The collapse of the Cardi Caliphate in 1031 after a long fitna (turmoil) in Cordoba (1009-1031) dramatically changed the history of the Iberian Peninsula: from the center of Muslim culture in the West, Andalusia turned into a province of the Berber empire of the Almoravids (1090-1146), and then the Almohads (1146-1492).

The period leading up to the Berber conquest of Andalusia (1031-1090) went down in the history of the Peninsula under the name of the era of appanage principalities (Muluk at-tawaif). It was a time of turmoil and civil strife that weakened the already fragile Arab state and contributed to the significant success of the Reconquista. Suffice it to say that by the end of the 11th century, Christians under the leadership of King Alfonso VI of Castile and Leon (d. 1109 )had recaptured from the Arabs the strategically important fortress of Toledo (1085), which, according to the famous Andalusian historian Ibn Hayyan, was the key position of the Peninsula . The emirs of Andalusia, unable to resist the beginning of the Reconquista, were forced to seek help from the North African Berbers-Almoravids, who conquered the possessions of the allies in the 1090s-1110s.

The tragedy of Muluk al-Tawaif and their subjugation to the ill-educated Berbers of North Africa stirred the minds of all contemporary historians: Ibn Hayyan (987-1076), Emir Abdallah (1073-1090), Ibn Hazm (994-1064), as well as historians who served at the courts of the Berber rulers of Andalusia: Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi (d. 1224), Ibn al-Khatib (1313-1374), Ibn Khaldun (1353-1406), al-Makkari (1591-1632). All of them referred in one way or another to the era of Muluk al-Tawaif, noting both the few positive and many negative aspects of this period.

Supporters of Berber rule (mainly faqihs - Islamic lawyers) praised the Almoravids as "the saviours of Islam", "the deliverers of Andalusia from the power of vicious emirs, who by their behavior completely spoiled the people entrusted to them" 2 . Others, like Ibn Izari, referred to the era of Muluk al-Tawaif as "a period of endless festivities and entertainment", preceding the "savage rule of the Berber nomads" .3 However, they all agreed that the decline in the power of the appanage princes was caused by their extreme frivolity in matters of faith and administration.

Ibn Hayyan, describing the rule of the Emirs of Valencia, Mubarak, and Muzaffar, formerly water distributors under the Amirids, mentioned their desire to "compare with the other emirs of the Peninsula in grandeur of buildings and luxury and complete disregard for the affairs of government and the word of Allah." 4 If the emirs of Valencia belonged to the Saqaliba 5 group and were not hereditary Muslims, then the same indifference to the commandments of Allah, and above all the duty to wage a holy war with the people of the world.

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enemies of the Muslims, could be found in emirs of Arab and Berber origin.

The Emir of Granada, Abdallah, lamented the lack of former unity of Muslims in the struggle for the faith, saying that " the emirs preferred to ally with Christians, rather than help their neighbors. They were like drowning men dragging each other into the abyss, and our fragmentation played into the hands of our old enemies, the Christians and the Berber Almoravids .6

The fragmentation of Muslims in the era of Fitna and Muluk al - Tawaif was also noted by Ibn Hayyan: "The most important thing that Allah did in the era of the dispersion of religion and the decline of statehood was that he threw us into the hands of Christians who had been waiting for this moment to conquer us for a long time. This happened after the collapse of the Amirid State in Cordoba. " 7

Thus, historians of the time of troubles (the era of Fitna and Muluk at-tawaif. - M. R. ) and the emirs themselves were well aware of the reasons that led to the decline of Muslim statehood on the Peninsula: the loss of religious feeling and spiritual unity of Muslims, as well as the collapse of the centralized Umayyad-Amirid state in Cordoba. They felt the inevitable decline of the power of the Arabs of Andalusia and willy-nilly agreed to accept the rule of the Almoravids, preferring their power to the Christian one. Though uneducated and savage, the nomads of the Maghreb were able to resist the onslaught of the Reconquista, and for several more centuries the Peninsula was under Muslim rule. It is for this that Ibn Hayyan expresses his gratitude to the Almoravi Dams, saying that they "cleansed Andalusia of paganism" 8, by which he meant a departure from Islamic traditions. This raises the question of whether the end of Arab rule in Spain was inevitable, or whether it was stimulated by certain historical events.

According to Ibn al-Khatib, the decline of Arab power on the Peninsula and its conquest by the Berbers were initially prepared. The historian writes: "in Andalusia, from time immemorial, there was a struggle between Arabs and Berbers, because the Arabs took possession of all the benefits of the country, while its true conquerors, the Berbers, got nothing." 9 Meanwhile, " the Berbers did not stop fighting for their rights, and whenever the power of the Arabs weakened, they gained the upper hand in some regions of Andalusia." In particular, their strength increased during the Cordova Fitna period, when Berber mercenaries captured a number of territories in the south of the Peninsula .10

The era of Muluk al-Tawaif seems to Ibn al-Khatib to be a period of political anarchy and illegal autocracy of adventurers. In his writings, the historian writes: "the Andalusians are descended from the spirits of division, like no other nation. None of the emirs of Andalusia had any rights to the throne. They were all eunuchs, commoners, and robbers; some of them were content with the glory of being rebels. Others said: "I will hold this area until someone else comes to take my place." But even if Omar ibn al-Aziz himself had come to them, they would not have accepted him and would not have obeyed him." In the context of the collapse of Arab statehood, the best way out, according to the historian, was to subordinate Andalusia to the Berbers-Almoravids, united by the ideas of Islam and centralization.

Ibn al-Khatib's statement about the illegitimate nature of the power of the Emirs of the Peninsula reflected the sympathies of the Berber author, who served the Berber rulers of the Maghreb. However, even he acknowledged that the power of the Berbers was established only as a result of the withdrawal of the Arabs from the political scene of Andalusia and was maintained not so much by the authority of the Berber party as by the weakness of their opponent. As soon as the Arabs refused to obey their legitimate authority, the Umayyads, they unwittingly turned from defenders of the Arab state to usurpers

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the authorities in the eyes of the majority of the population of the Peninsula, and with their endless troubles and internecine strife, they completely reduced themselves to the position of robbers.

A very interesting interpretation of the events taking place on the Peninsula is the theory of another Maghreb author, Ibn Khaldun, about the three components of Muslim statehood. Created on the basis of Ibn Hayyan's Kitab al-Mateen ("Book of Content"), which has not come down to us in the original , but has been preserved in the transmission of Ibn Bassam (1087-1147) and other historians, 12 this theory largely explains the ethnopolitical processes that led to the collapse of Arab statehood in Andalusia.

According to the historian, the main components of the Arab state at all times were Muruwwa, asabiyya and Khilafa Muruwwa meant the spirit of tribal militancy, asabiyya-a sense of tribal solidarity, and khilafa - the idea of a central authority, a caliphate. A necessary condition for the functioning of this system was the idea of Islam, which inspired the potential of the nomadic society of the Arabs and, later, the Berbers - Almoravids and Almohads. Islam sent Muruvwa to serve the Islamic state, arming the nomads with the idea of jihad (enhanced propaganda of the word of Allah). Under the centralized state, Asabiyya was transformed into Muslim solidarity or, in the words of Ibn Khaldun, "spiritual unity" (al-wahda ar-ruhiyya) of Muslims .14 As for the idea of the caliphate, it was the central idea that made it possible to unite the disparate nomadic tribes, forcing them to humble themselves before the highest authority of the vicegerent of Allah-the Caliph. According to the Maliki tradition, which has long been dominant in Andalusia, "By giving us a ruler, Allah has favored us more than by sending down the Qur'an." 15

Thus, the Islamic State equally needed a ruler (caliph), militancy (muruwwa), and tribal solidarity (asabiyya). For centuries, the Umayyad Caliphate in Andalusia has consistently followed these requirements. The authority of the Umayyads was unshakable for the Arab leaders of tribal districts, and the awliyas (singular Wali) - the governors. They concluded an akd (treaty) with the Emir (and later caliph), according to which they pledged to provide him with military assistance if necessary .16 The tribal army remained the main guarantor of the political stability of the Islamic state, as it was always ready to go on a campaign against the rebels and infidels at the request of the caliph. Finally, the Muruvwa cult provided Muslim Arabs with victories in a difficult struggle against numerous Christian and Berber opponents .17

Speaking about the formation and development of the Muslim state of Andalusia, it should be noted that it was the Arabs who were its creators, despite their extremely small number: they made up no more than one percent of the population of Spain. Immigrants from Syria, belonging to the political elite of the Umayyad Caliphate, introduced in Spain the system of kuar (tribal districts, in Syria - jund, mn.ch. ajnad ), which was practiced in the East, performing military and administrative functions. They fortified Asghar (the borders) 18 and began to actively promote Islam and Islamic culture. Many local inhabitants, Ibero-Romanes and Visigoths, who received the name Muvallads, adopted Islam. It was to the consistent centralizing policy of the Umayyads that Muslim Spain owed its existence in the face of a constant military threat from the Christians of the North, the local Arabized Christians-Muwallads, as well as the Berbers who came to Andalusia.

The Berbers, despite their belligerence and numerical superiority, were of little help in the affairs of government. According to the conqueror of Spain, the Maghreb governor Musa ibn Nusayyir ," they were wild nomads, cunning, treacherous, not knowing the word of honor " 19 . The Arabs were not without reason wary of their warlike allies.-

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dey, deterring them in every possible way from immigration to Andalusia. It was only in the tenth century, when the Caliph Abd ar-Rahman III an-Nasir (912-961) began to actively push the Christians, that it became necessary to turn to Berber mercenaries, since there were not enough forces to conduct an offensive war .20

In general, the power of the Arabs remained on the Peninsula for exactly as long as the Umayyad caliphs were able to manage the captured territory with the help of a tribal army. When the caliphs set out to conquer new areas of Spain and resorted to the services of mercenaries, they involuntarily became completely dependent on the latter. The attempt of the Arab aristocracy to restore its position in the state led to a struggle for the redistribution of power between three ethnopolitical tawaif (groups) Andalusia (Arab, Berber and Saqalib), which ended with the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate.

From this moment, the rapid decline of the Andalusian state, which Ibn al-Khatib wrote about, began. The absence of a caliph who embodies the idea of Arab - Muslim rule caused a decline in the authority of the Arab Taifa. The Arabs could no longer count on a leadership role in a society where they were a minority. Despite the significant number of converts to Islam (Muwallads) during the Fitna and Muluk al-Tawaif eras , 21 few of them were sincere adherents of the new religion, ready to defend the legitimate rulers. On the contrary, Muslim converts cherished the hope of becoming Emirati leaders like many of their own kind: former slaves then became emirs because they "no longer feared the wrath of the Caliph and Allah and thought that their prosperity would last forever." 22 So, the idea of fighting for the faith and a unified Muslim state is a thing of the past.

Gradually, members of the Arab military elite, who lost high military and administrative posts, turned to the civil service and lost both their former militancy and the support of tribal districts. As a result, the Arab Taifa became equal in strength to the Berber one and even began to concede primacy to it, as evidenced by the unsuccessful struggle of the Abadids of Seville with the Zirids of Granada for hegemony in the south-west of the Peninsula.

In the absence of a tribal army based on the principles of Muruvwa and asa Biya, the main military force of the Emirates became Berber mercenaries and, in part, Sakaliba and Christians: "In every region of the country, there was a group of Berbers who infiltrated the administration of the emirate. They sowed discord among the emirs and taught them lessons in strength. They have become like salt, without which they cannot eat bread, and like steel, with which they crush their enemies. After all, only with their help could the emirs seize new territories and repel attacks. " 23

Thus, the tribal struggle became the main engine of political processes in the Peninsula, which allowed Ibn Hayyan to describe the era of Muluk al-tawaif as a "wheel of civil strife" (raha'l-fitna) The only law of society was the law of force. It is not without reason that historians have compared the era of appanage principalities to the new period of Jahiyliya ("ignorance" is the Arabic term for the pre-Islamic era), when the forces of rivalry and hostility dominated tribal society. 25

Absorbed in the struggle for supremacy, Muluk al-Tawaif, and above all the Arabs, forgot about the very foundations of the existence of a Muslim state on the Peninsula - the idea of militant Islam and central power. As often happens, the victory in this struggle went to a third party-the Berbers-Almoravids. The conquest of Andalusia by the Muslims of North Africa confirmed Ibn Khaldun's idea that "nomadic tribes united by a spiritual idea can create or recreate a Muslim state ." 26

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The consequences of the collapse of the Umayyad state can be conveniently revealed by the example of the development of the emirates of the three ethnopolitical tawaifs of Andalusia - Arab, Berber and Sakaliba.

Emirates of Arab Taifa: Seville and Cordoba. The Abbadid Emirate occupied a special place in the system of appanage principalities, serving as a stronghold of Arab Taifa after the collapse of the caliphate in Cordoba. The Abbadids were descended from an ancient Lakhmid family and were among the so-called ad-Dahilun (newcomers). This term referred to the Arabs who came to Andalusia in 741 as part of the army of the Syrian general Balj ibn Bishr al-Qushayri .27 During the period of Fitnah and Muluk al-Tawaif, Seville became a stronghold of the Arab Taifa in its struggle against the Berbers.

The first prominent Abbadid politician in the Fitna era was the father of the emirate's founder, Ismail, who was appointed Qadi of Seville by Al-Mansur. According to Ibn Hayyan, " he was a man who gained fame during the time of the Jama'ah (community, council of sheikhs; a term for Umayyad power in Cordoba. - M. R. ) and fitnah. At that time, he spent a lot of money from his treasures without taking a single dirham from the treasury. So were his colleagues. He had great influence at court and used it to support the Cordovans during the Fitna period. The Qadi was known for his shrewd mind, extensive knowledge and cunning, and ability to achieve goals. " 28

Apparently, the cadi of Seville was not only an honest and respectable servant of the law, but also a skilled politician. It is possible that he planned to attract famous people from Cordoba to Seville in order to use their talents for personal elevation. At least this practice was used by his son and founder of the Abbadid Emirate, Abu'l-Qasim Muhammad ibn Ismail ibn Abbad (1023-1042).

Historians unanimously recognize Abu'l-Qasim as a great statesman of the Muluk al-Tawaif era. At the same time, everyone notes his political resourcefulness, diplomacy and even hypocrisy, thanks to which Cadi managed to become the first person in Seville. Ibn Hayyan reports this as follows: "Kadi rose to an unattainable height, fulfilling his desires, and overcame numerous difficulties. Al-Qasim ibn Hammud (Berber Caliph of Cordoba. - M. R.) appointed him Qadi of the city after the death of his father Ismail, first of all, keeping him at a distance for some time. The Qadi earned the Caliph's trust, but after a while he betrayed him, taking revenge for the insult and wanting his elevation. Thus, Abu'l-Qasim closed the gates of Seville to him when the Caliph approached it, fleeing from Cordoba. " 29

Qadi's behavior was risky and could have led to a punitive expedition of Berbers, but nothing of the kind happened: in the same 1023, Al - Qasim's brother Yahya, known for his favor for the Arab Taifa, took the throne. Under him, the Cordovans did not attempt any new rebellions. As for the deposed Abu'l-Qasim, he could not find enough supporters among the Berbers and Saqalibs to regain the throne. Moreover, the former caliph could not even think of a punitive expedition to Seville. Upon learning of the election of a new caliph, the Qadi of Seville sent a message to him asking him to recognize him as "the ruler of the city along with two other sheikhs." 30

The new caliph of Cordoba, Yahya ibn ' aiyyah ibn Hammud, who was concerned with strengthening his personal power, considered it prudent not to interfere in the affairs of Seville and recognized the Qadi as the ruler of the city. The caliph made it his condition to send hostages, and the Qadi readily sent his son Abbad, the future ruler of Seville, al-Mu'tadid, to Cordoba. In 1023, between Caliph Yahya ibn Hammud and Qadi Abu'l-

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Qasim signed a treaty that made Seville self-governing .31

Commenting on this event, Ibn Hayyan reports that " a group of influential Cordovans pushed Qadiya to break with the Caliph. They advocated the election of Ibn Abbad as governor of the city, praising its power and wealth, which makes up about a third of the land of Seville. In this way, the Cordovans tried to distract the Cadi from their plans, instilling in his heart the idea of gratitude. Meanwhile, he was buying their souls, which they didn't know about until they got into trouble. Among them were Abu Bakr al-Zubaydi, the grammarian, Ibn Yarim and others who helped the Qadiyah to calm the city and turn the circumstances in its favor. When his position was strengthened, the Qadi seized the former supporters, abolished the Jama'ah, and began to rule alone. " 32

Thus, the establishment of the sole authority of Abu'l-Qasim in Seville was preceded by two circumstances - the weakening of the Berber party in Cordoba (due to the expulsion of Al-Qasim) and the liquidation of the Jamaa council in Seville, i.e., in fact, the removal from power of the Cordovans who raised him to the throne. Further tactics of the emirs of Seville were determined by their independence from political rivals-Berbers and treachery towards political allies, primarily Cordovans. The main goal of the emirs of Seville was to strengthen their personal power and extend their influence on the Peninsula.

Over the years, the Qadi spent his wealth on acquiring slaves and mercenaries, which allowed him to significantly increase the emirate's military potential. However, in addition to purely material resources, the Cadi needed to legitimize his rule in Seville, which would allow him to finally get rid of the Berber claims to Seville and Cordoba, which the Cadi already considered his fiefdom.

For this purpose, according to Ibn Hayyan, " the Qadi began to obtain information about the remaining Marwanids (a branch of the Umayyads who came to power in Andalusia. - M. R. ), and news reached him of a man calling himself Hisham ibn al-Hakam (the legitimate caliph of Cordoba, who was repeatedly deposed during the Fitna period. - M. R. ). There were rumors that he allegedly escaped from the hands of the murderer, Suleiman (Berber Caliph Suleiman al-Mustain, 1009, 1013-1016. - M. R.), and for a long time hid in the East. One way or another, a group of Cordova Shiites never stopped denying Hisham's death and relaying incredible stories of his rescue... The story of Hisham smouldered in the hearts of the people like a fire in the coals, and Ibn Abbad decided to use the faith of the people for his own purposes: the Qadi announced that Hisham was with him, then gathered all the women and palace servants and forced them to recognize the new caliph. They did this by agreement with the Qadi, because they did not dare to argue with him or contradict him. " 33

As might be expected, the main organizers of the farce of the election of Caliph Hisham were the Cordovans, true supporters of the restoration of the Caliphate. However, as on the previous occasion, Ibn Abbad managed to outwit them. The ambitious cadi did not allow the Cordovans to assume even a share in the restoration of the Caliph to the throne, and in advance got rid of all the Cordovans ' advisers. In addition, the Qadi announced the caliph's decision to make Seville his residence. Thus, the qadi achieved several goals at once: he became a hajib (Minister of the court. - M. R.) under the puppet caliph, he got rid of the Cordova advisers, and also declared jihad against the Berber emirs of the Peninsula, who did not want to recognize Hisham as their caliph.

Ibn Hayyan wrote: "The Qadi began by destroying the power of the noble families, and then resorted to the help of the vizier Habib, entrusting him with his plans. He was the greatest villain of his time, extremely cunning and treacherous. Also, the Qadi in his actions relied on his son Ismail, who was distinguished by courage.

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and self-confidence and everywhere kindled the fire of troubles and civil strife. These two men helped the Cadi clear the path to power and accomplish feats that are innumerable. " 34 The main feat of the two generals was the victory over the army of Caliph Yahya in 1035 at the Battle of Carmon. By" freeing Seville from Berber rule, " 35 Qadi Abu'l-Qasim later earned the gratitude of Andalusian historians.

The attempts of some researchers, in particular D. Wasserstein, to consider the emirs of Seville as patriots of Andalusia and apologists for the revival of the Arab state on the Peninsula seem to be unfounded .36 On the contrary, with their endless and often futile wars, they have largely undermined the authority of Arab Taifa, turning out to be greedy and cruel conquerors. Their success against the Berbers was sporadic, and although they were able to drive the Berbers out of a number of areas, they failed to crush their main rivals, the emirs of Granada.

There are countless examples of the wars of the Emirate of Seville. So, in 1033, Qadiy Ibn Abbad sent his son Ismail to conquer the city of Beja, taking it from the Berber Emir, Ibn al-Aftas. The city was taken, but Ibn al - Aftas ' son, al-Muzaffar, continued to fight the Abbadids in the subsequent reign of al-Mu'tadid. In addition, at the end of his reign, the Cadi made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Malaga: the Berbers defeated the Sevillians, and the commander of the army, the son and heir of Abu l-Qasim, Ismail, was killed (1038). After the death of the Qadi in 1042, Abu Amir Abbad al-Mu'tadid (1042-1069) succeeded to the throne .

This emir went down in the history of the Peninsula as "the thunderstorm of the emirs of Andalusia"," the lion among the emirs " 38 . Ibn Bassam described his reign as follows: "Al-Mu'tadid was a man devoid of moral principles. Staying with him meant danger to both close and outsiders. He made many friends rich, subdued the rebellious, expanded his possessions, and increased his army. The emir began his activities with the murder of his father's vizier, Habib, whom he stabbed with a dagger, seizing his property and forcing his supporters to flee. After that, he continued to destroy and build, collect and waste, interfering in everything and leaving his garrisons everywhere. His wars were a fast-acting poison and a well-aimed arrow, and he considered peace an evil and most undesirable goal. " 39

Ibn Hayyan, who had a favorable attitude towards the Emir (apparently, the historian respected him as a persecutor of the Berbers), wrote: "He was a lion among kings, a leader of troubles, a sower of terror and a lawgiver of peace. His actions were terrible, and his thoughts were high, and in general the Emir was full of greatness. Some time later, he was accused of extreme cruelty and criminal measures in cases such as unfair sentences and excessive suspicion. However, be that as it may, the Emir will not be able to justify his cruelty, unfair treatment of his subjects and lack of mercy." 40

Even Ibn Hayyan, who sympathizes with the Abbadids, testifies to the repulsive appearance of the emir. This image is even more confirmed when the historian gives details of the tactics of warfare by the Emir of Seville. Ambushes and espionage activities were his main weapons in the fight against his enemies, with the help of which he managed to capture the most militarily weak emirates - Ronda, Moron and Arkos .41

If we look at the results and consequences of al - Mu'tadid's rule, we have to say that despite the acquisition of a number of areas in the west of the Peninsula, the emir was not able to resist the Zirid Emirate of Granada, his main rival. He also failed in his attempt to capture Malaga.

According to Ibn Bassam, " the people of Malaga favored the Abbadids and desired their rule, because they did not hear rumors about the terrible deeds of the emirs. They decided to betray their patron, Badis, and invoke al-Mu'tadid. " 42

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It goes without saying that the Emir of Seville immediately responded to this proposal, " because he always wanted to be the first. Ibn Abbad sent his army to Malaga to show its greatness and fearlessness. He placed his sons, Jabir and Muhammad al-Zafir, the future Emir of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, as leaders." However, this campaign ended with the defeat of the Abbadid army at the walls of Malaga in 1066. Muhammad al-Zafir, who escaped to Ronda, wrote to Qasid in which he called on his father to be merciful to him and pointed out the impossibility of taking Malaga with such a small detachment .43

In addition to the failure of the struggle for Malaga, the reign of the terrible Emir was overshadowed by the conspiracy of the eldest son and heir, Ismail Imad al-Dawl (1058). According to some historians, in particular Ibn Hayyan, Ismail wanted to take over the throne, getting rid of the supporters of his father. However, there are reasons to see this revolt as an attempt to eliminate the dictatorship of al-Mu'tadid, who surrounded himself with a network of spies, because of which "no one could breathe freely" .44 After some hesitation, the emir executed his son.

In the same year, the Emir announced the death of Caliph Hisham, whose Hajib he was nominally 45 . Thus, the policy of the Emir was in complete contradiction with the unification and obedience to the legitimate authorities that he preached. The consequences of his cruel and unjust rule were fully reflected in the era of the last Emir of Seville, Muhammad ibn Abbad al-Mu'tamid (1069-1091), when the population refused to defend the emirate from Christians and Almoravids.

According to Ibn Bassam, " Emir al-Mu'tamid was a contrast to his father. He was as great as al-Mu'tadid, but unlike al-Mu'tadid, who was more concerned with war than anything else in the world, Muhammad ibn Abbad was a great admirer of science and literature, as well as an outstanding poet. " 46

Under his rule, wars subside and take on the character of necessary defense. In addition, under al-Mu'tamid, Cordova was subdued, having been wrested from the hands of a Berber mercenary of the Toledo Zu'nunids, Ibn Uqashi, in 1075 .47 The conquest of the capital of the former caliphate was the cherished dream of the rulers of Seville.

The most glorious act of al-Mu'tamid. according to Andalusian historians, there was a declaration of jihad against Christians, who by that time had become a real threat to Arab rule in Spain. Almost all the emirs, including the Abbadids, were tributaries of the King of Castile and Leon Alfonso VI. In addition, the Christians outnumbered the Muslims both in equipment and in courage, as evidenced by the statements of eyewitnesses of the destruction of the suburbs of Zaragoza in 1083. 48 The event that forced the Muslims of Andalusia to admit their weakness was the fall of Toledo in 1085.

Fearing for the future of his possessions, the Emir of Seville, al-Mu'tamid, suggested that the emirs call for help from the Almoravids, the Berbers of North Africa. At the same time, the Emir famously said that he "would rather herd camels in the Maghreb than become a swineherd among Christians." 49 Al-Mu'tamid's words were prophetic: after defeating the Christians, the Berbers conquered the Muslim possessions, and the Emir of Seville was captured along with his entourage.

The conquest of Andalusia by the Almoravids began in 1086 with a victory over the army of Alfonso VI at Sagrajas. According to Yusuf ibn Tashfin, "only when he saw the beauty of Spain did he realize that he had never owned anything before." 50 In addition, Yusuf witnessed quarrels and quarrels among the Andalusian military leaders, who immediately after the battle began to complain about each other. Deprived of unity, the Muslims were soon to become victims of the Christians, and this thought justified the Berbers ' conquering aspirations. Finally, al-Mu'tamid was forced to use the Almoravids ' services once more (1088), asking for help against the Christians who were entrenched in the fortress of Aledo, as well as the Muslims of Murcia who had betrayed him .51

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According to the Emir of Granada, Abdallah, " none of our men wanted to fight. Everyone was waiting for Yusuf ibn Tashfin, considering him a worthy ruler. " 52 The Andalusians were ready to accept him as their liberator. Only the Emirate of Seville resisted Yusuf ibn Tashfin, and only the Emir and his entourage defended Seville in the main .53

The main reason for the easy conquest of Andalusia by the Almoravids, Andalusian historians considered the betrayal of their emirs by Muslims. The betrayal, in their opinion, was caused by a long era of troubles, wars and looting, which drove the population to despair and pushed them into the hands of the Berbers.

Zirid Emirate in Granada (1018-1090). The history of the Zirid Emirate in Granada, at first glance, is a contrast to the development of the Emirate of Seville. The founder of the emirate was the Berber military leader Zawi ibn Ziri (1010-1018), whom many Andalusian historians, including Ibn Hayyan, consider a model ruler. 54 He was called by residents of the Elvira district, among whom riots reigned for a long time. The people needed a strong ruler, and they chose Zawi ibn Ziri, who proved to be a talented military leader and an honest leader. "If you have previously participated in jihad, then this small jihad will be an honor for you: you will make people happy, protect their homes and restore them to glory. We, for our part, will help you with money and deeds. Help us and we will be your servants, " the people of Elvira 55 told him .

Zawi ibn Ziri made a contract with him and fulfilled all its conditions. He was able to quickly strengthen the suburb of Elvira, Granada, making it the capital of the emirate, and win the battle with the Umayyad Caliph al-Murtada, who wanted to take Granada from the Berbers (1018). The diverse army of Zawi ibn Ziri was united in their desire to defend their city. "We all wanted to die then, and no one thought of running away," Abdallah said of one participant in the battle .56 And the small but cohesive Berber army won. Local historians thus emphasized that the feelings of Muruvwa and Asabiya were still strong in the Andalusians, but only other emirs did not want to remember this.

The first emirs of Granada, appealing to the spirit of tribal solidarity of the Arabs and Berbers, repeated the path of the Syrian governors of Andalusia. Zawy ibn Ziri's successor, his nephew and comrade-in-arms, Habbus ibn Maksan (1023-1038), is described by Berber historians as "a worthy and excellent ruler." 57 He recreated the tribal army, strengthening it with personal authority. "The Emir ordered us to allocate soldiers for the service, as much as we could afford. For me, there is no other joy than to see that my army has grown and strengthened," Habbus told the tribal leaders .58 Using the spirit of tribal rivalry to strengthen the army, the ruler of Granada greatly contributed to the growth of the emirate's military power. However, with the death of Hubbus, the period of prosperity ended.

Khabbus ' son, Badis al-Muzaffar (1038-1073), who was known for his violent and irreconcilable temper, succeeded to the throne. This emir strongly resembled his contemporary and main rival, the Emir of Seville al-Mu'tadid. He, like al - Mu'tadid, loved power and hated dissenters, was harsh on his subordinates, and punished every word an informer said. If the Emir of Seville showed hatred for the Berbers and exterminated them in every possible way, then Badis had similar feelings for the Arabs. Thus, after learning of the insidious murder of the Berber emirs of Ronda and Arcos by al-Mu'tadid, Badis decided to destroy all the Arabs of Granada .59

This action was prevented by the intervention of Badis ' confidant, Katib Samuel Nagra-l-La (d. 1055). Katib, a Jew by birth, traditionally held the position of tax collector 60 and enjoyed the unlimited confidence of Badis. Historians unanimously recognize him as talented.-

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a diplomat and politician, but his role in the history of the Emirate of Granada is interpreted differently. According to Ibn Hayyan, he was a "great politician." 61 Some historians, in particular Ibn Bassam, accuse him of using the trust of Badis to rob the treasury, and almost handed Granada over to the Emir of neighboring Almeria, al-Mu'tasim. Others, like al-Marrakushi, place the blame on his son, which seems more plausible.

Be that as it may, the brutal rule of Badis was accompanied by a weakening of power, which led to an excessive increase in the role of second parties in the state. After Samuel's death, his son Yusuf became the first minister, who concentrated all power in his own hands .62 Replacing the elderly Badis ' supporters with his own men, he plundered the treasury without hindrance. Yusuf succeeded in slandering Badis ' son, Sayf al-Dawl, after he threatened to expose Yusuf's machinations. At Yusuf's insinuation, the son-heir was executed, and Yusuf continued to plunder public funds. To complete this, he arranged for the surrender of Granada to the Emir of Almeria, Al-Mu'tasim, who promised to give him protection. However, Hajib did not succeed in carrying out his plans: after learning about Yusuf's plans, Faqih Abu Ishaq al-Ilbiri wrote a pamphlet to Qasid, in which he called on the people to throw off the rule of the Jews. The Granadians destroyed Yusuf's palace and killed the minister (1066) 63 .

All this had a detrimental effect on the financial situation of Granada. Badis ' heir, the young Emir Abdallah (1073-1090), was forced to pay tribute to Alfonso VI out of his own funds. 64 However, he was not able to escape the reproach of his subjects, who accused him of being connected with Alfonso VI and aiding Christians. Taught by bitter experience, people no longer trusted their own emirs, who they saw as traitors and weak-willed intermediaries. When Alphonse VI advanced on Granada in 1090, Abdallah could only rely on his entourage. This was all that was left of Zawi ibn Ziri's once strong army. In the same year, the city was occupied by Almora-vidy, and the inhabitants of the city themselves handed over the Emir to Yusuf ibn Tashfin .

Thus, the last Emir of Granada, like the last Emir of Seville, al-Mutamid, was a victim of the inconsistent policies of his predecessor. By their cruelty and injustice (al-Mu'tadid) and weakness of will (Badis), the emirs of Seville and Granada provoked the anger of their subjects and undermined their trust in the central government, which led to a reluctance to protect the emirs from Christians and Berbers-Almoravids.

Emirate of Sacaliba in Valencia (1010-1102). If the Arab and Berber emirates fought each other for the championship, then the emirates in the hands of Saqalib were kept apart. The Saqaliba were called the Amirid Party, because they had once helped al-Mansur Abu Amir defeat Hajib al-Mussafi .66 The Saqaliba did not associate their power with the Umayyads and took the news of the collapse of the caliphate quite calmly. In the era of Muluk al-Tawaif, the Sakaliba tried not to enter into conflicts with the Emirs of Arab and Berber origin. The main concern of the emirs of Sakalib was to ensure material well-being, in which many of them achieved considerable results. Perhaps the most significant example of the development of Taifa Sakaliba is the history of the formation and decline of the emirate in Valencia.

The Saqaliba most closely fit the characterization given to the Emirs by Ibn al-Khatib - most of them "were eunuchs and crooks and had no claim to the throne." 67

The founders of the emirate were Mubarak and Muzaffar (1010-1021), who once served in the water distribution department under the Amirids. 68 Once mercenaries, the Sakaliba employed homeless and exiled people, "despicable slaves" who were trained in the art of war and paid handsomely for their service. Except

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Moreover, refugees from Cordoba found refuge in Valencia, who greatly contributed to the prosperity of the emirate both with their wealth and knowledge and experience.

While emigrants from Cordoba and other regions became a" new community "in power in the emirate, the original inhabitants of Valencia suffered: the emirs suffocated them with taxes and forced labor, so that" people became completely impoverished and began to dress in animal skins. - M. R.) and eat grass."

All the emirs launched a gigantic construction of palaces, striving to surpass each other. The luxury of Valencia surpassed, as contemporaries claimed, the luxury of Cordoba and aroused the desire of neighboring Christians to conquer it. The emirs themselves were convinced that their wealth and prosperity "are well deserved and will last forever. They even stopped fighting their enemies. " 69 By their carelessness in the affairs of government, and, above all, by their unheard-of exactions and injustices, the emirs aroused the wrath of their subjects. According to Ibn Hayyan, the Emir of Mubarak was killed on the day he uttered the phrase that "he cares for the welfare of Muslims." 70 He fell off a wooden bridge and was crushed by a horse. After getting rid of the hated ruler, the people broke into the palace and looted it. At the same time, another emir was elected, Labib, who, however, turned out to be no better than the previous one.

The new emir aroused the hatred of the Muslims of Valencia with his policy of flirting with Christians. According to Ibn Hayyan, "the Emir called on the Muslims to submit to the Christians and behaved like their servants." 71 This attitude towards Islam aroused the anger of the majority of the population, and the emir was deposed. However, the emirate was too weak to resist the Christians of Barcelona, and the next Emir, Abd al-Aziz, grandson of al-Mansur (1021-1087), was forced to continue the policy of reconciliation with the Christians.

According to Ibn Hayyan, the emir's main mistake was to hire "the greatest dog of the Christians, Cid Campeador" (1040-1099). This man, the historian wrote, did evil to all whom he served, and with his small army managed to defeat many, both Muslims and Christians. 72 Valencia actually passed into the hands of the Cid and his mercenaries (1087) and would have completely ceased to exist as a Muslim territory (1096 - the conquest of Valencia by the Cid), if not for the intervention of the Berbers-Almoravids, who, after a difficult war that went on with varying success, recaptured the city from the Christians (1102). After that, " new destinies were born in Valencia, and it was cleansed of paganism," 73 Ibn Hayyan wrote.

The development of the Emirate of Valencia, according to Andalusian historians, provides an example of not only the loss of Arab position, but also their departure from the Islamic religion. The Almoravids saved Islam in a territory that could no longer withstand the Reconquista. The main culprits of the decline of Muslim power were self-styled emirs, who undermined the military, material and moral foundations of Muslim rule in the region.

Using the example of the three emirates, Andalusian historians trace the processes that began with the Fitna of Cordoba: the decline of the authority of Arab rulers, the growth of the influence of various political adventurers, and the continuation of the "wheel of civil strife" era. The era of appanage principalities witnessed the collapse of the three components of Muslim statehood-Muruvva, Asabiya and Khalifa, as well as the idea of militant Islam. The Muluk at-tawaif, who were involved in civil strife and the pursuit of profit, forgot about their duty to fight for the faith and protect the interests of their subjects. The Andalusian emirs were betrayed by the population of Almoravi Dam and, in part, by the Christians (the capture of Valencia by the Cid Campeador and Toledo by Alfonso VI).

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notes

1 Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Kitab al-Zahira fi Mahasin Ahl al-Jazeera (The Treasure Book of the Islanders). Beirut, vol. 3, Part 1, 1979, p. 186.

Ibn Khaldun. 2 Tarikh al-Muwahadeen (History of the Almohads). R. T. 2. 1848. pp. 80, 82.

3 Cit. by: Ibid., p. 33.

4 Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 3. p. 19.

5 Sakaliba-the name of prisoners of war from Europe (especially from Sicily) who served in the guard of the caliphs of Cordova or at court. Usually the Sakaliba converted to Islam.

6 Les memoires de Abd Allah, dernier roi Ziride. Le Caire, 1955. P. 89.

7 Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 1. pp. 184-185. In 981, a palace coup took place in Cordoba: Abu Amir, known as al-Mansur (the Victor), came to power under Caliph Hisham II. After the so-called Amirid Revolution, power in the caliphate actually passed into their hands, and the Umayyad Caliphate began to be called the Amirid state.

Ibn Bossam. 8 Edict. soch. T. 1. Ch. 1. P. 102.

Ibn al-Khatib. 9 Tarikh Isbaniya al-Islamiyya au Kitab Aamal al-Aalyam (History of Muslim Spain, or the Book of Deeds of great men). Beirut, 1956. p. 112.

10 Ibid., p. 113.

11 Ibid., p. 144. Omar II ibn Abd al-Aziz (720-724), great-grandson of the "righteous Caliph" Omar I ibn al - Khattab (634-644), was known for his piety and kindness.

12 Excerpts from Kitab al-Mateen are preserved mainly in the anthology of Ibn Bassam, as well as in the writings of Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi, Kitab al-Bayyan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa'l-Maghrib ("A Book of Amazing Explanations on the History of Andalusia and the Maghrib"), Ibn al-Khatib's "Tarikh Isbaniya al-Islamiyya au Kitab Aamal al-Aalyam" ("The History of Muslim Spain, or the Book of Deeds of Great Men"), al-Makkari's "Nafah attib min husn al-Andalus ar-Ratib" ("The fragrance of a delicate branch of Andalusia").

Ibn Khaldun. 13 Al-Muqaddimah (Introduction). Beirut, vol. 2, 1900, pp. 204-205.

14 Ibid., p. 206.

Ibn Abd Rabbi. 15 Kitab al-Ikd al-Farid (The Book of the Miraculous Necklace). Beirut. Vol. 1. 1992. p. 20; Yumalik ibn Anas (d. 795) - the founder of the Maliki sect-one of the four Muslim orthodox denominations.

Lomax D. 16 The Reconquest of Spain. London- New York, 1990. P. 62.

17 Op. cit. P. 67.

Vernet Juan. 18 Historia de la ciencia espanola. Madrid, 1975. P. 13. Andalusia was divided into three border provinces (sugur) - Upper, Middle, and Lower levels. The upper border-the province-was located on the right bank of the Ebro River. Its center was Zaragoza. The middle one was located between the valleys of the Tagus and Ebro rivers with the center in the city of Salim (Medinaceli). The lower border-the province occupied the valley of the Tagus River. Its center was Toledo.

Peres H. 19 La poesie andalouse en arabe classique au XI siecle. P., 1853. P. 261.

Wasserstein D. 20 The Rise and Fall of the Party- Kings. Princeton, 1985. P. 56-59.

Peres H. 21 Op. cit. P. 256.

Ibn Hayyan. 22 Kitab al-Mateen (The Book of Content). Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. op. t. 1. ch. 3. p. 19.

23 Ibid., vol. 1, Part 2, p. 17.

24 Ibid., Part 1, p. 184.

25 Ibid.

Ibn Khaldun. 26 Edict. op. p. 204.

Ibn al-Khatib. 27 Kitab al-Ihta fi Akhbar Garnata (The complete History of Granada). Cairo, 1957, p. 246.

Ibn Hayyan. 28 Edict. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 2. pp. 14-15.

29 Ibid., p. 16. In 1023, an anti-Berber revolt broke out in Cordoba (the so-called Cordoba Revolution), during which the Berber Caliph Al-Qasim and his supporters were expelled from the capital.

Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi. 30 Kitab al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa'l Maghrib (A book of amazing explanations on the history of Andalusia and the Maghreb). Beirut, vol. 3, 1967, p. 213.

31 Ibid., p. 216.

Ibn Hayyan. 32 Edict. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. op. t. 1. Ch. 2. P. 16.

33 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

34 Ibid., p. 19.

Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi. 35 Edict. op. p. 241.

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Wasserstein D. 36 Op. cit. P. 69.

Ibn al-Khatib. 37 Decree. op. p. 234.

Ibn Hayyan. 38 Decree. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 2. p. 24.

39 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

40 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

41 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

42 Ibid., p. 39; Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi. Decree. op. p. 273.

Ibn Hayyan. 43 Decree. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 2. p. 39.

44 Ibid., vol. 3, Part 1, pp. 147-148.

45 Ibid., vol. 1.4. 2, p. 39.

46 Ibid., p. 41.

Ibn Izari al-Marrakushi. 47 Decree. op. p. 259.

Ibn Hayyan. 48 Edict. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bassam. Edict. soch. T. 1. 4. 1. pp. 183-187.

Ibn al-Asir. 49 Al-Kamil fi-t-Tarikh (Full story). Cairo, vol. 2, 1929-1932, p. 99.

50 Les memores... P. 103.

51 Ibid. P. 106-109.

52 Ibid. P. 106.

53 Ibid. P. 110.

Ibn Hayyan. 54 Decree, Op. Quoted from: Ibn Bassam. Edict. op. T. 1. Ch. 1. P. 422.

55 Les memoires... P. 18.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid. P. 25.

58 Ibid. P. 26.

Ibn al-Khatib. 59 Decree. op. p. 263.

Metz A. 60 Moslem Renaissance, Moscow, 1992, p. 62.

61 Les memoires... P. 72.

62 Ibid. P. 83.

Ibn Said. 63 Kitab al-Mughrib fi Hula-l-Maghrib (A Book of Amazing things about the best people of the Maghrib). Cairo, vol. 2, 1953, p. 102.

64 Les memoires... P. 72.

65 Ibid. P. 83.

Ibn Hayyan. 66 Decree. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bossam. Decree. op. t. 1.4. 3. p. 22. The Amirids were Haji-ba Abu Amir al-Mansur (d. 1002) and his sons Abd al - Malik al-Muzaffar and Abd al-Rahman Sanchuello, who ruled in the name of Caliph Hisham II in Cordoba (1002-1008).

Ibn al-Khatib. 67 Edict. op. p. 144.

Ibn Hayyan. 68 Edict. op. Cit. by: Ibn Bassam. Edict. soch. T. 1.4. 3. P. 18.

69 Ibid., p. 19.

70 Ibid., p. 20.

71 Ibid., p. 21.

72 Ibid., p. 95.

73 Ibid., p. 92.

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