I would now like to briefly return to possible objections (mentioned at the beginning of the article) regarding the mass outflow of gold and silver as an indicator of the lower competitiveness of European goods compared to Chinese, Indian, etc. (with the resulting projection on the level of national wealth and productive forces as the cause of the phenomenon). In addition to the previous, though hypothetically opposing arguments (in reality, no one objected to me), I will give this one. With the discovery of the New World, Europe was hit by huge amounts of precious metals that cost it almost nothing. They were indeed very cheap, since the Spaniards, denounced by a contemporary, forced "with bloody labor their slaves in Mexico to get silver from the bowels of the earth" [Raynal, 1834, p.298]. To put it more simply, throughout the Spanish and Portuguese West Indies there was a state labor service, according to which the native male population was forced for a considerable period of time to work gratuitously in the mines. In Peru, for example, this service was calledmita and applied to all Indian males aged 18 to 50 years [McCulloch, 1842, p. 500]. Add in the slaves from Africa.

There was so much gold and silver that there was a well-known price revolution. By the beginning of the 19th century, the average world price of gold in relation to silver, due to the cheapness of American production, was 1: 15.5, while the development of European or Siberian deposits gave 1: 46 and 1: 40 [Humboldt, 1827, p. 395, 398, 400 - 402]. (There was also a huge gap in the wealth of the mines and mines themselves.)

Why not consider this literally dropped from the sky abundance of precious metals with an unprecedented low cost more profitable, and also the most compact cargo for long-distance transportation, than sending goods that need a lot of work, protect them from spoilage in the ocean, and depend on the market conditions for a particular product brought.

But why, then, is there such a winning tone in the statements of J. McCulloch and F. McCarthy quoted just above? Engels - that, finally, as a result of industrial coups, the Rubicon of non-competitiveness was crossed, and Western commodity exports for the first time began to find their mass consumer in Asia (we will not specify the starting point of this mass market).

The fact is that all the main Western partners in the trade of the East, gold and silver were not cheap at all. T. Raynal writes: "Silver is not born in our fields, it is an American product that we got in exchange for our products"

Ending. For the beginning, see: Vostok (Oriens), 2008, N 2, pp. 70-80.

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[Raynal, 1834, p. 303]. And again: "I sell canvases to a Spaniard for a hundred francs and send this money to India" [ibid., p. 296]. Spain and Portugal monopolized the mines of America. These metropolises, parasitizing, supported themselves and their colonies at the expense of extracted precious metals-without developing industry and even bringing agriculture to a deplorable state. Everything was bought abroad. They themselves conducted a very lazy trade with the East - at their service was a Dutch, English or French merchant suffering from lack of money. Those small independent commercial connections, indeed, as T. Raynal notes, were in a privileged position, but the rest of the (main) part of the West, the purchase of gold and silver was certainly expensive, because in addition to providing the commodity equivalent, it was necessary to bear large customs costs ("pay important duties"), constantly take risks, overcoming numerous prohibitions of arrogant people. and smug hidalgo ("use amazing tricks, avoid great dangers") [Raynal, 1834, p. 228]. In general, Europe, which is actively trading with the East, had to make a very difficult commercial zigzag so that in Spain and Portugal, in their American colonies, after selling products that were not competitive on the Asian markets, they could go there with precious metals. This is brilliantly analyzed by A. Smith and sees, by the way, as it seems to me, in the current unfavorable situation, an optimistic version of the trading future of the West-a workaholic who is deprived of any large natural sources of gold and silver production (i.e., using Pushkin's: "why" in the future there will not be "he needs gold").

Here are the words of A. Smith: "The countries that have colonies in America and trade directly with the East Indies really enjoy all the splendor and ostentatious grandeur (!! - A. P.) of this trade. But other countries, in spite of all the envious constraints by which they want to push them back, often enjoy a greater share of the benefits that it brings. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for example, actually contribute much more to the development of industry in other countries than Spain and Portugal. The consumption of these colonies of only one object, namely linen, reaches... amounts of more than 3 million pounds a year. But all this significant consumption is served almost entirely by France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany. Spain and Portugal provide only an insignificant part of the total linen consumed by their colonies" (Smith, 1962, p. 455). Thus, according to Smith, it turns out that the West, with a few exceptions, is constantly working to create and improve industrial production, and the profits of Spain and Portugal are simply spent and "feed the luxury and extravagance of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon" [ibid.].

And so these crafts, which had grown into industrial branches, expanded quantitatively and qualitatively, but were still rejected by the East, and became stronger in the markets of Europe and America. Then came the time when, finally, after several rounds of the industrial revolution, it was Asia's turn. But the question is how deep this penetration went, how much it affected the economic life of Eastern societies. In the end, we need to give clear answers: what is the general volume of this mutual foreign trade and other types of international economic communication-per capita-in comparison with the total commercial turnover of both the West and the East, how do gross national product and foreign economic activity relate, and how much has been affected by the main sphere of employment and production in Therefore, this issue has developed into another research corpus, which is part of the source-research array on aspects of the external factor. The results of this kind of collected material will be presented in subsequent articles.

Here, I want to show only the outline of the gap between existing stereotypes, which distorted what should actually be expected from the results.

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the integration of Eastern societies into the world economy in the XX century, and an evidence-based invoice, if you perform at least one of the tasks set in the mentioned scientific and search building. Judge for yourself. It's one thing to be overwhelmed by the billions of yards pouring into the Indian market for British cotton fabrics. The flow began with 1 million in 1824, grew to 64 million in 1837 (a whole epoch according to Marx) [Marx, 1957, vol. 9, p. 133], and reached 2.2 billion in 1890. [Statistical Tables..., 1909, p. 155 - 156]. It is another matter when your estimates based on the demographic data of C. Clark and the statistical collection on foreign trade of countries and colonies of the world published on behalf of the US Congress in 1909 (all translated into dollars) contain, with all the foreign trade onslaught of the West on India, its imports (as of 1900 and in terms of per capita population) in 1.1 am. dollars, exports-in 1.3 am. dollars. For China, the figures are even lower: 0.3 and 0.2 US dollars. In that year, similar figures for the UK were 68.8 and 46.6 am. dollars, France-29.6 and 27.3 am. dollars, USA-11.2 and 18.0 1. One can't help but wonder what the power of the" heavy artillery "of the European bourgeoisie in the form of" cheap prices of its goods", which was threatened as early as in 1848 in the" Manifesto of the Communist Party " by Karl Marx and Fr. To break through "all the Chinese walls" [Marx and Engels, 1955, vol. 4, p. 428]. And what are these undervalued "Chinese walls"?

There can be no doubt that the industrial sector of the West has really enjoyed a huge increase in labor productivity and an equally large-scale reduction in the cost of its products, which is why they have become competitive in Asian markets and there is a certain demand for them. The dynamics of these changes are described in detail in the sources and scientific literature. J. McCulloch, for example, among other things, even gives calculations with the allocation of individual cost items of specific manufactured goods (raw materials, fuel, wages, etc.), in obtaining information reaches direct producers. This is, of course, the highest information aerobatics, when you meet unique statistical details with reference to Private Information [McCulloch, 1839, p. 627, 642, 653, 656 - 676; idem., 1871, p. 465-466]. However, the essence of the issue is not the need to prove the new ability of European goods to be present in Asian markets - it is indisputable. Personally, I am struck not so much by the fact of the very minuscule values of foreign trade turnover per capita, as by the structure of these newly appeared import requests of the East: yarn, fabrics, a few other consumer products, in particular hardware, and later-kerosene for lighting. It is clear that they have occupied a niche that is somehow connected with the West. Behind it, the rural periphery began with its own closed reproduction cycle, with a completely different character of relations with the city than in Europe.

But we will not delve into this aspect yet, which has certainly greatly slowed down Western economic penetration. Now we need to pay attention to something else: why even the mentioned niche shows (speaking in general, and not looking for exceptions) complete indifference to the import of factory, factory, railway equipment, steam engines, steam locomotives, etc. - in general, everything that represented the basis of Western scientific and technological progress. It may be objected that things were not so hopeless in India. But the colonial authorities operated there, making mostly strong-willed decisions. Only a small segment of the local business community (directly impressed by the demonstration effect)

1 Population: India - 283 million people, China-500 million, Great Britain-37 million, France-39 million, USA-76 million [Clark C., 1968, p. 106-108].

Export and import: India - 353.9 million US dollars (plus 25.8 million US dollars). precious metals) and 244.3 million (plus 68 million precious metals), China-117.5 million am. and 156 million, Great Britain-1 billion 725 million am. and 2 billion 546 million, France-1 billion 66 million am. and 1 billion 156 million, USA - 1 billion rubles. 371 million am. dollars and 850 million [see: Statistical Abstract..., 1909, p. 20-70].

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showed some independent initiative. Of course, it is not necessary to speak about the internal need of such Eastern societies, which grows organically out of their logic of being. A classic example is provided by independent China.

In the second third of the 19th century, the empire was already "open" to foreign trade, and the former influx of precious metals was replaced by their ebb. What does she buy? This is a bit of metal products, wool fabrics, a little more cotton textiles. However, everything is overshadowed by opium. It also drains out of the country the huge amounts of silver that used to flow here. It was he, and not machines, equipment, etc. Imported drug was the most popular product, the rest in the outside world of the subjects of the Middle Kingdom was of little interest, and this is a fact. While the British and Indians are unequivocally condemned for organizing such commercial activities that encourage the corruption of the individual, it should still be remembered that the Chinese had a choice. No one forced them to take drugs. But they didn't want to spend money on imported products that, unlike opium, would industrially modernize the country. It seems to me that there is an echo between this story and the words of John St. Mill, when he speaks about the reasons for the incredibly high rate of loan interest in China at that time: "the Chinese value the future in comparison with the present much less than most European peoples" (Mill, 1980, p.299).

In any case, the whole point of reconstructing the array of foreign trade indicators was built not as an end in itself to demonstrate the degree of resistance to Western influence, but as a way to understand the very cementing material of those very "Chinese walls".

From this point of view, we should also consider the thematic section on inter-Asian economic relations and their correlation with Asian-European ones. It is generally bypassed by any serious attention of researchers. Having set such a task, I was faced with the need to work with "patchwork" information. This was especially true of the starting time and the two centuries that followed. I was encouraged in some ways (that I was on the right track) by T. Man, when he argued about the possibility of obtaining additional profits for the Company if we engage in mediation in Asian waters [Mun, 1621, p. 21-22], and in others by G. - T. Raynal. One example was given above, and there are others. He calls inter-Asian relations "commerce from India to India", which, if introduced by European merchants, can give a much larger influx of goods to Europe, talks about the construction of local ocean-going ships, about the well-established system of exchange of clearly defined export-import nomenclature between Southeast Asia, Coromandel, Malabar, Arabia, Ceylon, etc. Basra [Raynal, 1834, pp. 335, 360, 362-363].

The list of separate, but, unfortunately, descriptive instructions on this issue could be continued. However, guided by the principle of giving quantitative estimates as much as possible in the final analysis, I focused on the data of T. Pires (he is a direct participant in the initial stage), the calculations of W. Moreland, also going back to Portuguese sources, and the information of the director of one of the trading posts of the Dutch East India Company, Jan P. Kuhn. I must say that in many difficult situations I was helped out by two wonderful authors-Ya. van Leer and K. Simkin. At the same time, I will add that their books are completely different from the template of foreign trade issues that we are used to dealing with. K. Simkin, of course, is not such an in-depth specialist as I am. van Leer. But its breadth of approach, the panorama it covers, redeems a lot. It is especially valuable for beginners to get into the topic. Too strict criticism of a scientist, in my opinion, is unfair 2.

2 See, for example, reviews of: Simkin C. The Traditional Trade of Asia. L., 1968 [Das Gupta A., 1970, p. 525 - 528; Blainey G., 1970, p. 272 - 274; Chaudhur P., 1969, p. 591 - 592].

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As far as inter-Asian trade itself was concerned, during the period of its approach to and entry into the twentieth century, there were fewer and fewer such difficulties. With the advent of more or less regular statistics, this idea of mine could only be filled with data taken from digital material on the geographical distribution of exports and imports of a particular eastern country. At the same time, I would like to remind you that the statistics of the 19th and early 20th centuries are not at all the pliable, digestible and mass - produced product that we find later-in the publications of the League of Nations and especially the UN. Therefore, carefully recreated parameters of quantitative fixation of a particular phenomenon at the beginning of the previous century (not to mention the time behind it) can (when superimposed on the statistical possibilities of studying modern processes) seem to another modern economist only a careless analytical sketch.

A certain research space (between the search and source array about the external factor and the second array focused on revealing the essence of the internal motives of the logic of the socio-economic existence of the East, which responded to Western influence in this way) is filled with the selection of a range of indicators of a related nature. They are intended to give, through comparable values, an idea of the potentials of the general economic activity of these two macrocivilizations that came into contact, how their material wealth was achieved and from what it consisted - that is, on what soil the processes I studied grew. From here, it is already possible to search for the causes of various dynamic qualities of development, especially those that appeared in the XX century, but were previously obscured by a number of seemingly prosperous economic parameters of Eastern societies. Perhaps my last remark will remind you vaguely of the phenomenon of the prodigy, who, having received initial advantages that are only partially related to his abilities, inevitably fades with age. In any case, the following example is typical (it will receive analytical development in subsequent articles, I only reveal the conditions of the task).

By the beginning of the XIX century. GNP per capita in Western Europe and economically leading Asian countries (India, China) it was almost identical. But after all, the former reached this level only as a result of the accomplished industrial revolution, while the latter did not need anything like this. Now let's be more specific about the indicators that I called adjacent.

To compare the material achievements of the West and the East, in particular, estimates of the state of agricultural production (for example, yield) and other parameters of the natural factor (or "natural machine")were used - in general, the context, simply put, is about the cheapness of food and other life-supporting resources, adjusted, of course, for climatic conditions.

Further. A view of the population as an economic potential. This is the first research aspect of its abundance. Here, the scale of urban economic life is linked to the size of the agricultural product redistributed in its favor, and so on.The second aspect of studying population dynamics in the centuries-old perspective goes beyond the range of related indicators that have independent significance. The need for quantitative data on the demographic plan arose everywhere. They are always present either in completely different kinds of calculations, or, at least, as a background for the analysis of any major economic problem, questions of social evolution. The panorama of the centuries-old dynamics of the population of the West and East (by country and economic and geographical formations) should always have been in front of my eyes. Only this sometimes helped to really comprehend the scale of what was happening, to get rid of illusions, to lose faith in some provisions that had already become stencils.

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It is clear that a very reliable source and research base was needed for such purposes. Therefore, I will digress a little on it before returning to the mentioned GNP per capita - another important multifunctional indicator for me, which is no less effective in comparative analysis.

In the XX century, the quantitative dynamics of demographic processes in its centuries-old aspect was studied quite actively. A lot of summary data on countries and regions with very detailed chronological details have already been published. The amount of work done is very impressive. Experts used not only the materials of the official population census found by historians, but also the facts and conclusions of related sciences, indirect research methods, and conjectural estimates. The fact is that of the Asian countries, only in India a general population census was first conducted in 1872, while in others it was done only in the twentieth century, and then not at the very beginning (in some-in the middle and second half of the century). However, persistent research has yielded results: the differences in the estimates made by different scientists have gradually narrowed. Of course, the process is not complete, but a strong centripetal trend lends sufficient reliability to their operational use, although with some caution, as, however, should be done with all data of an estimated nature.

The gradual expansion and refinement of the statistical base can be clearly traced in the works of A. M. Carr-Saunders (1936), M. K. Bennett (1954), J. Durand (1965, 1967, and 1974), and collective work edited by R. Mckensen and others (1973) [Carr-Saunders, 1936; Bennett, 1954; Durand, 1965; ibid., 1967; ibid., 1974; Dynamic der Bevolkerungsentwicklung, 1973]. Finally, the crowning achievement of the research space under consideration is the already mentioned book by K. Clark (published in 1968 and 1977). In 1975, N. M. Gurevich carefully analyzed it and offered only a few small country-specific clarifications [Gurevich, 1975, pp. 69-80]. In 1998, A. Frank actively worked with it (without critical comments) [Frank, 1998, p. 167, 169-170]. My own reflections on the material also convinced me that we should mainly rely on the dynamics proposed by K. Clark.

A specialist who collects a range of generalizing indicators for a comparative analysis of the economic parameters of Western and eastern macrocivilizations cannot do without what P. Barok did in the late 70s and early 80s of the XX century. To get an estimate of GNP (including per capita) for a period when statistics in its modern sense did not exist in Asian countries at all, was considered by many to be something from the field of humanitarian alchemy. But more than two decades have passed, and P. Barok's arguments live on and win. The understanding that the East was richer than the West in ancient times, and in the Middle Ages, and in the XVII-XVIII centuries, and not poorer even at the beginning of the XIX century, has always been present in scientific knowledge at the descriptive level, in individual fragments of specifics, and the overwhelming part of the European tradition of displaying trips to India, China and etc. leaves no doubt about this (which will be discussed in more detail in later articles). However, P. Barok proposed quantitative boundaries of representations, and in dynamics for the XVIII-70s of the XX century. and with full comparability of individual data and the series as a whole - in dollars and US prices 1960. The estimates presented to the VII International Congress on Economic History (Edinburgh, 1978) [Bairoch, 1978, p. 35-46] were subsequently revised somewhat. Therefore, it is advisable to use the 1981 publication. It defines the GNP of the states now called developed countries as $ 35 billion in 1750, that of the" third world " (without primitive societies) as $ 112 billion, that of 1800 as $ 47 billion and $ 137 billion, and that of 1970 as $ 2,386 billion and $ 800 billion. Thus, on the eve of the industrial age and in its initial period, the West's share in world GNP was only a quarter of its volume, the rest was accounted for by the countries now called developing countries. In

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1970. the picture is completely reversed to punctuality. But we will not touch on the current situation now - it is clear in principle. Let's go back to the beginning of the changes. In those days, as now, the East greatly outnumbered the West in population. Of course, it was not without it that such a significant preponderance in total GNP was ensured, but it was based on equal-order values of per capita national income. In the future, I will give them as detailed as possible. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to point out that by 1800, the GNP per capita in both Asian and Western countries was slightly below two hundred dollars (Bairoch, 1981, p. 3-17). Before the advent of the industrial era, it is clear that the balance tipped in favor of the East.

P. Barok's data was followed by the closest attention from those who are somewhat active in the field of Western-Eastern economic comparisons. V. A. Melyantsev has been searching in this direction for many years, and his conclusions coincide with the trends of the above-mentioned quantitative characteristics [see: Melyantsev, 1992, pp. 10-12; he, 1993, pp. 3-21; he, 1996; he, 2004, pp. 1-49]. Braudel described P. Barock's article on the methodology of calculating national income for such statistical conditions as "having a truly revolutionizing significance" [Braudel, 1992, p. 305]. It takes its digits and writes:".. .they strengthen me in my previous statements and hypotheses." However, there is a remark about China for setting the level of GNP per capita too high for 1800 ($228) [Ibid., pp. 550-551]. In the work of P. Bairoch for 1978 (and earlier calculations), there is indeed such a value [Bairoch, 1978, p. 45], but in the 1981 publication it was adjusted downwards, as, however, a number of other numbers were clarified. F. Braudel died in 1985. These changes made by P. Barok, F. Braudel did not have time to take into account. Therefore, the authors who refer to P. Barock according to F. Braudel, obviously doom themselves to inconsistencies. For example, I do not understand why A. Frank, knowing (judging by the bibliography) about the adjustment of 1981, operates with the Brodel-Barok sum of $ 228. completely uncritical. However, it should be noted that A. Frank also provides useful information: he provides a brief summary of research opinions in support of the considered quantitative trend [Frank, 1998, pp. 172-174].

P. Barok himself asks not to absolutize, but to treat his estimates sensibly. The fact that most of the data is presented in non-rounded figures is nothing more than a desire to reduce the degree of error in calculations. He also admits the possibility of an error of 8-10% when calculating the GNP per capita of the states that are now called developed (in the period before 1913), for the third world - about 15% (both in the XVIII and XX centuries). There is also advice not to exaggerate the analytical capabilities of this indicator in determining economic indicators. levels and living conditions. Costs that are not related to real production costs, writes P. Barok, cannot be calculated by the criteria of GNP. Formally, it does not show the influence of environmental quality, historical tradition - the conditions of the existing economic life, etc. So the national product should be considered (in the current state of science) only the least bad global indicator of the level of economic development [Bairoch, 1978, pp. 37-38].

But, oddly enough, this can not prevent penetration into the analytical bowels of the "Chinese walls", if you act not in line with the usual logic of comparisons, but from the opposite.

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Braudel F. Material'naia tsivilizatsiya, ekonomika i kapitalizm, XV - XVIII vek [Material Civilization, Economy and Capitalism], vol. 3. Vremya mira, Moscow: Progress, 1992.

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Gurevich N. M. Dinamika rosta naseleniya zarubezhnoi Azii v nashe eru [Dynamics of population growth in foreign Asia in Our Era].

K. Marx and F. Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Engels. Essays, Vol. 4. Moscow, 1955.

Melyantsev V. A. Vostok i Zapad v vtorom millennii: ekonomika, istoriya, sovremennost ' [East and West in the Second Millennium: Economy, History, and Modernity]. Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta Publ., 1996.

Melyantsev V. A. Genesis of modern (intensive) economic growth and problems of catching up and overtaking development in the countries of the West, East and Russia. Report / / Scientific conference "Genome of the East: experiments and interdisciplinary opportunities". Reports in the form of separate brochures. Moscow: Gumanitarii, 2004.

Melyantsev V. A. Economic modernization of peripheral countries in historical retrospect: trends, factors, social consequences // Interuniversity Conference " The East in the World Economic system (XVI-XX centuries)", Moscow, Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University, 1992.

Melyantsev V. A. Economic dynamics of Eastern countries in the Middle Ages and modern times // Bulletin of the Moscow University. Episode 13. Vostokovedenie [Oriental Studies], Moscow, 1993, No. 3.

Mill, J. S. Osnovy politicheskoi ekonomiki [Fundamentals of Political Economy], Moscow: Progress, 1980, vol. 1.

Raynal T. Philosophical and political history of institutions and commerce of Europeans in both Indies, composed by Abbot Raynal. Part 2. St. Petersburg, 1834.

Smith A. Issledovanie o prirode i prichinakh bogatstva narodov [Research on the nature and causes of the wealth of peoples], Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, 1962.

Neoliberal globalization and catch-up development / / Neoliberal globalization and catch-up development. Proceedings of the permanent interdisciplinary seminar of the Club of Scientists "Global World", Moscow, 2003, Issue 8.

Bairoch P. Les grandes tendances des disparites economiques nationales depuis la revolution industrielle // Disparites entre regions et nations dans le developpment iconomique depuis la revolution industrielle. Rapporteurs P. Bairoch, M. Levi-Leboyer. Contributions - Theme A 4. T International Economic History Congress. Edinburgh - Geneve, 1978.

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Das Gupta A. [Rec. on:] Simkin C. The Traditional Trade of Asia. L., 1968 // The Indian Economic and Social History Review. December. 1970.

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