On April 12, 1853, F. Engels wrote to I. Weidemeyer: "For the immediate future, that is, for us, the Russian campaign of 1812 is the most important, it is the only one where major strategic issues remain unresolved." 1 Over the 130 years that have passed since these words were written, the situation in the study of the Patriotic War of 1812 has changed radically, many original studies have been created covering various aspects of the" thunderstorm of the twelfth year", and more than one secret of Napoleon's diplomacy and strategy has been solved. But a number of issues still need further study. Among them is Napoleon's strategic plan for the withdrawal from Moscow: where did the French emperor intend to lead his army in early October 1812, and what did he think to do in the future?

This question was also considered by the participants of the struggle against the "two-language" army, for whom it was of practical significance. And even then, discrepancies in the understanding of Napoleon's strategic plan were revealed. On October 18, the Governor-General of Moscow, F. V. Rostopchin, wrote to M. S. Vorontsov: "I am in great fear about the enemy's move and I tremble lest he... find himself in Kaluga, from where it will be convenient for him to reach Volhynia in undeveloped places, avoiding meeting Chichagov." 2 A different point of view was held by L. L. Bennigsen, who had just been removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff by M. I. Kutuzov. On November 9, he wrote to an unknown addressee: "They said that Napoleon wanted to break through our army in order to seize the Kaluga Road, cross the Oka River and move through Little Russia, Podolsk or Volhynia provinces - in short, it was the most terrible nonsense." Bennigsen believed that Napoleon was marching on Kaluga in order to " remove us (i.e., the Russian army. ) from its communication line to mask its retreat and cover the transports." Referring to Napoleon's order for the construction of a new military road from Smolensk to Kaluga, Bennigsen concluded: "He intended to use this military road to retreat to Smolensk."3
In the journalistic and historical writings of the first years after the war, the point of view of F. V. Rostopchin prevailed. Thus, A. M. Bezobrazov believed that Napoleon "wanted to warn us with a quick and unintentional movement, or hide his direct goal, threatening to suddenly break through at Maloyaroslavets to the southern provinces." In the movement of the French army to Kaluga, the author saw Napoleon's far-reaching plan: "Then, during his retreat through these most fertile countries, the growth of the Russian army was growing.-

1 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 28, p. 487.

2 Russian Archive, 1908, book 2; p. 271.

3 Russkaya starina, 1909, November, pp. 361-362.

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in this way, at least, he would have compensated for the loss he had suffered in Moscow by acquiring new means of supplying his armies with food and threatening Russia with a new danger from the South. " 4 The author of the first major historical work on the war of 1812, Ya. Tikhonov, also believed that "the enemy tried to bypass the Main Russian Army and go to Kaluga in order to invade the grain-producing and abundant provinces." 5 A participant of the Patriotic War, Lieutenant Colonel D. I. Akhsharumov, took a dual position on this issue. In his opinion, Napoleon sought to ravage Kaluga "and then continue to follow either Smolensk or Vitebsk by fresh roads", but could also "turn to the devastation of the southern provinces" 6 . Neither one nor the other point of view was confirmed by documents. The authors limited themselves to general arguments about the profitability of a particular direction.

The issue was widely covered in the foreign literature of the 20-30s of the XIX century, but even here there was no consensus. Engels called "the best historian of the Napoleonic campaigns", believed that the French emperor led his army to Kaluga in order to break into the Ukraine, winter, and in the spring of 1813 to resume the struggle with Russia. The author was based on the documents of the General Staff of the French Army and Napoleon himself . Napoleon's state secretary, A. Feng, on the contrary, stated that after leaving Moscow, the French army had to capture Kaluga, and then turn to Smolensk, withdraw to the interfluve of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. Feng referred to a letter from Napoleon, allegedly sent on October 4 (16) to the French Foreign Minister G.-B. Marais (Duke de Bassano) in Vilna.

Since this document is important for resolving the issue, we will quote it: "A few days in advance I notified you of my intention to take up winter quarters between the Dnieper and Dvina. Now the time has come. The army marches; on the 19th I leave Moscow by the Kaluga Road. If the enemy decides to defend Kaluga, I will defeat them; then, depending on the weather, I will either search for Tula or go straight to Vyazma. In any case, at the beginning of November I will deploy the army in the area between Smolensk, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk. I decide on this movement because Moscow no longer represents a military position. I am going to look for another position from which it will be more profitable to start a new campaign, the action of which will be directed to St. Petersburg or Kiev. " 8
It may seem that this is the true plan of action of the French army for the end of 1812-the beginning of 1813. In reality, the situation is more complicated. First, it is well known that Napoleon often resorted to misinformation of the enemy. Secondly, it is very doubtful that he would send a detailed plan of action a thousand miles away to Vilna, knowing that at every mile his courier could be captured by Russian partisans along with the plan. But the main thing is that Napoleon never wrote such a letter. This can be seen if we compare the quoted " letter "with a similar but fundamentally different document published in 1868 in the 24th volume of the Correspondence of Napoleon. Here is the most important part of it: "His Majesty, having sent the wounded and sick (to the number of 2 - 3 thousand) to Smolensk, was going to start from Moscow on the 19th and move to Kaluga, defeat the enemy's army if it wants to defend this large fortress, as it is announced, and, depending on the weather, go to Tula or Bryansk or go back to Smolensk if the weather becomes severe. Impera-

4 Bezobrazov A.M. Brief review of the famous campaign of Russian troops against the French in 1812, St. Petersburg, 1813, p. 28.

5 Tikhonov Ya. Defeat of the French in the North, Moscow, 1814, p. 258.

6 Akhsharumov D. I. Description of the war of 1812 St. Petersburg, 1819, p. 201.

7 Jomini G. Politicheskaya i voennaya zhizn Napoleona [Political and military life of Napoleon]. Ch. 5. SPb. 1840, ch. 18.

8 Fain A. Manuscript, vol. 2, p. 1827, p. 157.

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thor thinks that in the first weeks of November he will set up his winter apartments between Smolensk, Minsk and Mogilev. He decided to make this move because Moscow, which has ceased to exist, is not a good position."

The compilers of the commentary to the Correspondence of Napoleon emphasize that this document is not written by Napoleon, but is an instruction to Marais to the French envoy in Vienna, Otto. The structure of the document fully confirms this characteristic: it consists of two parts: a letter from Napoleon Marais dated October 4 (16) with a demand to prepare the public opinion of the allied countries for the retreat of the French army from Moscow, and below - a message drawn up by the French minister. Its text is enclosed in quotation marks and signed " Duc de Bassano. Vilna, October 26, 1812 " 9. Thus, the document accepted by Feng for Napoleon's letter is not such. It was written to Marais and sent to European capitals in order to misinform the governments and public of the countries subject to Napoleon about the plans of the French emperor.

In 1835, in the book "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia", the famous German military historian K. Clausewitz argued that Napoleon's offensive on Kaluga was conducted with a limited goal - to push the Russian army, then calmly withdraw to Smolensk. "A man retreating in an enemy's country," Clausewitz explained, " as a general rule, needs a road prepared in advance." Such a road, in his opinion, could only be the Bolshaya Smolenskaya Road, since it was "provided with appropriate garrisons", and "stores necessary for the army were arranged on it". Clausewitz ridiculed those historians who, in his words, "so persistently defend the idea that Napoleon should have chosen a different road for his return journey, and not the one on which he passed" 10 . Clausewitz did not support his opinion with facts and documents, and it is indisputable. First of all, it is not clear why Napoleon needed to get involved in a battle with Kutuzov's army, if he could take the shortest route from Moscow to Smolensk. In this case, the French really would have broken away from the Russian army for several crossings.

Clausewitz's statement about the" preparedness " of the Smolensk Road does not correspond to reality. The chief quartermaster of the "Grand Army", General L. de Puibusque, wrote that he had failed to create food reserves in Smolensk and other cities. "I can safely say," he declared, "that even Robinson on his uninhabited island found much more help than our army in Smolensk." 11 Kutuzov knew that Napoleon had failed to create the necessary supplies on the Smolensk Road. On November 7, the field Marshal reported to Alexander I: "It was necessary to force him (Napoleon - B. A. ) to go along the Smolensk Road, on which (as we knew) he did not prepare any food."12 Clausewitz's theoretical assumptions were refuted by reality: driven back from Maloyaroslavets, squeezed on all sides by Russian troops, the French army, retreating along the Smolensk Road, experienced an acute shortage of food.

Later, many historians shared the views of Feng and Clausewitz13 . Sometimes the movement of the French to Kaluga is explained by the fact that on-

9 Correspondence de Napoleon 1-er. T. 24. P. 1868, pp. 265 - 266.

10 Clausewitz K. 1812, Moscow, 1937, p. 120.

11 Puibusk L. G. Letters about the War of 1812, Moscow, 1833, p. 49.

12 M. I. Kutuzov, Collected papers. Vol. 4, part 2. Moscow, 1955, p. 321.

13 Mikhaylovsky-Danilevsky A. I. Description of the Patriotic War in 1812, Part 4. St. Petersburg, 1839, p. 238; Mikhnevich N. P. Otechestvennaya voina 1812, St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 20-21; Tarle E. V. Napoleona's invasion of Russia in 1812, Moscow, 1938, p. 220-221.

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poleon wanted to take possession of the Kaluga reserves, "significantly improve the position of his army", and then "safely continue the retreat to Smolensk through fertile and untouched areas"14 . However, this does not fit in with the actual data on food supplies. On October 6, French troops had food supplies available for 20 days. [15 ] These supplies were sufficient to take the shortest route from Moscow to Smolensk. And how could Napoleon expect that the Russians would give him their supplies, and not destroy them, as they did in the border areas or in Moscow, especially since the supply of food and fodder in Kaluga was small? 16 There were no untouched areas between Kaluga and Smolensk. This area was in the field of military operations, was subject to raids by French foragers and deserters 17 .

L. G. Beskrovny did not express a definite opinion on the issue under consideration. On the one hand, he pointed out that, "having rejected the offer of close associates to spend the winter in Moscow, Napoleon finally decided to go to Kaluga, seize the Kaluga warehouses, and then go to winter quarters in mezhdurechye. Napoleon communicated the final plan to his Minister Marais." Further, with reference to the work of A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the "letter" of Napoleon Marais dated October 4(16) is given. On the other hand, assessing the results and consequences of the battle of Maloyaroslavets, the author concludes: "Kutuzov blocked Napoleon's path to the southern provinces and thereby condemned the French army to retreat along the ravaged road." According to him, the withdrawal of the Russian army to the Polotnyany Zavod "provided an opportunity to block Napoleon's path to Ukraine."18 The question is, why was it necessary to block Napoleon's path to the Ukraine, if he intended to retreat to mesopotamia? The discrepancy is still observed in the educational and reference literature; specifically, the question of Napoleon's plans after leaving Moscow was not studied in either pre-revolutionary or Soviet historiography.

Thus, two points of view co-exist in the literature 19 . At the same time, the tradition was established to consider the issue of Napoleon's withdrawal from Moscow out of connection with the actions of his troops in other theaters of war. The main source is the so-called letter of Napoleon Marais dated October 4 (16). At the same time, the operational correspondence of Napoleon for September - October 1812 was not analyzed, and the opinion of M. I. Kutuzov on this issue, known from published documents, was not taken into account.

During the first two weeks of his stay in Moscow, Napoleon claimed that he would spend the winter here and force the Russian government to sign a favorable peace for him. By his order, the Kremlin, the monasteries surrounding Moscow, and some of the remaining buildings were fortified. Hurry up

14 Zhilin P. A. Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812 M. 1953, p. 178; his. The death of the Napoleonic Army, Moscow, 1974, p. 272.

15 Montholon Ch. Memoires. P. 1823, p. 213.

16 See M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 2, pp. 64-67.

17 Narodnoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoy voine 1812 g. Sb. dokl. M. 1962, pp. 144-151.

18 Beskrovnym L. G. Otechestvennaya voina 1812 g. [The Patriotic War of 1812], Moscow, 1962, pp. 504, 512, 516.

19 Thus, S. B. Okun believed that " the French army was moving along the Kaluga Road in order to break through Kaluga back to Smolensk. It was to Smolensk, where there were supplies, where huge grocery stores should have been concentrated, that Napoleon could follow, leaving Moscow. The movement to the south would be as meaningless as a further stay in Moscow" (Okun S. B. History of the USSR. Lectures. Part 2. 1812-1825 L. 1978, p. 44; see also: Zhilin P. A. Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. Zhizn i polovodcheskaya deyatel'nost ' [Life and military leadership]. Moscow, 1978, p. 228). Other equally authoritative publications state: "Leaving Moscow, Napoleon made an attempt to break through to the relatively well-supplied Kaluga Road and even under favorable conditions occupy the fertile fields of Ukraine" (History of the USSR. Part 1. Ed. 4-E. M. 1979, p. 505; see also: History of the Ukrainian SSR, vol. 4. Kiev, 1983, p. 57).

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food and fodder stocks were created. "Vegetables, in particular cabbage, were carefully harvested in the huge vegetable gardens around the city. Within two or three leagues of the city, potatoes and hay, piled in numerous stacks, were also removed, and the transport was constantly engaged in transporting these products. " 20 Marshal L.-N. Davout wrote to his wife on September 18 (30): "Despite the fire, we find huge resources for food"21 . The Russian troops that entered Moscow discovered huge reserves that would have been enough for the French army for the entire winter .22 Thus, the widespread version that the French army in Moscow was experiencing a shortage of food and therefore had to leave the city is not true. Napoleon did not go to Kaluga to " seize the reserves of the Russian army."

What made the conqueror leave Moscow? This decision was influenced by many factors. And the stubborn unwillingness of the Russian government to enter into negotiations, and the beginning of the disintegration of the French army, and the actions of Russian partisans and militia (in five weeks Napoleon's troops lost more than 30 thousand soldiers and officers), and disturbing messages from France, where the opposition was raising its head, and the growing power of the Russian army, from Tarutin, which threatened Napoleon's main communications. In one or another combination, these circumstances are cited by historians when they explain the abandonment of Moscow by the French.

There was another reason, perhaps the most compelling one. In mid-September, the Russian troops on the flanks became more active. A separate corps under the command of General P. H. Wittgenstein went on the offensive and captured Polotsk. The Danube Army under the command of Admiral P. V. Chichagov arrived in Volhynia. The French command closely followed the movement of this army and tried to determine its purpose. The commander of the Austrian corps, Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg, who was advancing on Ukraine from the northwest, believed that the Danube Army would act against his troops. On September 12, he reported to Marshal L. A. Berthier, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, that "the situation is still difficult, but it may become even more serious." Schwarzenberg's report arrived at Napoleon's headquarters on September 24 and caused concern. The first thought of the French emperor was about the betrayal of the vassals: "The Austrians and Prussians are enemies in our rear," he said. But the arrival of the Danube Army in Volhynia caused particular concern. Napoleon divined the intention of the Russian command to counter the offensive of troops from the north and south to cut off the French communications, cut them off from the rear. Berthier advised the emperor "to carry out his first project as soon as possible: to leave Moscow and move closer to Poland, as this would put a barrier to all evil intentions and double our strength." 23
On September 24, preparations for the retreat began. Napoleon issued a series of orders reflecting his strategic plan for the new phase of the war. Schwarzenberg, under whose command was also the Saxon corps of General J. Rainier, Napoleon ordered to hold their positions and prevent the advance of the Danube army to the northeast. He sent two messages to his father - in-law, the Austrian Emperor Franz I. In the first, he asked " to strengthen Prince Schwarzenberg, so that he would not lose the honor of the Austrian weapons."

20 Caulaincourt A. Memoirs. Napoleon's campaign in Russia, Moscow, 1943, pp. 155, 158.

21 Cit. In: Otechestvennaya voina i russkoe obshchestvo [Patriotic War and Russian Society], vol. 4, Moscow, 1912, p. 181.

22 Russian Archive, 1866, p. 699.

23 Caulaincourt A. Uk. soch., pp. 173-174.

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In the second, sent two hours after the first, he demanded that the corps of General G. Reiss, which was stationed in Lemberg (Lviv), move to the rear of the Russian troops and send a 10-thousandth replenishment to Schwarzenberg. "I myself have planned to send 3 thousand infantry to make up for his losses," Napoleon concluded his message. Consequently, the 30-thousandth Austrian corps was to receive a replenishment of 13 thousand people. To his "old colleague", as Napoleon respectfully called Marshal K.-P. Viktor, he subordinated all the troops (over 40 thousand soldiers and officers) located in the Smolensk province. and Southern Belarus. They were supposed to support, depending on the situation, either the Schwarzenberg group or the corps of Marshal G. Saint-Cyr, who opposed Wittgenstein's troops.

On the same day, September 24, the French emperor ordered his envoy in Warsaw to speed up the recruitment of recruits in the Duchy of Warsaw, form detachments of Polish "Cossacks" numbering 30-40 thousand people and immediately send them to Schwarzenberg. Napoleon was worried about the loss of Rainier's Saxon corps. "Write to Saxony," he instructed Mara, " to send infantry, cavalry, and artillery to supplement the Saxon corps." The 15-thousandth division of General Duryutt, located near Warsaw, was ordered to follow a forced march to join the Austro-Saxon troops. In the Marais directive of September 26, Napoleon complained about the inaction of the Austrian troops in Galicia and ordered his minister, through Schwarzenberg and the French envoy in Vienna, to influence the Austrian government. "Tell them," he demanded, " that I am very surprised that Prince Reiss is not moving to the rear of the Russian troops." In the same days, he asked his wife, the daughter of Franz I: "Write more often to your father, recommend that he strengthen the Schwarzenberg corps." Note that Napoleon had not previously made such requests to Louise .24
So, in the western sector of his right flank, Napoleon obviously wanted to increase the number of Schwarzenberg's troops to 160 thousand people, put new Austrian troops into action, first of all, Reuss's 30 thousandth corps, defeat the 3rd Western and Danube armies with a combined strike from the west and southwest, and seize the western provinces of Ukraine. If necessary, Marshal Viktor's group was to support the Austro-Polish-Saxon troops.

K. Clausewitz and E. V. Tarle believed that Napoleon could not retreat by the southern route, because he had troops stationed on the Smolensk Road and could not abandon them. Napoleon's orders and orders of late September and early October show that he was seeking to move a significant force from his line of operations to the south. Thus, he ordered the Minsk governor, General Bronikowski, to stop all marching companies and send them to reinforce the 17th Polish Division of General J. G. Dombrowski, who was besieging the Bobruisk Fortress. Napoleon ordered Dombrovsky himself to lift the siege and lead an offensive on Mozyr, where General F. F. Ertel's Russian corps was located. "You must drop Oertel," Napoleon demanded. He ordered Marial Berthier to create a group in Smolensk consisting of General Baragz d'illier's infantry division, which had just arrived from France, and eight French and Polish cavalry regiments. On the 8th or 9th of October, these troops were to start from Smolensk and arrive no later than the 11th at Yelnya, located, as Napoleon wrote, "22 leagues from Smolensk on the road leading to Kaluga."

24 Correspondence de Napoleon 1-er. Т. 24, pp. 214, 225, 226, 250, 251, 253, 257, 260, 270.

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"This operation is very important," he warned Berthier, and then gave another instruction: "The Duke of Belluno (Marshal Viktor - B. A. ) will send artillery pieces and wagons to the road leading to Yelnya, which will come to Smolensk." Baraga d'illier was ordered to "build a new military road from the city of Yelnya to the city of Kaluga" 25 .

Notes made by Napoleon in Moscow no later than September 24 have been preserved. They address two issues: the conditions that must meet the withdrawal from Moscow, and the direction of retreat. He hoped to withdraw the army so that it would approach France and the countries under his control, provide the troops with food and fodder, take a position that would force the Russian government to negotiate peace, and finally preserve its prestige. It is quite obvious that the Smolensk-Minsk-Vilna road did not meet the second condition: from Puybusk, Napoleon knew that no supplies were prepared on it. In the same document, Napoleon noted that "Moscow is no longer of any interest," and outlined three possible escape routes. He considered a withdrawal in the direction of Kiev to be the most profitable, but dangerous, because, according to him, "the Danube army is heading there." The retreat to Smolensk was considered in two versions: through Kaluga or directly from Moscow. Giving preference to the latter, he listed its advantages: "There is no enemy, we know the road well and it is shorter by 5 marches, halfway we can even get carts from Smolensk." However, taking into account that "there are very few reserves in Smolensk and Vitebsk", Napoleon came to the conclusion that it was impossible to withdraw to this area. 26 From the third direction - to St. Petersburg - later he also refused. The only real thing was the south-western route. Leaving Moscow, Napoleon declared:: "Since in such circumstances it is necessary to stop at the least dangerous plan, I decided to retreat to Kiev." 27
Why was this decision made? When Napoleon wrote his notes, he did not yet know where the Danube Army, which he wanted to avoid, would go. In early October, he learned that it was operating against Schwarzenberg near Brest-Litovsk. Consequently, neither this army nor any other major Russian forces were present in this direction. Many marshals and generals supported the Kiev direction. At the last military council in Moscow, Davout's proposal to "burn Tula and Kaluga and go to Ukraine"was accepted .28 If successful, Napoleon's troops would actually move through the rich, untouched areas of the war. On their way were Trubchevsk, Sosnitsy and Kiev, where at the beginning of October about 600 thousand quarters of provisions and fodder were stored; in Oryol, Chernihiv and other provinces, food could also be found 29 .

The movement to Ukraine, in addition, created the appearance of making a flank march, which made it possible to conceal the retreat and preserve prestige. It was also important that the French army would approach Austria and the Duchy of Warsaw. This would compel their Governments to deploy the troops that Napoleon demanded without further delay. Before leaving Moscow, he issued the 25th bulletin, in which he announced his intention to lead the army allegedly to winter quarters in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Dvina, which cannot be regarded otherwise than as his new attempt to mislead the Russian command.

25 Ibid., pp. 225 - 226, 269, 270.

26 Ibid., pp. 235 - 236.

27 Cit. by: Zhomini G. Uk. soch., p. 370.

28 Istoricheskiy vestnik, 1900, July, p. 231.

29 See, for example, Proceedings of the Chernihiv Archival Commission. Chernihiv. 1913, issue 10, p. 129.

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On October 6, the main forces of the French army left Moscow, and the next day Napoleon left it. "I'm going to Kaluga, and woe betide anyone who blocks my way," he said. On the way to Maloyaroslavets, another attempt was made to deceive the Russians. By order of the Emperor, Berthier sent Colonel Berthemy to Kutuzov with a letter dated October 8. In it, the chief of Staff of the French army requested the" final decision " of the Russian government regarding Napoleon's proposal to make peace. The mark on the letter "Moscow" was supposed to convince Kutuzov that the enemy was still in the capital. In addition, Berthemy could make sure that the Russian army was stationed in the Tarutino camp. Thus, Napoleon made efforts to hide his plans, to divert the attention of the Russian command from the movement of his army to Maloyaroslavets and further to the Ukraine. Napoleon Marais ' instructions of October 4 (16), the 25th Bulletin, and Berthemy's dispatch to the Russian headquarters are all disinformation measures.

French army officers made various guesses. According to E. Labom, a staff officer of the Beauharnais corps, " some said that we should go to the Ukraine, others-move to St. Petersburg, while the most intelligent repeated that we should have returned to Vilna long ago." He got the impression of "uncertainty in the actions" of his command. Italian officer Ts. I wrote the lie in my diary on October 1: "They're already starting to ask each other which road we're going to take back: the one we came from, or the one we're going to take southwest?". However, a German doctor named G. Ross, who was traveling with Murat's corps, reported "a rumor spread in those days that Napoleon intended to penetrate into the southern provinces, the breadbasket of Russia." 30 Thus, despite the deep secrecy in which Napoleon kept his plan of retreat, the rumor of the movement to the Ukraine, although vague, leaked to his troops. It is noteworthy that none of the memoirists recalls the officially announced intention to follow in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Dvina, obviously, they did not believe in it.

M. I. Kutuzov had no doubt that " Napoleon will not stay in Moscow for long." It was important to determine which road his army would take to retreat. The commanders of units, partisan and militia detachments reported to headquarters about all enemy movements; by interrogating prisoners and deserters, and scouting in the rear of Napoleon's army, the Russian command, according to Kutuzov, "daily and hourly" received "reliable information about everything that was happening in Moscow." 31
Reports were also received from the south-western theater of war. Scouts reported to the General Staff that "bridges are being repaired by the enemy from Mogilev along the Chernihiv highway", that "2 thousand troops have been assigned from Stary Bykhov to occupy the town of Zhuravichi", that " the enemy has three divisions of French and Polish troops to pass through Rogachesky Povet (uyezd. - E. A.), that in the southern uyezds of Mogilev 2. "the enemy brought a lot of rye, which is ground into flour," that a strong enemy detachment is ready to move from Mstislavl, " directing its way to Chernihiv." Almost every report ended with the words:"This has been learned from the French officers." The reports also contained information that Napoleon had ordered Victor to move part of his corps to the Ukraine. 32
Kutuzov outlined his first thoughts on possible ways of withdrawal of the French from Moscow in a report to Alexander 1 dated September 22.

30 Ross G. With Napoleon to Russia. St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 78; Lozhye Ts. Diary of an officer of the Great Army in 1812, Moscow, 1912, p. 200; Vasyutinsky A. et al. Frenchmen in Russia, Part 2, Moscow, 1912, pp. 77-78.

31 M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 1, Moscow, 1954, pp. 313, 473.

32 TSGVIA USSR, f. VUA. d. 3518, part 1, ll. 505-505ob.; d. 3609, ll. 416, 419; f. 49 op. 211, sv. 16, d. 280, ll. 14-15.

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"The testimony of prisoners and deserters is very diverse," he wrote. "It is now difficult to penetrate his [Napoleon's] intentions, and the testimony of some prisoners even suggests that the enemy intends to retreat along the Smolensk Road." Further, Kutuzov reported on how he would act in this or that situation. If Napoleon retreated along the Smolensk road, the Russian troops "did not waste time "moving" parallel to this road to Yukhnov", but if the enemy went in the other direction, it was supposed to send 1-2 infantry corps with artillery to meet him .33 From this report, the ideas that Kutuzov was guided by before and after the battle of Maloyaroslavets are clear: a counter offensive to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the south, and then to pursue him by a parallel march. The report shows that Kutuzov did not trust the prisoners ' statements about Napoleon's intention to retreat to Smolensk.

The south-western direction appeared in the testimonies of prisoners and deserters more and more often. Prisoners were sometimes interviewed by the Commander-in-Chief himself. "I spoke yesterday with a party of captured officers," 34 he wrote, for example, to his wife on October 7. Nephew of the French Minister of War, J. Clark said that " Napoleon does not intend to stay in Moscow, but will make his way to Ukraine by force." Brigadier General J.-P. Augereau (brother of Marshal P.-F. Augereau) reported that the reinforced division of Baraga d'illier was ordered to build a military road from Yelnya to Kaluga 35 . Commenting on Augereau's information, the compilers of the journal of military operations of the General Staff noted that this " clearly proves the intention of the main French army to go to Kaluga and beyond after leaving Moscow, and through that to seize the most abundant provinces." Since the journal was regularly reviewed by the Field Marshal, there is reason to believe that this entry reflected his opinion. Kutuzov also knew about sending French agents to Ukraine. On September 26, he wrote to Chichagov: "According to the correct information that has reached me, the French sent two spies from Moscow to Kiev." 36
In late September and early October, Kutuzov held a series of events aimed at thwarting the enemy's plans. The combined detachment under the command of Major General I. S. Dorokhov (5 infantry battalions, 4 squadrons of the Elisavetgrad Hussar Regiment, 2 Cossack Don regiments and 8 guns) was assigned to seize Vereya and "operate in the space lying between Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk". He was supposed to be assisted by an army partisan detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky. Captain A. S. Figner's partisans were ordered to operate between Mozhaisk and Moscow, and Colonel N. D. Kudashev's army detachment "was directed to the Serpukhov Road, where, after searching for the enemy in the direction of Podolsk, they bypassed the enemy army and joined Captain Figner's party." In the journal of military operations of the General Staff for September 25-28, it says:: "All the parties sent out, although they are located in different directions from the army, nevertheless form a continuous connection with each other, which can be conveniently seen by considering their mutual position. Lieutenant Colonel Davydov is active from Smolensk to Gzhatsk, Major General Dorokhov is active from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, and Captain Figner is active from Mozhaisk to Moscow. " 37
Thus, Kutuzov put under surveillance all possible ways of withdrawal of Napoleon's army from Moscow. From squad leaders

33 M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 1, p. 354.

34 Ibid., part 2, p. 22.

35 Dubrovin N. Otechestvennaya voina v pis'makh sovremennikov [The Patriotic War in the Letters of contemporaries]. SPb. 1882, p. 208; Iz boevogo proshlogo russkoy armii [From the military past of the Russian Army]. Sb. dokl. Moscow, 1947, p.183.

36 M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 1, p. 386; part 2, p. 248.

37 Ibid., vol. 4, part 1, p. 400.

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the field marshal demanded to strengthen intelligence, "to get reliable news about the enemy's movement through the villagers." 38 By a circular dated October 8, Kutuzov informed Figner, Seslavin, Kudashev and Davydov of the results of the battle on the Chernishna River (October 6) and expressed confidence that Napoleon would leave Moscow. The Field Marshal ordered increased surveillance of the enemy and, in the event of its approach, "all villages, fodder and all kinds of supplies should be set on fire." 39 Similarly, instructions were sent to the governors of Kaluga, Tula, Oryol and other provinces adjacent to the theater of military operations. In every city, village, and village, combustible materials were prepared.

At the same time, the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kiev, Chernihiv and Kaluga provinces was strengthened. From the commander of the 3rd Western Army, General A. P. Tormasov, Kutuzov demanded "to stay in Volhynia and Podolia to protect that region, especially Kiev, from enemy attempts." 40 The number of the Ertel corps was increased to 20.5 thousand people. His task was to protect the Kiev and partly Chernihiv provinces. Along the Dnieper, 73 gunboats of the Dnieper military flotilla entered Pripyat, which had more than 4 thousand soldiers on board. The garrisons of the Bobruisk and Kiev fortresses numbered more than 6 thousand people each. By order of the Field Marshal, the so-called cordon chain with a length of 700 versts was organized along the northern border of Chernihiv region, guarded by 60 thousand warriors and Cossacks of the Ukrainian militia .41 In the area of Roslavl, the Ukrainian militia interacted with the Kaluga ones. Under Roslavl, through which the enemy could break through to Bryansk and the Shostkin powder factory, a 5-thousandth detachment of regular troops with 9 guns arrived. A 10-thousandth detachment of the Kaluga militia went to Yelnya.

In other threatened areas, Kutuzov also created superiority in forces Schwarzenberg's 65 - thousandth group was opposed by the troops of the combined 3rd Western and Danube armies, numbering about 100 thousand soldiers and officers with 402 guns 42 ; Ertel's 20-thousandth corps acted against Dombrovsky's 12-thousandth division; individual detachments of regular troops opposed Napoleon's troops in Southern Belarus. troops supported by the Ukrainian militia.

At the beginning of the war, the Russian government concluded a secret agreement with the Vienna court, according to which both sides pledged not to violate the Russian-Austrian border, and Franz I promised that the number of troops operating against Russia would not exceed 30 thousand people .43 Kutuzov knew about this agreement and ordered in no case "not to violate the borders of Austria, even if Schwarzenberg, fleeing from our troops, would enter its borders." Alexander I approved his decision 44 . For its part, the Court of Vienna also fulfilled the terms of the agreement. Despite all the harassment of Napoleon, the Austrian government did not give him new troops, although it had an army of 150 thousand people, and did not violate the Austro-Russian border.

Clausewitz mistakenly believed that Kutuzov "was taken by surprise"by the French army's move to Maloyaroslavets .45 In effect-

38 Ibid., part 2, p. 8.

39 Ibid., part 2, pp. 37-38.

40 Ibid., part 1, p. 245.

41 TSGVIA SSSR, f. 474, d. 37, l. 1; d. 45, l. 14; Narodnoe opolchenie, p. 432-433.

42 TSGVIA USSR, f. 4414, op. 291 (11a), St. 281, 8, part 3, ll. 9-10.

43 Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Series I. T. 6. Moscow, 1962, pp. 449-501.

44 M. I. Kutuzov. T. ?, part 2, pp. 455, 505.

45 Clausewitz K. Uk. soch., p. 181.

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However, the measures taken by the Field Marshal gave their results. Kutuzov learned about the French performance from Moscow under the following circumstances. On October 7, Dorokhov reported to the General of the General Staff on duty, P. P. Konovnitsyn, that French troops had appeared near Fominsky. This was the vanguard division of General J.-B. Brusier. Kutuzov immediately sent two regiments to reinforce Dorokhov's troops. On October 9, Dorokhov announced the entry of another enemy division into Fominskoye and, based on the testimony of prisoners, suggested that "this action of the enemy may be a preliminary movement of his entire army to Borovsk." Dorokhov's report was received by the General Staff on the same day. Chief of Staff A. P. Ermolov ordered the commander of the 6th Infantry Corps D. S. Dokhturov " tomorrow before dawn... perform". "His Lordship (Kutuzov - B. A. ) wishes," Ermolov emphasized, " that this enterprise should be covered with an impenetrable secret." The order did not specify either the route or the final destination. Yermolov 46 himself was supposed to lead the corps . Consequently, only two people knew about the tasks of the corps - Kutuzov and Ermolov.

On the morning of October 10, the 6th Corps, reinforced by a cavalry division, set out from Tarutin. Dokhturov was subordinated to the army partisan detachments of Figner and Seslavin. General M. A. Miloradovich received orders to attack the French troops on the Old Kaluga Road and thereby divert their attention from the movement of Dokhturov's troops to Fominskoe. In the evening, Dokhturov's troops arrived in the village of Aristov. Dorokhov reported to Dokhturov that near Fominsky and across the Nara River "a lot of enemy lights are visible," and suggested that large French forces were concentrated there. Two hours later, Seslavin came to Dokhturov and informed him that "the enemy has entered Borovsk and there are rumors in the army that they are going to the Mozhaisk road"47 . Seslavin introduced several French guards, who testified during the interrogation that the main forces of the French army were located 6 versts from Fominsky and Napoleon was with them. At the same time, a peasant arrived from Borovsk, who said that he had observed the movement of the French; his report was soon confirmed by detachments sent by Dorokhov. There was no doubt: the French army had left Moscow and was moving stealthily towards Maloyaroslavets.

Despite the late hour, Dokhturov decided to inform Kutuzov about this. The duty officer of Dorokhov's staff, D. N. Bolgovsky, sent by him, rushed to the Main Headquarters late at night and reported to Kutuzov. According to Bolgovsky's memoirs, Kutuzov, realizing from his report that Napoleon had left Moscow and was retreating, said:: "From this moment on, Russia is saved!"48 . Kutuzov's prediction that "Napoleon will not stay long in Moscow" was justified. At the same time, the French army retreated in the direction in which the field Marshal was preparing for a decisive battle.

On the morning of October 11, Miloradovich informed him that Napoleon's army was moving to the New Kaluga Road. Kutuzov no longer doubted that Napoleon was trying to bypass the Tarutinsky camp in order to move through Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets to Kaluga. The commander-in-chief immediately ordered Dokhturov to follow a forced march to Maloyaroslavets. The corps of Don Cossacks of M. I. Platov, detachments of Dorokhov and Kudashev were also sent here. In the second one

46 M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 2, p. 33 - 34, 129, 57 - 58.

47 TSVIA USSR, f. VUA, d. 3503, l. 22.

48 Harkevich V. I. 1812 in diaries, notes and memoirs of contemporaries. Issue 1. Vilna. 1900, pp. 242-243.

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In the middle of the same day, the entire army marched from Tarutin to Maloyaroslavets. In the journal of military operations of the General Staff on October 11, an entry was made: "The enemy, apparently, left Moscow altogether in order to retreat to our most abundant provinces." 49 So, Napoleon did not manage to make a secret maneuver. Upon receiving the first news of the French advance on Maloyaroslavets, the General Staff concluded that Napoleon intended to break through to the southern provinces. On October 12, the troops sent by Kutuzov in advance approached Maloyaroslavets almost simultaneously with the advanced units of the "Big Army".

The course and results of the Battle of Maloyaroslavets are thoroughly covered in the works of L. G. Beskrovny, P. A. Zhilin and other historians. However, further developments in this period of the war need some clarification. In particular, sometimes only one military council is mentioned, held by Napoleon in der. Moreover, they do not mention the issues discussed; the actions of Napoleon's troops on the Russian left flank deserve more attention, and the place of Kaluga in Napoleon's plans needs to be clarified. Memoirists agree that Napoleon held two military councils in Gorodnya: the first - immediately after the battle, the second-in the afternoon of October 13. According to the participant of the campaign A. de Chambray, at the first council Napoleon formulated the question as follows: "Should we attack the Russian army and open the way to the southern provinces of Russia by force, or retreat to Smolensk, unite with the Duke of Belluno, drive Wittgenstein beyond the Dvina, Chichagov - beyond Styr and then settle down for winter quarters beyond the Dnieper and Dvina wait for spring." L. A. Berthier, I. Murat, and J.-B. Bessier, who were present at the council, strongly opposed the new battle. Bessier said: "For such an enterprise, the army, even the guards, will not have the courage... And what enemy will we have to fight? Have we not seen the fields of the last battle, have we not noticed the frenzy with which the Russian militia, barely armed and equipped, went to certain death?"50 . Other marshals agreed with Bessier's opinion. After listening to them, Napoleon said:: "Kutuzov's arrival on the Kaluga Road completely changed the state of affairs." But he didn't give his decision.

He still hoped for success. The corps of I. Poniatowski at that time went around Maloyaroslavets to Medyn. After him, Napoleon expected to move the entire army. However, this plan of his was thwarted. On the morning of October 13, 20 regiments of Don Cossacks attacked the French army, causing a strange panic in its ranks. The Cossacks repulsed 11 guns, almost captured Napoleon, who was conducting a reconnaissance. On the same day, the vanguard of the Polish corps suffered a severe defeat near Medyn. After losing over 500 men killed and 5 guns, the remnants of the vanguard retreated. Among the prisoners was the commander of the vanguard, General Tyshkevich, who was found to have orders from Berthier to collect information about the roads leading to Medyn, Masalsk and Yelnya. The prisoners testified that Poniatowski's corps was tasked with "capturing Medyn and then breaking through on the road to Kaluga"51 . Having received this information, Kutuzov on the night of October 14 transferred his army to Detchin, and then to the settlement of Polotnyany Zavod, covering Medyn.

After an unsuccessful reconnaissance, which almost became his last, Napoleon called a new council of war. This time it was about ways to get away from Maloyaroslavets. Opinions were divided: Murat proposed to retreat to Mozhaisk, Davout-to move to Yukhnov and

49 M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 2, pp. 83, 85-86, 131.

50 Segur F. P. Pokhod v Moskvy v 1812 g. [A trip to Moscow in 1812], Moscow, 1911, p. 99.

51 TSVIA USSR, f. VUA, d. 3509, ll. 167-168.

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Yelnya. As on the first occasion, Napoleon closed the council without announcing his decision. According to the testimony of the military doctor at the General Staff of the French Army, I. Roy, who was present at the council, " at this meeting, everyone was of the opinion that the state in which the French army was then located made it necessary to abandon the planned campaign to Kaluga... Napoleon was the only one who held the opposite view at that time; he wanted to continue his movement to the south. " 52 Apparently, unaware of Poniatowski's defeat and the Russian army's move closer to the Medyn Road, Napoleon still intended to break through Kaluga. On the morning of October 14, he left Gorodnya for Maloyaroslavets. Halfway there, he became aware of the Russian army's approach to Detchin. Then the emperor gave the order to withdraw along the Smolensk road.

Napoleon's troops stationed in the Mogilev and Smolensk provinces also launched a southward offensive in mid-October. On October 12, a 7,000-strong French detachment from Mstislavl captured Chechersk and continued to move south .At the same time, four regiments of Polish cavalry and two battalions of German infantry advanced on Propoisk from Rogachev. 53 A large detachment was moving along the Mogilev-Chernihiv highway. Informing Kutuzov about the enemy's offensive on Chernihiv province, the Governor-General of Little Russia Ya. I. Lobanov-Rostovsky asked for troops. In a report to Kutuzov dated October 14, Ertel suggested "going to Little Russia to oust the robbers from it"54 . The commander-in-chief refused both, as he did not want to split up his army and relied on the strength of the Ukrainian militia.

Additional militia forces were sent to Propoisk, Chechersk and other threatened areas. Together with Ertel's units, they stopped the enemy, and then went on the offensive. Fierce fighting took place in the area of Roslavl. The French tried to attack Bryansk-Kaluga here. The tasks of the reinforced Baraga d'Illiers division were discussed above. On October 10, Napoleon ordered Viktor to move an infantry division and a cavalry brigade from Fominsk to Yelnya, "and from there to join the main army on Kaluga." 55 Part of these troops concentrated in Yelnya, their advanced detachments marched to Roslavl, but were stopped by the forces of the Kaluga and Chernihiv militias.

Interaction between these militias was established during the September battles for Roslavl and Bryansk. In October, they did not allow the French to capture Chernihiv and Kaluga provinces. Fearing that the enemy would occupy Roslavl, the head of the Kaluga militia, General V. F. Shepelev, asked the head of the Chernihiv-Poltava militia, General N. V. Gudovich, "to send two Cossack regiments and four infantry battalions to it" and thus "the cities of Bryansk and Roslavl will remain intact, and the hungry enemy will not use spare fodder." Gudovich immediately sent a strong detachment of soldiers and Cossacks to Roslavl and near Bryansk and ordered" from the side of Khotimsk and other adjacent places to the Mglinsky district and part of Surazhsky "to strengthen the defense," bringing it from other places " 56 . Upon the arrival of a detachment of the Ukrainian militia, the Kaluga warriors went on the offensive. On October 14, a detachment of General V. M. Yashvil attacked the French (1200 people) who had marched from Yelnya, and, according to Shepelev,,

52 Roy I. Frenchmen in Russia. Memoirs of the campaign of 1812 and two years of captivity in Russia. St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 59.

53 TSVIA USSR, f. 474, d. 45, ll. 12, 14.

54 Ibid., f. VUA, 3518, part 2, l. 22.

55 Correspondence de Napoleon 1-er. T. 24, pp. 282 - 283.

56 TSVIA USSR, f. VUA, 3518, ch. 2, ll. 13-15.

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"he overturned them instantly, drove them running in disarray to the city." The actions of the Kaluga militia, Ukrainian soldiers and Cossacks thwarted Napoleon's planned offensive from Yelnya to Kaluga. Later, the Kaluga militia and the partisan detachments of Davydov, Orlov-Denisov, Seslavin and Figner completely eliminated the Yelninsky group 57 .

The concentration of French troops near the Chernihiv and Kaluga provinces and their simultaneous offensive in mid-October on Propoisk, Chechersk and Roslavl was not accidental. In time, it coincided with the battle of Maloyaroslavets. This gives reason to believe that auxiliary blows were delivered from the Smolensk and Mogilev provinces, while the main forces of the Napoleonic army were tasked with capturing Kaluga and going to the southern provinces. Kaluga was clearly not the final destination, but the assembly point of the Napoleonic army. That's exactly what contemporaries thought. On October 27, Rostopchin reported to the Minister of Police S. K. Vyazmitinov that, in his opinion, "Napoleon's intention was to go through Kaluga to Kiev, and for this purpose all detachments were ordered to converge in the first of these cities." In the same sense, many participants in the war evaluated the battle of Maloyaroslavets. On October 23, 1812, F. N. Glinka wrote figuratively:: "The entire army... it blocked the gates of Little Russia " 58 .

In 1816, while on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon said:: "I wanted to move from Moscow to St. Petersburg or return by the south-western route; I never thought to choose the roads to Smolensk and Vilna for this purpose."59 If before the speech from Moscow, various rumors circulated in the French army about escape routes, then after the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, the picture changed. Now all the participants of the campaign were convinced that they were going to Ukraine. Labom wrote: "All experienced military personnel realized that the Russians had figured out Napoleon's plan... Since then, all talk about Kaluga and Ukraine has stopped." On October 18, Puibusk reported from Smolensk to his friend: "We have lost all possibility of taking the direction to Kaluga and the southern provinces, where we could find abundance and untouched places convenient for retreat." On January 15, 1813, Laugier rhetorically asked:: "Why didn't they take advantage of the Italian victory at Maloyaroslavets on October 24 and retreat instead of going to the Ukraine?"60 . Thus, representatives of the two opposing armies are unanimous in their assessment of the historical significance of the Battle of Maloyaroslavets. According to Kutuzov, "Maloyaroslavets is the limit of the attack, the beginning of the flight and the death of enemies." 61
It has been suggested in the literature that Kutuzov "understood as well as Clausewitz and Napoleon himself that in the end it was unlikely that the French army could completely abandon the "prepared" road and the Smolensk food supplies." It was pointed out that allegedly, in the opinion of the Russian commander, "the only real way for the French to withdraw is the Smolensk tract" 62 . No sources were provided to confirm this. Meanwhile, Kutuzov in many documents expressed his opinion about Napoleon's plans to withdraw from Moscow. For the first time, he reported to the king about Napo's plans-

57 Narodnoe opolchenie, p. 154-155; M. I. Kutuzov, vol. 4, part 2, p. 247-248.

58 The newly found papers of gr. F. V. Rostopchin. - Russian Archive, 1881, vol. 3, p. 224. Letters of a Russian officer about military incidents in 1812. St. Petersburg, 1821, p. 154.

59 Cit. In: Otechestvennaya voina i russkoe obshchestvo [Patriotic War and Russian Society], vol. 3, Moscow, 1912, p. 31.

60 Vasyutinsky A. et al. Uk. soch., pp. 152-153; Puibyusk L. Uk. soch., pp. 102-103; Lozhye Ts. Uk. soch., p. 367. Referring to the" victory of the Italians", the author meant that they were the first to break into the city.

61 OR Saltykov-Shchedrin State Medical University, f. 133, d. 16, l. 138.

62 Tarle E. V. 181? year. Moscow, 1959, p. 658; Beskrovny L. G. Uk. soch., p. 523.

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Leona October 13: "The enemy seems to have completely left Moscow and, with the intention of retreating to our abundant provinces, reached out with all their forces along the New Kaluga Road to Borovsk. With all his cunning and characteristic movements, his intention was warned. " 63 The caution with which Kutuzov evaluated Napoleon's actions is understandable: the field Marshal did not have complete data at that time. For the same reason, the ultimate goal of the movement of the French army is also not specifically named: by" abundant provinces " you can mean any southern provinces of Russia. But already on October 28, in a letter to Senator D. P. Troshchinsky, Kutuzov listed the provinces that he had in mind, and at the same time again noted that Kaluga was only an intermediate point for the movement of the French army: "Napoleon, with his exhausted army, was looking to break through Kaluga into the provinces that I so ardently defended, such as Tula, Oryol, Poltava and Chernihiv".

Kutuzov's subsequent reports show that every day he became more and more convinced of the correctness of his initial conclusion about Napoleon's plans. "From the very moment," he wrote to the tsar on November 7, " when the enemy decided to leave Moscow after their defeat on the 6th of last month, it was necessary first to think of closing our communications with Kaluga and preventing them from entering Onaya, through which they intended to pass to the Orel province and then to Little Russia, so as not to He could not tolerate the shortcomings that had now reduced his army to such a state of disrepair. That he had this intention was confirmed to me by many of the captured generals, which was why it was necessary to force him to go along the Smolensk Road, on which (as we knew) he did not prepare any food." Kutuzov went on to explain the nature of his movement through Medyn to Borovsk: it was caused by the need to cover the southern direction again .64
From this report it follows that Kutuzov took into account in advance the possibility of the movement of Napoleon's army to the south and prepared accordingly for this. The actions of the Russian troops near Maloyaroslavets are the best confirmation of this. To understand the situation and understand Napoleon's plans, Kutuzov was helped, of course, by the testimony of captured French generals, but these testimonies only confirmed his conclusions drawn on the basis of other data. There is no reason to believe that he imagined Napoleon's course of action and plans differently, in a false light. Contrary to popular opinion in the literature, Kutuzov knew for sure that Napoleon did not have large supply bases on the Smolensk Road.

In December 1812, Kutuzov submitted a report to Alexander I, in which he gave a military - strategic overview of the campaign from the day the army retreated to the Tarutino camp to the expulsion of enemy troops from Russia. Referring to Napoleon's plans after the speech from Moscow, he wrote that he had in mind "to go by the Borovsky road to Kaluga, and if he could have defeated us at Maly Yaroslavets, overturned us over the Oka, and settled down in our richest provinces for winter quarters." Since the field Marshal had already mentioned the Ukrainian provinces earlier, it is clear that they were also being discussed now. On February 9, 1813, assessing the results of the battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov wrote that, "always fearing" the movement of Napoleon's army along the Borovskaya road, he sent Dokhturov's corps in advance "to the side of the village of Fominsky". The day of October 12, 1812, he called one of the "most famous in this bloody war, for the lost battle of St. Petersburg".

63 M. I. Kutuzov. Vol. 4, part 2. p. 97. Compare his report to Alexander I of October 20: "The enemy's desire was to bypass me and go to Kaluga, so as to break into our abundant provinces" (ibid., p. 175).

64 Ibid., pp. 226, 320-321.

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Maloyaroslavets would have entailed the most disastrous consequences and would have opened the way for the enemy through our most fertile provinces. " 65 Having guessed the plan of the French command, Kutuzov already from October 28, 1812, confidently asserted that Napoleon's goal was to break into the Ukrainian provinces, winter there, strengthen his army, and in the spring of 1813 resume military operations.

An analysis of various sources, primarily operational correspondence of both Napoleon and Kutuzov, as well as the actions of French and Russian troops in mid-October 1812, convincingly indicate that "in the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved not a tactical (defense of Kaluga, as many historians believe), but a major strategic task - it disrupted the plan." the breakthrough of French troops into the Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk Deroga ravaged by them. Kutuzov's foresight as a commander was manifested in the fact that he understood Napoleon's hidden goal from the movement of French troops to Maloyaroslavets, and having unraveled his strategic plan, he firmly and consistently carried out measures that led to the complete collapse of the enemy's plans.

65 Ibid., pp. 555, 109-110.

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