of the partisan movement that made him invincible.

Already in the first months of the war, powerful partisan forces were created in the territory occupied by the invaders. By the end of 1941, there were more than 2 thousand partisan detachments with a total number of more than 90 thousand people and a significant number of combat groups27 . "Our partisan movement," noted M. I. Kalinin, " resulted in a general popular struggle, which grew stronger every month. Our party has played an enormous role in this movement. The Communists became the initiators and organizers of the first partisan groups. A large part of the success can be attributed to the centralized and purposeful leadership of the partisan movement. " 28
From the first days of the war, partisan detachments launched active military operations. The methods of fighting in the rear of the German-fascist troops were diverse: attacks on garrisons, strong points, columns of troops and headquarters, destruction of warehouses and logistics bases, seizure of equipment and weapons, sabotage of land, river and sea communications, and disabling communications equipment. For the Red Army, intelligence was obtained about the size of the enemy, its weapons, equipment and plans, as well as about the regroupings of units and formations.

The wide scale of the partisan movement was forced to recognize the German command. The order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, W. Keitel, dated September 16, 1941 stated: "From the very beginning of the military campaign against Soviet Russia, a communist insurgent movement arose in all the regions occupied by Germany... In this case, we are talking about a mass movement directed centrally from Moscow... Thus, there is an ever-increasing threat to the German leadership of the war. " 29
On May 30, 1942, in order to unite the leadership of the partisan movement behind enemy lines and for its further development, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSPD) was created by the decision of the State Defense Committee, and then the republican and regional headquarters. P. K. Ponomarenko, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of Belarus, was appointed Chief of Staff. The TSHPD was assigned the task of directing and coordinating the activities of partisan formations, supplying the partisans with weapons and equipment, and interacting with the Red Army.

These facts convincingly refute the fabrications of Sovietologists about the unorganized nature of the partisan movement and their attempts to downplay the leading role of the Communist Party in its development. They prove the absolute invalidity of the bourgeois versions that the Soviet leadership did not use Lenin's ideas about supporting and organizing a nationwide guerrilla war.

Unable to deny the role of the party leadership in organizing the partisan movement, bourgeois historians try to distort this role, to prove that only" on the orders of party functionaries " partisan detachments were created and operated, while denying the patriotic initiative of the masses. These "party functionaries", as well as regular military personnel, says the English historian M. Foot, "knew their duty: to train and lead every fit person."

27 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 4, Moscow, 1975, p. 127.

28 Kalinin M. I. Articles and Speeches (1941-1946), Moscow, 1975, p.134.

29 Cit. Software: Criminal goals - criminal means. Documents on the occupation policy of fascist Germany on the territory of the USSR (1941-1945). Moscow, 1968, p. 89.

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a man or woman was sent to partisan detachments, which were supposed to receive orders from the highest party leadership. " 30 If they were local partisan groups acting on their own initiative, according to a book by the English historians Haves and White, they were "small in number", fought only "to save themselves" and "waited for the war to come to an end"31 .

Here we are dealing with an attempt to separate one side of the phenomenon from the other, to absolutize certain features of the event. On the one hand, bourgeois historians try to show the Soviet partisan movement only as fully organized by the central leadership without any initiative of the masses; on the other, they try to see in the patriotic movement of the working people behind enemy lines only a spontaneous, unmanageable process. They do not see an indissoluble link between the broadest, to a certain extent spontaneous, mass action to fight the occupiers and the party leadership, which gave this movement an organized, purposeful character. It is impossible to deny the fact that a partisan movement can be effective only if there is the broadest initiative of the masses, the highest patriotic impulse of the people. The widespread deployment of the partisan movement was made possible by the massive influx of local people into the partisan formations. The main content, the main feature of the partisan movement, Lenin pointed out, is its popular character. Without the full participation and support of the people, there can be no successful partisan actions.

A partisan movement cannot be artificially inculcated, apart from the desire and will of the people. "The necessity to take into account the mood of the broad masses in organizing partisan actions is beyond doubt," wrote V. I. Lenin .32 The Communist Party relies on the nationwide character of the movement, supports the creative initiative of the masses, and gives the movement its main strength - ideological character, organization ,and effectiveness. 33 These Leninist conclusions and propositions were convincingly confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. "The inspirer and organizer of the Victory of the Soviet people," states the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," was the Leninist Communist Party. Through its many-sided activities, it has ensured a strong unity of the political, state and military leadership, army and people, front and rear. " 34
The desire of bourgeois historians to distort the leading and inspiring role of the Communist Party, to denigrate the history of the Soviet partisan movement, is clearly seen in their attempts to deny the national character of the struggle behind enemy lines. Bourgeois historiography is dominated by versions that partisan detachments were artificial formations, either as specially created groups of " commandos "(Thomas)," poorly organized groups of paratroopers", detachments of" fanatical communists "(Baldwin), or accidentally formed due to circumstances groups of" encircled and deserters " (Dupuis).35
Some reactionary historians try to convince the reader of the alleged" indifference "and" passivity "of the Soviet people towards the invaders, or even of the" hostility " of the Soviet government. "By submitting-

30 Foot M. S. D. Op. cit., p. 12.

31 Hawes S., White R. eds. Resistance in Europe 1939 - 1945, p. 177.

32 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 13, p. 365.

33 See ibid., vol. 14, pp. 7-12.

34 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

35 Thomas D. Op. cit., p. 699; Baldwin H. W. Op. cit., p. 399; Dupuy T. N. Op. cit., p. 85; etc.

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the vast majority of the population of the occupied areas, Cooper writes, " were at least indifferent to the invaders, and for the most part welcomed them as an incentive that could bring about changes for the better."36 N. Ryazanovsky, Simpson, Irving, and others hold a similar point of view. Previously, it was put forward by Armstrong, Dallin and some others.

It should be noted that the fiction about the artificial formation of partisan detachments out of connection with the national resistance movement was put into circulation by the Hitlerites themselves during the war. In the orders and instructions for combating partisans, the latter were declared members of" forced "organizations" inspired " by the Communists. This was, in particular, written in the "Basic provisions for the fight against partisans", approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the German Land Forces V. Brauchich in the fall of 1941. The "Combat Manual for Combating Partisans in the East", which was put into effect on December 1, 1942 and signed by the Chief of Staff of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht A. Jodl, provided information about the composition of partisan detachments. The instruction stated that partisan detachments were recruited from the remaining Soviet soldiers in the occupied territory, from the allegedly "forcibly conscripted recruits from the population and partly from the population who, out of need, were forced to join these gangs for the purpose of plunder"37 .

The entire history of the Soviet partisan movement refutes these claims. From the very beginning of the occupation, the Soviet population took an active part in the struggle against the Nazi invaders. The so-called liberators were met with national resistance and armed struggle. M. I. Kalinin said in those days:"The partisan struggle should be considered a manifestation of the greatest popular initiative in the defense of the Motherland, in the defense of the freedom of their people from the enslavers." 38
All forms of popular resistance were closely interrelated. Armed partisan groups worked together with the underground. Militant organizations and groups in cities and other localities, when the situation required it, switched to open armed actions. The struggle of the population often rose to the level of sabotage activities of partisans and underground fighters: residents of the occupied areas went out in whole villages to destroy railway tracks, arranged blockages on the roads, and took part in uprisings behind enemy lines with weapons in their hands.

As for the composition of the partisan detachments, they were voluntary armed formations representing all segments of the population. They also included military personnel-soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who failed to break out of the encirclement. The organizing core of the partisan detachments was an active member of the Communists and Komsomol members. The bulk of the partisans were local residents, who constantly replenished the partisan detachments.

Recruitment of partisan detachments took place exclusively on a voluntary basis. The TSHPD directive specifically stated to the local headquarters of the partisan movement: "I prohibit the mobilization of the population in partisan detachments. The partisan movement is a volunteer movement, a patriot movement, and it is growing and will continue to grow

36 Cooper M. The Phantom War, p. 20.

37 Cited in: Critique of bourgeois concepts of the history and politics of the CPSU, L. 1974, p. 334.

38 Kalinin M. I. Uk. soch., p. 427.

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as a result of the great desire of the working masses to defeat the German occupiers. " 39
Partisan detachments were constantly replenished with patriots from among the local population. A particularly large increase in the number of partisan detachments was observed in 1942-1943. Despite heavy losses, by November 1942 there were 1,770 detachments of 125,000 men. Only in December 1942, according to the TSSPD, there were about 140 detachments and groups with a total number of more than 14 thousand people .40 Partisan formations grew especially rapidly in Belarus, Ukraine, and the Leningrad Region. By the beginning of 1944, the total number of armed partisans, despite losses in battles, reached 250 thousand people .41 In total, in 1941-1944, over 1 million people fought in the ranks of the Soviet partisans .42
The direct support of the armed partisan forces were their hidden reserves - self-defense units, self-protection units and others. In areas controlled by partisans, they guarded settlements, reported on the appearance of the enemy, and helped neutralize spies and provocateurs. Reserves served as the main source of replenishment of partisan formations, and they were often involved in combat operations. In the spring of 1943, they numbered more than 500,000 people only in Ukraine, Belarus, Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and Oryol Oblasts43 . The actual reserve of partisans were all Soviet people who sought to fight the enemy. The command of the 3rd Leningrad Brigade reported in December 1942: "95% of the population of the Porkhovsky district actively supports the partisans. It was not uncommon for the population of entire villages, led by the headman, to express a desire to join partisan detachments. " 44 Examples of this kind are not isolated.

The composition of the partisans clearly reflected the national character of the partisan movement. By the beginning of 1944, partisan detachments and underground groups included: workers-30.1%; peasants-40.5%; employees-29.4%; 90.7% of partisans were men, 9.3% were women, and up to 60% were young people .45 According to data on partisan formations in Belarus at the end of 1943, 88.8% of local residents were in them46 . A vivid example of the national struggle of Soviet patriots is the creation of partisan territories and zones behind enemy lines. They were formed in Belarus, Leningrad, Oryol, Kalinin and Smolensk regions. By the summer of 1942, 11 partisan territories had emerged, where many thousands of square kilometers of Soviet land behind enemy lines were under full partisan control. Their area was equal to the territory of such European states as Holland, Denmark and Belgium, combined 47 .

In the partisan regions, people lived according to Soviet laws. District party committees and Soviet bodies - district executive committees and village councils-operated legally here, and schools, hospitals,and clubs were reopened. The entire population stood with the partisans to defend the partisan territories. The creation and expansion of partisan territories and zones testified to the courageous struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines for the preservation of Soviet power, for the socialist system. Their existence

39 Cit. In: Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], vol. 5, book 1, p. 491.

40 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 6, pp. 170, 174-175.

41 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 303.

42 The party is at the head of the people's struggle behind enemy lines. 1941-1944, p. 68.

43 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

44 A party at the head of the people's struggle behind enemy lines. 1941-1944, p. 68.

45 Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol. 6, Moscow, 1978, p. 231.

46 History of the Second World War 1939-1945 Vol. 7, p. 304.

47 World War II. Brief history, p. 162.

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it signified the complete failure of Hitler's "new order" and convincingly proved the determination of the Soviet people to fight to the end for the socialist ideals, for the freedom and independence of their Homeland .48
The just nature of the war waged by the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders in defense of the socialist gains for the freedom and independence of the world's first state of workers and peasants was the motive that determined the readiness of the Soviet people to take up arms against the invaders and fight heroically in defense of the socialist Fatherland. Lenin's foresight was fully confirmed in the partisan war: "There will never be a victory for a people in which the majority of workers and peasants have recognized, felt and seen that they are defending their own, Soviet power-the power of the working people, that they are defending the cause whose victory will ensure for them and their children the opportunity to enjoy all the benefits of culture, human labor"49 . The statement of the founders of Marxism-Leninism that the liberation struggle generates unprecedented resistance of the masses of the people, which can undermine the plans of the invaders, has been fully confirmed .50
Meanwhile, the writings of many bourgeois historians are dominated by the claim that the main motive for the resistance of the Soviet people was the "brutal occupation policy" of the Germans, as a result of which the population of the territories occupied by the enemy was forced to wage a "struggle for survival". This point of view is shared by Ryazanovsky, Koller, Cooper, Baldwin, Foote and others. "Cruelty... played a key role in the cause and outcome of the struggle, Cooper writes ... without German barbarity, the Soviet partisan movement could have been stillborn."51 . Earlier, in the 60s, such versions were put forward by West German authors E. Hesse, W. Goerlitz and others. Their untenable positions were exposed by Soviet researchers .52 However, modern authors continue to galvanize these versions.

According to Sovietologists, the reasons for the brutal occupation regime were "Nazi racial philosophy "(Foote), the eternal enmity "between Slavs and Teutons "(Baldwin), between "Western civilization and Asian barbarism" (Lucas), and even as a response to the" cruelty " of the Russians, caused by the Soviet leadership's call to destroy everything, nothing Don't leave it to the enemy (Irving). There are arguments designed at least for the naive reader. For example, Simpson argues that since Hitler considered the Russians primitive and Russia a savage country, he did not use the army to protect the rear zone, as in "civilized" Europe, but the Waffen-Ss and the police, who committed atrocities .53
In fact, the terrorist regime established by the occupiers in the temporarily occupied regions of the Soviet Union was by no means the result of the"eternal enmity between Slavs and Teutons",

48 For more information, see: Gortsev V., Kupreeva A. Partisan zones and actions of the partisans of Belarus (1941-1942). - Military Historical Journal, 1976, N 1.

49 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 38, p. 315.

50 See: K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 2, p. 539.

51 Cooper M. The Phantom War, p. 1; Riasanovsky N. V. A History of Russia. N. Y. 1977, p. 582; Collier R. Op. cit., p. 184; etc.

52 Kardashov V. N., Samukhin V. P. Uk. soch., pp. 332-333, 341.

53 Foot M. R. D. Op. cit., p. 12; Baldwin H. W. Op. cit., p. 305; Lucas J. Op. cit., p. 12 - 13; Irving D. Op. cit., p. 287; Simpson K. Op. cit., p. 41.

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or the arbitrary actions of A. Rosenberg, Reichskommissar of the Eastern Territories, as the authors of the "Almanac of the Second World War" try to assure 54 . Nazi terror was an integral part of the imperialist class policy of German fascism, aimed at eliminating socialism as a system and implementing the program of German colonization of the occupied Soviet lands. Defining the political goals of the war against the USSR, Hitler at a meeting of the leadership of nazi Germany in March 1941 said:: "Our tasks in Russia are to break up the armed forces and destroy the state... It is a struggle for annihilation. " 55 As Irving writes, Hitler repeatedly stated:: "I will go down in history as the one who destroyed Bolshevism... only such a result will be justified. " 56 These goals were fully in line with the class interests of German imperialism. The Soviet people were well aware of this and greeted the invaders not with flowers, as some Sovietologists claim, but with a partisan war that began immediately with the arrival of the invaders and soon took on a broad national character.

There is no doubt that the cruelties and atrocities committed by the invaders in the occupied territories increased the hatred of the Soviet people and their desire to avenge their torment and abuse. But the main driving force of the Soviet people was love for the socialist Motherland, Soviet patriotism. By means of bloody terror, the fascists tried to paralyze the will of the Soviet people to fight, to sow fear among them, the consciousness of the impossibility of resistance. However, the Nazis were deeply disappointed. The ground was truly burning under the feet of the invaders. The partisan movement expanded every day.

Some Western historians try to blame the atrocities of the Nazis on Hitler and his associates, who allegedly "mistakenly" issued the well-known "order on commissars", which ordered all commissars and communists to be shot as soon as they fell into the hands of the enemy. This order, even partially executed, the authors of the Historical Encyclopedia of World War II write ," contributed to the effective strengthening of Russian resistance. " 57
However, this order and other subsequent orders, such as W. Keitel's instruction of September 16, 1941, to shoot from 50 to 100 communists for one German soldier in order to "nip in the bud the communist machinations"58 were not accidental. Realizing that the Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the struggle of the Soviet people against fascism, the Nazis in their plans for the destruction of the Soviet State gave a special place to the physical extermination of Communists, leading cadres, and workers of the ideological front.

Here is how one of the fascist authors imagined the supposed state of Soviet society after the extermination of the communists: "The surviving demoralized rabble of human beings, devoid of leaders, will be so crushed and broken by unspeakable horrors, sufferings and terror that they will stand defenseless and devoid of will in the face of their conqueror and will be clay in their hands the winning potter " 59 . However, the fascist "potters" miscalculated: in the USSR they met at all

54 The Almanac of World War II, p. 126.

55 " Top secret! Command only! " Doc. Moscow, 1967, pp. 179-180.

56 Irving D. Op. cit., p. 283.

57 The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II, p. 291.

58 See: "Top secret! Only for the command!", p. 396.

59 Cit. By: Kondakova N. I. Ideological victory over fascism in 1941-1945, Moscow, 1982, p. 65.

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not with clay, but with granite, with the unbreakable unity of Soviet society. The bloody terror did not break the will of the Soviet people to resist. The partisan struggle flared up more and more.

By distorting the essence of the partisan war and the nature of its driving forces, which determined the scope and scope of the struggle of Soviet patriots, bourgeois falsifiers seek to deprive the partisan movement of the bright ideals of socialism for which the Soviet people fought. "There was no point in calling on the masses to rally around the ideas of Marx and Lenin "with the general" passivity of the Russian peasant, " writes Lukas. The same point of view is shared by K. Ruffman (Germany)60 .

Bourgeois falsifiers did not see the qualitative difference between Soviet patriotism, which combines the patriotism born of the October Revolution and traditional patriotism-a feeling inherent in any nation, especially one waging a war of liberation. "Patriotism,"Lenin pointed out," is one of the most profound feelings anchored by centuries and millennia of isolated fatherlands. " 61
The patriotism of the Russian people was clearly manifested in the periods of liberation wars against foreign invasions. With the victory of the Great October Revolution, patriotism was filled with socialist content, and the defense of the socialist Fatherland became a sacred task for all the working people of the Soviet country. The unprecedented national patriotism that flared up with a bright flame during the Great Patriotic War and served as the most important incentive to heroic resistance to the invaders was the natural result of the greatest socialist transformations, the titanic activity of the party, which instilled in the Soviet people faith in the rightness and invincibility of socialism. The ideological basis of Soviet patriotism was the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the ideas of the Communist Party. "Deep ideological conviction, boundless faith in the rightness of the great Leninist cause, "notes the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU" On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945,"served as an inexhaustible source of spiritual strength of the Soviet people, its moral and political cohesion." 62
During the war years, the Communist Party in its ideological work was widely based on the heroic traditions of the historical past of the Russian and other peoples of the USSR. But the main focus of the party, contrary to the claims of bourgeois authors, was to propagate the revolutionary traditions that had developed in the course of the workers ' struggle for their social liberation, against internal and external counter-revolution during the civil war, and to propagate Lenin's ideas about defending the socialist Fatherland.

The ever-growing desire of the partisans to join the Communist Party was a convincing confirmation of the fact that Soviet patriots fought for bright communist ideals in the fight against the invaders. During the years of occupation in the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol, Kursk and Moscow regions, more than 6 thousand people were accepted into the party in partisan detachments, in Belarus-about 10 thousand, in Ukraine - 4600 people. The party stratum in partisan formations was 10-12%, Komsomol - 20-25%63 .

60 Lucas J. Op. cit., pp. 13, 17; Ruffman K. Sowjetrussland 1917 - 1977. Struktur und Entfaltung einer Weltmacht. Munchen. 1977, s. 65.

61 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 190.

62 Pravda, 17. VI. 1984.

63 The Party led the people's struggle behind enemy lines 1941-1944, from 90 to 91, 146, 158.

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Soviet people fought selflessly for their socialist Fatherland. In the occupied territory, the Nazis could not find such a social stratum on which they could rely. Under the harsh conditions of the occupation regime, the Soviet people remained loyal to their Homeland and socialism, they did not obey the orders of the occupation authorities, did not recognize the "new order" introduced by the fascists, and sabotaged the socio-political and economic activities of the occupiers .64
Some bourgeois authors write a lot about the fact that the desire to conduct an armed struggle against the invaders was inherent only to the Russian people, inspired by the traditional "Great Russian nationalism", while other peoples did not take part in the partisan movement, allegedly experiencing "national hostility to the Soviet regime". Such statements are made by Cooper, L. Davidovich, R. White, and others. 65 The purpose of such statements is obvious - to discredit the Leninist national policy of the Communist Party, to downplay the role and significance of the heroic liberation struggle of the Soviet multinational state, united by internationalism and the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship. All the nations and nationalities of our country, aware of the unity of their destinies with the fate of the socialist Fatherland, have done everything possible to defeat fascism.

The history of the partisan movement and underground struggle against the enemy does not know such a representative national composition of participants, as was the case during the Great Patriotic War. So, in the partisan detachments of Ukraine there were representatives of 62 nationalities; in the partisans of Belarus-71.1% of Belarusians, 19.3% of Russians ,3.9% of Ukrainians; among the partisans of the Smolensk region - representatives of 45 nationalities, in the North Caucasus - 30 nationalities. 66
Attempts by bourgeois authors to belittle the role of the partisan movement in such regions as the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, and the North Caucasus are untenable. There was also a nationwide guerrilla war going on here. So, in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus only in the first half of 1944, about 95 thousand people joined the partisan detachments, 19 brigades and 260 detachments and groups were re-formed. The number of partisans in the regions of Western Ukraine was 12.6 thousand by the summer of 1944 .67 Partisans were active in the North Caucasus. In the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories, Kabardino-Balkar, North Ossetian, Chechen - Ingush ASSR, Circassian, Karachay and Adyghe autonomous regions, 168 partisan detachments with a total number of more than 10 thousand partisans fought in the Great Patriotic War. Kabardians, Balkars, Ossetians, Circassians, Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Nogais, Abadzins and other Caucasian nationalities fought in them68 . Partisan combat operations caused great damage to Hitler's troops. Only by partisans of the Krasnodar Territory during the war

64 For more information, see: Gridnev V. M. The struggle of the peasantry of the occupied regions of the RSFSR against the German-fascist occupation policy. 1941-1944. M. 1976; Zagorulko M. M. Organization of mass sabotage as an important form of national struggle against the invaders. In: The Party at the head of the people's struggle behind enemy lines. 1941-1944; Babakov A. A. Nationwide struggle of Soviet people in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by fascists. In: Podvig naroda [Feat of the People].

65 Cooper M. The Phantom War, p. 4; Davidowicz L. The Holocaust and the Historians. Cambridge (Mass.). 1981, p. 80; Resistance in Europe 1939 - 1945, p. 14; etc.

66 Sovetskie partizany [Soviet Partisans], Moscow, 1963, pp. 374, 512, 172; Ivanov G. P. Kommunisticheskaya partiya - organizer and leader of the national struggle in the rear of the German-fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War. Krasnodar. 1969, p. 62; Essays on the history of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Kyiv. 1977, p. 551.

67 History of the Second World War of 1939-1945. Vol. 8, p. 161; vol. 9, p. 222.

68 Grechko A. A. Battle for the Caucasus, Moscow, 1973, p. 248.

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During the occupation, 500 combat operations were carried out, about 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were killed and wounded. 70
These facts are clear evidence that the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and socialist internationalism were the most important factors contributing to the widespread deployment of the partisan movement behind enemy lines, and the sources of heroism and courage of Soviet patriots.

The selfless struggle of the Soviet partisans behind enemy lines during the Great Patriotic War received national recognition and high praise from the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. More than 184,000 orders and medals were awarded to participants of the partisan movement for their bravery, perseverance and courage shown in the fight against the Nazi invaders behind enemy lines, and 234 participants of the partisan movement were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union .71
A number of recent works by bourgeois authors continue to attempt to downplay the scale, role, and significance of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. "In general, the military capabilities of the partisan forces in the war were not very great," writes Laqueur, " and did not have a decisive influence on its outcome." Cooper 72 calls the Soviet partisan movement a "ghost war". Statements about the" insignificance " of the partisan war behind enemy lines are supported by references to the fact that the alleged losses of Hitler's troops from the partisans were small and did not play a decisive role. Some of the bourgeois historians refer to the figure of German losses of 50 thousand people, which was given at the Nuremberg trials in 1946 by the war criminal A. Jodl. Others go even further. "Recent studies show," Cooper tries to assure the reader, "that they were even smaller, between 15 and 20 thousand people." 73 However, this data is far from the truth. In terms of its scale, political and military results, the partisan struggle, as well as the mass resistance of the population to all the activities of the fascist invaders in their rear, became of strategic importance and turned into one of the decisive factors in defeating the enemy invasion.

During the war, Soviet partisans and underground fighters inflicted huge damage on the enemy in manpower, weapons and equipment. They destroyed, wounded and captured over 1.5 million soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, military construction organizations of the TODT, German officials of the occupation administration, and military railway workers. More than 20 thousand train wrecks were made, 18 thousand steam locomotives and 165 thousand cars were disabled, 12 thousand railway and highway bridges were destroyed and captured, about 53 thousand cars, more than 4.5 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 aircraft, 2.8 thousand guns and mortars 74 .

The nationwide struggle behind enemy lines, especially on communications and communication lines, caused stiffness in the actions of the fascist units

70 For more information about the partisans of the North Caucasus, see: Ivanov G. P. In the rear of the frontline, Moscow, 1971; Khmyrov A. P. Communists of Kuban-organizers of the partisan struggle (1942-1943) - Scientific Works of Kuban University, 1972, issue 150.

71 Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. Vol. 5, book 1, pp. 651-652.

72 Laqueur W. Op. cit., p. 3; Cooper M. The Phantom War, p. 162.

73 Cooper M. The Phantom War, p. IX.

74 See: Essays of the Communist Party of Moldova. Chisinau. 1964, p. 302; Ocherki istorii Karelii [Essays on the History of Karelia]. 1964, p. 398; National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Doc. i m-ly. Vol. 1. Minsk. 1967, p. 23; Struggle for the liberation of the Baltic States in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, Vol. 2. Riga. 1967, p. 330, 331; Ponomarenko P. K. Nepokorennye (Nationwide struggle in the rear of the fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War). Moscow, 1975, p. 58; Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945 Vol. 1, p. 246, 508; vol. 2, p. 366; vol. 3, p. 42, 99, 416, 417, 428; Makarov N. I. Nepokorennaya zemlya Rossiiskaya, p. 314.

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and connections, slowing down maneuvers by troops and resources. The actual terms of regrouping troops planned by the enemy were disrupted. The Fascist command lost control of units and formations. All this weakened the combat capability of the enemy army.

The results of the Soviet partisan movement behind enemy lines are characterized not only by human, material and other losses, but also by the enormous impact that it had on the decline in morale and combat capability of soldiers and officers of the fascist army. The Hitlerite generals were forced to admit this. So, G. Guderian, who commanded the 2nd Panzer Group during the war, and then became chief of the General Staff of the German army, wrote that "as the war took on a protracted character, and the battles at the front became more and more stubborn, the partisan war became a real scourge, strongly affecting the morale of front-line soldiers"75 .

One of the most important results of the activities of the partisans, the struggle of the population behind enemy lines, was the collapse of the political, military and economic plans of the military - political leadership of the Reich to turn the occupied Soviet territories into a source of raw materials, food and free labor for Germany and its allies.

In recent years, bourgeois historiography devoted to the Second World War has suggested that the Soviet partisan movement was ineffective, since the German-Fascist command did not divert significant forces to fight it. Thus, Simpson writes that only a few tens of thousands of people were used against the partisans, half of whom were police troops, "poorly armed: elderly soldiers, only partially fit for military service." 76
However, such claims are refuted by the facts. The popular struggle in the occupied areas required large forces from the enemy to protect communications from the incessant attacks of the partisans. The invaders sought them out by weakening certain sections of the front. So, during the Battle of Moscow in November 1941, according to the German General Staff, almost 300 thousand soldiers and officers were allocated from the regular troops to protect communications and fight partisans .77 In the autumn of 1942, 15 field divisions, 10 security divisions, 27 police regiments, and 144 police battalions fought against the Soviet partisans. For comparison, the German-Italian forces that fought in North Africa in the summer of 1942 numbered only 12 divisions .78 In 1943, in addition to the soldiers of auxiliary formations, the Wehrmacht command already used more than 20 divisions of the active army .79 According to the calculations of the GDR historian G. Kunrich, made on the basis of documents of the German military command, the Hitlerite military leadership used a total of 25 divisions of the Wehrmacht, over 327 thousand SS and police, and about 500 thousand auxiliary troops to fight the Soviet partisans .80 These data are significant evidence of the power of the partisan movement, which provided invaluable assistance to the Soviet Army in defeating the Nazi invaders.

75 Cit. In: Results of the Second World War, Moscow, 1957, p. 126.

76 Simpson K. Op. cit., p. 44.

77 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

78 Makarov N. I. Implementation of Marxist-Leninist ideas on partisan struggle during the Great Patriotic War, p. 49.

79 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 7, p. 311.

80 Kuhnrich H. Der Partisanenkrieg in Europa 1939 - 1945. Brl. 1965, S. 432.

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Hitler's command attached great importance to anti-partisan actions, as evidenced by Nazi documents. As early as September 7, 1941, the German leadership was discussing ways to combat" the partisan movement growing like a multi-headed hydra " in the occupied Soviet territories .81 On October 25, 1941, the directive of the German High Command "On the fight against partisans"was signed. On August 18, 1942, the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht issued a directive to strengthen the fight against partisans, which indicated that this struggle had reached a level where "success or failure" of operations at the front depended on it. Special Directive No. 46 on anti-partisan warfare, signed by Hitler in April 1943, regarded this war as "part of general military operations." 82 In December 1942, a special anti-partisan headquarters was established under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

All this indicates that the partisan movement was a serious force that required the diversion of significant enemy contingents. Enemy troops marching to the front were constantly attacked by partisans and underground fighters. Instead of resting, the units assigned to the rear were forced to guard various objects and participate in numerous punitive expeditions. All this mentally and physically exhausted enemy soldiers and officers, reduced their morale. As Irving noted, "for a simple German soldier, the Eastern Front was like a nightmare. To this nightmare... the spectrum of guerrilla warfare has been added. " 83
The national partisan movement in the rear of the fascist invaders is an epic of unwavering steadfastness, courage, and loyalty of the Soviet people to their socialist Fatherland. The immortal feat of the Soviet partisans is a golden page in the annals of the Great Patriotic War, one of the brightest expressions of ardent Soviet patriotism, boundless devotion of our people to the ideals of communism.

The leadership of the Communist Party gave strength and organization to the mass partisan movement of Soviet patriots. Never before has a single party had to lead a partisan movement as massive and rich in forms as the struggle of the Soviet people in the Soviet land occupied by the fascists. The Communist Party successfully coped with this task and gained new experience in leading the masses in the fight against aggressors.

These are the facts. Attempts by bourgeois sociologists, historians, and military specialists to cast a shadow on the Soviet partisan movement, to downplay its role and significance as one of the most important factors in the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, are futile.

81 Cit. by: Irving D. Op. cit., p. 312.

82 Cit. by: Simpson K. Op. cit., p. 43.

83 Irving D. Op. cit., p. 286.

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