B. V. DOLGOV

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: strengthening Islam, social thought, French Islam, Islamophobia

Representatives of the Arab-Muslim diaspora in France, natives of the Maghreb countries, in the 2010s intensified their participation in the socio-political life of French society. In France, as well as in many EU countries, there is an increase in Islam, both in religious and socio-political terms. This activity can only be defined to a certain extent as the integration and acceptance of French culture and civilizational values by a part of Muslims. To a greater extent, it reflects the desire of a significant part of the Muslim community to preserve their Islamic values, traditions and religion.

This trend is reflected in the Muslim community's nomination of candidates for municipal and parliamentary elections, membership in socio-political and human rights organizations, and the active influence of Muslim organizations on public thought in France. For example, in 2012, for the first time in the history of France, about 400 French citizens from the Arab-Muslim diaspora ran for parliamentary elections (the total number of candidates was 6,611), and about 10 of them were among the 571 elected members ^of Parliament1. Representatives of French Muslims actively work in the National Advisory Committee on Human Rights, defending the right of Muslims to express their belonging to Islam.

THE RISE OF ISLAM IN FRANCE

One of the most well - known Muslim organizations, the Union of Muslim Associations (UMA), based in the Saint-Denis district, a suburb of Paris, where about 450 thousand Muslims live, mostly from North Africa, regularly publishes materials on its website covering the life of the Muslim community, details of municipal election campaigns, and criticizing authorities that promote Islamophobia and racism, according to the SMA. Defending the right to practice Islam and express their belonging to it, this part of French Muslims uses the democratic laws and traditions of France.

The activation of the Muslim diaspora and the growing presence of Islam in France cause a mixed reaction in French society. A part of the political establishment and the scientific Oriental community accepts and shares the position of this Muslim association. This resulted in a change in the definition of Islam made during the time of President Nicolas Sarkozy-from the term "Islam in France" (islam en France - fr. yaz.) to "Islam of France" or "French Islam" (islam de France - fr. yaz.). This term, with which not all French people agree, can be interpreted in such a way that Islam becomes an integral part of French public thought and culture.

In turn, a part of the French scientific Oriental community is interested in Eastern metaphysics and Islamic esotericism. In particular, Abdennour Bidar, a well - known French philosopher, one of the ideologists of the concept of individual Islam, made a report on this topic at a scientific conference in Paris in May 2014 at the Higher School for the Study of Social Sciences.

The thesis of "acculturation" (acculturation. - French) of Islam, i.e. the possibility for a Muslim to express his or her Islamic identity more in relation to Muslim culture than in relation to religion. In the French Muslim community, as well as in the Muslim Ummah (Muslim world - ar. yaz.), there is a debate on this issue. However, at the moment, the majority of Muslims, including the well-known Sunni ideologist Youssef al-Qaradawi, do not accept this thesis.

At the same time, a debate continues in France about French national identity and the role of Islam in it. Part of the political establishment and orientalists, including Gilles Kepel, a well - known French scholar of Islam, express concern about the growing influence of Islam and, in their opinion, the attitude of secular Republican France towards this. This concern is reflected in the adoption of laws prohibiting the expression of religious affiliation (including the wearing of veils by Muslim women) in public places. Human rights organizations report an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment and acts of aggression against Muslims, including attacks on veiled Muslim women, in 2013-2014.

The relative increase in Islamophobia is explained by the continuation of illegal immigration from Arab-Muslim countries to France, to some extent associated with the negative consequences of the "Arab Spring", as well as the case of the " Toulouse arrow-

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa Today, 2014, No. 12.

Al - Qaeda-linked French citizen of Algerian origin, who shot six people in Toulouse in 2013, and, of course, with periodic reports of arrests of radical Islamists in France.

Public concern is also caused by the fact that French Muslim citizens are traveling to Syria to participate in jihad ("holy war"). - ar. yaz.) against the ruling Syrian regime. According to official figures, at the beginning of 2014, 700 French citizens are in Syria in the ranks of armed anti-government groups.² If they return to France, according to law enforcement officials, they may pose a certain threat to public safety.

This situation, along with the ongoing global financial and economic crisis affecting France, and the discontent of a part of the population with the government policy and the policy of the EU leadership, which, according to its opponents, "imposes decisions that do not correspond to its interests, and European commissioners who were not chosen by anyone," leads to an increase in the influence of right-wing parties.

In particular, the National Front (FN) led by Marine Le Pen. The unprecedented victory of the FN in the European Parliament elections on May 22-25, 2014 was a clear indication of this.25% of French voters voted for the FN candidates, which allowed the front to get 22 seats out of 74 reserved for France (751 seats in the European Parliament in total). As a result, the NF, in a coalition with its allies from Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, will be able to form a parliamentary group that can significantly influence EU policy.

In turn, the Islamic factor has an impact on European foreign policy, as some Muslims, citizens of EU countries, including France, support the "Islamic revival" in Arab countries.

INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

External Islamist movements are also actively influencing the situation in the French Muslim diaspora. Thus, the initiators of the creation in France in the 1980s of one of the most influential Muslim socio-political structures-the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (SIOF) were followers of the Tunisian Islamist Nahda (Revival) party and the Egyptian Islamist Muslim Brotherhood Association³. In 2012, Sheikh Ahmed Jaballah, a well-known Muslim ideologue and preacher, was elected Chairman of the CIOF. He is of Tunisian origin and also adheres to the doctrinal concepts of Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ahmed Jaballah is also the director of the European Institute for Human Studies (IESH), which opened in 2001 in Saint-Denis, a suburb of Paris. IESH has a theological department where future imams are trained. Its scientific council includes such well-known Sunni ideologues as the aforementioned Yousef Al-Qaradawi, who is a permanent resident of Saudi Arabia. Qaradawi is an implacable opponent of President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian leadership, because they lead the secular Arab Socialist Renaissance party and because most of the Syrian leadership is represented by Alawites.

The Muslim Brotherhood in France successfully cooperates with the Turkish Islamist organization "National Vision" (Milli gyuryush. - Turkish), with the participation of which the "National Federation of Muslims of France" (NFMF) was established in 1985. It controls hundreds of places of Muslim worship, especially in the area of Lyon and Strasbourg, where it has one of the largest mosques, accommodating up to 3 thousand parishioners.

French policy towards the Muslim diaspora is also influenced by France's relations with the countries of the Islamic world, in particular with Qatar. In the 2000s, during the reign of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Qatar became one of France's most privileged economic and political partners. Qatari investments worth tens of billions of euros were invested in the most innovative areas of the French industry - the aviation industry, modern weapons, as well as in real estate (palaces of the XVII century, the most prestigious shops in the center of Paris on the Champs-Elysees and on the Rue de Rivoli), the hotel industry (prestigious hotels in Paris and on the Cote d'Azur), gambling (27% of casinos in Cannes on the Cote d'Azur), mass media (Radio Europe-1, Paris Match magazine, Al-Ja-zira channel in French) and even sports (purchase of the Paris Saint Germain - PSG football club in 2011).

French ministers, well-known state and political figures, journalists, and businessmen were regularly invited to Qatar for various symposia, where deals were made, and business and personal ties were established. A new area of investment for Qatar is the French social sector, namely, the development of the suburbs of large cities, where the main part of the Arab-Muslim diaspora lives. In 2011, during a visit to Qatar by representatives of the French municipalities of these suburbs, united in the "National Association of Elected Local Deputies" (ANELD), which actively fights against racism and for increasing its representation in French government structures, the Emir of Qatar promised them financial assistance for the development of infrastructure, as well as to support places of Muslim worship.

At the same time, the right-wing part of the French political establishment, primarily the National Front (FN) party, through the mouth of its leader Marine Le Pen, calls this situation the "catharization" of France. Marine Le Pen believes that Qatar's financial and economic support for French Muslim organizations is actually aimed at "promoting the Muslim world."

* Alawites - a branch of Shiite Islam that emerged in the tenth century AD. It is an eclectic mix of elements of the Shiite faith, Gnostic Christianity, and pre-Muslim cults and beliefs. Alawites reject many of the precepts of Islam, revere Jesus Christ and a number of Christian saints, and celebrate some Christian holidays. Encyclopedic dictionary, Moscow, Nauka. 1991. (Islam. Entsiklopeditheskiy slovar. 1991. М., Nauka)

fundamentalism in the heart of France."

In response to such criticism of the government's policy and to the statements of a number of representatives of the French establishment that the increasing presence of Islam in French society contradicts the law on the separation of church and state, French President Francois Hollande said: Hollande noted that this law was adopted in 1905 "in the religious context of that period in a society protected from external influences. A century later, religious pluralism has become a modern reality, and Islam has taken a significant place in it."⁴. F. Hollande also confirmed the importance of promoting the process of "Republicanization of French citizens belonging to the Muslim culture so that they can free themselves from the shackles of tradition." At the same time, he stressed that "the French Socialist Party (FSP) has historically played a major role in defending secularism and at the same time supported the principle of coexistence of secularism and Muslim culture as the main element of the social contract."

An important point in the policy of the French Socialists towards the Muslim diaspora was the issue of women's emancipation. Thus, Segolene Royal, Deputy First Secretary of the FSP, who participated in the 2007 presidential campaign, emphasized in one of her speeches that " one of the fundamental democratic principles is equality of rights between women and men. The degree of compliance with this principle reflects the degree of democracy of the society." In practical terms, the FSP pursued a policy that encouraged "Frenchmen of Muslim culture" to join its ranks, as well as promoting the creation of socio-political organizations that were ideologically close to the FSP, which attracted Muslims, including from areas where, according to the FSP, "ethnic and religious communoterism"was present.

As part of this policy, the FSP leadership began to form, both within the party itself and in related organizations, a "new elite" consisting of French of Muslim culture, mainly immigrants from the Maghreb countries. Georges Morin, a teacher from Algeria who arrived in France in 1966, was one of the most prominent figures nominated from the Maghreb members of the FSP. He was appointed a delegate to the leadership of the FSP for French citizens from the Maghreb.

GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS THE MUSLIM DIASPORA

This policy was an assimilation model, according to which immigrants should fully accept the French Republican principles, including secularism, the French language and the education system. Unlike the British model of multiculturalism, representatives of the Muslim diaspora in France are not considered as a national minority, but are considered French citizens with varying degrees of assimilation (residence permit or French citizenship). In the 1980s, the term "assimilation "was replaced by the more politically correct term"political integration" in relation to immigrants.

The French authorities have made significant efforts to address the problems associated with the Muslim diaspora and the growth of Islamist tendencies. They can be divided into two areas. The first is to tighten legislation and fight illegal immigration, and the second is to overcome social marginalization, improve residential areas where migrants live, and combat racism and discrimination.

In the first direction, as a result of the measures taken, the number of illegal immigrants decreased from 250-300 thousand per year in the 1980s-1990s to 90 thousand per year in the 2000s. In 2006 - 2007, legislation on family reunification was tightened, and genetic tests were introduced to identify kinship. Illegal immigrants are being expelled. So, if in the early 2000s about 12 thousand illegal immigrants were expelled per year, then in 2009 30 thousand were expelled. In 2007, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development was established, which implements a centralized policy on migrants.

As part of the second direction, a law was adopted against racism and discrimination, according to which a fine of up to 25 thousand euros can be imposed on the perpetrator for their manifestations. Special schools and boarding schools were created for talented children from immigrant families. The development of areas where migrants live was carried out, including free allocation of land for the construction of mosques. An immigration contract has been introduced, according to which newly arrived migrants receive free French language training in the amount of 400 hours and civil law and duties in the amount of 30 hours.

Contacts and cooperation with Muslim organizations have become another direction of the French authorities ' policy towards the Muslim community. At the same time, the authorities preferred to rely on more moderate Muslim patriarchs who led the associations of the Grand Mosque of Paris, the French Council of Muslim Worship (FSMK), the National Federation of Muslims of France, and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, as opposed to radical youth organizations and "uncontrolled" independent mosques.

In response to criticism from some Muslim organizations and the parliamentary opposition that the authorities are trying to organize "neocolonial administrative Islam", Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the post of Minister of the Interior at that time (2002 - 2007), replied that it was in no way about the administration of Islam, because the republic grants full and equal rights to all faiths to practice their religion. At the same time, Nicolas Sarkozy, continuing the traditional French policy towards Islam, combined restrictive methods and control, within the framework of the law, with a constant dialogue with socially significant groups of Muslims.

Along with this, the cultural component of Islam was highlighted. So, Sarkozy stressed that among French Muslims there are quite a lot of people who are not deeply religious, or even non-believers. However

However, for them, Islam is also an important part of their identity. In this regard, one of the components of Sarkozy's "Muslim policy" was based on the conclusion that the majority of the Muslim diaspora, especially its younger generation, belongs to the poor strata of society. This situation was a risk factor for the growth of social tension and deterioration of the situation with public security, since Muslim youth, deprived of the opportunity for a decent existence, was naturally a fertile ground for the spread of radical Islamist ideology.

The solution to eliminate this danger, according to the plan of Minister Sarkozy, was as follows. As you know, Muslims do not have the same institution of religious leaders and church hierarchy as other world religions. The role of such an intermediary between the state and the mass of Muslims was to be played by the established FSMK. It could solve the problems of Muslims under the paternalistic aegis of the state.

After the establishment of the FSMC, Nicolas Sarkozy maintained constant contacts with its leadership, as well as with imams and rectors of major mosques, in order to establish mutual trust and cooperation. According to Sarkozy, he was "a demanding friend of French Muslims and their lawyer and mediator in resolving their issues in state institutions." Taking into account the mistakes of his predecessors, who, as a rule, relied in their" Muslim policy " on contacts only with the Grand Mosque of Paris, Sarkozy expanded the base of communication with the Muslim community, both through the FSMK and by involving the most influential organizations, including SIOF, in the dialogue, despite the fact that part of the secular French establishment She considered SIOF to be an exponent of fundamentalist ideology.

* * *

The majority of the Muslim community in France continues to maintain its Islamic identity. Moreover, here, as in many countries of Western Europe, there is an increase in Islam-both at the religious and socio-political levels. To a large extent, this was the result of the failure of the policy of multiculturalism, which the leaders of Western European countries, including France, were forced to admit. Muslim migrants and their subsequent generations, who were born here and received French citizenship, did not fully integrate into French society.

At the same time, Islam is entering French culture, social thought, and French society as such. To a certain extent, this is due to the crisis of the Christian and, in particular, the Catholic Church and the entry of Europe, including France, into the so-called post-Christian era, as well as the formation of religious pluralism and the strengthening of the role of Islam in it.

In France, to a large extent, this was also a consequence of the change in the perception and, accordingly, the definition of Islam, from the term "Islam in France" to "French Islam", which occurred in the 2010s. The term "French Islam", with which not all French people agree, can be interpreted in such a way that Islam becomes an integral element french culture and social thought.

The concept of "French Islam" is ambiguously perceived in French society. There is quite a large part of it that shares it and supports the demands of Muslims in their right to defend their religion. However, there is another part of society that categorically does not agree with the fact that Islam actually became an element of the French national and civil identity, which, in their opinion, contradicts the French constitution. This category of French citizens defends the concept of a republican and secular France. There is now a certain division in French society and a different understanding of French Islam and its place in society.

As for the perception and practice of Islam, as well as Islamic identification in the French Muslim community, they have different trends and are not uniform in the French Muslim community. Most Muslims practice traditional classical Islam. Some of them perceive the Islamic identity as more cultural than religious. In recent years, a movement of secular Muslims who profess democratic and partly secular values has been gaining strength in France. This movement unites many socio-political organizations, including women's organizations. Followers of individual Islam are beginning to play a certain role in the Muslim environment, considering the practice of a religious cult to be a private matter of a citizen. Individual Islam, practiced, as a rule, by a small part of Muslim intellectuals and young people, nevertheless becomes a social phenomenon.

On the other hand, French Muslims are increasingly influenced by neo-fundamentalist movements, which to a certain extent express social and partly civilizational protest. Some Muslims are characterized by rejection of European values and rejection of integration. Their leaders preach communoterism, i.e. the closed existence of the Muslim community according to the laws of Islam.

To a certain extent, the rise in Islamist sentiment is a reaction to the current manifestations of racism and Islamophobia. In turn, external factors, such as the" Arab Spring", crisis phenomena and conflicts in a number of Arab countries, in which political Islam movements are involved, lead to the strengthening of radical Islamism, the ideology of which influences the Muslim diaspora.

^{Kepel Gilles.} 1 Passion francaise. Gallimard. P., 2014, p. 13.

^{Thomson David.} 2 Les f'rancais jihadistes. Les arenes. P., 2014.

^{Kepel Gilles.} 3 Quatre-vingt-treize. Gallimard. P., 2012, p. 37.

^{Geisser Vincent et Zemouri Aziz, Marianne et Allah.} 4 Les politiques francais face a la "question musulmane". La decouverte. P., 2007, p. 140.

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