By the spring of 1916, the huge Russian army, numbering about 7 million people, occupied strongly fortified positions from Riga to the borders of Romania. The troops were rested from continuous fighting during the difficult months of the retreat of 1915, quartermaster supplies improved somewhat, and marching teams of new fighters continuously joined the army.

By this time, the incompleteness of the rifles had finally been eliminated; infantry units were brought up to standard strength, and in case of damage or loss of rifles during combat operations, there were small stocks of weapons in some places. The divisions of the armies of the south-western front had even more bayonets than was required by the state - instead of 14,400-up to 16,000 ¹ .

The field artillery began to receive quite a sufficient amount of ammunition, but heavy artillery was still in short supply, and there were too few shells for the small number of guns available. In addition, the Russian troops were not provided with the proper number of machine guns. We were considerably inferior in this respect to the enemy's armies.

"Give more heavy guns and shells to them, send the machine guns ordered abroad as soon as possible," the frontline commanders constantly appealed to the chief of the main artillery directorate, but, in general, the army's situation has improved significantly.

At the beginning of June 1916, the offensive of the armies of the south-western front unfolded, and as a result, the brilliant Brusilov breakthrough followed. The troops of the front conquered a huge territory, captured about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, captured 496 guns, 1446 machine guns, 357 mortars and a lot of various military equipment.

Brusilov's victory saved Italy, whose armies were retreating under the onslaught of Austro-Hungarian troops. A significant part of the enemy divisions operating against Italy were hastily transferred against the Russian armies. In addition, the Brusilov breakthrough forced Romania to break out of neutrality and take the side of the Allies. A radical change in military operations in favor of the Allies was expected soon.

One of the main reasons for the significant success of the Russian army should be considered an improvement in the supply of ammunition and weapons. The Russian War Ministry had managed to prepare some supplies by that time, and it could even provide some assistance to its weaker allies.

*

At the beginning of September 1916, military operations began with the advance of the Romanian army into Transylvania, and within a few days it became clear that its troops were completely unprepared for the supply of weapons. The entire burden of supplying the Romanians with military supplies was to fall on the Russian Ministry of War. It was littered with a wide variety of requirements, ranging from the release of weapons, shells, rifles, machine guns and ending with uniforms, wagons for the wagon train, horse harnesses, materials for factories, etc.

The demands were sent to the Russian Ministry of War both directly from the headquarters of the Rumanian king, who was at that time commander-in-chief of the Rumanian army, and from the Rumanian envoy, Mr. Diamandi, who was in St. Petersburg, and also from our military agent in Bucharest. We paid attention to the uncertainty and haphazardness of these applications: shells were required for a wide variety of guns, and we had to organize a new production of them, rifle cartridges had to be supplied both to the Romanian rifles of the Mannlicher system with a caliber of 6.5 mm, and to the Austrian ones with a caliber of 8 mm, as well as to the Italian ones with the Vetterli system with a caliber of 11.4 mm. On the release of these rifles, a special request was received from the headquarters of the Romanian king. According to the information provided by our Ministry of War, the Stavka, in addition to us, also addressed similar requests to the British and French governments.

At the beginning of the war, the Russian army was in roughly the same position as the Romanians later found themselves in. Then Russia had to turn to all its allies in the hope of getting something. The diversity of requirements and the lack of a system in Russian applications drew the attention of the British Minister of War, Field Marshal Kitchener, who raised the issue of sending a special mission from the Russian army to London and Paris to resolve this issue. As a result, the mission of Admiral Rusin was sent. (The author of the article participated in this mission as a representative of the Artillery Committee of the State Agrarian University.)

Minister of War Shuvaev immediately ordered that all the demands of the Romanian army should be met as far as possible. However, he considered it necessary.-

The author of the article was a member of the mission and used personal observations and notes when writing the article.

¹ Personal records when examining weapons. Information about the number of weapons in the troops of the south-western front is also placed in the work of A. I. Litvinov. "May breakthrough of the XI Army in 1916", p. 84. Military ed. 1923.

It is appropriate to send a special mission to Romania consisting of military technicians, representatives of our complacent departments and officers of the General Staff, and instruct it on the spot to find out all the issues of combat supply to the Romanian army under the care of Russia and our allies.

The mission was to go to Romania immediately and, based on a study of the needs of the Romanian army and the state of the Romanian military industry, draw up a detailed supply plan for the Romanian army. Gen was appointed Chairman of the mission. Guibert von Greifenfels, who had already had a number of business trips abroad during his service, and the author, as he had experience in finding weapons abroad, was appointed his deputy.

A week after the outbreak of hostilities, Romania's complete unpreparedness for waging war was revealed. The appearance of the Romanian army had been expected for a long time, especially since the beginning of 1915, when Russian troops were advancing beyond the Carpathians, which was fraught with great difficulties. The appearance of the Romanian army on the flank of the enemy forces at this time could have been of considerable benefit to the Russians. Everyone remembered that the expectation of a Rumanian attack was the main reason for the risky and untimely attack on Hungary launched by the Russian army in 1915, during which the last reserves of shells were used up and the last reserves of troops were used up. A year after these events, it turned out that none of the allies - neither Russia, nor France, nor England - had taken care to clarify in advance the question of proper supply to Romania.

In the middle of September 1916, a Russian mission consisting of representatives of the eye engineering and main quartermaster departments, as well as specialists in metal supply, shell preparation and gunpowder left for Bucharest via Mogilev and Kiev.

Despite its high official position, the mission's progress on Romanian roads slowed down; on the first day, it advanced only 80 km. I had to send an urgent telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, G. Bratian. Bratianu had specially assigned an officer to the mission, whose job it was to speed up its progress.

It was known that Romania is the most backward, agricultural country and that the result of extreme poverty of its population is the highest mortality rate in comparison with all European countries. The small number of industrial enterprises that existed in Romania were entirely in German hands. Despite the considerable debt owed by a small Romanian state, the largest amount of loans was also placed in Germany. This made it possible for the Germans to export huge quantities of the products they needed - oil and wheat-from Romania during the war.

The common people-the Rumanian peasantry - were well disposed towards the Russian people, who were relatively close to them in character, customs, customs and culture; in former times, Romanians and Russians were somewhat closer to the common Orthodox faith.

At the head of the state was a king from the German Hohenzollern family - this circumstance predetermined the sympathies of the upper classes and influenced the foreign policy of Romania. The kinship ties of the king and the interests of the financial and industrial aristocracy led to the conclusion of a secret military treaty of Romania with Germany and Austria-Hungary directed against Russia in 1883. Thus, Romania, before becoming an ally of Russia, was in the camp of its enemies for 30 years.

*

Upon arrival in Bucharest, after discussions with the military agent Colonel Tatarinov and representatives of the Russian embassy, the mission was fully presented with a picture of the negotiations that the Russian Embassy conducted with Romania about its speech and the reasons for its prolonged neutrality. Negotiations with the Romanian government were conducted continuously from the very beginning of the war. The Entente countries offered Romania more favorable territorial concessions than the central powers. Russia could promise Romania Transylvania, which was mostly inhabited by Romanians, but was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The latter did not consider it possible to transfer the entire region to the Romanians, agreeing to cede only a small part of it. The Liberal party, then in power in Romania, led by its leader, Bratianu, haggling with the central powers and seeking greater compensation from Austria-Hungary, delayed Romania's appearance on the side of the Allies for two years.

Romania's geographical position created a very unfavorable situation for it. From the south, because of the Danube, it was threatened by the Bulgarian army, which could be reinforced by Turkish and German troops (it should be borne in mind that the capital of Romania-Bucharest - is located only 50 km from the Danube). From the west, Romania could be attacked by Austrian and German troops. Therefore, Bratianu, supported by the French government, demanded that Russia send a special army of 200 thousand people to the mouth of the Danube, against the Bulgarians. It was impossible to remove such a large number of troops from the Russian front, and it was necessary to take into account the difficulties of properly supplying such a remote army with insufficient railways. Transport difficulties were compounded by the difference in the width of the Russian and Romanian railway tracks.

The Russian command agreed to send only one corps of two divisions to Dobrudja. The success of Brusilov's breakthrough led to a significant intensification of negotiations with the Romanian government on the part of Russia, but Bratianu constantly cited various considerations that

in his opinion, they did not give an opportunity to make an immediate decision.

Members of the embassy, among other things, presented the mission with an interesting document showing the importance that Russia's allies attached to Romania's timely intervention ^.2 An instruction sent by the French Government on July 9, 1916, i.e., at the height of the Brusilov offensive, to the French Ambassador in Bucharest, Mr. Blondel, drew attention to the following:: "Romania's performance must be carried out immediately in order to have any price. It would not be difficult for her to make a vigorous attack on the weakened and retreating Austrian army, and this would be extremely useful to the Allies. This action would have completely defeated the enemy, who was already very demoralized, and would have given " the opportunity for Russia to concentrate all its forces against Germany. Thus, Romania would have joined the coalition at the right psychological moment, which would have given it the right to meet its national aspirations in the future... The present moment is very decisive. The Western Powers have always had complete confidence in Bratian and the Romanian people. If Romania does not take advantage of the opportunity presented to it, it will have to abandon the idea of becoming a great nation by uniting all its fellow tribesmen." However, Bratianu, ignoring the extremely favorable moment for his speech, continued to bargain.

Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Gen. Alekseyev finally declared in July 1916 that a Romanian intervention could be of interest to Russia only if it took place no later than August 7.Gen. Alekseyev was well aware that the offensive of the armies of the southwestern front was coming to an end: for more than two months, Russian troops had been fighting continuously, and the German command had managed to transfer large reinforcements to the Austrian army during this time. The pace of the Russian offensive decreased. Despite Gen. According to Alekseyev, Bratianu continued to drag out negotiations. Romania did not come out until August 27, when the Russian reins almost everywhere went on the defensive.

To Dobrudja, at the mouth of the Danube, to help the Romanians Gen. Alekseyev was able to send only one corps from two alternate, weaker divisions under the command of Gen. Zayonchkovsky. As a result of this composition of the corps and the insignificance of the forces sent, the Russian actions were unsuccessful. The Rumanian troops, assembled at the Danube in three divisions, were defeated at Turtukai by the invading German-Bulgarian army under Gen. Mackensen. The actions of the Romanian army in Transylvania were also unsuccessful, where the Oka was pushed back by a specially formed German-Austrian army under the command of Gen. Falkenhayn. Battles were already being fought on Romanian territory, and the enemy captured Hermannstadt and Craiova.

Such was the state of affairs at the front when the mission arrived in Bucharest. She was introduced to Prime Minister Bratian and his brother, the Minister of War. My acquaintance with the Bratianu brothers was limited to a ten-minute salon conversation, so to speak. Among the ministers of the Romanian government was also the third brother Bratianu. The mission did not conduct any specific negotiations with the Bratianu brothers. The mission got the impression that the Minister of War was quite far away from the extremely important issues of army supply that the mission was sent to study. Most of all, the mission had to negotiate with the head of the GAU of the Romanian army, Gen. Paraskivesco.

If the elder Bratian (Prime Minister) could still be excused for his somewhat superficial attitude towards military affairs, since he was preoccupied with the general policy of the state, then his brother, the Minister of War, was already inexcusable; he was, apparently, only a puppet placed in this post by the party. In general, the experience of the mission showed that it was preferable to contact junior employees, since the people in charge of the case could provide very little help with everyday inquiries and inquiries.

For the work of the mission, a separate room was set aside in the building of the Ministry of War. An officer who knew French was assigned to help her. He invited the right people to negotiate. Conducting negotiations was not particularly difficult, since most of the Romanian officers spoke French. In addition, the Romanians, unlike others, did not consider it necessary to keep any information secret from the Russians.

About a million conscripts were conscripted into the Romanian army. By type of service, the Romanian army consisted of the following units: infantry-102 regiments, 3 battalions each, and 10 rifle regiments, two battalions each; artillery-220 foot, mountain, horse and heavy batteries, four guns each; cavalry-22 regiments, four squadrons each; engineering troops - 5 sapper battalions, each with three sappers and one telegraph company.

The entire army consisted of 23 divisions. Three divisions had already been destroyed at Turtukai and Dobrudja. 15 divisions were consolidated into 5 corps, the rest operated separately. These 20 divisions comprised 4 armies of 500,000 men. In addition, there was a strategic reserve for the protection of Bucharest, about 50 thousand. The reserve of people called up and trained was 340 thousand: recruits in 1917-60 thousand. In total, the army had 950 thousand people, 200 thousand horses ^.3

² This document is contained in the notes of Maurice Palaiologue, the French Ambassador to Russia. "Tsarist Russia on the eve of the revolution", p. 156. GIZ. 1923.

³ Personal records during a business trip. These data were published in my work "Weapons business on the edge of two epochs" Part 11, p. 98. Ed. F. Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy, 1939.

Information about the size of the Romanian army was also interesting because it made it possible to compare the figures known before the war about its composition with its actual strength in 1916. When drawing up war plans, the military forces of Romania were estimated by the Russian general staff at 5 corps (20 infantry divisions). These pre-war data turned out to be correct. After clarifying common issues, the mission members conducted further work separately, each in their own specialty. It was necessary to get acquainted with the supply plans not only for small arms, but also for artillery, which required a lot of time to make inquiries from employees of the Romanian military Ministry: it was necessary to take into account the number of available field, field heavy and heavy artillery guns of a wide variety of calibers, which were in service both in the troops and as well as the availability of combat kits for them. The extreme variety of calibers with a rather small number of some guns was a significant drawback of the organization of the Romanian artillery. This made it extremely difficult to supply ammunition to military artillery units, as well as their factory production. Further, it was necessary to compare the available records of the receipt of weapons and ammunition from factories with the norms established by the High Command for their consumption at the fronts and make those corrections that revealed a relatively small experience of the war.

Only a detailed acquaintance with all the needs of the Romanian army in all types of supplies - from artillery to quartermaster and sanitary - could give a correct picture of its actual situation and make it possible to find out what the Romanian armada is particularly in need of and what substantial assistance should be provided by the Russian Ministry of War.

The unsuccessful actions of the Romanian army forced the mission to take all measures to speed up the solution of the task assigned to it by the Minister of War.

*

Among the various military factories, the mission examined the most significant ones: the arsenal in Bucharest, the Vulcan, Wolf, Roman factories and the cartridge factory under construction, then the powder factories in Dudesti and Marocesti, the oil-bearing area of Komarnika with oil distillation and toluene production plants.

Familiarization with the supply plans of the Romanian army and with the productivity of the Romanian factories revealed a rather sad picture of the general situation of the country.

The long years of German influence and the allied obligations assumed by Rumania under the secret treaty of 1883 meant that the supply of its army was entirely at the discretion of the central Powers. There were only a small number of own military factories in this country. Germany and Austria-Hungary held Romania's economy and equipment in tenacious hands, and it was not so easy for Romania's new ally, Russia, to free it from these ties.

Familiarization with the plan for supplying the troops with weapons related to my specialty-small arms-showed that the Romanians did not have a single weapons factory. Mannlicher rifles and Schwarzlose machine guns were ordered from Austria-Hungary. In Romania, only workshops for the repair of weapons were organized. Only ten primary divisions had machine guns, and then six per regiment; 8 of the 13 reserve divisions had no machine guns at all, while some belligerent States already had up to 50 machine guns per regiment.

The capacity of the cartridge factory was extremely low, and it could meet the combat needs of the mobilized Romanian army in rifle cartridges only by 10%. The Romanian War Ministry believed that the prepared ammunition reserves would last for three to four months of the war, and during this time the plant would be completed and the allies would bring cartridges.

With regard to the supply of small arms, Romania expected to receive from Russia 100 thousand Wetterli magazine rifles (except for the 100 thousand sent to it earlier), 150 thousand Austrian 8 mm rifles of the 1889 and 1895 samples, 400 Maxim machine guns; 170 million Wetterli rifle cartridges, and 8 mm Austrian rifle cartridges. - 235 million; Russian cartridges-26 million, cartridges for Romanian rifles of 6.5 mm caliber - 115 million. In addition, there was a request for the release of hand grenades in the amount of 2 million and materials for their manufacture in the same amount ⁴ .

The situation was even worse with regard to artillery supplies. It turned out that before the war, all items of artillery material were obtained mainly from Germany and Austria-Hungary. There were no gun factories in Romania, only repair shops.

The main problem was that the country had neither mines, nor mines, nor metallurgical plants, there was not even metal for making weapons for the army. Shell workshops were available, but in very small numbers. At the then existing consumption rates, they could in no way provide the army with shells. The entire mobilization reserve of shells was sufficient for the conduct of the war for only six weeks. The explosion of warehouses in Bucharest further complicated the situation. A colossal shortcoming, which made it extremely difficult to supply, was the diversity of the Romanians-

⁴ Personal records. These data are also included in my work "Armory on the edge of two epochs". Part I, p. 98. 1939.

Russian artillery. Due to the lack of shells and the already occurring shell famine, the Romanian Military Ministry asked the United States to supply, in addition to the orders already made in France and England, the following number of shells at the rate of six months: grenades - 20 thousand 37-millimeter, 500 thousand 53-millimeter, 200 thousand 57-millimeter and 100 grenades - 15 thousand 63-millimeter, 100 thousand 75-millimeter and 50 thousand shrapnels, grenades-50 thousand 87-millimeter and 50 thousand shrapnels, 10 thousand 105-millimeter sample of 1891; grenades-30 thousand 105-millimeter sample of 1912 and 20 thousand shrapnels; grenades-10 thousand 120-millimeter sample of 1888, 10 thousand 120-millimeter sample of 1901 and shrapnel 13 thousand ⁵. In addition, individual cartridges were required, as well as grenade glasses for a field gun in the amount of 650 thousand, separate shock tubes, ignition glasses, etc.For six months, 642 thousand kilograms of different types of gunpowder were required. There were absolutely not enough powder factories in the country. There were only small factories in Dudesti and Marocesti, and expansion work had just begun.

As a clear example of Romania's lack of preparation and inability to wage war without the help of the allies, we can cite information about the number of quartermaster's allowance items requested by the Romanian Military Ministry: 400 thousand overcoats in finished form and 1 million in materials for manufacturing, 400 thousand and 600 thousand uniforms in materials, 3 million and 1.5 million shirts in materials, the same the number of long johns, handkerchiefs 3 million, trousers a million and a million in materials, fur coats 200 thousand, papas 200 thousand, socks 1500 million pairs, a million pairs of shoes, gun belts and bandoliers 400 thousand, artillery harness for 4 thousand sets, 6 horses; horseshoes 1 million, canned meat 20 million cans, 500k lumps of soap, etc.

From this list, it can be seen that the Romanian army needed literally everything - from weapons and shells to uniforms, shoes and soap. In particular, the artillery and baggage trains were in a particularly poor situation due to the lack of horseshoes for horses. Winter has begun. In the Carpathians, snow fell, and ice formed on mountain roads. It turned out that horseshoes with spikes were not prepared for horses, they were ordered and received from abroad, from the factories of our opponents. The horses slid, broke, and fell from the steeps. Urgent telegrams were sent to the Russian quartermaster's office, requesting the immediate delivery of a million horseshoes.

This was followed by requests for the release of a wide variety of materials, products and devices: acetone, spring steel, high-speed steel, tungsten, sulfuric acid, fire bricks, camphor, chlorine, calcium chloride, ammonium nitrate, pyrometers, rangefinders, graphite crucibles, fire equipment, etc.

In view of the difficult situation of the Romanian army, the Russian Ministry of War agreed to release the vast majority of all declared items and materials after the mission verified all requests and petitions.

Finally, the mission visited an oil field located near the mountains. Komarnik and represented the greatest wealth of Romania. The huge facilities for distilling oil and extracting toluene were built with German money and represented a very special area, unlike the usual picture of a backward, agricultural country. A very significant number of factories with a large working population were located here.

Germany needed Romania during the war as an allied or even neutral country. From Rumania, as we have seen, the German army received grain products, fodder for horses, and oil with its derivatives. After Romania's performance on the side of the Entente, Germany was particularly interested in delivering a lightning strike against the Romanian army before the latter had time to receive proper assistance with troops and equipment from the Allies. The concentrated offensive of the Austro-German armies from the west and the Bulgarian-German armies from the south, aimed at defeating the Romanian troops and capturing Bucharest, was crowned with complete success by December 6. The Russian corps sent to help Romania managed to save the Romanian army only from encirclement and keep the Germans from further advancing into the north-eastern part of Romania. The country's oil-rich region soon fell back into German hands.

Of course, we all knew very well about the enormous importance of the oil-bearing region of Romania for Germany, but exhaustive, accurate information on this issue became widely known in Russia later, when we published a translation of the work of von Kuhl and Delbrueck "The Collapse of German offensive operations in 1918", compiled and published by these authors after the war. In this work, there are indications that in 1918, with the deterioration of the situation of the German army, its high command decided to find out the question of how long it would have enough fuel and lubricants if Rumania again went to the enemy countries. "Does Romania's secession compel," says von Kuhl, " an immediate cessation of hostilities? The study of this issue yielded the following results: aviation can continue its full activity for about two more months, then the army will be left without aircraft. Cars can also continue operating for about two hours.

⁵ Personal records during a business trip. These data are also included in my work "Weapons business on the verge of two epochs". Part II. p. 99.

⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

months, then reduced by half. Lighting facilities, which are essential for the supply of kerosene to the civilian population and agriculture, will be disrupted within one to two months. " ⁷ This excerpt shows how colossal Romania's speech was for the Entente countries.

These were the results of studying both the supply plans of the Romanian army and the situation of the Romanian military industry, and at the end of November the mission returned to St. Petersburg. After two and a half months in Romania, it became clear to us that this country would be able to fight the war only with continuous assistance from its allies and mainly from Russia.

*

Romania declared war on the central Powers on August 27, 1916, and on December 6 Bucharest was already taken by the Germans. The war is effectively over. Kamlania lasted only about three months.

Military operations in Romania are commonly referred to as the"Romanian episode". Given the enormous scale of the First World War, the Romanian campaign can certainly be called an episode, but this episode had a very big impact on the further course of the war. The victory of the German and Austrian forces, along with some other reasons, allowed the central powers to continue the war for a considerable time, thanks to the oil sources of Romania. This episode, of course, deserves the most careful study.

The famous German military writer H. Ritter, in his work on the attack on the Romanian army, wrote: "An area of colossal economic importance has been conquered. The Entente has been enriched with a new heavy disappointment! " ⁸

On the other hand, the Romanian campaign provides a vivid negative example of insufficient preparation for war and poor planning of the entire army supply business. This fault cannot be entirely attributed to Romania alone. Planning and preparing the supply of the Romanian army with all kinds of allowances and mainly weapons and ammunition, in addition to Romania itself, should also have been the responsibility of those states that so intensively sought its support, i.e., the Entente countries and, first of all, Russia. Military agents from all three countries were stationed in Bucharest, and they were able to get acquainted in detail with the state of this crucial issue in advance and take appropriate measures in advance.

If the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander of the Russian army Gen. If Alekseyev had set a date for the Romanian army's appearance, then by this time all the allies should have not only clarified the supply issues, but also brought the most important missing weapons to the borders of Romania. Sending a mission after the opening of hostilities, of course, was a belated event. After all, it was necessary to take into account the presence of long communication lines from England and France, through Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, as well as the difficulty of supplying from Russia due to the breakdown of transport at that time and, if necessary, the re-stitching of the narrow Romanian railway line to the Russian, wider one.

The Rumanian government, concerned about the tragic situation of its army, which had withdrawn partly to Russian territory and partly to Northern Rumania and had lost almost all its supplies in the retreat, sought to conclude special conventions with the Russian war ministries, according to which the supply of the Rumanian army would not be the result of good will alone, but the fulfillment of the obligation the relevant act. Such conventions were concluded at the beginning of 1917.

The supply of ammunition and weapons to the Romanians was continuously carried out. An accurate record of the items sent was to be kept by the military statistics department of the newly formed Main Directorate for Foreign Supply in Russia during the war, which simultaneously determined the total debt of the Romanian government to the Russian Ministry of War. However, it is extremely difficult to find out how timely and quickly the items necessary for her army were delivered to Romania at various times, and especially again ordered and manufactured in Russian factories. It is definitely known that the weapons and ammunition were sent to her in a timely manner. This includes 100 thousand Wetterli rifles, 150 thousand Austrian rifles, cartridges for these rifles, Maxim machine guns and Russian cartridges. Only 6.5-millimeter cartridges for Romanian rifles were not delivered, which we had to make again and the order for which was not accepted.

After the February revolution, a new agreement was concluded, according to which the Romanian and Russian troops of the special Romanian front were to form a "single" army in terms of supply, with the release of everything necessary for it according to Russian standards.

⁷ Delbrueck G. and von Kuhl "The collapse of German offensive operations in 1918", p. 29.

⁸ Ritter H. "Criticism of the World War", translation, p. 148. Voenizdat. 1923.

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