France Keywords:, European Union, Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran

For many years, the Middle East has remained one of the" hot spots " of the planet. Sharp contradictions between such regional players as Israel and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, their neighbors-Iraq and Iran, as well as the involvement of the United States and European Union (EU) states in the Middle East have resulted in a series of crises that are extremely difficult to resolve. It was in the Middle East that one of the first major conflicts of the post-bipolar period broke out - the Gulf War. In the 1990s and 2000s, the region was shaken by another outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 2003 was marked by the war of the United States and its Western European allies with Iraq. Since 2002, the issue of Iran's nuclear program has been on the agenda of international meetings. The events of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, dubbed the "Arab Spring"¹, have once again drawn the attention of both the EU and the entire international community to the development of the region's countries.

The activity of the European Union in the Middle East makes us turn to the study of the Middle East policy of its member states. France is one of the most active countries shaping the EU's foreign policy, including in the Middle East. First of all, this is due to the fact that, since the era of the Crusades, the region has been in the orbit of France's foreign policy interests - both during the formation and existence of its colonial empire, and after the political independence of the region's states in the second half of the XX century. It was France that initiated the formation of the foreign policy course of the "United Europe". In 1980, under her pressure, a declaration was adopted at the summit of the European Economic Community (EEC), as the EU was then called, in Venice, which reflected the common positions of the Union's countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict.²

FRANCE AND SHAPING THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY COURSE

The end of the Cold War meant that Paris needed to find its place in the new post-bipolar structure of international relations, in which the United States became the sole superpower. In order to maintain its position in the world, France has chosen the role of one of the European leaders in the development of supranational institutions and the formation of a common foreign and security policy (CFE) and its "offshoot" - the European Security and Defense Policy (ENPO). Since the 1990s, Paris has linked maintaining its position in the world, including in the Middle East, to attracting the potential of the European Union. The interest of both France and the EU as a whole in strengthening their role in the Middle East is explained by a number of considerations, primarily security: due to the geographical proximity of Europe and the Middle East, the destabilization of the situation in the latter can pose a real threat to Europeans. In addition, EU countries have significant economic interests in the region, which is the world's largest oil basin, and from which European countries traditionally import energy raw materials. The Middle East is an extensive market for European industrialists to sell and sell weapons. The region is also important for France and the EU, as Europe has developed numerous Arab (and much earlier Jewish) communities, whose interests the EU must take into account. In addition, the achievement of stability in the Middle East, from the Western point of view, implies that the countries of the region become familiar with such "European values" as democracy, respect for human rights, etc. ³

Since the 1990s, the idea of creating a kind of "security and stability belt" that would cover the European countries of the CIS, the Caucasus, the Maghreb and the Middle East, has become indispensable in the speeches of European leaders on foreign policy issues. France is an ardent supporter of this idea. Thus, the head of the European Commission, the Frenchman Jacques Delors, initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (ESP) program, launched in 1995 at the Barcelona Conference, and in 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to implement a more specific project on the basis of the ESP - the creation of the Mediterranean Union4, which would serve as the basis for the formation of a security and stability belt around the European Union. the entire Mediterranean Sea with coverage of the Middle East countries.

FRANCE AND THE WAR

IN THE PERSIAN GULF

The Gulf crisis, which lasted from August 1990 to April 1991, was a unique event in its own way. First of all, this conflict turned out to be a first step.-

after the end of the cold war. The USSR and the United States condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and actually demanded the restoration of the country's independence. During the UN discussions, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States presented a united front against Iraqi aggression, even though they had all supported Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 in different ways.

While participating in the conflict of the 1990s, France pursued, first of all, economic interests. Iraq was France's second-largest oil supplier, and Baghdad also owed Paris about 24 billion francs.

As far as Kuwait was concerned, France had virtually no cooperation with it, and President Francois Mitterrand's reluctance to send soldiers there - for the sake of other people's interests - was understandable.⁵ However, France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, could not ignore the Iraqi aggression. In general, Paris intended to maintain its influence in the region by solving several contradictory tasks at once: to achieve the liberation of Kuwait together with the United States, preferably without the participation of French troops, and to preserve friendship with the Arab world, in particular with Iraq, as well as Israel. Therefore, France actively participated in the settlement of the crisis, first of all by diplomatic means, and then by military means. The levers of French influence on the situation in the Persian Gulf were the condemnation of the annexation in the UN (Security Council resolutions 660 and 678), economic sanctions (freezing of assets, oil embargo, suspension of scientific and technical contacts), as well as the demonstration of military force by sending several warships, helicopters and ground troops to the Gulf coast.

However, despite its solidarity with the United States on the issue of the liberation of Kuwait, Paris was in no hurry to follow Washington in relation to the regime of Saddam Hussein. France, which turned out to be, according to F. Mitterrand," between the self-confidence of the United States and the inflexibility of Iraq, " has chosen to be a defender of international law, constantly emphasizing her commitment to action within the UN. In addition, Paris insisted on some autonomy in its actions as part of the anti-Iraq coalition led by the United States, while demanding that the White House inform the Elysee Palace and consult with it. Meanwhile, France actively participated in negotiations with Iraq, Kuwait and the United States, with the USSR, which took a neutral position, and with a number of Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, the Maghreb countries, etc.). weight of your position. Thus, in practice, the mechanism of forming a single foreign policy line of the "United Europe" on various issues was worked out. However, this attempt was not successful, and Paris had to act as an ally of Washington in resolving the crisis by both diplomatic and military means: the French Air Force and ground forces still took part in the battles against Iraqi forces.⁶

Despite the fact that the war ended with France in the camp of the victors, due to the complexity and inconsistency of the tasks assigned to it at the beginning of the crisis, it was not able to reap the fruits of the coalition's victory. In the eyes of the United States, the Elysee Palace confirmed its role as an inconvenient ally and was not invited by the Americans to participate in the post-war settlement in the region. At the same time, Paris managed to maintain its important relations with the Arab world and even played a role in putting the Kurdish issue on the agenda. In April 1991, at the initiative of France, the UN Security Council approved resolution 688, condemning the repressive policy of Saddam Hussein against the Iraqi Kurds. After that, France, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted Operation Provide Comfort to provide food and humanitarian aid to the Kurds.⁷

In general, the conflict in the Persian Gulf was, first of all, a military and political victory for the United States. As far as France is concerned, its position in the region has been weakened since the war, but it may have been this circumstance that prompted Paris to

further activation in the formation of the common foreign policy course of the EEC/EU.

PARIS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

Maneuvering between Israel and its Arab neighbors has been and remains a characteristic feature of Paris ' Middle East policy since the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958.Against the background of the pro-Israel position of the United States, France seeks to maintain dialogue with both sides. Back in 1982, Mitterrand defined the French position on the Middle East settlement as the achievement of mutual recognition by Israelis and Palestinians of each other's rights to existence and security. This idea is the basis of French policy in the region to this day.

France's relations with Israel are ambiguous. On the one hand, the development of bilateral contacts in politics, economy and culture is evident.⁸ On the other hand, the Palestinian issue remains a problematic issue in the dialogue between Paris and Tel Aviv. France insists on the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by the Israelis in 1967 and still held today. A cooling in relations between Paris and Tel Aviv also occurred due to the supply of French weapons to Baghdad in the 1980s. It is not surprising that in 1991, after the rocket attack on Israel by Iraq, the condolences sent to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs were sent to Baghdad. Mitterrand's comments to Israeli President Herzog were received coldly: the latter stated that it was France that made S. Hussein dangerous.⁹

Despite the fact that Mitterrand's visit to Israel in 1992 was marked by a "restored trust" between Paris and Tel Aviv, ¹⁰ relations remained cool. This was reflected in the 1992-1993 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, when France failed to mediate between Israelis and Arabs on its own and the United States was involved in the dialogue. But the French were not going to step aside. In 1996. Jacques Chirac became the first head of state to address the world's largest economy.

The Palestinian Legislative Council. The French president supported the idea of unifying the Palestinian territories, offering economic assistance to Palestine, including the construction of a port in Gaza. According to Chirac, Jerusalem should have been made a city open to all faiths.

The difficult relations between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the unwillingness of the United States to give up the role of mediator, hindered the settlement process. In 2002, France proposed accepting Palestine into the UN and then continuing negotiations with Israel, but this idea was met with negative reactions by both Israel and the United States.

A new source of tension in French-Israeli relations between 2000 and 2004 was a series of anti-Semitic acts in France. In 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Aaron Sharon called on French Jews to emigrate to Israel. Paris has begun working to strengthen relations with Tel Aviv. While receiving Israeli President Michael Katsav in 2004, Chirac recalled that France is home to the second largest Jewish community in the world after the United States, thus emphasizing the importance of dialogue between the two countries. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected President of France in 2007, confirmed France's loyalty to friendship with Israel, however, He also demanded that the Israelis recognize the Palestinian State and withdraw from the occupied territories.

Taking into account the lessons of the Gulf War, in the early 1990s Paris called for the consolidation of the EU countries around their positions to resolve the Middle East conflict. The Elysee Palace initiated the EU Seville Declaration, adopted in June 2002, which recognized the right of Palestinians to self-determination within the 1967 borders. In December 2007, the World Donors ' Conference was held in Paris, where participants pledged to contribute $7.7 billion to Palestine. Over the course of three years, Nicolas Sarkozy put forward two new ideas: to make Jerusalem the capital of both states and to create a Franco-Palestinian industrial zone in Bethlehem.

The rivalry between Israel and Syria in Lebanon creates an additional difficulty in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is this country that France considers to be the traditional vehicle of its influence in the Middle East and is trying to mobilize not only its own, but also European forces to help Beirut. In 1995, Jacques Chirac put forward the idea of turning Lebanon into a link between the EU and the Arab world12. During the Israeli military operation in southern Lebanon in 1996, France, on behalf of the EU, acted together with the United States as a peacekeeper and secured the dispatch of observers to the conflict zone. After the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000, Jacques Chirac proposed to involve the IMF and the G8 in the reconstruction of the country. In 2006, France and the United States participated in the peace process after Israel launched a new operation against the extremist organization Hezbollah, ¹³ which had gained a foothold in southern Lebanon. Under the French presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, diplomatic relations were established between Beirut and Damascus.

Thus, France seeks not only to directly influence the Palestinian-Israeli settlement, but also participates on behalf of the EU in peacekeeping processes for the sake of stabilizing the situation in the Middle East. However, today, due to the serious influence of the United States on the region and the EU's lack of a unified position on the Middle East, we should talk not so much about France's success as about working for the future.

IRAQ CRISIS: FRANCE VS. PAX AMERICANA?

The war in Iraq, which began in the spring of 2003, was another test for France's readiness to defend its own and European interests in the post-bipolar world. Despite the fact that France was in solidarity with the United States on the issue of the nature of the C regime. Hussein, the Government of the French Republic strongly opposed

against the US desire to remove power in Baghdad by military means, emphasizing the need to disarm Iraq under the auspices of the UN. France's actions earned it the title of "leader" of the group of countries that opposed intervention in Iraq.¹⁴

France's behavior is explained by both economic and political reasons. In addition to the fact that Paris was interested in importing oil from Iraq, one cannot but agree that the unilateral actions of the White House called into question the French project of a multipolar world.¹⁵ In its objections to the United States, France enlisted the support of Germany and Russia. However, the Paris-Berlin-Moscow triangle, which was formed in February 2003, did not last long, since none of the parties included in it was going to sacrifice their relations with Washington for the sake of peace. Hussein. However, Zh. Chirac denounced Bush's actions, pointing out that without UN authorization, "there is no justification for the unilateral use of force."¹⁶ Unable to prevent the US invasion of Iraq, he made it clear that his country, together with Russia, would veto a resolution on the use of force against Baghdad in the UN Security Council, and laid full responsibility for The invasion of Iraq on Washington.

Apparently, the active rejection of American war plans by Paris was aimed at rallying European partners around itself and achieving EU unity on such an important foreign policy issue.

However, due to the split of EU members into two camps - supporters and opponents of the war in Iraq - France, as in 1991, was unable to unite the EU member states around its positions. Although Paris could not prevent the war, the French forces, unlike the British, did not take part in the fighting against the Iraqi regime.

A kind of" revenge " of the United States on France for its behavior in 2003 was the economic consequences of the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Paris had to cancel about 5 billion rubles. euros - 80% of the amount that Baghdad owed Paris ¹⁷. The escalation of the conflict in Iraq in 2003-2010 and the de facto occupation of the country by the Americans led to the fact that both France and the entire EU, which had no power levers to influence the situation, are still playing a secondary role in resolving the crisis. Paris ' course on the Iraq issue can be seen as a search for economic and humanitarian methods of influencing the development of the political process in a Middle Eastern country drained of blood by the war.

France and the EU as a whole have repeatedly expressed their support for dialogue between different political forces and national reconciliation in the country. Under the auspices of the EU, Paris actively participates in Eurojust activities aimed at training future Iraqi officials and law enforcement officials. French diplomats have consistently stressed the importance of building the rule of law in Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations.

In summary, as in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, France failed to mobilize the EU's capabilities to create a certain "counterbalance" to US dominance in Iraq. The lack of unity among the EU member states, as well as its lack of power capabilities to influence the situation, has led to the fact that today United Europe participates in the settlement of the Iraq crisis de facto only as a junior partner of the United States. It should be noted, however, that the Iraq crisis has demonstrated the EU's ability to use "soft power" - economic (investment in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, training of personnel, etc.) and humanitarian ways to influence the situation in the region. It seems that in the future, if the EU's common foreign policy course is strengthened, it is precisely the successes achieved by the Union through "soft power" that can become the basis for the growth of the EU's influence in Iraq.

LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR IMPASSE

Another acute crisis in the Middle East is related to Iran's nuclear program. Ironically, it was France that was at the origin of Iran's acquisition of atomic energy: in the 1970s, under President Vladimir Putin. Giscard d'Estaing French specialists have started supplying the regime of Shah M. Pahlavi with equipment for nuclear power plants.

In 2002, the IAEA announced the discovery of elements of a secret nuclear program in Iran-the construction of two plants in central Iran: a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy water production plant in Erak.¹⁸ The international community, interested in the prospects of this program, represented by the three EU leaders-France,

Germany and Great Britain have started negotiations with Tehran. On October 21, 2003, the foreign Ministers of these countries signed the Tehran Declaration during their visit to Iran: under its terms, Iran pledged to cooperate with the IAEA in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and renounced nuclear development in the military sphere. ¹⁹ December 18, 2003. Iran has signed an Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).The IAEA seems to have been granted the right to inspect any Iranian nuclear facilities (although the Iranian Parliament subsequently did not ratify this document ²⁰). The next step on this path was the signing by the same countries on November 14, 2004. The Paris Agreement, under which Iran guaranteed that its nuclear program was intended exclusively for peaceful purposes ²¹. Thus, a de facto "troika" of EU leaders dealing with the Iranian issue was formed.

However, after M. Ahmadinejad became the new President of the Islamic Republic in 2005, Iran resumed nuclear development.

The radical statements of Ahmadinejad, who promised to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth, could not but worry the West and especially the nuclear powers - the United States, France, and Great Britain, who are wary of attempts by some states to join the "nuclear club".

In 2006, this "troika" grew into the "six" - at the expense of the United States, China and Russia, within which (along with the UN) there is still a debate about ways to solve the crisis. N. Sarkozy supported the practice of combining dialogue and strict requirements, unequivocally stating that Iran has the right to a peaceful atom, but not a nuclear weapon. "If Iran wants to have nuclear power, it will be helped to get nuclear power. If Iran wants to have nuclear weapons, the international community will fight against this desire, " he said in 2008. ²²

The resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in 2006-2008 (1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803) did not have a significant impact on the development of the dialogue. In June 2010, the European Union, following the UN, adopted a package of sanctions against Iran, imposing an embargo on investment in the country's oil and gas industry, restricting the issuance of visas and freezing the assets of representatives of the Iranian ruling circles. The Istanbul talks of the" six "with Tehran in January 2011 did not bring results. They were attended by the EU representative K. Ashton emphasized once again: The " six " countries recognize Iran's right to receive nuclear energy, but only for peaceful purposes. The sides still have to find ways out of the diplomatic impasse. The participation of three EU leaders in the" six "(English wording"E3+3" ²³) suggests that as long as we are talking about a political settlement of the crisis, the role of the EU in them will be no less significant than the role of the United States, Russia or China, and the latter will have to take into account the weight of Brussels in further negotiations.

* * *

An analysis of the Middle East crises of the 1990s and 2000s leads to the following conclusions. A characteristic feature of French policy in these years was the combination of unilateral actions with collective demarches of EU member states. The country is making special efforts to strengthen its own and European positions in the Middle East. However, the role of Paris should not be overestimated, since today it does not play a decisive role in the region. Both France itself and the EU as a whole have the opportunity to work for the future. The" soft power " of Europeans can bear fruit both at the pre-crisis stage - through diplomatic maneuvers, and at the post-crisis stage-during the restoration of the economy in the territories affected by the military conflict. In the future, the EU may also become more active in the Middle East in the context of the possible withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and in the framework of the further development of the Mediterranean Union.

The fact that the Middle East and North Africa remain the sphere of French foreign policy interests, Paris was not slow to remind in 2011, after watching the coups in Tunisia and Egypt (as a result of which the presidents of the two countries - Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Zbigniew Ben Ali and H. Mubarak lost power), as well as for the outbreak of the civil war in Libya. At the same time, if in the first two cases the reaction of official Paris was rather restrained (France limited itself to political support for the opposition and its readiness to allocate economic assistance to the "democratic" forces advocating the "march to freedom"²⁴), then Gaddafi's unwillingness to follow his Tunisian and Egyptian colleagues forced France to openly use force to put pressure on the Libyan leader.

Undoubtedly, since Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he has not been a welcome partner for Paris. Even V. Giscard d'Estaing, who was President of France in 1974-81, noted in his memoirs that the policy of the Libyan leader interferes with French interests in Chad and in general-in North Africa and the Middle East25. Despite the fact that France maintained diplomatic relations with the Libyan Jamahiriya (during Gaddafi's visit to Paris in 2007, he was allowed to pitch his tent next to the Elysee Palace), Paris did not hide the fact that Libya is a partner of the United States. Apparently, the Gaddafi regime's persecution of its opposition has become a convenient excuse to eliminate the regime of an inconvenient leader.

Pressure was exerted through both diplomatic and military means. So, already on February 26, 2011. France froze diplomatic relations with Libya, entrusting the Russian Embassy to represent its interests in Libya for a while.²⁶

On March 6, Paris officially supported the creation of the National Council of Libya (CNL), which opposes Gaddafi, and on March 11, the French Republic became the first state to recognize the CNL as the only legitimate authority in the country.²⁷ Finally, it was the French draft that formed the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011, which authorized political, economic and military sanctions against the Libyan regime.²⁸

On March 19, a summit was held in Paris, which was attended by-

representatives of 18 countries and three international organizations (UN, LAS and EU) expressed their support for resolution 1973. On the same day, it was the French Air Force, in coordination with Washington and London, that delivered the first blow to the Libyan army (after almost 2.5 hours, the second blow was delivered from US Navy ships).²⁹. In their speeches, the French officials were categorical: Gaddafi must go ³⁰.

Observers also point out a number of points that should not be discounted when looking for the causes of the French war in Libya. Among them are both domestic political ones (N. Sarkozy's desire to increase his rating in the eyes of the French on the eve of the 2012 elections by means of a "small victorious war"³¹) and foreign policy ones. According to some observers, France's activity in Libya is nothing more than a desire for Paris to get some kind of political and economic points, after French diplomacy "slept through" the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.

There is also an opinion that France, together with Great Britain, sought to strengthen its influence in Africa, hoping to outstrip the United States here.³² The fact that France took on a significant burden of the war in Libya can be explained by the fact that when planning this operation, Paris took into account the experience of its participation in the resolution of crises: 1991-in the Persian Gulf, 1999-in Yugoslavia and 2003-in Iraq, and tried to take advantage of what is happening in North Africa and in in the region as a whole in their own interests.

However, Paris did not take into account the possibility of resistance to the Gaddafi regime, the protracted nature of the civil war in the country, or the cost of NATO's actions against Gaddafi's forces. Even killing Gaddafi is unlikely to boost Sarkozy's standing in future presidential elections.

¹ It was under this title that a colloquium on the unrest in North Africa was held in April 2011 at the Institute for Arab Studies in France - http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/afrique-du-nord-mediterranee_1062/ev enements_20878/colloque-printemps-arabe-enjeux-espoirs-un-changement-mstitut-du-monde -arabe-l6.04.11_91610.html

² In the Venice Declaration, the EEC countries expressed their satisfaction with the signing of the 1979 Mepc-David Accords, while emphasizing that these agreements do not solve the Palestinian problem as a whole. - См.: La Politique exterieure de Valery Giscard d'Estaing. P., 1985. P. 373 - 375.

^{Kuznetsov D. V.} 3 The Arab-Israeli conflict and France: Foreign Policy and Public opinion during the Presidency of F. Mitterrand (1981-1995). Blagoveshchensk, 2005, pp. 7-20.

⁴ Literally translated - "Union for the Mediterranean" (Union pour la Mediterranee).

^{Attali Jacques.} 5 Verbatim. T. III (1988 - 1991). P., 1995. P. 548 - 550, 585.

⁶ Ibid. P. 592. The fighting of the French forces in the Persian Gulf was called "Operation Daguet" (Operation Daguet).

⁷ Ibid. P. 752.

⁸ For example, for Israeli tourists, France is the second most attractive country after the United States - www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo__i33/israel-territoires-palestiniens_413/france-isr ael_1160/index.html

^{Attali Jacques.} 9 Op.cit. P. 708.

¹⁰ Histoire de la diplomatie francaise. T. 2. Paris, 2007. P. 532.

¹¹ http://www.elysee.fr/president/international/visites-d-etat/proche-orient/proche-orient.8272.ht ml

¹² http://elysee.fr/elysee/elysec.fr/francais_archives/interventions/discours_et_declarations/1995/ juin/allocution_prononcee_a_l_occasion_du_dejeuner_offert_par_le_president_de_la_republi quc_en_l_honneur_du_president_libanais-palais_de_l_elysee.l248.html

¹³ This Lebanese organization is an offshoot of the Iranian organization of the same name, and the Persians call it Hezbollah, while the Arabs call it Hezbollah. Since the article is about Lebanon, it seems appropriate for the author to use the Arabic version of the name (see the comment of the arabist G. I. Mirsky -http://www.izvestia.ru/news/315813).

^{Briguet Gatlle.} 14 Etats europeens et guerre d'Irak. Geneve. 2005. P. 2, 5 - http://www.unige.ch/ieug/publications/euryopa/briguet.pdf

¹⁵ France in search of new Ways, Moscow, 2007, p. 546.

¹⁶ http://elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_archives/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2003/ mars/declaration du_president_dcla republique_sur_l_iraq.1763.html

¹⁷ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/irak_430/france-irak_1157/presentatio n_14108/index.html; http://www.rue89.eom/20l0/10/11/son-non-a-la-guerre-en-irak-a-coute-4-milliards-a-la-france -170466

¹⁸ See the report of the Director General of the IAEA, M. ElBaradei, June 6, 2003 In particular, it recommended that Iran sign an Additional Protocol to the NPT - http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003 -40. pdf

¹⁹ See the text of the declaration on the IAEA website http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml

²⁰ http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2003/iranap20031218.html; http://ria.ru/politics/20050925/41500761.html

²¹ See the text of the agreement on the official website of the French Embassy in Iran - http://www.ambafrance-ir.org/article.php3?id_article=549

²² http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/XVIeme-conference-des-Ambassadeurs.html

²³ http://www.consilium.curopa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-data/EN/foraff/118915.pdf

²⁴ Indicative in this case is the comment of the French Foreign Minister A. Juppe on Egypt. When asked by a journalist if he feels that France has lost a friend in the person of H. Mubarak, with whom it created the Mediterranean Union, A. Juppe diplomatically stated :" Our friend is the Egyptian people. We worked with the Egyptian people, who were legitimately represented by President Mubarak. Today we want to work with the new Egyptian leaders. We are glad that this democratic revolution is taking place now " - www.diplo-matie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/egypte_414/france-egypte_1136/visites_849 3/entretien-alain-juppe-avec-al-jazecra-caire-6-mars-2011_90356.html

^{Giskard d'Estaing V.} 25 Vlast i zhizn [Power and Life], Moscow, 1990, pp. 150-153.

²⁶ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/libye_409/france-libye1176/presentatio n_4528/libye-evacuation-ressortissants-francais-26.02.ll_90180.html. This was also reported by the Russian media. See for example: http://www.ria.ru/world/20110227/339601601.html

²⁷ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/libye_409/france-libye_1176/presentati on_4528/creation-du-conseil-national-libyen-06.03.11_90342.html; http://www.cconomist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/03/france_and_libya

²⁸ According to Vincep Jover, a correspondent for the Nouvelle Observer magazine, the French representative had to play ahead of the game on the evening of March 17, so that the French project, and not the US project, was submitted to the vote. All this almost detective story V. Jover outlined in his blog on the magazine's website -http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/archive/2011/03/23/libye-histoire-secrete-de-la-resolution- 1973.html

²⁹ According to RIA Novosti, the first strike on March 19, 2011 was carried out by the French Air Force at 19:58, the second-by the US Navy at 22: 39 -http://www.rian.ru/arab_mm/201l0320/3560l8043.html

³⁰ http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/libye_409/france-libye_1176/presentati on_4528/libye-tribune-conjointe-nicolas-sarkozy-barack-obama-david-cameron-l5.04.1l_9l60 7.html

³¹ http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/03/france_and_libya, http://www.inosmi.ru/africa/20110405/168099944.html

³² http://www.economist.com/node/18285922; http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060412,00.html

Permanent link to this publication: