The problem of France's recognition of the USSR and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries is relevant both in political and scientific terms. From a distance of 60 years, many aspects of this problem become more distinct. Soviet scientists have already done considerable work on studying the history of Soviet-French relations .1
Materials stored in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Archives of France, Archives of the Institute of Im. Maurice Thorez at the Central Committee of the PCF, the French press of those years allow us to expand our understanding of the events related to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and France, in particular, to better understand that the activities of the Soviet state aimed at strengthening the power of the Soviets, solving economic problems, and at the same time developing mutually beneficial external trade and economic relations They stimulated the desire of certain trade and economic circles and prominent political figures of France to establish business contacts in various fields of economy and culture between the two countries.

The path to recognition of the USSR by the French government turned out to be long and difficult. The process of forming public opinion in favor of such a decision was complex. Various political forces in France were engaged in a sharp struggle on this issue. While the ruling circles took a contradictory position, the working masses strongly supported the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet country.

The French monopoly bourgeoisie actively participated in the organization of the civil war and armed intervention against the young Soviet state. Of all the countries, and this is once again confirmed by the materials of the archives, France occupied the lowest position in those years.-

1 Manfred A. Z. Traditions of friendship and cooperation. From the History of Russian-French and Soviet-French Relations, Moscow, 1967; Borisov Yu. V. Soviet-French Relations 1924-1945, Moscow, 1964; Gurvich S. N. Rabocheye dvizhenie i levy blok v Frantsii (1921 - 1926), Moscow, 1966; Shishkin V. A. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i strany Zapada v 1917-1923 1969; Belousova Z. S. Franco-Soviet relations of 1920-1930 and the problem of collective security in Europe. - French Yearbook (hereinafter - FE), 1969. Moscow, 1970; Karpova R. F. Recognition of the USSR de jure by the government of France. - FE, 1970. M. 1973; Salychev S. S. The French Socialist Party between two world wars. 1921-1940 Moscow, 1973; Rubinsky Yu. I. Disturbing years of France. The struggle of classes and parties from Versailles to Munich (1919-1939). M. 1973; History of France. Vol. 3. M. 1973; Molchanov N. N. USSR - France. Poluvekovoy put ' [The Half-century Way], Moscow, 1974; Trofimova L. I. Moscow and Paris exchange ambassadors. - New and modern History, 1974, N 6; History of foreign policy of the USSR, Vol. 1. Moscow, 1976; Smirnov V. P. Modern history of France, Moscow, 1979; et al.

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the position taken in relation to the Soviet Republic 2 . French workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors, civil servants, progressive intellectuals, all advanced people persistently demanded that the Government of their country abandon armed intervention and the economic blockade.

The peaceful orientation of the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy, its first successes in restoring the national economy, and the conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements with a number of countries by the RSFSR in 1920-1922 also opened up broad prospects for France. The economic crisis, the difficulties of restoring the national economy, and the decades-long international division of labor made it imperative that the French ruling circles engage in contacts with Soviet Russia. The deepening contradictions between France and Britain, the general complexity of the international situation of those years also dictated the need to change the policy towards the Soviet country.

Already in 1921-1923. There were signs of some softening of the tone of French politicians in matters concerning relations with the Country of the Soviets. This, in particular, was reflected in a number of speeches by Zh. Leigh, A. Millerand, A. Briand, who, although they remained on anti-Soviet positions, had to reckon with the irreversible changes that had taken place in the world. Each of them expressed in his own way the idea that it was still possible to negotiate with the Soviet leaders on certain conditions. At the same time, they demanded that the Soviet government recognize the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments both in relation to private loan holders and to governments that provided loans to Russia during the First World War. "Companies with French capital that have created Russian industry," the French Foreign Ministry said in a document, " must obtain guarantees for the resumption of work, for compensation for losses incurred and the establishment of appropriate economic obligations. Guarantees must be given to ensure the protection of French interests through the organization of certain controls and the conclusion of long-term contracts containing precise obligations on the part of Russia." At the same time, it was stressed that "recognition of the Russian government is possible only if this government complies with the obligations previously assumed by Russia." 3 From the above documents, it is clear that, despite all sorts of "conditions", the term "recognition" itself began to appear in government documents, in the press, and in the speeches of officials.

When diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Republic and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland in 1920, and ambassadors were exchanged, the French government officially expressed its dissatisfaction with this act of the Baltic States. Since Soviet embassies were opened in the capitals of these states, contacts of the latter with diplomatic representatives of other countries, including France, became inevitable. The French Foreign Ministry gave its diplomats special instructions not to establish contacts with Soviet ambassadors. If they themselves make appropriate attempts, it was prescribed to treat this negatively. A telegram to the Ambassador in Helsinki dated February 14, 1921, requested that the Soviet ambassador be received only "as a private person." 4 Ambassador M. Fabre

2 Arhives du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres de France; 1918 - 1929. France-Russie, Serie Z, carton 619, dossier 20 (hereinafter referred to as AMAE). Vol. 348, pp. 85-90; Vol. 349, pp. 16-17.

3 Ibid. Vol. 348, pp. 110 - 112.

4 Ibid. Vol. 347, t. II, p. 7.

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In a telegram dated February 24, 1921, he confirmed: "In accordance with the instructions that Du Chaffaut (an employee of the French Foreign Ministry) has just conveyed to me ," the members of the Bolshevik mission should be considered only as private individuals, so that if one of them pays me a visit, he should be listened to and, of course, return his card without specifying his official title " 5 . Another dispatch sent to the French ambassadors in the Baltic states said: "Avoid any contact with them. If they come to your representative office, you must not receive them. " 6
At the same time, French diplomats were required to closely monitor the actions of the Soviet representatives and, if possible, find out the nature of the negotiations they were conducting. The French side was particularly concerned about the emerging contacts of the Soviet state with Britain and Germany, and the signing of trade agreements between them. When in the autumn of 1921 the NKID representative M. M. Litvinov made a trip to the capitals of some European states, the French ambassador to Switzerland reported: "Litvinov is Chicherin's assistant... I took a serious trip, a study tour of the main European capitals. He met with the British and German financial circles." Further concerns were expressed that the Soviet side would make concessions to England and Germany, and France would lose the traditional profitable Russian market .7
There was growing concern in French ruling circles about the lack of Franco - Soviet contacts. When the merchants began to insist that the government allow them to enter into business relations with Soviet trade representatives, the authorities said that they had nothing against contacts of private merchants with Soviet cooperation and state trade .8 Then came the idea of sending official representatives to the Soviet country. At the end of 1920, such a proposal was made by the former representative of the French military mission in Russia, Jean-Claude Juncker. de Lubersac. In his appeal to the government, he asked to be allowed to visit Soviet Russia unofficially, citing that he knew Lenin, met with him and discussed various problems. Indeed, in February 1918, during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Vladimir Ilyich received him and Zh. Sadulya at their request 9 . A group of people also expressed their willingness to visit Soviet Russia in 1920: P. Arbel , a metallurgical magnate; Negra, a lecturer at the University of Dijon; G. Cattovaza, a former employee of the French consulate in Ekaterinoslav; Ehrlich, a member of parliament ,a "specialist in Slavic affairs" 10. But the government, under pressure from reactionary forces, did not agree to their trip.

Every year, the French economy felt more and more in need of the Russian market. Significant social forces were in favor of broad economic contacts. This idea was also supported by left-leaning figures from the radical and socialist parties. The restoration of relations with Russia was demanded by merchants and industrialists. Many of them were well acquainted with the economic program of the Soviet state, with NEP. One of the editors of L'Humanite, A. Dunois, wrote that the reactionary policy of the "National Bloc" in the field of Franco-Russian relations is on the verge of bankruptcy,

5 Ibid., p. 8.

6 Ibid., p. 23.

7 Ibid., pp. 131, 147.

8 Ibid. Vol. 349, p. 37.

9 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 37, pp. 55-56,

10 AMAE. Vol. 347, p. 23.

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"the capitalists themselves will soon force the French government to resume contacts with Russia." 11
The fear that the French would not gain access to the Soviet market, which would be filled with German, English, and Scandinavian goods, accelerated the government's decision to allow individuals to enter into trade and economic agreements with Soviet Russia. This also paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations. 12 V. I. Lenin, speaking at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet on November 20, 1922, said: "We are on a road that is absolutely clear and definitely outlined, and we have secured success in front of states around the world, although some of them are still ready to declare that they do not want to sit down with us at the same table. Nevertheless, economic relations, followed by diplomatic relations, are improving, they must improve, and they will certainly improve. " 13
Signs of changes in the position of France were noted by the Izvestia newspaper on January 2, 1922: "Recently, the tone of French circles and the French press in relation to Soviet Russia has clearly changed. An influential group of capitalists was formed, headed by Sheveli, who were vitally interested in restoring relations with Russia as soon as possible. Now, in France, the capitalists are beginning to take into account the fact that the interests of Britain and Russia in the East clash in some places, while in France and Russia there they do not... A. Briand, speaking in the Senate in December 1921, noted that Russia " cannot be considered as an insignificant quantity and ignore its existence. On the contrary, French capital has so far done nothing to bring it closer, and this question cannot be delayed any further." 14
These ideas were widely adopted in France before the Genoa Conference. The newspaper "Le Temps" wrote on January 2, 1922: "On the day when the states (meaning France, England, Italy. - N. K.) will take up Russian affairs and get guarantees from the Bolsheviks, they will understand that the vital needs of Russia can always be coordinated with the needs of France." On the eve of the conference, M. Kashen, speaking in Parliament, said:: "In Genoa, our delegates will have to talk to the Soviet delegates as equals. The Genoa Conference should mark a final break with our previous policy, and this should be declared publicly. "15 M. Cachin wrote in L'Humanite:" The policy that the Entente has followed since the armistice has failed completely. The Genoa Conference will take place, and we have no doubt that France will be there, and it will have to meet face to face with representatives of Soviet Russia, whose presence at all international conferences was demanded only by the Communists." 16
However, the reactionary forces of France in 1921-1922 still opposed the expansion of contacts with Soviet Russia. This was one of the reasons for A. Briand's resignation. He was replaced by R. Poincare, who was extremely anti-Soviet and tried to exert a corresponding influence on the participants of the Genoa Conference. Irreconcilable-

11 Cit. according to: Pravda, 1. X. 1921. "National Bloc" - created in 1919 during the first post-war parliamentary elections association of a number of right-wing political parties and groups led by A. Millerand, R. Poincare, J. Clemenceau, L. Barthou.

12 AMAE. Vol. 349, p. 20; see Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, pp. 16-17.

13 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 45, p. 301.

14 Izvestia, 2.1.1922.

15 AMAE. Vol. 349, p. 52.

16 L'Humanite, 2.1.1922.

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The weakness of the French Government towards Soviet Russia was also evident at the conference itself. The French delegation did everything possible to place the representatives of the proletarian State in an unequal position.

The Soviet delegation made proposals for a general reduction of armaments, for the settlement of financial and property claims, and for the normalization of political relations between the Soviet republics and the capitalist countries. The representatives of France and Belgium rejected these proposals. The French delegation demanded the restoration of private property of foreign capitalists, recognition of the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, and changes in legislation aimed at undermining the Soviet social system. The Soviet delegation responded by saying: "The Russian government delegated its representatives to the Genoa Conference in the hope of reaching an agreement here with other states that, without encroaching on the social and political regime established in Russia after the revolution and the victorious repulse of interventions, should not hinder, but facilitate the economic and financial situation of Russia and at the same time clear the way for improving the economic situation of Europe. Russia is not defeated. A general agreement can only be reached in the tone of negotiations that is usually used among Powers that talk to each other on an equal footing." 17 A letter from the Soviet delegation to the chairman of the French delegation stated: "The Russian government cannot conceal from the French Government that its hostile policy towards Russia has aroused a lively feeling of indignation against France in the public opinion of Russia and that, apart from this policy, there would be no other reason to prevent the restoration of the most friendly relations between Russia and France and its allies. The Russian Government is convinced that a change in this situation is as necessary as it is useful in the interests of France, Russia, the peoples of Western Europe and the economic revival of the whole world. " 18
After the Genoa Conference, the French bourgeoisie continued to closely monitor the development of events in the Soviet country and the progress made in the restoration and development of the national economy. Answering the questions of the Izvestia newspaper correspondent, G. V. Chicherin noted:: "In French society itself, the desire to restore economic relations with the Soviet Republics, which are extremely beneficial and necessary for both countries, and subsequently political relations, is growing and developing uncontrollably. The Soviet republics constantly and unequivocally expressed and expressed a sincere desire to find common ground with France, to start negotiations with it, and to establish peaceful and normal relations with it. " 19
Information about the situation in the U.S.S.R. and the strengthening of Soviet power gradually spread to France. Sources of information about our country were not only the press and radio, but also eyewitnesses. In 1920-1923. Representatives of various social strata of France visited the Soviet country. Among them were communists, socialists, trade unionists, merchants, etc. Some of them met abroad with L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov, G. V. Chicherin and others. Their reports on their trips to Russia and everything they saw invariably aroused great interest .20 By the end of 1923 in the mood of the ruling class

17 Proceedings of the Genoese Conference, Moscow, 1922, p. 240.

18 Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. V. Moscow, 1961, p. 279.

19 Ibid., Vol. VI, Moscow, 1962, p. 556.

20 AMAN. Vol. 348, pp. 141-144, 154, 154a, 155.

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However, there have been some changes. It became obvious that the government of R. Poincare would not last long in power. His domestic and foreign policies were sharply criticized. The economic situation of the working masses was deteriorating. The small and middle bourgeoisie became disillusioned with Poincare. A major role in this was played by the occupation of the Ruhr by French troops. Dissatisfaction with the government's policy in the "Russian question"was also growing more and more clearly.

The growth in the number of supporters of contacts with the RSFSR was largely promoted by the trip of the leader of the Radical Socialist Party E. Herriot to Soviet Russia. Shortly before his trip, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, he said:: "I would like to see France reach out to Russia to help it rise." 21 His visit to the Land of Soviets in September 1922 aroused great interest in France and largely contributed to a change in the tone of the bourgeois press. The Herriot Foundation, which is kept in the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, contains materials that show his desire to see everything that is happening in Soviet Russia with his own eyes. "I would like to get an idea of the situation of the country, about which various reports were spread," Herriot wrote .22 On the eve of his departure, in an interview with the newspaper "Information", he said:: "I look towards Russia with broad economic and political interests in mind. The Russian people cannot die... I am confident that Russia will come out of this ordeal even stronger and more hardworking than ever before." To the question: "is it possible to trade with the Bolsheviks?" Herriot replied in the affirmative. "Be that as it may, the citizens of the Russian Republic have found their homeland. I put my trust in the Russians - that's why I'm going there... I want to make sure on the spot what position we should choose. " 23 In an interview with the Paris correspondent of the Morning Post, Herriot stressed: "I am going to Russia as an independent observer and a sincere democrat, whose goal is to work for the benefit of rapprochement between the two nations. Of course, the French government will be informed of my departure, but my mission is not related to any government assignments. If I go to Russia, I will go at my own risk. " 24
Nevertheless, the French public was convinced that Herriot was traveling to Russia on behalf of the 25 government . They claimed that Herriot was entrusted with a confidential and responsible mission, that he was authorized to conclude economic transactions, etc .26 Some bourgeois newspapers predicted the failure of this mission, assuring that Herriot would not be able to see everything he wanted .27 The French police closely followed Herriot's trip, giving all the details of his meetings, according to police reports stored in the National Archives 28 .

On September 20, 1922, Herriot arrived in Moscow. He was given the opportunity to visit Petrograd, Nizhny Novgorod and other places. V. I. Lenin, in an interview with the Observer and Manchester Guardian newspaper correspondent M. Farbman, said:: "We highly appreciate both Herriot's reception in Moscow and the step towards rapprochement with France or negotiations with it, which have now become possible and probable

21 Herriot E. From the past. Between two Wars, 1914-1936. Moscow, 1958, p. 147.

22 Ibid., p. 148.

23 Pravda, 7. IX. 1922.

24 Ibid., 24. VIII. 1922.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 3. IX. 1922.

27 Les Debats, 1.IX.1922.

28 Archives National (hereinafter-AN). F 7 - 13492.

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and, I would like to think, necessary. Any rapprochement with France is extremely desirable for us, especially in view of the fact that Russia's commercial interests urgently require rapprochement with this strongest continental power. " 29
Leaving the USSR, Herriot stated:: "I stayed for about three weeks and had the full opportunity to see absolutely everything that interested me. What our press writes about Russia is a fantasy, a novel, a sensational film. As for my views, you probably already know that I am a supporter of rapprochement with Russia. The Russians and the French are two Republican peoples who had and still have common interests. We need to come to terms, we need to meet, get to know each other, and the rest will follow." Answering the question of the Pravda correspondent: "How do you think about this rapprochement specifically?", Herriot said: "We should exchange trade delegations and start resolving the issue of debts and property in a spirit that would not contradict either your or our principles... I am convinced that the Soviet government is very stable... It represents the majority of the people... I will say everywhere - in parliament, in the press, and in the government-that the peoples of France and Russia are close in spirit and interests, and that friendship must be restored between them." 30
After returning to his homeland, Herriot actively promoted the idea of recognizing the USSR. "Let's fight the stupid hatred, the vile hatred that never created anything. We must work to reconcile the Russian Republic with the French Republic, " 31 he said." We must not curse this greatest country in the world, but learn from it. " 32 Le Temps, assessing Herriot's reception, noted:: "Moscow's position confirms that the chances of a possible Russian-French agreement are growing." 33 In a letter to Poincare, Herriot stressed that the Soviet government's position was stable: "There is no one, and it is difficult to imagine anyone who could replace him." 34 Speaking at the Society of French scientists, continuing the same idea, he stated:: "All Republicans should unite to demand recognition of the Soviet Republic. A campaign should be launched in favour of such recognition. " 35 Defending the idea of rapprochement with Russia, E. Herriot sought to gain confidence in broad public circles, among the" average " French.

In a letter to Chicherin, Herriot wrote:: "I had a long conversation with Mr. Poincare. 1) He assured me that Russia would have a broad opportunity to participate in the conference that would decide on freedom of the Straits (meaning the Lausanne Conference - N. K.). In this matter, he will show great tolerance. Some documents should have already proved this to you. (2) The question of the ships (which were taken to Bizerte by Wrangel and handed over to the French government ) was received very favorably. Attempts will be made to find a solution: it is necessary to find out the attitude of the parliament. I'll keep an eye on it. 3) The idea of exchanging trade delegations is significantly strengthened. The Chamber of Commerce wants to take it up. In my opinion, the group should be headed by a consul. This seems to me essential in order to ensure communication with the government and avoid the influence of reactionaries. I run my campaign with all the energy and skill I can muster,

29 Leiin V. I. PSS. Vol. 45, p. 237.

30 Pravda, 7. X. 1922.

31 Herriot E. La Russie nouvell. P. 1922, p. 297.

32 Zarya Vostoka, 9. XI. 1924.

33 Le Temps. 14.X.1922.

34 Cit. by: Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1962, N 10, pp. 152-153.

35 Pravda, 28. XI. 1922.

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acting in the interests of our two states. Last night I had a meeting with a group representing French interests in Russia. I met with the resolute resistance of Mr. Ehrlich. However, I am patient and stubborn. With good will on both sides, success can be achieved. " 36 Chicherin's reply read: "Dear Mr. Herriot, I am deeply pleased to receive your very friendly letter of October 26, and we are grateful for your friendship and your good intentions. Mr. Malyshev (head of the Soviet delegation to the Lyon Fair. - N. K.) would like to immediately go to Lyon for preliminary negotiations, and also arrange for the simultaneous departure of several of your compatriots from Irbit in Siberia... I hope that the general idea of the huge role that the restoration of good relations between us could play will also be successful. This great historical task must be carried out. Its goal is reconciliation in the most general sense of the word. " 37
Herriot was not alone in his desire to study the real state of affairs in Soviet Russia and establish friendly contacts with it. A certain role in the establishment of diplomatic relations was played by the trip of Senator A. de Monzy in August 1923. His personal archive, recently opened to researchers, contains interesting materials about this trip. He wrote: "The purpose of my visit is... explore Russia... Despite various difficulties, I learned a lot. Everything I have seen has once again confirmed my opinion that no economic relations are possible between France and Russia until political and diplomatic relations are established beforehand. I would like to see something done in this regard before the French elections. I belong to the Republican Party; it is only natural that I should hope for the victory of the left wing in Parliament. The majority of the left will undoubtedly support the restoration of relations with Soviet Russia. " 38
A significant part of the official circles of France opposed de Monzy's trip. These people spread rumors that the Soviets had set up a "trap" for him .39 White emigration was particularly keen to prevent this trip. Regarding the hostile speeches of the Russian emigration to the Soviet government, de Monzy wrote: "Who should I believe? Friends in exile who are at odds with their past, or like Herriot, who is accused of compromising? I decided that I should go to Russia to see and check out" 40 . After returning from the USSR, he published a series of articles about his journey. In one of them, he wrote: "At first they thought that it would be enough to deny Russia in order to destroy the Soviets. On the other hand, starting in 1918, I believed that we should not break off our contacts... I became convinced that presence diplomacy is a necessary complement to a victorious policy... We gave support to the opponents of the Bolsheviks... In the absence of military success, we hoped for success... at the conference in Genoa, which we did not achieve. But in diplomacy, as in the home, the door does not remain open for long. After the meetings in Genoa, Soviet delegates were invited to Lausanne - invited by Great Britain, Italy, and France. And to invite someone is to assume that they exist... In my opinion, last year France actually recognized the Government of the Soviets. " 41
De Monzy also wrote about his impressions of the trip in the article "Pu-

36 Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. V, p. 667.

37 Ibid., p. 666.

38 AN. F 7 - 13492.

39 Ibid.

40 Le Journal, 14.VIII.1923.

41 Ibid, 21.IX.1923.

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the descent to Lenin's country. Streets of Moscow": "As for people, they have a good complexion and this purely Slavic power. No signs of physiological decline... This is the first impression of a strong race, a strong people. Everywhere there is a massive movement forward. " 42 In another article, he noted that industrial production is being revived in Russia and labor organization is being improved .43 The publication of articles in the newspaper "Le Journal" was followed by a discussion about the expediency of friendly contacts with the USSR and the restoration of traditional ties between the two countries.

In September 1923, de Monzy performed at the Odeon Theatre in Marseille. Police reports said: "Senator de Monzy has organized a conference on Russia organized by the Society of National Education. Approximately 1,500 people were present. The assembly supported the speeches of the majority of speakers who declared themselves in favor of rapprochement and resumption of relations with Russia, which was approved in the pages of the newspapers "La Liberte" and "Les Debats" .44 In Paris, de Monzy spoke at a Scientific society. "L'Humanite" reported that the room was full of people who wanted to hear a story about events in Russia, about Moscow 45 . About his trip to the USSR, de Monzy published a book in which he pointed out: "The recognition of Russia by France will not be a matter of any party, but will be a matter of healthy meaning and political realism. It will not be our concession to the Communists." One of the arguments for rapprochement between the two countries, de Monzy considered "age-old traditions" 46 .

The National Archives of France contains documents that make it possible to form a definite opinion about the mood of emigration. The "Russian Committee" headed by V. Burtsev was categorically opposed to the recognition of the USSR, and the circles of the White Hungarian emigration were ready to "lynch de Monzy" 47 . Milyukov's Latest News especially attacked him. The position of P. N. Milyukov himself was most clearly expressed in his letter to E. Kuskova: "Pumpyansky (a member of the Cadet party - N. K.) ... has completely left us. Participates in the "mixed society", stands for recognition and for de Monzy. There is a limit that we cannot cross here. " 48 The Social Revolutionaries ' assessments have become more restrained. Some of the emigrants believed that it was necessary to put an end to the "uncertainty" in relations between France and Russia, that it was necessary to establish diplomatic relations, to recognize the USSR de jure and de facto. But most of the emigration still hoped for the demise of the Soviet government. The White Emigrant press trumpeted intensive preparations for "decisive battles with the Bolsheviks." 49 Special efforts were made by her to compromise the missions of Herriot and Monzi 50 .

But no matter how angry the White Guard press was, no matter how many anti-Soviet resolutions were adopted and speeches were made that anathematized the Bolsheviks, the developing and expanding positive process could not be stopped. The demand for recognition of the U.S.S.R. was vigorously supported by French workers. The Communist Party systematically fought for this.

In 1923 in connection with the revival of anti Soviet actions of the British government and the reactionary forces of France solidarity democrat-

42 Ibid., 15.VI 11.1923.

43 Ibid., 3.VIII.I923.

44 AN. F 7 - 13492; La Liberte, 30.X.1923; Les Debats, 9.X.1923.

45 L'Humanite, 1.X.1923.

46 De Monzy A. From the Kremlin to the Luxembourg Palace, Moscow, 1926.

47 AN. F 7 - 13492.

48 Latest news, 17. IX. 1923.

49 AN. F 7 - 13492.

60 Russkaya gazeta, 1. X. 1923.

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The conflict between France and the Soviet country was manifested in new forms. In July 1923, the editorial office of the newspaper Izvestia received a letter from France with the following content:: "Dear comrades, The frenzied pursuit of Britain and France to arm the air fleet, on the one hand, and your energetic efforts to create your own air fleet, on the other, led us to the idea of donating half of our daily earnings to the fund raised for this purpose. Until the ultimatum of Curzon, a protege of the oil companies, we lived under the illusion that the world bourgeoisie, which perfectly takes into account the sympathies of the world proletariat for workers 'and peasants' Russia, would not dare to attack this country. Curzon's ultimatum has convinced us that as Soviet Russia becomes more and more firmly established every day, it is at the same time becoming, as it were, a heavier weight suspended at the feet of world reaction; bound in its attack on the proletariat, this reaction will do everything possible for it to free itself from these obstacles. put. So, if we decide to do our bit to take part in strengthening the defense of Russia, we are convinced that by doing so we are protecting our own existence." 51
The movement of French workers in support of the USSR merged with their struggle to solve their own socio-political problems. In July 1923, the Central Committee of the PCF issued a proclamation calling for the resumption of the struggle for a general amnesty, for the amnesty of Zh. Sadulya, M. Cotten (he shot at Zh. Clemenceau and wounded him), the liberation of those who in the spring of 1919 raised an uprising on the ships of the French squadron in the Black Sea 52 . The Third Congress of the PCF adopted a resolution demanding recognition of the USSR .53 The working youth took a particularly active part in the movement for recognition of the Soviet country. This was clearly demonstrated during the International Week of Working Youth. M. Cachin and the secretary of the Union of French Youth, Jean-Claude Monsieur, delivered speeches to an audience of thousands. Guillot. The speech of the representative of the Soviet Komsomol was listened to with great interest and attention. The police made an attempt to arrest him, but the young workers of Paris hid their comrade from Soviet Russia. This fact was discussed at the Lyon Congress of the PCF 54 .

The "Russian Question" has not left the pages of the press. More and more insistent demands were made to resume relations with Russia. The newspaper "Information" asked the question: "Will we really bring the matter to such a situation in which the Russian people will finally establish themselves in a hostile position to us? It would be very imprudent of us to create further difficulties on the way to negotiations." Even the right-wing "Les Debats" noted: "Prudence compels us for the time being to limit ourselves to encouraging the resumption of trade relations with Russia, which do not bind the government in any way, i.e. in the form of a private initiative." "Journal de Debats" wrote: "All persons who would like to act in this direction will be supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will receive the necessary passports." The reactionary "Action francais" noted: "The discussion over the past few days on this issue and the press campaign indicate the fluctuation of public opinion on the Franco-Russian issue. It is felt that the French government does not find the courage to approach this issue closely and is feverishly looking for intermediate solutions. " 55
51 Izvestiya, 29. VII. 1923.

52 L'Humanite, 20. VII. 1923; Pravda, 26. VRI923.

53 Parti Communiste. III Congres National tenu a Lyon les 20, 21, 23 janvier 1924. Adresses. Resolution. P. 1924, pp. 24. 25.

54 Ibid.

55 See Pravda, 3. III. 1923.

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During the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Paris, the demand for recognition of the USSR was particularly powerful. The huge garden off Avenue Emile Zola was completely filled. The workers of Paris came here. Speaking at the rally, A. Barbusse warmly welcomed the October Revolution. "Russia has given Marxism real strength, "he said. M. Kashen, speaking about the Soviet country, stressed:" This long - suffering nation is gaining a second wind, is beginning to revive. And now, one by one, the capitalist Powers that only yesterday wanted to deal it a fatal blow are turning to it... Russian revolutionaries... they managed to defend their conquests. Never before in any other country has such heroism, such faith in the future, such self-control, such a flexible and subtle mind been demonstrated. Only the 93rd year can serve as such an example in history." M. Cachin called on the French proletariat to fight for the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. 56 P. Semard, the leader of French trade unions, a communist, in his speech stressed that all the years after the Great October Revolution, the slogan of recognition of the USSR was in the first place in the struggle of French workers. 57 .

Traditional cultural ties between the two peoples were revived and developed on a new basis. It is known that for a long time the intensive cultural exchange between the two peoples has largely contributed to their mutual spiritual enrichment. During the years of intervention and the civil war, this connection was interrupted by the fault of the ruling circles of France. In the 20s, a certain revival begins. In 1923 V. Mayakovsky came to Paris. He wrote about his impressions in the newspaper Izvestia on February 6, 1923: "Paris is now seeing the first Soviet Russians. The red passport book of the RSFSR is a landmark with which you can live for two weeks, have no other advantages and still remain the soul of society... Everywhere the appearance of the Soviet makes a splash with obvious shades of surprise, admiration and interest... I even had a certain queue set up for me. They spent several hours asking questions, starting with Vida Ilyich and ending with the very common version about the "nationalization of women" in Saratov." At the banquet in honor of Mayakovsky, the first toast was raised to the Soviet government. The newspaper "L'Humanite" published Gorky's novel "Mother" and other works by him. July 7, 1923 The National Committee of Social and Political Sciences organized an evening where Professor P. Levy spoke about cultural life in Soviet Russia. Speakers spoke with great enthusiasm about the transformation of the USSR's culture and economy .58
The invitation of the Soviet delegation to participate in the Lausanne Conference was regarded by a significant part of French public circles as a de facto recognition of Soviet Russia. In 1923, the Soviet delegation was invited to participate in the Lyon Fair, where Gostorg, Promburo, Kustpromtorg, paper mill, oil plants and trusts were represented: match, tobacco and machine-building 59 . At a banquet held in honor of the delegations that arrived at the fair, Herriot said: "Let us unite in a single fraternal impulse all peoples of free spirit and generous energy, starting with our Slavic friends, whom we welcome to this table as messengers of final peace." To the correspondent of ROSTA E. Herriot stated: "Russia's participation in the Lyon Fair is a pain-

50 L'Humanite. 26.X. 1923.

57 See Kumanev V. A. Stanovlenie sovetsko-frantsuzskikh kul'turnykh svyazi [Formation of Soviet-French cultural relations]. - New and recent history, 1977, N 4.

58 Pravda, 10. VII. 1923.

59 Izvestiya, 2. II. 1923.

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your interest. We have known your fine, cultured industry before, but here we also have valuable samples of first-class Russian goods... We are definitely moving towards resuming relations with Russia. As the head of the democratic parties, I can assure you that there has been a decisive turn in French public opinion. " 60
However, anti-Soviet actions encouraged by the French government forced the USSR to withdraw its delegation from Lyon. The gist of the matter was as follows. Back in March 1921, Soviet trade organizations entered into a deal with a French joint-stock company for the development of trade and industry for the sale and purchase of a number of goods. When the cargo from the RSFSR arrived in Marseille, it was sequestered at the request of the former owners of silk-weaving enterprises in Russia, the Bunatian brothers, which undermined the legal basis of the transaction. At the same time, the verdict of the court stated that official acts of the Soviet Government would not be valid for the French court until the USSR was recognized by France. Then other White emigrants claimed that the Soviets were selling their property. This complicated the establishment of economic relations. Herriot wrote: "French public opinion has undoubtedly proved more reasonable than our timid government, and especially than the majority of the 'National Bloc', for which the struggle against Russia is a matter of domestic policy. Russian emigrants and bankers should not be allowed to put obstacles in the way of rapprochement between France and Russia. " 61
Together with the working people of the whole world, the French working people and the advanced people of France deeply mourned the death of Lenin, the leader of the world proletariat, the creator of the world's first socialist state. The Congress of the FKP honored the memory of Vladimir Ilyich with a five-minute silence. On the day of the funeral, French workers erected a bust of him on the square in Saint-Denis. Mourning ceremonies were held in Paris and other cities. With portraits of Lenin, workers marched through the streets of a number of cities.: "Lenin's authority and deeds have taken such root that they will remain even after his death. Lenin's death is a great loss for the Soviets, but the Soviets will not die. I believe that France has no reason not to send an official mission to Moscow." Herriot wrote: "There is no need to prove how far I was from Lenin's teaching, but I always admired his exceptional talent as a statesman, his determination, energy, and truly encyclopedic education. I am sure that if he had lived, he would have done much more for his country, because he was a man who was able to assess any situation and find a way out of it." During the mourning days, the municipalities of the two cities of Chambon and Fejerolles (de Loire) decided to name one of the streets after Lenin. Professors V. Vash and P. Penleve spoke at the funeral meeting in the Sorbonne dedicated to Lenin's memory .62 Paying tribute to the memory of the leader of the proletarians of the whole world, the French workers expressed confidence that the Soviet people will cope with difficulties and will not change their principles and plans, that the day will come when France and Russia will stretch out their hands to each other.

Meanwhile, the crisis of the" National Bloc " deepened. Poincare's policy was sharply criticized on domestic and foreign policy issues by Communist and radical Socialist deputies. Trying to save their situation in late 1923-early 1924.,

60 Pravda, 8. III. 1923.

61 Ibid., 27. III. 1923.

62 Ibid., 23, 26. I. 1924; 28. II. 1924.

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The Poincare government attempted to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government through the mediation of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, E. Benes .63 But this action was late and could not change anything. In the elections of May 11, 1924, the "National Bloc" was defeated. The victory was won by the "Left Block". Herriot became the head of the government. In one of his first speeches, he declared the need to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet government, and recalled his visit to Soviet Russia in 192264 .

On June 17, 1924, E. Herriot made a statement in the Chamber of Deputies about France's readiness to recognize the USSR. At his suggestion, a commission was created under the chairmanship of Senator de Monzy "to study the conditions for the possibility of recognizing the USSR." At the same time, on his initiative, the Society of Franco-Soviet Friendship was created, which issued a proclamation stating that recognition of the USSR by France is the first prerequisite for rapprochement between the two countries: "The goal (of the society - N. K.)," it said, " is to organize propaganda for the recognition of Russia by France as the first condition for economic and social development." a political agreement". The first members of the society were: E. Herriot, P. Painlevet, A. de Monzy, M. Moutet, J. Godard, A. Aulard, A. Gide, P. Langevin and others. It consists of 11 senators, 13 deputies, 20 prominent scientists, and 16 representatives of the business community. The society declared that " the social system that Russia has created for itself is recognized by the whole of Europe, This great country is beginning to re-enter European life... and it will become more and more important every day in the economic life of each of the European countries. Is it really necessary to wait until it is too late and our two peoples, who are still almost strangers to each other today, will be definitely hostile to each other?" 65
On July 15, 1924, Herriot sent to NK. USSR Foreign Ministry note on its intention to prepare proposals for restoring normal bilateral relations in a short time 66 . However, there were still a lot of difficulties on the way to this. Forces continued to operate in France, trying to disrupt the emerging trend towards an agreement. The League for the Protection of French Interests in Russia opposed the recognition. White emigrants bribed bourgeois newspapers and everywhere opposed the recognition of the USSR. On October 28, 1924, Herriot, on behalf of the Council of Ministers of France, sent a telegram to Mikhail Kalinin about France's readiness "to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union by mutual exchange of ambassadors. From now on, non-interference in internal affairs will be the rule governing relations between our two countries." The reply telegram of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. stated that the Soviet Government "attaches serious importance to the elimination of all misunderstandings between the U.S.S.R. and France and to the conclusion of a general agreement between them that can serve as a solid basis for friendly relations, guided by the constant desire of the U.S.S.R. to effectively ensure universal peace in the interests of the working people of all countries and to friendship with all peoples"67 .

Chicherin wrote in a telegram to the French government: "It is impossible not to see the enormous importance of this step for the entire international community.

63 For more information, see: Borisov Yu. V. UK. op.; Gurvich S. N. UK. op.

64 E. Herriot. UK. soch., p. 253.

65 See Langevin L. Paul Langevin and Soviet Russia. - FE, 1973. M. 1974, p. 13.

66 Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. VII, Moscow, 1963, p. 519.

67 Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. VII, p. 515.

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politicians. It is impossible not to see the significant role that France plays, especially on the European mainland, as a result of which the entry of France into friendly relations with the Soviet Union will have serious results for the entire international situation on the European mainland, as well as in other parts of the world... We warmly welcome this act. We see the prospects that it opens up for us in the future for the development of our international policy and our international economic relations." Assessing the fact of recognition of the USSR by France, G. V. Chicherin said at the meeting of the Second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on October 28, 1924: "This step is the end of a whole strip of history in which the French government occupied a much more irreconcilable position in relation to the Soviet Republic than other leading states of Europe. Hence the serious significance that we attribute to this act for the whole of European politics, for the whole of world politics. " 68
The recognition of the USSR opened up new prospects for strengthening friendship and mutual understanding between the two peoples. The Executive Committee of the PCF noted:" At the moment when the rulers of France recognized the USSR, the French proletarians and communists congratulate their brothers on this success. " 69 In early November 1924, the two sides exchanged ambassadors. The first ambassador of the Soviet Union to France was L. B. Krasin, and the first French ambassador to the USSR was Sh. Erbet.

60 years have passed since then. During this period, relations between the USSR and France developed in different ways. There were years of alienation that caused great harm not only to our two countries, but also to all the peoples of Europe. But there were also memorable years marked by the joint struggle against fascism, the struggle for detente in Europe, for preserving and strengthening peace. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Konstantin Chernenko said at a dinner in honor of French President F. Mitterrand on June 21, 1984: "Many factors bring our two countries closer together. First of all, it is the historically formed ties of friendship between the Soviet and French peoples, cemented by the joint struggle in the most difficult of wars. " 70 The 60-year history of Soviet-French relations convincingly testifies to the enormous opportunities that open up prospects for further expansion of cooperation between the two countries.

68 Ibid., pp. 518, 519.

69 L'Humanite, 29.X.1924.

70 Pravda, 22. VI. 1984.

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