The ruling circles of Royal Romania, being closely connected with the governments of England and France, played a very prominent role in the line of international policy that was embodied in the infamous Munich agreements. Already on the eve of Munich, the rulers of Romania embarked on the path of revising their foreign policy. Attempts by some Romanian politicians to establish a united front of struggle against fascist aggression with the USSR and other peace-loving countries failed. After the expulsion of N. Titulescu from the post of Foreign Minister (August 1936), the coming to power of the pro - fascist Goga-Cuza government and the establishment of the royal dictatorship, the political line of the ruling circles of Romania began to clearly emerge, taking into account the interests of both Hitler's Germany and the "Western democracies".

To a certain extent, the main points of Romania's foreign policy during the interwar period have already been reflected in the works of Soviet historians .1 Historians of socialist countries also pay considerable attention to these issues .2 The activities of Romanian diplomacy during this period continue to arouse the close interest of bourgeois historians .3 It is impossible not to pay attention to the works published in the West by former politicians of royal Romania-G. Gafencu, N. Petrescu-Komnen and others, who falsify the position of the Romanian government regarding the Anschluss of Austria and the Czechoslovak crisis, trying to prove "innocence-

1 S. E. Leviticus. The aggressive plans of bourgeois-landlord Romania on the eve of World War II. "Scientific Notes" of the Moldavian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, vol. VI. Kishinev. 1957; A. A. Yazkoza. Romania on the eve of the Second World War, Moscow, 1963; A. A. Shevyakov. Economic and military-political aggression of German imperialism in Romania. Chisinau. 1963; same name. Romania's foreign policy after Munich. "New and recent History", 1968, N 5; N. I. Lebedev. "The Iron Guard", Karol II and Hitler, Moscow, 1968; B. M. Kolker. The Romanian government and the Munich conspiracy. "Balkan Historical Collection" I. Kishinev. 1968.

2 J. Benditer. Atitudinea guvernului roman faa de Cehoslovacia in lunile pre-mengatoare Miinchenului. "Studii", 1956, N 5; A. Niri. Istoricul unui tratat inrobitor. Bucure§ti. 1965; T. Georgescu. Nicolae Jorga impotriva hitlerismului. Bucuresti. 1966; S. Voicu. Pagini rie lupta a Partidului Comunist Roman irnpotriva fascismului, pentru independenta si suveranitate nationala (1934 - 1940). "Lupta de clasa", 1966, N 6; E. Campus. Mica intelegere. Bucureijti. 1968; C Popisteanu. Romania si Antanta balcanica. Bucuresti. 1968; "Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia". Collection of articles, Moscow, 1959; Z. Fierlinger Ve sluzbach GSR. Vol. I-II. Praha. 1949 - 1951; V. Krai. Rumunsko a pruhod Rude Armady na pomoc Ceskoslovensky v roce 1938. "Slovensky prehled", 1966, N 6; K. Aladar. Magyar orszag Kulpoiitikaja a masodik yilaghabaruuelostejen (1938 november-1939 szeptember). Budapest. 1963; H. Batowski. Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie. Jesicti 1938 - wiosna 1939. Warszawa. 1962; A. Ort. Miinchen und die Kleine Entente. "Die Hintergriinde des Munchener Abkommens von 1938". B. 1959.

3 G. Bonnet. Le Quai d'Orsay sous trois Rcpubliques 1870 - 1961. P. 1961; "Survey of International Affairs. 193S". Vol. II L. 1951.

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the" guilt " of the Romanian rulers in the betrayal of Czechoslovakia. Former Romanian Foreign Minister G. Gafencu, who left Romania shortly after Antonescu came to power, published a number of works that strongly whitewash the actions of fascist Germany and the Romanian government. No less zeal in these matters was shown by the predecessor of G. Gafencu as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Royal Romania, N. Petrescu-Comnen. The former Secretary General of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, A. Kretseanu, holds the same position .4 In his 1967 book Aspects of Russian-Romanian Relations, the reactionary Romanian emigration again raised the question of Soviet-Romanian relations during Munich and World War II .5 The authors of this work, as well as G. Gafencu, N. Petrescu-Comnen, and A. Kretseanu, grossly distort the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, seeking to misrepresent Soviet-Romanian relations in the interwar period, and in every possible way whitewash the reactionary foreign policy of Royal Rumania.

This article attempts to examine the position of the government and ruling classes of Royal Romania on the eve and during the Czechoslovak crisis, and to show its anti-Soviet, imperialist nature, since this aspect of the activities of bourgeois Romanian diplomacy has not yet received proper coverage in the historical literature.

The foreign policy of post-war Romania was closely linked to the policy of Western powers. The peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and its revolutionizing influence on the struggle of working people around the world caused Romania's ruling circles to hate the world's first socialist state. Economic and financial dependence on Western countries further strengthened the anti-Soviet orientation of Romanian foreign policy and, in addition, encouraged Romanian diplomacy to pursue the tactic of constantly maneuvering between the major imperialist predators of Europe at that time, the tactic of" playing on two tables", as Antonescu put it. No less important was the desire of the Romanian rulers to retain Soviet Bessarabia, treacherously captured in 1918, as well as other territories obtained after the second Balkan and First World Wars. The Romanian-Polish Alliance of 1921, the Lesser and Balkan Entente, and the treaty relations with France were the instruments used by the Romanian ruling circles to preserve the existing borders. But the rapidly developing international events of the mid-1930s, which could at any moment trigger a critical situation around Romania, pushed Bucharest to look for" more reliable "allies than bourgeois-landowner Poland and" decaying " France - Their eyes were fixed on Berlin and Rome, where they hoped to find even more loyal ones allies to carry out their anti-Soviet policy.

On March 12, 1938, Hitler's troops invaded Austria. Britain and France contented themselves with a formal protest against the Anschluss. Only the Soviet government came out with a strong protest against the aggressive actions of Nazi Germany, which threatened the "political, economic and cultural independence of small peoples"6 .

4 G. Gafenco. Prelude to the Russian Compaign. L. 1945; ejusd. Derniers jours de l'Europe. P. 1916; N. P. Comnene. Anarhie, dktature ou organisation internatio-nale. Geneve. 1946; ejusd. Preludi del grande drarama. R. 1947; A. Cretzeanv. The Lost Opportunity. L. 1957; ejusd. The Soviet Ultimatum to Roumania (26.VI.1940). "Journal of Central European Affairs", 1950, vol. 9.

5 "Aspects des relations russo-roumaines. Retrospective et orientations" P. 1967.

6 See "New Documents from the History of Munich", Moscow, 1958, p. 21.

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Bucharest reacted to this event in a peculiar way. On March 18, 1938, in a conversation with the German envoy in Bucharest, Fabritius Karol II, stated that he had long considered Anschluss an inevitable action and was positive about it, although it seriously affected the interests of Romania and all its allies in the Danube basin and undermined the foundations of post-war peace in Europe. The head of the Romanian state, as the German envoy in Bucharest notes, was afraid that Hitler's action would not lead to complications in Romania's relations with Great Britain and France. At the same time, he did not miss the opportunity to emphasize that he wants to strengthen close relations with Nazi Germany .7 Only the Romanian Communist Party strongly condemned the aggressor's actions. "The fact that the Government of the royal dictatorship does not find a single word of protest against the occupation of Austria," the Central Committee of the People's Republic of China said in its address to the people... defending Romania's ally Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack by Hitler shows that this government is preparing to surrender Romania to Hitler. " 8

The Anschluss created favorable conditions for the further economic and political expansion of Nazi Germany in Central and South-Eastern Europe. It led to a decline in the prestige of England and the Faction in the ruling circles of the countries of the Danube basin and strengthened the position of the most reactionary and chauvinistic elements closely associated with the Nazis. On the other hand, the Anschluss contributed to the growth of the political influence of Nazi Germany in South-Eastern Europe and played an important role in the military - strategic plans of the Nazis. According to the Nazi historian R. Krugman, Austria became "the gateway to the Southeast for greater Germany." 9 Given the unspoken Anglo-German agreement that resulted from Halifax's conversation with Hitler in 1937 and provided the third Reich with the opportunity to seize Central Europe by" peaceful " means, 10 the fascist government began active political and diplomatic actions to prepare for the dismemberment and then capture of Czechoslovakia. In the implementation of these goals, not the least role was played by Royal Romania. Its rulers, increasingly inclined to play the role of accomplices in the policies of both the Anglo-French bloc and fascist Germany, developed a complex system of foreign policy actions.

Taking advantage of the defeat of the National Liberals and National Tsaranists in the December 1937 parliamentary elections, Karol II called on Goga-Kuza's pro-fascist government to come to power, which openly declared that it intended to pursue a new foreign policy orientation and seek a treaty of friendship with Germany and Italy .11 The coming to power of this government was positively received in Berlin. With this event, the Nazis pinned high hopes not only for strengthening their political and economic relations with Romania, but also for the final collapse of the entire system of alliances created by France in Central and South-Eastern Europe. They were right in their hopes. The Goga-Cuza government, and after the establishment of the royal dictatorship on February 10, 1938, the Miron Christie government, directed all their efforts to prevent any diplomatic steps that could cause discontent in Nazi Germany. This explains the fact that the Royal Government had a negative attitude towards the

7 "Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945" (hereinafter-DGFP). Series D. (1937 - 1945). Vol. V. Washington. 1953, p. 261.

8 "Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist din Romania", ab. XXII. 13/1015.

9 R. Krugmann. Siidosteuropa und Grofideutschland. Breslau. 1939, S. 190.

10 "Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War". Vol. I. November 1937-1938, Moscow, 1948, pp. 23, 35-36.

11 "New York Times", 20.I.1938.

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any peace-loving steps of the Soviet Union and its firm intention to provide effective military assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of fascist aggression.

In the context of Hitler's campaign aimed at isolating Czechoslovakia and launched long before the capture of Austria, Romania pursued, in essence, a policy of complicity with German aggression, which helped to disrupt measures to protect the independence of Czechoslovakia. Back in the summer of 1937, during the visit of Karol II to Warsaw, the chiefs of the general staffs of Romania and Poland, during secret negotiations, decided to take all necessary measures to prevent the passage of Soviet troops through Romanian territory to protect Czechoslovakia. Receiving the Czechoslovak envoy to Moscow in August 1937, M. M. Litvinov stated that, according to information available to the Soviet Government, the Rumanian king had given an obligation in Warsaw not to allow the Red Army to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia .12 In November 1937, during a meeting between Karol II and Benes, as the Minister of the Royal Household Urdarian reported to the German envoy, " King Karol openly told Benes that Romania would not interfere in the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany." In the future, Carol II and his advisers, including all the former prime ministers of Romania, as well as the leaders of bourgeois political parties, decided to introduce a special article (Article 91) in the constitution "granted" to the people after the establishment of the royal dictatorship, prohibiting the passage of foreign troops through the territory of the kingdom and requiring the publication of a special law in if necessary, skip them. On the one hand, the adoption of this article was intended to show the Nazis Romania's determination to prevent the passage of Soviet troops to help Czechoslovakia, and on the other - gave Romania the opportunity to maneuver. This step was quite satisfactory to both the Anglo-French bloc and fascist Germany. The fascist press noted with satisfaction that with the introduction of this article in the Constitution, Czechoslovakia lost its last hope of assistance from the USSR.14

In this connection, the response of the Romanian Foreign Minister G. Tatarescu in March 1938 to the request of the French envoy in Bucharest A. Thierry regarding the passage of the Red Army through Romanian territory is not without interest. After an exchange of views with the King, Tatarescu stated:: "In the event of a conflict only between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Romania's contractual relations with Poland and the countries of the Balkan Pact oblige it to take a neutral position. If France intervenes in the conflict, Romania will be ready, although not obliged, to intervene as well. But at the same time, we must reach a preliminary agreement with Poland. Romania categorically refuses to allow the passage of Russian troops. However, if Romania is confronted with a Russian ultimatum, it will never put itself in conditions that could lead it into a state of conflict with France and Czechoslovakia. " 15 Tatarescu's response leaves no doubt that the Romanian government did not consider it necessary to burden itself with the protection of its ally, Czechoslovakia. At the same time, it assumed that Romania's determination to remain faithful to the Polish - Romanian treaty of 1921, which was directed against the USSR, would be positively assessed by both the Anglo-French bloc and fascist Germany. In this respect, the Romanian rulers were right.

12 See V. Krai. Op. cit., str. 331.

13 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. II. L. 1950, p. 337.

14 "Popolo di Roma", 24.II.1938.

15 N. P. Comnene. Prciudi del grandc dramma, p. 37.

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When , on March 17, 1938, the Soviet government called on the European powers to take collective measures to stop further Fascist aggression and prevent World War 16, Romania expressed solidarity with the Western countries that rejected the Soviet proposal. Berlin's hopes for the Romanian government's support for the German position on the Czechoslovak issue were fulfilled. After the Anschluss of Austria, when the situation in Central Europe became even more acute, the Soviet Union again raised the question of allowing Soviet troops to pass through Romanian territory in case Hitler decided to attack Czechoslovakia. To this end, in April 1938, the USSR Envoy to Czechoslovakia, S. Alexandrovsky, visited Bucharest 17 . But this visit was unsuccessful. The news of the new Soviet initiative, as the West German historian A. Hillgruber notes, alarmed the Nazis. They decided to clarify once again how firmly the Romanian government is determined not to hinder Germany's aggressive actions against Czechoslovakia, and at the same time to give the Romanian rulers hopes that Germany can become a guarantor of the Romanian borders. In preparation for a new diplomatic offensive, Hitler, receiving the new Romanian envoy in Berlin, R. Juvar, on April 22, 1938, told him that Germany had no territorial claims in the Balkans. At the same time, he stressed that he is ready to guarantee the existing Romanian borders 18. Shortly after this conversation, the Romanian envoy met with Ribbentrop. The latter called on Romania to join the "pan-European" cause in order to "stop the wave of Bolshevism." In response, Giuvara stated that a "true Romanian" should under no circumstances "pursue a pro-Russian policy." 19 Of course, all these conversations were secret, and the world community could only guess at the true intentions of the Romanian government.

European diplomatic circles still hoped that Romania, as an ally of Czechoslovakia in the Lesser Entente, would show some concern for the security of its partner. However, the session of foreign Ministers of the Lesser Entente countries held in Sinai on May 4-5, 1938, did not justify these calculations. Romania, like Yugoslavia, remained indifferent to the fate of Czechoslovakia, which was threatened by fascist aggression. In response to an attempt by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Krofta to involve members of the Lesser Entente in the discussion of the Czechoslovak problem, Yugoslav Foreign Minister M. Stojadinovic, supported by Petrescu - Komnen, stated that the Sudetenland question was an internal matter of the Czechoslovak government .20 But at the same session, the ministers actively discussed the recognition by the countries of the Small Entente of the capture of Ethiopia by Italy, the Anschluss of Austria , as well as the possibility of establishing cooperation with Hungary, which constantly followed in the wake of German policy. Romania followed the same course on the Czechoslovak question during the session of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva in the first half of May 1938. During a meeting between J. Bonnet and M. M. Litvinov, the French minister asked whether the Soviet Union would provide assistance to Czechoslovakia if the latter was subjected to aggression. M. M. Litvinov gave an affirmative answer, but asked his interlocutor to find out the opinion of the Bucharest government about the possibility of passing parts of the Red Army-

16 "Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. IV, Moscow, 1946, p. 334.

17 "Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia", p. 476; DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. II. p. 250.

18 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. II, p. 250; vol. V, p. 273; A. H i 11 gruber. Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Wiesbaden. 1954, S. 18.

19 "Arhiva ministerului de externe" (далее - AMAE). Cazier 86, vol. 39. Teiegrama lui R. Djuvara dc la Berlin, N 3890 din 26 aprilie 1938.

20 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. V., pp. 274 - 275.

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mii through Romanian territory. At a meeting with Bonnet, Petrescu-Comnen, on behalf of his government, replied that Romania "will never allow this"21 . This position suited the French government perfectly. In order to find out Romania's position on the Czechoslovak issue, M. Litvinov repeatedly talked with Petrescu - Komnen, but the latter, " making general declarations about the desire to develop friendly relations, avoided specific topics."

In mid-May 1938, when German-Czechoslovak relations were sharply strained by the Nazis and bilateral military preparations followed, all the activity of British and French diplomacy was aimed at forcing Czechoslovakia to capitulate in the face of the Fascist threat. This behavior of England and France could not but affect the strengthening of the pro-German, anti-Soviet and anti-Czechoslovak political line of the Romanian ruling circles. Their foreign policy course strengthened both the anti-Czechoslovak and anti-Soviet positions of the rehabilitation Poland, which was preparing to take part in the partition of Czechoslovakia together with Fascist Germany and Hortist Hungary. The essence of this policy was fully revealed during the visit of the head of the Romanian government, Miron Christie, to Warsaw in May 1938. Regarding this visit, on May 29, Litvinov sent a telegram to the USSR plenipotentiaries in France and Czechoslovakia: "According to our information, Patriarch Miron agreed in Warsaw on joint actions of Poland and Romania against the USSR, in the event of an attempt by the Red Army to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia. This decision will be specifically formalized in Warsaw, where a Romanian military delegation headed by Chief of the General Staff Ionescu is leaving in a few days."22 During the May crisis, according to Fabritius, the German envoy in Bucharest, Romania "was informed by Great Britain of every stage of the crisis and, together with the latter, exerted pressure on Prague and tried to persuade Benes to surrender."23

The web of conspiracy against Czechoslovakia was woven in deep secrecy. The Bucharest rulers, who had put a lot of effort into disrupting collective action in defense of Czechoslovakia, were afraid to openly declare that they were opposed to helping it and allowing Soviet troops to pass through Romanian territory. Crucescu, the Romanian Envoy to Prague, met with Crofta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, on May 30. Crucescu told the Czechoslovak minister that the Romanian government did not want to make a public statement that it would never, under any circumstances, allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory. This intention, continued Crucescu, " is dictated by our desire to avoid anything that might weaken the international position of Czechoslovakia, not to risk anything that might damage the good-neighborly relations that we intend to maintain with the Soviets, and, finally, not to engage in advance and in vain the future, since everything must ultimately depend depending on the circumstances of the moment " 24 . By refraining from openly declaring its refusal to allow the Red Army to pass, Romanian diplomacy hoped to maintain the illusion that the Romanian government might side with Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Romanian government hoped to influence the git with such a position-

21 "Survey of International Affairs. 1938". Vol. II, pp. 131-132; see also Documents and Materials on the Eve of World War II. Vol. I, p. 169.

22 "New documents from the history of Munich", p. 46.

23 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. II, p. 337.

24 B. M. Kolker. Op. ed., pp. 230-231; see also N. P. Coinnene. Prelucli del grande dramma, p. 70.

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Leurovtsev, so that they would somewhat moderate their sympathies for Hortist Hungary, which demanded a revision of the Romanian borders.

Since the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia itself did not actually want to use the Soviet Union's military assistance, Crofta, during the same conversation with Crucescu, frankly told him: "We - at least not Kruti-do not want effective support for the Russian army. However, we want this not to be known, and that the possibility of Soviet military assistance may help to moderate Germany's demands. We are sure that if this specter is eliminated formally by a declaration of refusal on the part of Romania (to allow Soviet troops to pass - A. Sh.), then nothing will be able to stop the German pressure on us anymore. " 25 This statement by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was received with great relief by the Rumanian Government, for it now knew that an open official refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass would not be necessary.

Thus, nothing prevented the Romanian Government from continuing its policy of aiding and abetting aggression. At the beginning of July 1938, the French envoy in Bucharest, Thierry, reported to Bonnet that the Romanian government, as before, continued to reject the proposal for the admission of Soviet troops .26 The rulers of Romania did not want to commit themselves to certain obligations in relation to Czechoslovakia. This is confirmed by Petrescu-Comnen's telegraphic reply to Crofta's inquiry about Romania's position regarding the passage of Soviet troops through its territory. Petrescu-Comnen reported that "no one can demand that Romania agree in advance to the admission of Soviet troops." 27 The pressure on the Czechoslovak government had a direct connection with Romanian-German and Romanian-Polish relations. As reported on May 30, 1938, by the Soviet plenipotentiary in Prague, S. Alexandrovsky, Crofta, even during the May session of the Council of the League of Nations, received information about Romania's statements in Warsaw and Berlin that it "will not allow the Red Army to pass through its territory under any conditions," and even about its threats together with Poland to declare war on the USSR, if the latter tries to transfer its troops to help Czechoslovakia through Romanian territory 28 . All the activities of the Rumanian rulers during the period under review gave Hitler and his collaborators in London and Paris the opportunity to believe that Bucharest was far from thinking of thwarting their imperialist plans in the Czechoslovak question.

The May crisis of 1938 did not turn into a war, primarily due to the firm position of the USSR, which defended Czechoslovakia. On May 26, the Izvestia newspaper reported on the Soviet government's determination to repel the aggressor. The Nazis could not ignore this statement, as well as the readiness of the Czechoslovak people to defend the independence of their country. A certain role in deterring the aggressor was also played by the progressive public around the world, which sided with Czechoslovakia .29 In addition, the Nazis did not have complete confidence in the position of the Romanian government. Hitler did not consider it possible to rely implicitly on Bucharest's repeated declarations of sympathy for Germany. He assumed that the Romanian rulers could, as has repeatedly happened to them in international relations.

25 B. M. Kolker. Op. ed., p. 231.

26 G. Bonnet. Op. cit., p. 163; "Survev of International Affairs, 1938". Vol. II, p. 276.

27 "Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War". Vol. I, p. 169.

28 "New documents from the history of Munich", pp. 39, 46-47.

29 In Yugoslavia alone, during the May events in Czechoslovakia, 60,000 volunteers declared their readiness to fight in the ranks of the Czechoslovak army against the deadly enemies of the Slavs - the German imperialists (see V. K. Volkov. German-Yugoslav relations and the collapse of the Small Entente, Moscow, 1936, p. 249).

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as before, suddenly abandon their assurances and go to the "stupidity" - to allow Soviet troops to pass through Romanian territory.

As the Anglo-French rulers became more and more willing to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for their imperialist goals, the Rumanian government increasingly openly took the German side in the Czechoslovak question. On August 14, during a meeting with Benes, the Romanian envoy in Prague, Crucescu, advised the Czechoslovak government, in order to normalize relations with nazi Germany, to achieve "a certain weakening of relations with the Soviets in the foreign policy aspect, and a more conciliatory mood of public opinion inside the country, which today looks towards Moscow and takes a sharp anti-German position." 30 After the May crisis, Romania began to obstruct even the flight of Soviet aircraft to Czechoslovakia. But Romanian-German relations continued to strengthen in the summer of 1938, especially in the economic sphere. In addition to the supplies stipulated in the trade agreement of December 6, 1937, the Romanian government, at the request of the German side, undertook to supply Germany with a large amount of grain and aviation gasoline in exchange for anti-aircraft guns and other weapons and equipment. Romanian-Polish relations were also significantly strengthened, which was also beneficial to Hitler. Romania became more active than before in supporting the Yugoslav policy aimed at strengthening German positions in the Balkans.

After the May crisis, the Romanian government continued to officially play a double game in the question of Czechoslovakia, ingratiating itself alternately with Fascist Germany, then with England and France. Ultimately, this policy led the Romanian rulers to commit the Nazis to a benevolent neutrality. The statement made by the Romanian military attache in Budapest on June 29, 1938, is typical in this regard. "If Germany attacks Czechoslovakia from Hungarian territory," he stated, " the countries of the Lesser Entente will not threaten Hungary. If Hungarian troops participate in military operations together with German ones, the Bucharest and Yugoslav governments will be able to justify their neutrality by saying that an attack on Hungarian territory occupied by the German army will, in fact ,be an action not against Hungary, but against Germany. " 31 On August 21-23, 1938, a session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Lesser Entente countries was held in Bled (Yugoslavia). It was the first time that Hortist Hungary was invited to it. In violation of the Trianon Treaty, the meeting decided to grant the latter equal rights in armament matters. The decisions of the session, taken primarily at the insistence of Romania and Yugoslavia, finally undermined the foundations of the Small Entente and opened the gates even wider for Hitler's aggression in the Balkans. The positive attitude of the fascist dictators to the decision of the members of the Small Entente is clearly expressed in Ciano's notes. "Good news from Bled... - he noted on August 24. - The Bled meeting marks a new phase in the destruction of the Lesser Entente. Czechoslovakia is isolated. The system of French unions is finally overturned. " 32

The dispatch to Czechoslovakia at the end of July of the British government emissary Lord Rensiman, who was supposed to facilitate the transfer of a significant part of Czechoslovak territory - the Sudetenland - to Hitler during his "mediation" mission, was carried out in the following way:

30 AMAE. Cazier 3, vol. 2. Raportu] confidential Ks 2130 de la Praga din 14 august 1938.

31 "Studii", 1956, N 5, pp. 11 - 12.

32 G. Ciano. Ciano's Diary. L. 1948, p. 146.

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It was carried out not without taking into account the position of Romania 33 and another ally of Czechoslovakia in the Small Entente-Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, while continuing to take measures to repel the aggressor, again raised the question of allowing its troops to pass and Soviet aircraft to fly through Romanian territory. On August 13, 1938, the Romanian government made it clear through the channels of French diplomacy that it would "turn a blind eye" to the flights of Soviet aircraft at an altitude of 3 thousand meters. m and above 34 , but at the same time kept silent about the possibility of skipping troops. As for the permission of Soviet aircraft to fly at this altitude, the calculation was simple: for anti-aircraft artillery, the height of more than 3 thousand meters was then simply unattainable, and in the event of a protest from Berlin, the Romanian rulers hoped to justify themselves with this. In order to finally resolve the issue of allowing Soviet troops to pass through to help Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Government tried once again to persuade the French government to influence Bucharest and Warsaw. In response, Bonnet informed M. M. Litvinov on September 1, 1938, that the French Foreign Ministry had failed to obtain a positive response from Romania and Poland .35 In fact, as is now known, Paris did not address the governments of these countries with a demand for a positive solution to the question of the transfer of Soviet troops through Rumanian territory to help Czechoslovakia, but limited itself to raising such a question before Bucharest and Warsaw.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet government decided to use the League of Nations, the next session of the Council of which was to be held on the tenth of September. M. M. Litvinov, in an interview with the French Charge d'affaires Papyar on September 2, noted that " if Poland and Rumania are now causing difficulties, then their behavior, especially Rumania, may be different if The League of Nations will decide on aggression. " 36 However, at a meeting with Bonnet, Petrescu-Comnen said that even the decision of the League of Nations on the presence of German aggression will not force the Romanian government to reconsider its position. Komnen went on to say that the latter stemmed from the allied obligations with which his country was bound to Poland and Yugoslavia (meaning the obligations under the Warsaw Pact of 1921, as well as treaty relations within the Lesser Entente and the Balkan Union). "If the Russians try to pass," he stressed, "Romania, with the support of Poland, will defend itself." 37 In diplomatic parlance, this meant declaring war on the Soviet Union. The Romanian government's hostile position to the USSR was also explained by the fact that it considered the passage of the Red Army through Romanian territory to be more dangerous in terms of socio-political consequences than the division of Czechoslovakia and the approach of the Reich to the borders of Romania. Its rulers assured German diplomats that Romania was not bound by any treaties to enter the war over Czechoslovakia and that it wanted to stay out of the conflict under all conditions. But they understood neutrality in a peculiar way, as a profitable enterprise, as a political and military bargain: the Romanian authorities hoped to earn a good jackpot by supplying oil, coal, bread and fats to the warring countries. 38

The anti-Soviet and anti-Czechoslovak policies were supported by all the reactionary forces of Romania-from the Iron Guard, which was a German agency, to the National-Tsaranist "democrats" at the head

33 "Studii", 1956,. V 5, p. 13.

34 "Survey of International Affairs, 1938". Vol. II, pp. 278 - 281.

35 "New documents from the history of Munich", pp. 68-69.

36 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

37 "Survey of International Affairs, 1938". Vol. II, p. 280; G. Bonnet. Op. cit., pp. 201 - 203, 303.

38 A. Hillgruber. Op. cit., S. 22.

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with the quirky bourgeois politician Yu. Manna. Here is what G. Ohebeanu, one of the Tsaranist leaders and the nephew of Y. Maniu, wrote about the political line of the ruling circles: "Romania can and should... if necessary, prevent the spread of Bolshevism at all costs... We have not signed an alliance agreement with Russia. Very good! We did not link Romania's fate with Russia. Very good! We do not give permission for the passage of Russian troops through our country. Very good. " 39 The course of Romania, as well as Yugoslavia, in the Czechoslovak question in the tragic days of September 1938 was a poorly disguised version of the policy of England and France. The anti-Soviet policy of the Bucharest leaders was actively supported not only by the Romanian reactionary press, but also by all the leading newspapers in England and France, not to mention the German press. They intimidated: the rulers of Romania that the passage of the Red Army through its territory could create the ground for the Bolshevization of the masses, 40 and perhaps even for a political coup.

On September 21, 1938, M. M. Litvinov addressed the plenary session of the League of Nations and declared that the Soviet Union was ready to fulfill its obligations to Czechoslovakia .41 The Soviet government took concrete steps to provide emergency assistance to the victim of Nazi aggression. The Romanian authorities were informed about these measures by French diplomats. By betraying the interests of Czechoslovakia, the Governments of Romania and Yugoslavia tried to buy off the immediate threat from Nazi Germany and gain economic benefits. In this regard, the opinion of the Romanian diplomatic mission in Berlin is very characteristic, which in its telegram of September 22, that is, a week before the opening of the Munich Conference, recommended to its Foreign Minister: "Romania, without wasting a moment, should go hand in hand with Yugoslavia to understand the situation, putting aside all kinds of sentimentalism and especially the so-called obligations of honor, which no longer exist today, since Czechoslovakia is finally and irrevocably deleted from the current European reality."42 In fact, this was the point of view of the Romanian government, which outwardly continued to play the role of a "friend" of the Czechoslovak people. Petrescu-Comnen, receiving Fabritius on September 27, said that the Romanian government would try to persuade Prague to resolve the conflict in favor of Germany .43 At the same time as supporting the claims of the Nazis, Bucharest actively fueled Poland's aggressive aspirations, demanding that Prague satisfy Polish territorial claims. The exchange of letters between Petrescu-Comnen and the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, at the end of September 193844, eloquently attests to this .

After the Munich Agreement, the anti-Soviet efforts of the leading circles of royal Romania were appreciated by the Western powers in Britain, France, Germany and Italy. Active Munich resident Zh. Bonnet, referring to Romania's position during the Czechoslovak crisis, asked Petrescu-Comnen to convey to Carol II the gratitude of the French Government for its important contribution to the Munich action 45 . So did the British Chamberlain government. Romania's refusal to

39 G. Ohabeanu. Drurnu! politic". Cluj. 1938, pp. 15 - 16.

40 "La Republique", 8.IX. 1938.

41 Izvestia, 22. IX. 1939.

42 "Sludii", 1956 N 5, p. 15.

43 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. II, pp. 980 - 981.

44 "Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939" (hereinafter-DBFP). 3 d Series. Vol. III. L. 1950. pp. 45 - 46.

45 N. P. Comnene. Preludi del grandc dramma, p. 85.

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the defense of European peace and Czechoslovak sovereignty during the Munich period was openly recorded some time later by the leader of the most reactionary wing of the National Liberal Party and a person close to the royal court, G. Bratianu. On May 22, 1939, he wrote in the newspaper Universul: "Romania's position during the September crisis was quite clear. It stubbornly resisted any attempt to turn it into a road for the passage of the Soviet Army."

The true meaning of the Romanian foreign policy became especially clear at the end of September 1938, when Marshal Dvora Flondor, on behalf of the King, during a meeting with the German envoy, tried to find out the possibility of establishing friendly relations between Romania and Germany. On September 29, Fabritius telegraphed to Berlin: "In my opinion, this demarche is a preliminary probe on the part of the King as to whether and to what extent we are ready to help Romania against Soviet Russia. The King is becoming more and more aware that French aid is becoming increasingly illusory and that good relations with Germany can also protect him from Hungarian revanchist aspirations. But he does not consider it possible to take a more decisive step towards rapprochement with the German Reich until we have secured Romania's protection from Soviet Russia. " 46 He does not want, the envoy continued, to spoil relations with France, and especially with England, by moving too quickly towards Germany. Romanian bourgeois politicians sought to obtain from Hitler guarantees of inviolability of the borders of royal Romania. Referring to this problem, the envoy wrote that such guarantees are probably out of the question, since it is hardly advisable to shed German blood on the Dniester for Romanian interests, and besides, German guarantees to Romania would be considered by Hungary and Bulgaria as an unfriendly act. " But we can-and this corresponds to our current program Fabritius advised, " help Romania with a significant amount of armament, perhaps more than has been given so far, by supplying aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and equipment for its military industry. To this end, significant loans may be considered. " 47

The Romanian-German negotiations for a long time, and especially during the Czechoslovak crisis, show that the close political relations between Romania and Hitlerite Germany were built mainly on an anti-Soviet basis, because the USSR was the main obstacle to their aggressive aspirations, which were reflected, in particular, in the Romanian bourgeois press and the speeches of the then leaders of Romania 48 . The anti-Soviet orientation of the policy of the Romanian ruling circles and their desire for rapprochement with nazi Germany also left a noticeable imprint on Romanian-Hungarian relations. When the Horthy clique publicly claimed part of Czechoslovak territory, Bucharest politicians played a difficult and dangerous game against the interests of peace in Europe. While not fully supporting all Hungarian demands, the Romanian authorities did not object, however, to the transfer of part of Czechoslovak territory to Hungary. Romanian politicians were only afraid that the occupation of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine, which Horthy claimed, would strengthen Hungary too much and create conditions for revising the Trianon Treaty .49

Follow-up to the recommendations of the Munich Security Conference

46 This refers to the continued occupation of Bessarabia by Royal Rumania.

47 "DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. V, pp. 308 - 310.

48 See S. E. Leviticus. Op. ed., pp. 208-210; "Curentul", 4. XI. 1938.

49 N. P. Coоmnene. Prcludi del grande dramma, p. 110.

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On November 2, 1938, in Vienna, representatives of the German and Italian governments (Britain and France were eliminated from further participation in deciding the fate of Czechoslovakia) played a comedy of so-called arbitration. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which was not finished by the Munich residents, was continued. In accordance with the decision of the "arbitrators", the southern regions of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (with the cities of Kosice, Mukachevo, Uzhgorod) were transferred to the chortists. Polish Foreign Minister Yu. Beck (who came to Galac in mid-October 1938 to meet with the king) called for participation in the division of Czechoslovakia and Romania. But the latter refused. Romanian historians consider this decision of the king to be nothing more than a manifestation of Romania's allied debt to Czechoslovakia .50 But one can hardly agree with this interpretation, because all the actions of Romanian diplomacy during the Munich period indicate the opposite. Moreover, non-participation in the division of Czechoslovakia is not yet the fulfillment of allied obligations. The rejection of Beck's proposal was explained not by the friendly feelings of Romanian bourgeois politicians towards the Czechoslovak people, but by their unwillingness to extend the Romanian-Hungarian border by another 100 miles51 , as well as the king's desire to please Hitler. Karol II hoped that the north-eastern part of Transcarpathian Ukraine, which, according to the Polish Foreign Ministry, Romania could claim, would be part of the Reich, and the railway passing through it would provide a direct link between Romania and nazi Germany. The King could not but know that the Transcarpathian corridor would give the Nazis access not only to Soviet Ukraine, but also to the borders of Romania. But the King didn't seem to care. Reporting on the plans of the Romanian government, Fabritius wrote to Berlin on October 28, 1938, that G. Bratianu, on behalf of the King, " wants to draw our attention to the need to preserve the corridor that would separate Poland from Hungary and guarantee the most secure connection between Germany and Romania through Czechoslovak territory. If Poland and Hungary share a common border, they will cut us off (from Romania). "52

The Munich Agreement and the subsequent dismemberment of Czechoslovakia had far-reaching consequences for Romania's domestic and foreign policy. Having found themselves completely isolated, its ruling classes decided to seek a way out of this situation in a gradual departure from the orientation towards England and France, in further rapprochement with the fascist states, strengthening allied relations with the rehabilitating Poland on an anti-Soviet basis, and actively serving Hitler's aggressive plans in the East.

A different position was taken by the progressive forces of Romania. Realizing that the country was facing a national catastrophe, they openly opposed the treacherous policy of their rulers and warned their people that the fate of Romania and all the countries of the Balkan Peninsula is closely linked with the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party of Romania called for the unity and strengthening of patriotic forces, for the creation of an anti-fascist military-political alliance that would become an obstacle to aggression. "The only hope," she pointed out, " that can block the path of the predatory acts of Hitlerism is the creation of a strong bloc of states that are threatened by the imperialists from Berlin... It is necessary to conclude a close political and military alliance with the Soviet Union , a State whose peaceful policy protects the independence of all the small states of Central and South-Eastern Europe.-

50 EI. Crobanu. In legatura си pozitia Romaniei fata de Cehoslovacia in perioda "Mtinchenului". "Analele", 1956, N 1, pp. 99 - 100; E. Campus. Mica injelegere. Bucuresti. 1968, pp. 326 - 327.

51 "Survey of International Affairs, 1938". Vol. II, p. 92.

52 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. V, p. 324.

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Europe"53 . But the warnings of the patriotic forces and their calls for action were not heeded by the Bucharest rulers, who continued to pursue an anti-Soviet and pro-German foreign policy. The Romanian authorities did not want to cooperate with the USSR. In the subsequent period, the anti-Soviet policy of the Romanian government was increasingly strengthened, which is confirmed, in particular, by documents about the meeting of the king with the President of Turkey in August 1939. Karol II told Ismet Inen that even if the Soviet government sincerely wished to protect Romania from aggression, it would not allow the Red Army to enter Romanian territory and would not agree to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR .54

The peace - loving policy of the USSR, aimed at preserving peace in Central and South - Eastern Europe, was not to the liking of the Bucharest rulers, because "reactionary Romania," as the Romanian historian J. Benditer notes, " saw in the war (against the USSR - A. Sh.) a way out of the situation created for it. One of the stages of preparation for this war was the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and therefore, by refusing to allow Soviet troops to pass through the country's territory (or through its airspace), the ruling circles supported Hitler's aggression against the Czechoslovak people"55 . The treacherous act committed by the leading circles of England and France in Munich was received with enthusiasm by official Bucharest and the Romanian reaction. The press - from fascist to bourgeois-liberal - competed in praise of the leaders of the "Western democracies", German and Italian fascists. The partition of Czechoslovakia and the entry of Hitler's army into the frontiers located near the borders of the Soviet Union were presented to the Romanian people as "the victory of reason over evil", as "the triumph of peace". The leading circles of the National Liberal Party emphasized that " 8 hours of discussion (in Munich. - A. Sh. they resolved a conflict that could have caused a three-year war, and that the methods used were new and effective. " 56

The Romanian reactionary ruling elite did not want to understand that the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR was also a deadly threat to Romanian sovereignty, in the formation of which Russia played a huge role in its time (in 1877-1878). Pursuing their own imperialist goals, the ruling circles of Romania willingly made a deal with German fascism, since class hatred of the Soviet Country precluded a sober assessment of the current international situation. The guiding principle for the rulers of Romania was the king's statement that "he would rather see the Germans as his enemies than the Russians as friends." 57 Based on this, they eventually dragged the country into an anti-Soviet war. Only as a result of the crushing defeat of fascism by the Soviet Army during World War II did the fascist dictatorship fall in Romania, and the Romanian people were able to take their fate into their own hands.

53 "Documente din isforia PCR". Bucuresti. 1953, p. 318.

54 See B. M. Kolker. On the question of Romania's declaration of neutrality at the beginning of World War II. Izvestia of the Academy of Sciences of the MSSR. Chisinau. 1966, N 2, pp. 30-31.

55 "Studii", 1956, N 5, p. 19.

56 "L'independance Roumaine", 4.X.1938.

57 DGFP. Ser. D. Vol. V, p. 310.

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