B. KOPECZI. Staatsrason und christliche Solidaritat. Die ungarischen Aufstande und Europa in der zweiten Halfte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Budapest. Akademiai Kiado. 1983. 423 S.

The national liberation movement in Hungary in the 16th and 19th centuries is closely linked to international relations in Europe and is therefore widely reflected in European public opinion. An important stage of this movement was the uprisings of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. The historical fate of Hungary was such that in the XVI - XVII centuries.the country was divided between two rival powers - the Ottoman Empire and Austria. Therefore, the Hungarian liberation movement was inevitably intertwined in relations between these powers, as well as their allies and opponents, and above all France. Already in the book "France and Hungary at the beginning of the XVIII century", the well-known Hungarian scientist B. Kepeci, in parallel with the study of the diplo-

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matic connections of the leader of the Hungarian uprising of the beginning of the XVIII century. Ferenc Rakoczy considered the question of the attitude of public opinion in France and the countries allied to Austria to the uprising, which made it possible to take a broader look at the whole problem and see how significant this uprising occupied in the socio - political life of Europe at the beginning of the XVIII century .1 In his new monograph, Kepeci explores this issue using the example of the Imre Teke movement (1678-1686). On the actual diplomatic relations, he dwells rather briefly, focusing mainly on the analysis of public opinion both in the countries that supported Tekey, and in those that were supporters of the Habsburgs and opponents of France.

Describing the situation of Hungary at that time, Kepeci notes that it was no longer a "barrier" on the way of the Turks to Central Europe to the extent that it was in the XV-XVI centuries. The internal contradictions in it were complicated by the fact that, firstly, the nobility of the Habsburg part of Hungary began to doubt that they would defeat the Turks, and, secondly, because they saw the development of Habsburg absolutism as a threat to their privileges (pp. 7-8). The conflict between the Hungarian feudal lords and the Habsburgs was also caused by the counter-reformation policy of the Habsburgs, which was closely related to their financial measures (in order to replenish their treasury, the Viennese court tried to take away estates from a number of Hungarian Protestant magnates). Many Hungarian feudal lords from the Habsburg possessions are beginning to take part in anti-Habsburg movements led by magnates who ruled in Transylvania .2 From this situation, Kepeci proceeds to answer the question of why the party of Hungarian Protestant feudal lords, inclined to ally with the Turks and supported by France, which in the second half of the XVII century. She began the struggle for hegemony in Europe against Austria (the latter was joined by the German princes, Holland, England and Spain). As the author emphasizes, the anti-French coalition came up with the idea of Christian solidarity, since France sought to weaken the Habsburgs ' position by means of an alliance with the Turkish Empire (p. 8). What, however, prevailed in practice: the "state interest" or the idea of Christian solidarity? Using the example of the attitude of public opinion in Western Europe to the Imre Tekey movement, B. Kepeci tries to resolve this issue.

The Habsburgs contributed to the socio-economic and political backwardness of Hungary, which was the starting point of the later numerous conflicts (p. 27). Kepeci reasonably notes that the opposition Hungarian nobility looked at France and Turkey as their allies. The author emphasizes the orientation of the Hungarian uprisings of the 17th century to external assistance (p. 27). It seems to us that we should add to this such a circumstance as the fear of the oppositional Hungarian nobility, experienced in relation to their own people, and the unwillingness to rely on them.

Much attention in the book is paid to the French press, and also in Holland, where many French Protestants fled after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. With the appearance of permanent newspapers in these countries, the flow of information about Hungarian affairs increases, which usually came from Cologne and Habsburg newspapers. As Kepeci notes, interest in the Hungarian uprisings increased as the conflict between France and Austria developed. If at first the French and Dutch newspapers called the supporters of Tekey ("kuruts" - Crusaders) "rebels", then from 1672 the Parisian newspapers already called them "discontented" (p. 30).

The author traces the connection between the development of Austro-French relations, especially during periods of escalating hostilities, and the approach of the European press to Hungarian affairs. Kepeci's conclusion is interesting that both the presentation of information and even the choice of terms were determined by the foreign policy interests of European powers (p. 73). Also interesting is a detailed analysis of the content of political commentaries on the Hungarian question in the journals of that time, which were designed in the spirit of the interests of European governments (pp. 82, 111-114).

Kepeci spent a lot of time analyzing the controversy between pamphleteers from various European countries on the Hungarian question. In the countries opposed to France, criticism of Louis XIV's foreign policy reached

1 Kopeczi B. La France et la Hongrie au debut du XVIIIe siecle. Budapest. 1971, pp. 9, 12, 585, 604.

2 Istoriya Hungarii [History of Hungary], Vol. 1, Moscow, 1971, pp. 308-309.

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to the point that he was compared to the Turkish Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, whose foreign policy was particularly aggressive towards the countries of Central and Western Europe (p. 127). At the same time, Kepeci notes that the Protestant princes of Germany were also ready to oppose the German emperor (p.135). In England, the tone of pamphleteers became even harsher, for during the Stuart Restoration and after the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, official propaganda strongly condemned any attempt to revolt against the monarchy (pp. 135-136). The Whigs who were in opposition were sympathetic to the Hungarian Protestants. Habsburg propaganda, the author notes, as in the time of Charles V, condemned the French monarchy as a violator of the unity of the Christian world (pp. 159-168). The German philosopher Leibniz called the French even more enemies of Christendom than the Turks (p. 172). In the pro-Habsburg pamphlets, the idea appears that France is the enemy of the German nation (p. 183).

As relations between Austria and France deteriorated, attitudes towards French politics became increasingly prominent in Western European public opinion. The Turkish wars and the Hungarian question began to be viewed through the prism of Austro-Turkish contradictions. Anti-French propaganda made extensive use of the fact that the French government, protecting the interests of Catholics in England and thereby interfering in the internal affairs of this country, supported the Hungarian Protestants, while at the same time persecuting Protestants in their own country (p.195, 201). In Holland and the German lands, there were calls for Protestant countries to resist Louis XIV, who was accused of seeking to create a "universal monarchy" (pp. 201-203).

Kepetsi studied the historical and geographical literature of the 17th and early 18th centuries, which mentioned the Tekeya movement. He notes that the confessional and political orientation of the respective countries and Governments was also decisive in assessing the Tekeya movement (p.238). In general, this literature was actually a supplement to journalism (p. 322, 323).

Separately, the Hungarian scholar considered the question of the reflection of the Tekey movement in fiction, coming to the conclusion that in poetry and prose the figure of its leader was depicted as an exotic phenomenon and only in some works he was characterized as a fighter. The image of a freedom fighter appears only under the influence of the ideas of the French bourgeois Revolution at the beginning of the XIX century (p. 372).

Kepeci's work, based on the study of various sources in many European languages, contributes to the study of the political ideology of Europe in the second half of the XVII century.

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