In the last third of the 19th century, one of the main trends in world politics was the struggle of the British and Russian empires for influence in continental Eurasia. In this" Big Game " between Great Britain and Russia, the definition of the boundaries of spheres of influence depended solely on the military and political potential of the two empires. Russian expansion in Central Asia has caused the political and military elite of Great Britain to feel a serious challenge that is developing into a direct threat to the security of British India. Most British politicians, officials and experts understood the hypothetical nature of Russia's threat and the lack of resources for a direct invasion of northwest India. At the same time, ensuring the security of the northwest Frontier required considering hypothetical threats as real ones. In addition, the British establishment was well aware that even if the invasion of regular troops was impossible, Russian agents could create many problems with their anti-British activities in Afghanistan.

The most vulnerable point in India's strategic security system was its north-western border. On this part of the border, the Himalayan Range was an almost insurmountable barrier against invasion from China, and, of course, no one in Great Britain or India was afraid of such an invasion. But on the other side of the frontier, facing the territory of Russia, the Hindu Kush ridge divided Afghanistan into western and eastern parts. Thus, in theory, the Russian army was able to invade the Indus Valley from Transcaspian Turkestan across the plain of western Afghanistan through Herat and Kandahar. Both the Imperial government in London and the Viceroy's residence in Simla saw the Hindu Kush as the border between the British and Russian spheres of influence in Central Asia.

Keywords: British Empire, Russian Empire, India, Afghanistan, border, security, tribes.

In 1874, British Prime Minister B. Disraeli replaced the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, with Lord Lytton, which meant the transition from a policy of "skillful inaction" and "closed border" to an offensive "forward policy" on the north-western border. In 1873, the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, offered Northbrook a defensive alliance against Russia. The Viceroy refused, and then the Afghan ambassadors went to Tashkent to negotiate with the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, K. P. von Kaufmann. In response, Disraeli instructed Lytton to immediately enter into a defensive alliance with the Emir of Afghanistan and the tribal leaders of Balochistan. The Viceroy offered the Emir an alliance, but he refused because of the British demand to place permanent representatives in Kabul and Herat.

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But Lytton did not abandon his plans for a "forward policy", which he planned to pursue not only in Afghanistan, but also to the north, in the khanates of Central Asia - Kokand, Khiva and Bukhara. In a letter to Disraeli's Cabinet Secretary for India, the Marquess of Salisbury, he wrote: "The prospect of war with Russia is very exciting... A sea of fire can be poured around the northern borders of India, inciting the khanates to rise up against their Russian masters." Salisbury dampened Lytton's belligerence. He believed that Russia did not have the potential to successfully invade India, while it was very dangerous to involve Anglo-Indian troops in adventures in Central Asia. "Russia can offer the Afghans to plunder India. We can't offer them anything, because there is nothing to plunder in Afghanistan "[Hopkirk, 2004, pp. 426-427].

The apotheosis of Lytton's "forward policy" was the invasion of Afghanistan on November 21, 1878, and the deployment in Kabul of the resident, and in fact the ruler, the viceroy, Major Louis Cavagnari. The uprising in Kabul in September 1879 led to the destruction of the British mission, and only the campaign of the detachment of F. Roberts 'attack on Kabul, followed by his victory over Ayub Khan's forces at Kandahar in June 1880, allowed General Burroughs' troops besieged in this fortress to be saved, and Great Britain to "save face" (Glushchenko, 2000).

Lytton's" forward policy " ended in complete failure, and he was dismissed. In 1880, Lord Ripon was appointed Viceroy of India, who withdrew British troops from Afghanistan and returned to the passive "closed border" tactic. Power in Kabul passed to Abdurrahman, who returned from Russian Turkestan and was proclaimed Emir on July 22, 1880. Afghanistan retained the status of a buffer state, but the security problem of the north-western border of India remained unresolved. After the failure of attempts to take control of the Kabul River valley, it became obvious to the British generals that it was necessary to limit control to the tribal area in the mountains on the Indo-Afghan frontier. The problem was that these 47 Pashtun (Patan) tribes were extremely decentralized in their governance and were never fully subordinate to either the Afghan emirs or the Indian rajas. Naturally, the freedom-loving Highlanders were not going to obey the British officials either (Tikhonov, 2003).

The British defense of the northwest frontier was based on its "southwest bastion" - the tribal zone in Balochistan, and the "northeast bastion" - the principalities of Chitral, Gilgit, Nagar, and Hunza in the western foothills of the Himalayas. Between Balochistan and Chitral were the tribes of Waziristan, whose territory was controlled by British garrisons in the valleys of the Tochi, Gumala and Kurama rivers. The Afridi tribes living in the Tyre Valley controlled the Khyber Pass from Peshawar to the Kabul Valley. The Baloch tribes occupied the Bolan Pass along the valley of the river of the same name, which flows from southwestern Afghanistan towards the Quetta Valley, and then to Punjab and the Indus Valley (Novitsky, 1901, pp. 112-114).

After the first Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-1842. Balochistan was incorporated into British India and received the status of a "district transferred to the administration of England". After the second Anglo-Afghan War, in February 1881, British agents entered into an agreement with the Afridi leaders to protect, but in fact refrain from looting trade caravans in the Khyber Pass. The Khyber Pass was considered British territory. At key points of the passage, British engineers built Fort Maud and Ali Masjid fortifications.

Each Afridi clan received from 500 to 1,700 rupees per month, depending on the number. In addition, as early as 1878, Colonel Warburton and his assistant Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan transformed the Afridi militia into a corps of Khyber riflemen, organized on the basis of British military regulations and armed with modern Snyder rifles. 173 thousand rubles were spent on the maintenance of this building-

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pii (115 thousand rubles) per year from the budget of the Peshawar administration. According to V. F. Novitsky, this was a profitable agreement for the British, since every year caravans with goods worth 2 million rubles passed through this passage, and their security was provided relatively cheaply [Novitsky 1901, pp. 145-148].

In 1881, the capture of the last fortress of the Turkmen Geok-Tepe tribes by the troops of General M. D. Skobelev and the peaceful annexation of Merv meant the establishment of Russian control over the Eastern Caspian region. Theoretically, Russian troops were able to cross the Trans-Caspian desert belt and reach the Herat-Kandahar line, beyond which they were no longer separated from northwestern India by any geographical barriers. This led to the strengthening of the position of supporters of the "forward policy"in the British establishment. In December 1884, Lord Ripon was succeeded as Viceroy by Lord Dufferin.

Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in India. Roberts, as a professional soldier, could not ignore the changing strategic situation in Central Asia. In his memoirs, he praised Skobelev's military operations as "the most important step taken by Russia in its advance towards India." He regarded the construction of railways and the development of Turkestan as the" railway encirclement " of northwestern India. Roberts criticized the speech delivered by the leader of the British Liberals D. Bright in Birmingham on April 16, 1879, in which he argued that natural barriers were sufficient to ensure the security of India. The general believed that this task could not be solved without increasing the number of troops, territorial annexations and strengthening control over the tribes on the frontier [Roberts, 1900, p. 503, 514].

F. Roberts, the "saviour of Bobe," who won the title of Lord of Kandahar for his victory in the second Anglo-Afghan War, understood better than anyone else in India or in the entire British Empire the difficulty of establishing military control over Afghanistan with its Muslim population. "The fervent fanaticism of religious feelings, which forms the main feature of the Afghan character," is the main reason for the hatred of Afghans for any foreign invaders, the general believed. In the event of any aggression from outside, "the mullahs become masters of the situation and subordinate private quarrels to hatred of the common enemy, the movement quickly takes on the character of a religious war."

In March 1885, Roberts attended the semi-official meeting of Viceroy Dufferin with the Afghan Emir Abdurrahman in Rawalpindi, which took place during another crisis in Russian-Afghan relations. During the negotiations, Dufferin and Roberts managed to convince the emir of the preference for targeting the UK rather than Russia. Afghanistan was cementing its status as a British ally and buffer zone against a possible invasion of India. Russian-British rivalry in Central Asia was moving from the "Afghan" to the "Pamir" phase [Zhigalina, 1990, p. 119]. At the same time, Abdurrahman refused to accept British military engineers to reinforce Herat, citing the "rudeness, lack of education, suspicion" of his subjects and their hostility to foreigners in general and to the British in particular. The Emir asked for and received 20,000 modern rifles, four cannons, two howitzers, a mountain artillery battery, and a cash subsidy of 10 lakhs (1 million) rupees (Roberts, 1900, p. 428-429).

F. Roberts believed that for the successful defense of the Khyber and Bolan passes, reliable modern communications are primarily important, and not fortifications. The defense of the Indian frontier should be dynamic, not static. The Indian budget did not have the money to build enough forts to ensure reliable communications in the mountains among mobile, warlike and potentially hostile tribes. Even if the necessary funds were found, there wouldn't be enough soldiers for these numerous forts. Therefore, the control of movement and the fight against raids

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nomadic tribes can only be carried out by mobile troops armed and equipped for combat operations in the mountains. To do this, it is necessary to create a network of railways through which troops can quickly move from their permanent locations to strategic points on the frontier and concentrate on the most dangerous areas. Such mobile units will be able to control any area in the "tribal belt", while forts will allow military operations only against tribes living in the neighborhood, or will serve as auxiliary bases for troops operating in the field [Roberts, 1900, p. 513].

Lieutenant Colonel of the Russian General Staff V. F. Novitsky, who made a 4-month trip to the north-western frontier of British India in 1898, noted the very mediocre condition of the fortifications. "The north-Western border has been reinforced unsatisfactorily and carelessly. There are no fortresses in the exact and modern meaning here, the existing forts are weak in most cases, and numerous but small clay fortifications cannot be of serious importance in the fight against the artillery of the modern European army " [Novitsky, 1901, p. 176].

In 1888, George Curzon, a Tory member of the House of Commons and future Viceroy of India, traveled by rail from St. Petersburg to Baku. Then he took the steamer "Prince Baryatinsky" across the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk, and from there again by rail reached through Merv and Bukhara to Tashkent. After returning to London, the traveler published a book, "Russia in Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian question, "in which he expressed dismay at the construction of a railway that runs 300 miles along the Iranian border and has become the" sword of Damocles constantly hanging over the head " of the Shah. He convinced readers of the ability of the Russian military command to transfer troops with all the necessary weapons and equipment to any point in the Caucasus or Central Asia in the shortest possible time (Curzon, 1889).

In 1893, Curzon published the article "India between two Fires" in the magazine "Nine's Century". In it, he wrote that while Russian Cossacks began patrolling the Pamirs, French gunboats began to threaten Bangkok. This has created threats to India's security from both the northwest and northeast. Criminal indifference based on geographical ignorance has led to increased threats to India's security: Russia has occupied Merv, reached the "gates of Herat" and the "Roof of the World", the Pamirs, France has captured Vietnam, Annam, Cochin China, Cambodia, created its "new Asian empire in Indochina" and established itself on the borders of Siam. After these events, the British could no longer ignore the "facts of geographical empiricism" and began to "artificially construct buffer states, more or less independent and more or less friendly" (Curzon, 1893, p. 178).

Curzon believed that buffer states in Asia in principle cannot be stable, since "their existence in the East depends on the character of the individual, the ability to govern of an Indian prince or monarch." Buffer states, as a rule, are weaker than their neighbors and depend on random factors: the "life cycle", "extravagance of power", "contempt for morality" and need external protection. In the early 1890s, according to Curzon, the danger increased: Russian attacks on Afghanistan began, and French attacks on Siam. Two European nations hostile to Great Britain appeared "in the heart of Asia and on the flanks of the Indian Empire." New threats to India's security emerged: "the instability of the French governments and the cautious pride of the tsar" (Curzon 1893, p. 179-181).

Curzon saw a danger in the constant Russian advance on the Pamirs. Russian military intelligence officers disguised as hunting parties conduct geodetic surveys of the area "inch by inch"and look for routes for the movement of "expedition columns" through the Hindu Kush. In the event of the withdrawal of Russian troops to the Hindu Kush, Anglo-in-

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The Indian forces will be forced to move to the lines of Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar, Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar and Chitral-Wazin-Gilgit-Hunza (Curzon, 1893, p. 183-184).

In British imperial politics, strategic concepts were usually quickly translated into practical actions. The proponents of the" forward policy " never completely lost their influence, and at the slightest opportunity, the border of British India shifted in a northerly direction. In 1876, Mehtar (ruler) Chitral Amman al-Mulk became a vassal of the Maharaja of Kashmir and accordingly a vassal of the Viceroy of India. In Gilgit, on the border of Kashmir and Chitral, a British agency was established to monitor the situation on the frontier and "protect" the Khan of Gilgit from incursions by Afghan troops. In 1889, Anglo-Indian troops were sent to Gilgit under the command of Colonel Algernon, whose main task was to monitor the movement of Russian reconnaissance parties in the Pamirs [Churchill, 2004, p. 13].

After the death of Amman al-Mulk in 1892, an internecine war broke out in the principality between his brothers and sons. Under the pretext of fighting the threat of Russian intervention in these feuds, in March 1895, Major J. R. R. Tolkien and his colleagues were sent to the United States. Robertson, with 400 Kashmiri and Sikh soldiers, marched 200 miles at an altitude of 12,000 feet from Gilgit through the Shandur Pass and occupied the Chitral fortress. The British garrison was immediately besieged by the forces of one of the pretenders to the throne - the brother of Amman al-Mulk Sher Afzul. Simla and Calcutta are in a panic over the threat of a "new Khartoum". On March 23, a detachment of 400 Sikhs under the command of Colonel J. R. R. Tolkien set out from Gilgit. Callie. He made a forced march through the pass and entered Chitral from the east on April 20. On March 30, Major General R. Lowe's 15,000-strong force moved into Chitral from the south, from Peshawar through the Swat Valley and the Malakand Pass. On April 13, Low's detachment defeated the Pashtun militia and prevented the tribes from coming to Sher Khan's aid [Novitsky, 1901, p. 166; Hopkirk, 2004, p. 524-578].

By order of the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, two infantry battalions were stationed in Chitral as a permanent garrison, and the khanate itself was granted protectorate status. In addition, two battalions were stationed in the Malakand Pass. But on June 13, 1895, Lord Rosebery's government refused to keep "armed forces or European agents" in Chitral. However, after the Rosebery government resigned on August 16, 1895, the new government of Lord Salisbury declared the continuation of the" 1876 policy " and declared its presence in Chitral [Churchill, 2004, pp. 16-17]. But the Salisbury government also continued to debate internally about the boundaries, timing, methods, and cost of such forward movement. The security of the British garrison in Chitral could only be ensured by building an extremely expensive road through the territory of the Pashtun tribes.

An official of the Finance Department of the Indian Civil Service, O. Colvin, in 1895 published an article" Indian Frontiers and Indian Finance "in the" Ninth Century", in which he gave a justification for the"forward policy". He believed that only the rapid advance of Russia in Central Asia to the borders of Afghanistan in the 1870s and 1880s forced the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to activate the "forward policy". At the same time, he opposed military and political operations outside the Indian frontier, since they were associated with significant human losses and material expenditure. In accordance with this, Lytton considered it necessary to take up military positions on the high mountain routes crossing the Indian frontier, but did not set the task of territorial annexation. The Government of India occupied Quetta in 1876 and connected this outpost with the territory of India by railway. British agents established control over Balochistan and appeared in Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar, which resulted in a" minimal necessary increase in British responsibility and costs " [Colvin, 1895, p. 845-849, 859].

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O. Colvin believes that after the second Anglo-Afghan war, the British "forward policy" led to the formation of prerequisites for ensuring the security of the north-western frontier of India as "an integrated system and scheme of organized border policy from the Arabian Sea to China and from the Indus River in the east to the steppes of Central Asia in the west." According to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Gundamak in 1881, Emir Yaqub Khan agreed to the annexation of Pishina and Sibi districts to the Quetta district. In 1887, these territories were formally incorporated into British India. The author considered the annexation of Quetta to be the first part of the "forward policy", the second - the connection of this fortress by rail with the transport network of the Indus Valley and the coast of the Arabian Sea. The third part of this policy should be the crossing of the mountain ranges from Herat to Kashmir by British troops. This task was accomplished if roads were built from Kashmir to Kashgaria in China, as well as through Chitral to the highlands of the Eastern Pamirs, which was formally part of the Kokand Khanate.

The proclamation of Chitral as a British protectorate marked the first north-westward expansion of British India since the annexation of Punjab in 1849. According to Colvin, the main goal of the British expedition to Chitral is to close the exit from the mountain gorge to the plain leading to Jalalabad. To complete Lord Lytton's program, it is necessary to build a road from the border of British India to Chitral through the territory of the Pathan tribes of the Swat Valley and ensure its security by placing military posts on the Malakand Pass and on the Chakdar River (Colvin, 1895, p. 852-853).

British rule in Chitral was fairly stable, Colvin thought, and there was no threat of revolt from the local tribes, since the Chitral people were "a fickle and impressionable people, but easily managed and not fanatical in their means." In turn, the key to the peace of the Pathan tribes is the agreement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Indian Government, Sir Mortimer Durand, which he concluded in November 1893 with the Afghan Emir Abdurrahman. Under this agreement, the Indian government was granted control and "free hand" in dealing with the" rebellious and quasi-independent tribes " of Waziristan (Colvin, 1895, p. 854).

British garrisons should be stationed at key points of the frontier, which, without dispersing their forces, concentrate their attention and efforts on ways and positions that ensure the fulfillment of British obligations. The British forces facilitate the effective work of civil servants with their native assistants. They also help the police maintain order and, if necessary, eliminate the lawlessness and violence of "disaffected elements of the population". In addition, the British military Administration provides "public justice courts" that administer justice on the British model, but in accordance with native customs. Only the presence of British troops can ensure the service of recruited tribal representatives to protect roads and passes. The establishment of law and order is a necessary condition for the construction of roads and administrative buildings, the normal operation of the post office and telegraph, the creation of pharmacies and outpatient centers for medical care to local residents [Colvin, 1895, p. 855].

Colvin believed that such a policy of" soft but decisive intervention " should create a sphere of influence in the "band of tribes" on the frontier, which should have military protection as the only possible guarantee against Russian expansion. He did not consider the Russian-British diplomatic agreements of 1884 and 1895 to be sufficient guarantees for the security of the Indian frontier. on the delimitation of the borders of Afghanistan. In his opinion, the "sphere of influence" is only a diplomatic formula that powers use to indicate their territorial claims and the limits of expansion.

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The diplomatic arrangements between Great Britain and Russia need to be supplemented by real political control over the tribes on the Indo-Afghan frontier. British residents in the tribal area should block their contacts with other European powers, but not interfere in their internal affairs. The British presence should create opportunities to open communications and at the same time block the illegal traffic of weapons and ammunition. "Spontaneous impact of civilization... trade, commerce, increased comfort and wealth, security of life and property, gradually work to rid these tribes of the murderous and predatory instincts of the past "[Colvin, 1895, p. 859, 861].

O. Colvin believed that "our own experience in India and the history of the Russian advance in Central Asia demonstrate that when a civilized power and restless semi - civilized tribes come into contact, circumstances sooner or later lead to the conquest of the latter" [Colvin, 1895, p. 882-83].

In order to prove his point, Colvin cited a speech by an Indian Civil Service official, Sir George White, at a meeting at the Viceroy's residence in Simla, which was published in the Pioneer Mail on October 8, 1897: "The history of all times shows that civilization and barbarism cannot exist simultaneously and at the same time peacefully as they do. independent neighbors. A savage cannot submit to the restrictive influence of a more civilized society in order to live peacefully. This is a typical case among our border tribes, who pride themselves on their individual freedom and do not obey order." Eternal peace is a "dream" even for those civilized societies in which humanity is a "popular idol". War is an inescapable "human experience" and an everyday reality on the Indian frontier, where "we have about 200,000 men from the most rebellious nations, with excellent fighting qualities that are not limited to a civilized government and are burning with fanaticism." The reality is that "we will not be at peace with them and must remain always ready and armed."

With J. R. R. Tolkien White disagreed with another participant in the meeting, Henry Green, who criticized this "forward policy" model. Pathans are decentralized tribes that are only nominally subordinate to their own chiefs. "They hate all Europeans, and the life of a British officer trapped in their mountains is as unsafe as it was 30 years ago. Their only virtue is personal bravery. Such peoples... this is the best defense we can have in the rear and on the flanks of the invading army, but at the same time, the best course of action we can take is to keep them at bay... Any attempt to advance military posts into these passes or instill fear in independent mountain tribes... it will lead to constant irritation and frequent punitive expeditions" (cit. by: [Colvin, 1897, p. 859-860]).

O. Colvin considered far-fetched disputes between supporters of the "forward policy" and the" closed border", as diametrically opposed strategies for ensuring the security of the borders of British India. "The opinion of a soldier on such subjects today will be expressed by a statesman tomorrow." Military experience makes it necessary to interfere in the internal affairs of "rebellious thugs and bandits". It confirmed the common opinion of the Pathans of all those Europeans who had ever dealt with them. "Their tribal organization, their fanaticism, treachery, and past history... they are combined with difficulties that hinder all those who invade their harsh and inconvenient country, and do not allow us to expect in the future a more hospitable and peaceful possession of our roads and military garrisons, our telegraph and postal communications " [Colvin, 1897, p. 861-862]. The British author emphasized the fundamental impossibility of peaceful relations with the mountain tribes. In 1876, R. Sandeman, a political agent of the Indian government, entered into an agreement with ha-

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nom Baloch agreement establishing a British agency in Quetta. But already in 1877, the British representative in Quetta, L. Hewson, was killed, and the agency was liquidated. Only by 1890 did British forces complete the "regularization" of control over Balochistan.

The author recognized the constant growth of the Indian government's spending on "forward policy" since 1876, which reached its maximum value in 1897. He estimated the cost of establishing a regular service to Chitral alone in 1895 at 25 lakh rupees (£250,000). Such excessive military spending is a threat to India's internal stability. Raising taxes on salt and on the lands of Marathas and Sikhs to pay for the needs of Muslims in Waziristan and Chitral, according to the author, is contrary to political morality and common sense. Unlike the capture of Upper Burma, the annexation of Chitral will never make up for the money spent (Colvin, 1895, p. 885).

But Colvin opposes the false " security economy." The abandonment of military expeditions and peaceful relations with the tribes do not mean reducing the costs of the frontier administration. British residents will continue to spend heavily on tribal subsidies and gifts to chieftains, on maintaining the police, repairing roads, bridges, hospitals, etc. At the same time, payments of British subsidies are the legal basis for violating tribal autonomy, access to their territory, and interference in their internal affairs. Violation of autonomy is the usual result of tribal internecine wars, "the usual results in a tribal country on its own borders "(Colvin, 1895, p. 871, 885).

The author considers it necessary to reduce the external security expenditures of the Indian Government by proportionally increasing them in the budgets of the native principalities. The Raja of Kashmir paid for the accommodation of British residents in Hunza and Nagar. The troops of other princes are more preferably employed in the frontier service on the Indian frontier than in other parts of the British Empire that are remote from India and do not face external threats to their security. It is characteristic that, unlike mountain tribes, Colvin does not consider autonomous principalities as possible sources of threats to Indian security [Colvin, 1895, p. 863].

Simultaneously with O. Colvin's article, in October 1897, the "Ninth Century" published L. Griffin's article " The Failure "of the forward "Frontier Policy". Since 1880, the author served as Secretary of the Punjab Administration, combining it with the posts of chief political agent in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan and president of the Border Militia and Defense Committee. He outlined the position of the civil administration and rather sharply criticized the military for its desire for risky and expensive operations, as the only way to ensure the security of the northwestern frontier. The author defends the merits of the "closed border" policy and non-interference in the internal affairs of tribes.

L. Griffin analyzed the negative impact that the Chitral expedition had on British interaction with tribes on the northwestern frontier of India. The author argued that the invasion of Chitral was the reason for the "collapse" of the entire system of interaction between the British administration and the Pashtun tribes. Such an ill-conceived and overly aggressive "forward policy" was one of the main reasons for the uprising of the tribes of the Malakand Basin and Swat Valley, which began on July 17, 1897.

The command of the Anglo-Indian forces considered the expensive Chitral expedition the only way to prevent the hypothetical passage of Russian troops through the Hindu Kush. In this operation, the Anglo-Indian troops demonstrated good training, bravery, enthusiasm and speed in crossing the high mountain passes. The author believed that Sikhs, Gurkhas and Pathans were superior to the Rus-

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they are equal in their intelligence, and equal in their tenacity. But "nevertheless, the Chitral policy is a failure and our success is a Pyrrhic victory." The Indian government spent $ 20 million on all military operations. rupees (2 million pounds). Such extraordinary spending has created a situation where " for India, financial disorganization is more dangerous than Russian ambitions." To prevent budget deficits, the Indian government was forced to cut spending on administrative management and public works.

Griffin doubted the strategic value of Chitral, as "the idea of a Russian invasion through one of the northern passes is fantastic and chimerical." The high mountain ranges are difficult to traverse, and besides, snow blocks traffic through the passes six months of the year. A small population in the barren valleys can provide food for at best "several hundred Cossacks". Even if the "Cossacks" invade Chitral in the summer, they will not be able to retreat in the winter and will be "imprisoned", after which they will inevitably surrender or starve to death [Griffin, 1895, p. 981-982; 1897, p. 510].

According to Griffin, an effective border policy required "a well-balanced mind... a proper sense of proportion" in the use of military force and did not involve the use of a "sledgehammer" of regular troops to kill "mosquitoes", i.e. tribes. The defense of the Punjab, the "main gate of India", did not require the deployment of troops on all mountain passes and continuous military operations. Under the principle of a "closed border", Anglo-Indian troops conducted expeditions only as a punishment for individual tribes for certain specific hostile actions. In each case of a highland raid on Indian territory or looting of a caravan, a decision was made either on economic sanctions, i.e. on a blockade and termination of trade, or on an expedition against a certain "aggressive tribe". Such one-off military operations were "cheaper and more effective" than any long-term military campaign. Griffin estimated that the funds spent on the expedition to Chitral would be enough for 20 routine raids by Punjab border troops.

The highlanders themselves took the occasional military operations of the Anglo-Indian troops quite calmly, as well as the usual raids of their neighbors, and this did not spoil the British relations with the tribes as a whole. The British administration did not interfere in tribal internecine wars, and therefore British prestige and reputation did not suffer from the constant quarrels of "rogue leaders". Griffin himself personally maintained friendly relations with Mehtar Chitral Amman al-Mulk, a "fierce old savage", although he once refused two slave girls sent to him as a gift (Griffin, 1895, p. 984).

Expeditions to punish" guilty "tribes were the "ordinary work" of the Punjab Frontier Forces, which were subordinate to the Lieutenant governor of the province and collectively numbered 12 thousand soldiers recruited from the local population, Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs, Nepalese Gurkhas and Afghan Pathans. Only in the Peshawar district was a British regular regiment stationed. The author emphasized that the "independent Highlanders" in the British service were distinguished by loyalty, discipline and high combat qualities. So, in 1874, 732 Afridi, 333 Orakzai and Mohmanda were recruited for British service in the territory of the tribes, of which only 27 deserted. "In wars, the sense of military honor and loyalty among these mountaineers is very strong and they did not hesitate to fight even against their fellow tribesmen" (Griffin, 1897, p. 511).

In the absence of a real Russian threat, the "extravagant political adventures" of the command of the Anglo-Indian troops led to the need for the advanced posts to be located in a hostile environment, in which it was extremely difficult to ensure their safety. "Conflict, violence, and murder are unforgettable features of governance in a mountainous country, as they are in every country where society is still on the rise."-

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It is at a primitive stage of development, and there can be no question of higher ethical laws in any situation." It was only possible to ensure the safety, or at least the evacuation, of the British garrison from Chitral if a high-altitude road was built from the Indian border to this protectorate.

But, according to Griffin, this " military road will turn neutral tribes into hostile ones." The peace relations between the British and the Afridi were already significantly damaged by the information that appeared about the project to build a railway from Mishni to Lalpura along the northern bank of the Kabul River. The new, cheaper and faster trade route threatened to end the caravan trade through the Khyber Pass and deprive the Afridians of British subsidies for its protection. The author argued that the security of the northwestern frontier can be ensured only if the interests of the tribes are taken into account and their internal self-government is guaranteed. "Afridians love fighting, but they love money even more, and the reason for their decision to risk their lives and subsidies must be rooted in their internal affairs... The Afridians are savages, but this does not mean that they are fools; they clearly see that the policy of conducting military roads through independent territories, even if they lie outside their immediate borders, can lead to their isolation and seriously threaten their independence " [Griffin, 1895, p. 981,985-987; Griffin, 1897, p. 510].

Griffin argued that to ensure the strategic security of India's northwestern frontier, it is not necessary to build roads through mountain valleys and passes. To do this, it is enough to have an advanced British garrison in Gilgit, which the Punjab border force can easily defend with the help of troops of the loyal Raja of Kashmir. To secure British interests in Chitral, it is quite sufficient to appoint an agent from the local Muslim clergy who has the necessary sources of information and authority [Griffin, 1895, p. 990].

L. Griffin emphasized that the reason for the success of the Punjab government's policy in the "tribal belt" was its flexibility, pragmatism and rejection of the initially set abstract schemes. By creating a system of control over this region, the British promptly abandoned any dogmas and principles, making a separate decision on a case-by-case basis, depending on the situation. He refers to the successful experience of protecting the border from Kashmir to Sindh by R. Sandeman with the help of volunteers recruited from Baloch tribes. He was able to rely on the oligarchic rule of the leaders, which turned into a natural channel of communication with their tribesmen and an effective means of control [Griffin, 1897, p. 513].

This economical and efficient border policy ended when the Punjab Border Force was subordinated directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in 1886. Griffin believed that the British generals Donald Stewart, Redvers Buller, and the staff officers in Calcutta did not know the conditions of service in the mountains and could not respond quickly and adequately to changes in the situation. Against the small mountain tribes, regular troops numbering up to 60 thousand people began to be put forward, which would be enough to repel the invasion of the army of any European power. "Annoying intervention measures... beyond any reasonable proportion " led to a waste of funds and to the general indignation of the tribes. In Griffin's opinion, the permanent military posts at Kurama and Samana were completely in vain. These costly fortifications are isolated by hostile tribes, and serve 36 Sikhs who do not know the local languages and customs. These posts can be besieged and captured at any time, which will give the Highlanders an idea of the military weakness of the British and completely discredit them. Such outposts "in peacetime are completely useless for all the purposes of civilization, they constantly require valuable troops and this is the cause of chronic irritation and discontent. In wartime, they will require an army to save them."

page 43
For Griffin, the central tenet of frontier warfare was that "there should be no military post that is not capable of reliable defense or quick rescue." Such static posts deprived the British troops of freedom of maneuver and made the defense of the frontier extremely unreliable. "In the old days, when tribes raided our territory, we punished them wherever and whenever we wanted. We were not so foolish as to play their game, to give them all the initiative, to give them the opportunity to concentrate their forces against isolated positions that we were forced to defend, moving troops into uninhabited wild mountains during the hottest and most unhealthy time of the year that the tribes naturally choose for their campaigns "[Griffin, 1897, p. 514].

Thus, in the course of intensive discussions in the last third of the nineteenth century, British administrators and experts were able to form a fairly effective model of imperial security policy in the "tribal belt" on the northwestern frontier of British India. In the context of increased Russian expansion in Central Asia, British politicians, officials and intellectuals were able to adequately assess the degree of increasing threats to the security of this "Achilles heel" of the British Empire. In general, we should note the decline in alarmism in the British establishment and the growing understanding of the impossibility of a direct invasion of the Russian army on the territory of India. At the same time, all British authors were aware of the high probability of destabilization of the situation in Afghanistan and especially in the area of Pashtun tribes, which the Afghan Emir practically did not control. Despite minor differences in details, British experts agreed that the creation of a security system on the Indo-Afghan border is possible only if the aggressive "forward policy" is abandoned, the inviolability of the territory is respected, and tribal self-government is guaranteed.

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Novitsky V. F. Voennye ocherki Indii [Military Essays of India]. St. Petersburg, 1901.

Tikhonov Yu. N. "New offensive policy" against Pashtun tribes (1922-1945) // East (Oriens). 2003. N 4.

Hopkirk P. The Big Game against Russia: Asiatic Syndrome, Moscow: RIPOL CLASSIC, 2004.
Churchill W. S. India, Sudan, South Africa. Campaigns of the British Army, 1897-1900. Moscow: EKSMO Publishing House, 2004.

Colvin A. Indian Frontiers and Indian Finance // The Nineteenth Century. November 1895.

Curzon G.N. Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question. L., 1889.

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Griffin L. The Breakdown of "Forward" Policy // The Nineteenth Century. June 1897.

Roberts. Forty-One Years in India. From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief. L., 1900.

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