Keywords: France, Tropical Africa, defense agreements, military-technical cooperation

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the African colonies of France gained independence one after another, but Paris took measures to preserve and even expand its military, political and economic presence on the continent. This was due to the historical ties between the mother country and the colonies, as well as the richness of the natural resources of Tropical Africa, in which France was perhaps more interested than any other colonial power.

Back in 1946, at the initiative of President Charles de Gaulle, the so-called French Union was created, within which the French colonies were transformed into departments and overseas territories. In 1958. The Union was transformed into the French Community, which united the mother country with the already independent states. This association was soon replaced by a system of bilateral treaties between Paris and the former colonies.

It should be noted that de Gaulle agreed to grant sovereignty to the African colonies only in exchange for their full support of France's policy in the international arena.¹ Having gained formal independence, the countries willingly agreed to this condition, since they needed economic assistance and military-political support of the former metropolis. In addition, ensuring security in the liberated territories was in the interests of both sides, so already in the initial post-colonial period, a number of agreements on military cooperation were signed between France and its former colonies. In the 2000s and 2010s, there was a need to adapt early agreements to new political realities.

Agreements in the military-political sphere are given a priority role in the so-called White Paper (2013), which outlines the French defense concept: "The defense partnership that France is developing with a number of countries contributes to strengthening its influence on the world stage... This is due to France's desire to nurture, deepen and strengthen long-term bilateral relations, which provide it and each participant with more opportunities to strengthen their own security. " ²

The defense concept provides for a special format of military cooperation with African countries, whose armed forces are provided with special means and equipment to ensure rapid response to conflict situations.³ The provisions of the White Paper have been practically implemented in recent military peacekeeping operations in Côte d'Ivoire (from 2002 to 2015) and in the Central African Republic (CAR) (from 5 December 2013 to the present).

The current stage of French-African relations in the military-political sphere has not yet received proper coverage in Russian publications.

ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF AGREEMENTS

The need to preserve and strengthen military-political contacts between France and the countries of Africa was justified by General de Gaulle, who sincerely believed in the civilizing mission of France. In his Memoirs of Hope, Charles de Gaulle wrote about the former colonies:: "Having given them self-government now, it was necessary to leave them to their fate on the principle of" out of sight - out of mind?".. All the good things we have already done for their progress, the resulting friendships ... our millennial vocation to expand and expand our influence has made us see them as privileged partners. If they speak our language, if they have adopted our culture, then we must help them. " ⁴

In the sphere of culture, education and science, the international organization Francophonie has become a conduit for French influence. In the military-political and economic fields.-

The Zuz "patronage" began to be implemented through a system of links between the former metropolis and its recent ward territories, called "Francafric" and based on clientelist, personalized relationships.

In order to legitimize this system in 1960-1978. France has signed 8 defense contracts with the countries of Tropical Africa. In 1960, a similar agreement was signed with the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo (ROK) and Chad (later the ROK and Chad denounced it). The Treaty with Ivory Coast, Niger and Dahomey (now Benin) was concluded in 1961, but it only entered into force with Ivory Coast. The 1977 Interim Protocol with Djibouti was supplemented in 1991 by an agreement on the control of air space.⁵

Separate military-technical assistance agreements were signed with Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic and the Comoros, a military assistance treaty was concluded with Cameroon, and a protocol on military-technical assistance was signed with Gabon as an annex to the defense agreement.⁶ The formal status of each agreement reflects differences in the policies of individual African States: the authorities of some of them gave France the authority to ensure their defense and maintain internal order, while others needed only financial, logistical and training support.⁷

For the past two decades, French Governments have been trying to get the crisis resolved by Africans themselves. In 1998, France, together with the United Nations and the EU, launched the Renforcement des capacites africaines au maintien de la paix (Strengthening the Capacity of Africans to Maintain Peace) program. Since 2007, the responsibility for its implementation has been fully transferred to the EU. The program covered not only French-speaking countries. However, it should be recognized that it has not led to the formation of an African peacekeeping force capable of effective action.⁸

African politics J. Chirac's first presidential term (1995-2002) was largely determined by the need to "co-exist" with the socialist government of L. Jospin. The Prime Minister opposed Paris 'interference in the affairs of African countries and sought to abandon the "secret" relations within the framework of Francafric. That is why, in 1999, the former metropolis allowed the overthrow of the then President of Ivory Coast, A. K. Bedier.

On May 6, 2002, there was a change of government in France, and Paris began to act differently: in September 2002, Operation Likorn was launched on Ivorian territory, the purpose of which was to support the acting President L. Gbagbo.

On June 13, 2003, in his speech at the IV Forum of the Institute of the Higher School of National Defense on the African continent, French Foreign Minister D. de Villepin called for abandoning non-participation in African affairs, while not resorting to intervention tactics as much as possible.⁹ Proposals were also put forward for the "Africanization" of decision-making and the increased use of African Union (AU) peacekeeping contingents and African regional organizations.

The French researcher H. Serekeberhan argues that the main goal of the Paris strategy was to "... make France's policy credible, giving it international legitimacy" thanks to the multilateral format of crisis resolution.¹⁰ In practice, this was reflected in 2003 during Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): then France became a kind of intermediary between the UN and EU forces. ..France supports African efforts aimed at resolving conflicts on the continent, and in the event of their failure or lack of them, the country is ready to intervene if necessary. " ¹¹

NEW TIME, NEW APPROACHES

Nicolas Sarkozy, as a candidate for the post of President of the Republic, promised in 2006 to review the nature of relations between France and its former colonies. ¹² A year after his election, he called for reducing the French military presence in Africa, revising outdated defense agreements. He also called for the formation of the Afro-Union armed forces ¹³.

As a result, almost all previously concluded agreements with African states were revised under his leadership. The new documents were drawn up "according to a single model" in order to adapt bilateral relations to the regional format of interaction between African states. The partnership should facilitate the training of military personnel of both individual countries and AU contingents (the first was the agreement with the Comoros of September 27, 2010; the last at the moment - with Senegal of April 18, 2012). Exceptions are the defense cooperation agreements with Djibouti and Gabon, which provided for the deployment of French military personnel on their territories bases (other documents mention only the creation of the necessary infrastructure for the needs of the French Armed Forces).

In general, during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, all existing agreements were signed, although the ratification of treaties with Djibouti, Ivory Coast and Senegal in the French Parliament took place already during the presidency of F. Sarkozy. Hollande, which began in 2012.

Let's compare the "old" and " new " texts - the defense agreement between the governments of France and Cote d'Ivoire of April 24, 1961 and the treaty between these countries signed on January 26, 2012.

In 1958-1961, the first President of Ivory Coast, Fr. Houphouet-Boigny, who enjoyed great prestige in Africa, held the positions of Minister of State and Council of Ministers.-

nickname of the French government. He had a great influence on the formation of French African policy. It is believed that it was he who coined the term "Fransafric"in 1955.14 And the actions of France in the 2000s in relation to Ivory Coast became one of the most striking examples of the demonstration of French policy on the African continent.

The preamble to the 1961 Agreement states that it affects both defense in general and defense against external threats in particular. The separation of the concepts of "defense" and "defense against external threats" suggests that French intervention was allowed to resolve the internal political crisis.

According to article 2, the parties to the agreement "... may request assistance from France in accordance with the conditions established by special agreements " ^.15 It was in them that it was prescribed that France can invade the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to "maintain order", i.e. to protect the "pro-French" ruler who is experiencing political difficulties ¹⁶. The French Armed Forces (the number of which is determined in each specific situation according to Article 5 ¹⁷) can use all available information on the territory for security. infrastructure - civil, industrial, etc.

It is interesting that, despite the existence of an Agreement, France destroyed Ivorian military aircraft ⁱⁿ 2002,18 when, by mistake, a French military base was bombed instead of rebel forces on the instructions of President L. Gbagbo, and 9 Frenchmen were killed. And in 2010 - 2011, the French armed forces, together with the UN forces, removed L. Gbagbo, who was out of control, and helped A. Ouattara come to power.

The text of the 2012 Franco-Ivorian treaty, despite its bilateral nature, refers to the agreement on strategic partnership between the EU and Africa, approved in December 2007 at the Lisbon summit, which provided for the creation , with EU support,of an African collective security system involving the AU and regional groupings. ¹⁹

Article 2 of the 2012 bilateral treaty specifies the possibility of cooperation with other countries and regional organizations to resolve security issues: France should not be solely responsible for resolving every political crisis. The preamble of the Agreement with Cote d'Ivoire stipulates that both States respect each other's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

The text of the document notes that " ... this agreement does not provide for the provision of assistance... For Côte d'Ivoire, in the event of external aggression, and even more so in the event of an internal crisis, it is only an exchange of views on the nature of threats and the means to counter them. " ²⁰

According to article 2, the main tasks are training, providing uniforms and logistical support to Ivorian forces.²¹ The Annex to the Treaty describes the Ivorian infrastructure required for the permanent or temporary deployment of French forces.²²

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The internal inconsistency of the concluded agreements predetermines the emergence of serious questions about their content, although, as expected, they were designed to eliminate all disputes and bring more transparency to Franco-African relations.

Thus, on April 5, 2011, during the presentation of the updated agreements with Cameroon, Togo and the Central African Republic to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly of France, the rapporteur-MP M. Terreau-stated that "...automatic mechanisms, according to which our country could be involved in intervention in an African country, have become unacceptable today, and it is necessary to base our relations on a true peer-to-peer partnership."²³

These words were made just in the days when France, together with the UN forces, carried out an operation to remove L. Gbagbo from power in Ivory Coast: at that time, the old agreement continued to operate, which legitimized France's actions.

On December 5, 2013, France launched a military operation "Sangris" in the CAR - in connection with the sharply escalated confrontation between Muslims and Christians there (on March 24, 2013, the Christian president was overthrown). Bozize). It should be noted that since 2002, within the framework of the "Strengthening Peacekeeping Capabilities" program, Paris has been conducting Operation Boali in the Central African Republic to assist the forces of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Countries and the armed forces of the Central African Republic in stabilizing the internal political situation.²⁴

The new operation was launched in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013, aimed at strengthening the African-led International Mission in CAR (MISCA)²⁵. The resolution stated that "... takes note of the message of the CAR authorities dated 20 November 2013, in which they request the assistance of MISCA from the French forces " ²⁶.

In other words, there was a reference to the bilateral relations between France and the Central African Republic, but it did not prevail. In addition, on April 10, 2014, the UN Security Council voted in favor of the French draft resolution 2149, which provided for the dispatch to the CAR of a multidisciplinary Integrated UN Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) numbering 11.8 thousand people.²⁷

On 15 September 2014, the transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA took place. In this regard, France has stated that it " will continue to do so."..Pays tribute to the outstanding work carried out by African soldiers in support of the French Operation Sangaris and the EU Forces operation.

These joint actions made it possible to avoid the CAR's descent into chaos"²⁸. On October 7, 2014, following talks with the Chairman of the AU Commission, N. Dlamini-Zuma, the President of the Republic of South Ossetia, Fr. Hollande announced that France will reduce its presence in the Central African Republic to a minimum of ²⁹.

It should be noted that France launched Operation Sangaris on the eve of the France-Africa summit held in Paris on December 6-7, 2013. On it, she tried to present herself as a firefighter, and not as a gendarme ³⁰. Paris pledged to support the AU's efforts to achieve the full operational capacity of the African force, including the rapid response force to crises.³¹ Paris has committed to train up to 20,000 African troops annually to form a rapid response force and then deploy them to "hot spots" ³².

FRENCH RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON

The question arises: does the operation in the CAR mean France's transition to a new policy on the African continent?

On the one hand, France has assumed responsibility for resolving the bloody conflict in its former colony. The operation was carried out in a short time, the French military contingent was withdrawn after its implementation, and priority was given to regional and international peacekeeping forces.

Paris does not withdraw from African affairs, on the contrary, it intends to train the armed forces of African countries with even greater zeal.

On the other hand, the Central African Republic has large reserves of diamonds, uranium, gold and oil, ³³ and French companies are certainly interested in stabilizing the domestic political situation in this country.

French policies may vary from indifference to intervention, but in general, Paris follows the idea of countering "English-speaking dominance" in Africa.³⁴

In 2008, a special unit of the Pentagon was created-the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). Under its auspices, military maneuvers are conducted on an ongoing basis to improve the interaction of the continent's armies in conducting peacekeeping or anti-terrorist operations with the help of United States forces and resources. They also involve countries that are in the zone of traditional French influence; in addition, they receive military assistance.

From a formal point of view, Paris is not excluded by America from African affairs. France, together with other European States, participates in two key multi - lateral exercises that take place on an ongoing basis - "Flintlock" (in the Sahel region) and "Sahara Express" (in the coastal African States). The purpose of the latter is to ensure the safety of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

S. V. Kostelyanets, a researcher at the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes that AFRICOM also has a hidden goal-to protect vital oil, natural gas, uranium, gold and precious stones deposits in ^the United States35. Therefore, France is not going to give up its active military presence in Africa, and the military training of Africans both in France and on the ground allows maintaining the influence of the former metropolis on the African continent.

By the way, Russia and France have established close cooperation on this continent. In particular, the French use Russian heavy transport aircraft in conducting peacekeeping operations in Africa.³⁶ With regard to Operation Sangaris, the Russian Foreign Ministry welcomed the efforts of France, which assumed responsibility for resolving the crisis.³⁷ Summer 2014 Russia has sent ⁴⁰ Kamaz trucks to the CAR within the framework of the UN World Food Program38.

As for the actions of France in Ivory Coast, the Russian Foreign Ministry said:"...It is necessary to deal with the legal aspects of the actions of UN peacekeepers and the French contingent in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, who intervened in the internal conflict, speaking out in support of one of the parties. " ³⁹ At the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded from France "...be strictly guided by its mandate as approved by the UN Security Council. " ⁴⁰ However, the Russian Federation recognized Ouattara as the legally elected president of Ivory Coast.

Through bilateral defense partnership agreements, Paris is strengthening its legitimate military presence in Africa and gaining ground to intervene in African affairs. Thanks to the treaties, France appears more like a "crisis manager" than a gendarme acting at its own discretion.

The reform of the agreement system under Nicolas Sarkozy changed the wording and identified mutual consultations and support for African States as a key task, although their meaning remained the same. Despite the reference to international and regional formats for resolving crisis situations in African countries, these agreements shift the key responsibility for resolving them to France.

HEADING FOR "AFRICANIZATION"

The defense agreements discussed above fit well into France's current African policy. On the one hand, they contribute to the "Africanization of solutions", allowing new personnel to be trained for the African armed forces. Such training helps preserve French influence among the military and prevent them from falling under the influence of other states, primarily the United States.

On the other hand, they provide a basis for the active use of French contingents, even in the event of actions by international forces.

A vivid example of this is Operation Likorn (2002-2015), already mentioned above. In turn, Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic, implemented under the UN mandate, was initiated by the authorities of this country. It is in fact an extension of Operation Boali, which has been carried out since 2002 under a bilateral agreement with France.

The implementation of Operation Sangaris in a fairly short period of time, the rapid withdrawal of the French military contingent, and the desire to give priority to international peacekeeping forces suggest certain changes in French African policy. This is also evidenced by F.'s statement. Hollande at the France-Africa summit in December 2013 that African countries should decide their own fate.

Of course, it is difficult for Paris to radically restructure its relations with the former colonies. But the new agreements take into account previous experience and allow us to maintain mutually beneficial contacts in various fields.

^{Varenne L.} 1 Abobo la guerre. Paris, 2012, p. 24.

² Livre blanc. Defense et securite nationale. 2013, p. 15.

³ Ibid., p. 55.

⁴ of Hopes: Renewal 1958-1962. Moscow, 2000, p. 40.

⁵ Livre blanc... 2008, p. 167-168.

⁶ Liste des accords bilateraux de defense ou de cooperation militaire de la France. Annexe 9 - http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-info/i3394.asp# P1743_426607

⁷ Sous-serie 9 C. Assistance militaire francaise - http://www.servi cehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr/contenu/functions/dc/attached/FRSHD_PUB _00000272_dc/FRSHD_PUB_00000272_dc_att-FRSHD_PUB_0O0OO272.pdf

^{Charbonneau B., Chafer T.} 8 Introduction: peace operations and francophone spaces // International peacekeeping. Vol. 19, Issue 3, p. 277.

⁹ Discours de M. de Villepin, ministre des affaires etrangeres, au 4eme forum de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale sur le continent africain, 13 juin 2003 - http://serge.bozanga.free.fr/france_suite_3.htm

¹⁰ Serequeberhan H. La politique de la France a l'egard des conflits en Afrique. Depuis 2002, la politique a tatons // Annuaire Francais de Relations Internationales. 2006. Vol. VII, p. 426.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 428 - 429.

¹² Declaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre de l'interieur et de 1'amenagement du territoire, sur la democratic au Benin et sur l'etablissement de nouvelles relations entre la France et l'Afrique, Cotonou, le 19 mai 2006 -http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/06300181l.html

¹³ Discours de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, president de la Republique devant le Parlement Sud-africain. La Cap, 28 fe'vrier 2008 - http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/lMG/pdf/PARLEMENT_AS.pdf

^{Filippov V. R.} 14 "Fransafric": the secret policy of Paris on the African continent / / Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 2014, N 3, с. 129 (Filippov V.R. "Fransarfrik": tainaya politika Parizha na Afrikanskom kontinente // Mezhdunaronaya zhizn. N 3) (in Russian)

¹⁵ Cit. но: Accord de defense entre les gouvernements de la Republique Francaise. de la Republique de Cote d'lvoire, de la Republique du Dahomey et de la Republique du Niger du 24 avril 1961 - http://yanko.chez-al ice.fr/ci/crise/docs/accord_def_24_avri1_ 1961.pdf

^{Lasserre I.} 16 La France consolide sa presence a Djibouti // Le Figaro. 22 de'cembre 2011.

¹⁷ Accord de defense entre les gouvernements de la Republique Franchise...

^{Serequeberhan H.} 18 La politique de la France.., p. 423.

¹⁹ Projet de loi N 426 autorisant la ratification du traite instituant un partenariat de defense entre la Republique francaise et la Republique de Cote d'lvoire du 21 novembre 2012 - http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ 14/projets/pl0426.asp: De'cret n°20l4 - 1764 du 31 decembre 2014 portant publication du traite instituant un partenariat de defense entre la Republique franchise et la Republique du Cote d'lvoire, signe a Paris le 26 Janvier 2002 -http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/20l4/12/31/MAEJ1430007D/jo/texte

²⁰ Cit. по: Projet de loi N 426 autorisant la ratification du traite instituant...

²¹ Decret n°2014 - 1764 du 31 decembre 2014 portant publication du traite instituant un partenariat de defense entre la Republique franchise et la Republique du Cote d'lvoire (ensemble une annexe), signe a Paris le 26 Janvier 2002 - http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2014/12/31/MAEJ1430007D /jo/texte

²² Ibidem.

²³ Cit. no: Seance du 5 avril 2011 de la Commission des affaires etrangeres. Compte rendu N 47. Partenariats de defense: France-Cameroun (n° 3194); France-Togo (n° 3196); France-Republique centrafricaine (n° 3197) - http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cafe/10 - 11/c 1011047.asp#P12_254

²⁴ L'operation Boali. Ministere de la Defense de France -http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operations-achevees/operation-boali -2002 - 2013/1-operation-boali

²⁵ UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2127 (2013) - http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/594/45/PDF/N1359445.pdf?Open Element

²⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2149 (2014) - http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/295/83/PDF/N1429583.pdf?Open Element

²⁸ Cit. по: RCA - Transfert d'autorite de la MISCA a la MINUSCA (15 septembre 2014) communique du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres et du Developpement international - http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/republique-centrafricaine/evenements-17748/ article/rca-transfert-d-autorite-de-la

²⁹ Declaration conjointe a Tissue de l'entretien avec Mme Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, presidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine. 7 octobre 2014 - http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/declaration-conjointe-a-l-issue-de-1-entretien-avec- mme-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-presidente-de-la-commission-de-1-union-africaine/

^{Leymarie Ph.} 30 Gendarme ou pompier en Centrafrique? -http://blog.mondediplo.net/2013 - 12 - 04-Gendarme-ou-pompier-en-Centrafrique

³¹ La declaration finale du Sommet de l'Elysee pour la Paix et la Securite en Afrique. 7 decembre 2013 - http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/la-declaration-finale-du-sommet-de-1-elysee-pour-la -paix-et-la-securite-en-afrique/

³² Allocution du President de la Republique pour l'ouverture du Sommet de l'Elysee pour la Paix et la Securite en Afrique. 6 decembre 2013 -http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-pour-l-ouv erture-du-sommet-de-l-elysee-pour-la-paix-et-la-securite-en-afrique/

³³ Central African Republic - https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html

^{Hugon F.} 34 Les nouveaux acteurs de la cooperation en Afrique // Revue Internationale de politique de developpement. International Development Policy. 2010. Is. 1, p. 88.

^{Kostelyanets S. V.} 35 On the US African Command-www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2009/30 - 10 - 09.htm

^{Sapir Zh} 36 Russia: lessons from the crisis // Expert, 2015, No. 4, p. 20.

³⁷ Comment of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Mission on the situation in the Central African Republic (22.09.2014) - http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rafr.nsf/89414576079db5 59432569d8002421fc/44257b100055e32d44257d5b005d129

³⁸ on the transfer of Russian KAMAZ trucks to the Central African Republic by the UN World Food Program - http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rafr.nsf/89414576079db559432569d8002421fc/44257bl00055e32d 44257d1500548dcd!OpenDocument

³⁹ Cit. by: Comment of the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry A. K. Lukashevich in connection with the events in Cote d'Ivoire (7.04.2011) - http://mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rafr.nsf/89414576079db55 9432569d8002421fc/432569a400373407c325786b0028a8f3!OpenDocum ent

⁴⁰ Cit. by: Comment of the Russian Foreign Ministry's diplomatic mission on the humanitarian situation in Ivory Coast (12.04.2011) - http://mid.ru/ bdomp/ns-rafr. nsf/89414576079db559432569d8002421fc/432569a400373407c3 257 870005a5406!OpenDocument

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