More than a hundred years have passed since Nietzsche declared the death of God. Both those who welcomed this prophecy and those who regretted it agreed that it pointed to some supposed fact: the growth of unbelief (in the religious sense). However, throughout the twentieth century, the validity of this view became increasingly questionable, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it turned out to be very dubious as a description of current processes. Religion did not decline. On the contrary, in many regions of the world there is a real surge of religious faith.

Ever since the Enlightenment, intellectuals of all stripes have thought that the inevitable result of the modern era would be the decline of religion. It was assumed that the progress of science and its accompanying rationality would replace the prejudices and irrationality of religion. Not only Nietzsche thought so, but also other prominent thinkers of the modern era - especially Marx (religion as the opium of the people) and Freud (religion as an illusion).

So did two great representatives of classical sociology. For Emile Durkheim, religion is nothing more than a metaphor for the social order. Max Weber believed that "rationalization" - that is, the growing dominance of scientific thinking-

This article, in a slightly different form, was presented at the William Phillips Memorial Lectures at the New School for Social Research on October 10, 2007. (William Phillips Memorial Lecture at the New School for Social Research on October 10, 2007). For the original, see: Berger P. Secularization falsified / / First Things. February, 2008. P. 23 - 27.

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lena-will destroy the" magic garden " of pre-modern worldviews. Of course, they felt differently about this intuition. The enlightenment atheist Durkheim saw the secularity of modernity as progress. Weber, on the other hand, was not thrilled with what he saw: it seemed that modern man was becoming a prisoner in the "iron cage" of rationality. But both agreed-with optimism or nostalgia-in their view of what they thought was going on.

Frankly, they were wrong. Modernity itself does not give rise to secularization, although in some cases this has happened (one of them, as I will soon show, is very significant for the phenomenon of secularism).

In my opinion, this mistake can be described as a confusion of concepts: modernity does not necessarily secularize; but it necessarily generates pluralism. The modern era is characterized by a growing multiplicity of different beliefs, values, and worldviews within the same society. And this multiplicity certainly challenges all religious traditions, each of which must now deal with the fact that "all these others" live not somewhere in distant countries, but in the neighborhood. However, secularization theory does not address this challenge.

When viewed on a global scale, there are two major religious outbursts - a resurgent Islam and a dynamic Evangelical Protestantism. Passionate Islamic movements are now on the rise throughout the Muslim world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Chinese Sea, including in the Muslim diaspora in the West. The rise of Evangelical Protestantism has attracted less attention from intellectuals, the media, and the general public in Western countries, and this is partly because it has never been associated with violence anywhere, and partly because it is more directly in conflict with the established beliefs of elites: a leading British sociologist of religion, David Martin, has called it "a new way of thinking."a revolution that no one expected." Nevertheless, it has spread faster and over a much larger geographical area than the resurgent Islam. In addition, the growth of Islam has been observed at least among the population, which has always been Muslim - here we are talking more about rebirth than conversion. Evangelical Protestantism, on the other hand, has penetrated parts of the world where this form of religion was previously unknown. And here we are dealing with mass appeals.

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The most numerous and dynamic segment of what I call evangelical diffusion has become Pentecostalism. It began almost a century ago in a number of places in the United States as small groups of people who began to speak in tongues and experience miraculous healings. From the very beginning, Pentecostalism was actively proselytizing-mainly in America (although it had early outposts abroad, even, oddly enough, in Sweden). But Pentecostalism began to flourish in the 1950s, mainly in developing countries, and it continues to this day. The boundaries of Pentecostalism are somewhat blurred. It is a multidimensional phenomenon that includes purely Pentecostal denominations, Pentecostal communities without confessional affiliation, and Pentecostal movements within the main Protestant churches, as well as the Roman Catholic Church. All of these groups are collectively known as charismatics. According to a recent study by the Pew Research Center, there are 400 million charismatics in the world.

Religious dynamism is not limited to Islam and Pentecostalism. For example, the Roman Catholic Church is experiencing difficulties in Europe, but it is doing very well in the Global South. The Orthodox Church in Russia is being revived. Orthodox Judaism is rapidly developing in America and Israel. Hinduism and Buddhism are experiencing a resurgence, and the latter has achieved some success in the field of proselytism in America and Europe.

Simply put, modernity is not characterized by the absence of a God, but by the presence of many gods - with two exceptions in this overall picture of a fiercely religious world. One of them is geographical: This is Western and Central Europe. The causes and current form of what we might call eurosecularity represent one of the most interesting problems in the sociology of modern religion. The other exception is perhaps even more important when we discuss secularization: this is an international cultural elite, which, in fact, is an extension of the enlightenment European intelligentsia to a global scale. It is outnumbered everywhere, but it is very influential.

Thus, secularism finds itself in the global context of dynamic religiosity, which means that it has become a global religion.-

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nods with serious challenges. There are three variants of secularism.

First, the term may indicate recognition of the implications for religion of institutional differentiation, which is a key characteristic of modernity. Social activity, which in pre-modern societies was carried out within a single institutional context, is now dispersed among different institutions.

For example, raising children was previously entirely the responsibility of the family or tribe, but now it is handled by specialized institutions. Teachers who were previously family members who had no special training now receive special training in teacher training institutions before performing their tasks, which in turn give rise to other institutions, such as State certification bodies and teacher unions.

Religion has gone through a similar process of differentiation: what was once the business of the whole society, now belongs to the competence of special institutions. The Christian Church, long before the advent of modernity, provided the prototype of religious specialization, separating the domain of Caesar from that of God. Modernity has only broadened and extended this differentiation.

One example of what this process has led to is the denominational system characteristic of the American religion - with many different religious institutions operating in a free market environment. The American example clearly shows that secularism, as an ideology that recognizes the institutional specialization of religion, does not necessarily imply hostility to it. This moderate attitude towards religion is then expressed in a moderate understanding of the principle of separation of church and state. The State is not hostile to religion, but refrains from direct participation in religious affairs and recognizes the autonomy of religious institutions.

However, the second type of secularism is characterized precisely by a hostile attitude towards religion, at least when it comes to its public role. The French understanding of the state emerged in the struggle of the continental Enlightenment with Christianity and was politically shaped by the French Revolution.

This second type of secularism, which treats religion as a strictly private matter, can be relatively simple.

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soft, as it is observed in modern France. Religious symbols or actions are strictly excluded from political life, but privatized religiosity is protected by law.

The third type of secularism is not so complacent, as can be seen from the practice of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. But both the soft and hard versions of laicite (secularism) are characterized by the fact that religion is removed from public life and is enclosed in a private space. Trends that go back to the French version of secularism also exist in America; they are reflected in the activities of groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or the Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. What might be called the ACLU's point of view is well documented in an old Jewish joke. A man tries to get into the synagogue during the great feast. The doorman stops him and says that only people who have reserved seats can enter. "But it's a matter of life and death," says the man. "I need to talk to Mr. Shapiro - his wife was taken to the hospital." "All right," says the gatekeeper. "You can go in, but God forbid if I see you praying." The latter phrase very accurately describes the ACLU's position on providing public services to religious institutions (from school buses to medical support).

Any typologies, of course, oversimplify social reality, but it is useful to keep in mind the full range of existing secularisms. First, there is a moderate version that is typical of the traditional American view of the separation of church and state. Then there is a more radical version, presented by the French laicite, and later by the ACLU, in which religion is simultaneously restricted to the private sphere and protected by religious freedom legislation. Finally, there is secularism (as in the Soviet situation), which privatizes religion and seeks to suppress it; and its adherents can be just as fanatical as religious fundamentalists.

All these types of secularism are currently being actively challenged. Even a moderate version of secularism, which is embodied in the American understanding of the separation of church and state, faces the challenge of modern religious beliefs.

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movements that reject the differentiation between religious institutions and the rest of society. Their alternative is the domination of religion in all spheres of human life.

For obvious reasons, the focus is now on challenging radical Islam. This challenge is represented by the ideal of a Sharia State-a society in which all aspects of public and private life are subject to Islamic law. Muslims themselves disagree on whether this view is related to the essence of the faith proclaimed in the Qur'an, or whether it is a later addition that can be changed. Be that as it may, the call for a comprehensive Islamic State resonates strongly among modern Muslims. It is in no way limited to jihadists who seek to create such a State by force. Many Muslims who do not have a penchant for terrorism or holy war hold similar views.

The idea that religion should dominate the entire society is not unique to Muslims. The ideal of a Sharia state is very similar to the ideal of a Halakhic state promoted in Israel by some groups of Orthodox Jews. Hindutva ideology in India has similar ambitions, and influential circles in the Russian Church call for "monolithic unity of church and state" (an expression recently used by a high-ranking representative of the Moscow Patriarchate). The term fundamentalism applies to all of these cases.

In progressive circles in America, similar ambitions are often attributed to Evangelical Protestants and Catholics. But empirically, this is wrong. Only a very small percentage of evangelicals in the United States and elsewhere seek to establish a Christian State.

As for the Catholic Church, its last attempt to establish a Catholic state took place during the Spanish Civil War, when it supported the nationalists. After the Second Vatican Council, such a position became unthinkable. Indeed, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, the Catholic Church has become an important driver of democratization, especially in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Philippines.

An important distinction should be made between movements that are inspired by genuine religious motives and those that are not.

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movements that attach religious labels to non-religious aspirations.

Of course, it is not easy to determine which motives are genuinely religious and which are not. However, there are quite obvious examples of both. You can trust the words of a suicide bomber in the Middle East when he says that his act is intended to bear witness to the greatness of God. Sociologists (most of whom hold quite secular views) tend to believe that religious motivation is suspicious, that it is used to legitimize the "real reasons" underlying the conflict. This is a prejudice that prevents us from understanding the driving force of religious faith.

But there are also obvious examples of how religious labels are attached to aspirations that are quite material in nature. One such example is the Bosnian conflict, in which conflicts of political and ethnic interests were religiously marked. As P. J. O'Rourke once pointed out, there were three groups of participants in the Bosnian conflict; they were similar and spoke the same language; they were separated only by a religion that no one believed in. The other case is Northern Ireland. And again, it is best illustrated by a joke. The gunman jumps out of the doorway, puts a gun to the head of a man and asks:: "Are you Catholic or Protestant?" "Actually," the man says,"I'm an atheist." "Oh, yes," the gunman replies, " but are you a Catholic atheist or a Protestant?"

The country that is currently facing a political challenge to secularism is Turkey. The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Ataturk, who was strongly opposed to Islam and probably against religion in general. He wanted to" civilize " Turkey, and by civilization he meant the secular culture of Europe. He followed the French political model: public life should be antiseptically free, so to speak, from religious symbols and religious behavior. Thus, Ataturk forbade men to wear traditional fezs on their heads, insisting that the Turks wear European hats and caps. (By the way, this clearly had an anti-Islamic meaning: in a headdress with a visor, it is difficult to touch the ground with your forehead when bowing during Muslim prayer.)

Secularist ideology is firmly entrenched in large sectors of Turkish society, in particular, in the Kemalist political environment.-

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the political and military elite. It dominated the urban middle class. And Muslim culture continued to exist in the Anatolian hinterland among those who verbally adhered to the Kemalist ideology, but at the same time passively resisted it in family and social life.

In recent years, this resistance has become politically active. Some overtly Islamic parties have joined the political process, challenging Kemalist orthodoxy. For some time, the military tried to prevent such parties from coming to power. But it became increasingly difficult to contain them. One of the reasons is the mass migration of Muslim culture carriers from the Anatolian hinterland to cities. Another reason is that Turkey is becoming more democratic (which is partly due to the elite's desire to get the country to join the European Union), and as a result, all these unenlightened people are starting to participate in elections. Another reason is that some members of the elite have questioned the old secularist orthodoxy and become more moderate in their opposition to political Islam.

An Islamist party is currently in power. Its leaders say they have no desire to overthrow a secular republic or establish a Sharia-based State. The military has not yet intervened, limiting its dissatisfaction to threats. The most notable religious challenge was the insistence by many Muslim women that they be allowed to wear the hijab, a symbol of Islamic piety, in public places, which is still prohibited. (It is interesting how often the headdress becomes a stumbling block in the conflict between secularists and devout Muslims-from the male fez to the hijab.)

The results of these Turkish discussions are also important outside of Turkey. The Pahlavi regime in Iran deliberately tried to emulate the secular state of Ataturk. Once again, the deeply religious population took a position of passive resistance and, in the end, achieved power. But the difference between the two paths to power clearly shows that challenges to secularism can take very different forms. In Iran, the Islamic State was created as a result of the revolution, and it is characterized by a brutal dictatorship under the hegemony of the Shiite clergy. In Turkey, the Islamic party came to power through democratic elections, and still (although the Kemalists do not agree with it).-

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they are suspicious of this) it not only respected the principles of a secular state, but also really made it more democratic.

What is common in this case is the inability of the enlightenment intelligentsia to see what is really happening. I've only been to Iran once - in 1976, two years before the Islamic Revolution. All the intellectuals I met, with one exception, were in opposition to the Shah, and most of them expected a revolution. However, none of them thought that the revolution would actually happen, and I never once heard from them about Ayatollah Khomeini. Around the same time, my wife was lecturing in Turkey. Driving through Istanbul, she noticed green flags (symbols of Islam) hanging on houses and shop windows. She asked her host university professor (of enlightenment persuasions) if these flags meant a revival of Islam. "Not at all," the professor replied. "They were put up by visitors from the provinces - ignorant people who will never have much influence."

A long time later, I also visited Turkey, where I had an experience that can serve as a metaphor for the religious challenge to secularism not only in Turkey, but also everywhere. The main tourist attraction of Ankara (almost the only one) is the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk. It is an impressive building on a hill that offers a panoramic view of the city. During my trip, there was only one large mosque in the city center (it was recently built by the Saudis). Thus, the center of the capital Ataturk literally represented a public space, cleared of religious symbols. But since 1920, Ankara has grown a lot, and now its center is surrounded by a large number of new urban areas. As far as you can see, each of them has a mosque. Thus Islam laid siege to the capital of Kemalist secularism not only politically, but also physically.

India and Israel are two other instructive examples of how the secular elite faces a challenge to popular religion. When India became independent in 1947-and Nehru delivered his famous speech celebrating "India's meeting with its destiny" - the new state's status was clearly defined as a secular republic. There was nothing in this expression that was hostile to religion, Hindus or other believers. After all, Gandhi served (and still does

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(serves as) a national icon. Basically, this was done in order to contrast India with Pakistan, which at the same time became independent and positioned itself as a state for Muslims. India, in contrast, was understood as a state in which all religious communities feel at home - Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains and Christians.

Today, India is still constitutionally a secular republic in the sense of neutrality towards all religious communities. But in essence, it is one of the most religious countries in the world, where more than 8% of the population professes Hinduism. Of course, this has political consequences. Over the past decades, the Congress Party, which has ruled since the founding of the independent state, has continued to adhere to the secular ideal (for this reason, Muslims mostly vote for it). But its main competitor is a party that actively appeals to Hinduism, considering it the core of Indian civilization. And this party, which is now called the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), periodically comes to power - both in some states and in the central government.

The situation in Israel is remarkably similar to that in India in its secular and religious dynamics. This state declared its independence a year later than India. It identified itself as a Jewish state, but this in no way meant that Judaism was to become a State religion. Like India, Israel was a democratic country from the very beginning, and it was assumed that non-Jewish minorities of Muslims and Christians would become its full citizens.

As it turned out, Israel's dual identity was strained between a democratic State and a Jewish State, especially after the annexation of the Palestinian territories in the 1967 war. Unsurprisingly, this tension has put Arab citizens of Israel in an uncomfortable position. But what is directly important for our topic is that many religious Jews feel uncomfortable in a secular, religiously neutral state.

For a long time, the political and cultural elite was predominantly secular. In Israel, there is no exact equivalent of in-

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The main opposition party, Likud, has gained strength mainly due to the votes of those Jews who are dissatisfied with the secular elite (of course, due to a number of reasons, and not just because of its secularism). Again, it is not surprising that many Arab citizens vote for Labor (the Israeli Labor Party).

The United States is another case in point. The religious challenge to secularism has been an important aspect of American culture and politics for the last forty years or so. Unlike Turkey, India, and Israel, the American Republic was not created under secularist slogans. The American Enlightenment was very different from the French, and the founding fathers were not opposed to religion, although some of them were not particularly devout Christians. Similarly, the First Amendment has no secularist meaning and was adopted rather to preserve peace between the various denominations of the then largely Protestant nation.

For a long time, this mechanism worked properly. And the area of religious tolerance has steadily expanded, from various Protestant denominations to Catholics and Jews, and finally to virtually all religious communities that do not engage in illegal or clearly unacceptable activities.

The changes that occurred later (I assume, starting in the 1930s) can be called the Europeanization of the cultural elite. This elite became more and more secular, and its politics became more and more secularist (this was, if you will, a kind of kemalization). Although the population as a whole remained quite religious throughout this time.

This religiosity, especially in its evangelical form, was despised by the elite. This attitude of the elite towards evangelicals is perfectly reflected in the articles of G. L. Mencken (especially in his description of the so-called Dayton "monkey trial"), which still remain relevant in this sense. Being progressive has come to mean being secular. However, the United States remains by all measures the most religious society in the Western world. Sooner or later, this situation was bound to lead to a political clash. Just as in Turkey, India, and Israel, the non-progressive population was ready to rise up against the elite, using democratic mechanisms to do so.

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There have been two major outbreaks of this rebellion, both involving the Supreme Court, the least democratic institution of the three branches of government: the ban on prayer in public schools in 1963 and the ban on anti-abortion laws in 1973. As a result, there was a curious castling of the two main parties: the Republicans received the support of religious rebels, and the Democrats turned out to express the secularist sentiments of the elite. And in recent elections, the degree of religious commitment - Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish - was the single best indicator of how people were going to vote.

I think this positioning of the two parties was random; it could just as easily have been reversed. But once the dichotomous identification was established, both secularists and religious voters became important elements of both parties. They supplied activists - people who wrote checks, participated in campaigns as volunteers, knocked on doors and wrote addresses on envelopes.

All this fascinates any sociologist who tries to understand modern cultural and political processes. Question: Should this concern anyone else? The answer is " yes " if this person cares about the future of democracy in the modern world.

There is a general consensus that fundamentalism is bad for democracy, as it hinders the moderation and willingness to compromise that make democracy possible. I agree. But it is very important to understand that there are secularists who behave in the same way as religious fundamentalists: both of them do not want to question their own ideas, they are militant, aggressive, and despise those who differ from them. was wittier). There are some fundamentalists who believe that religious tyranny comes from all sides if a Christmas tree is placed in a public place. And there are other fundamentalists who believe that the nation will descend into moral anarchy if the Ten Commandments are removed from the courtroom.

In simple terms, fundamentalists are fanatics. And fanatics have an inherent advantage over moderates: fanatics have nothing else to do - they don't have a life outside of what they do. The rest of us have other interests: family, work, hobbies, bad habits. However, neither do we

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we must actively defend the core values of our civilization and political system. It seems to me that a very important task of our time (and perhaps of any time) is the active defense of moderation. This is a difficult task, but not impossible.

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