At the Battle of Sedan (September 1, 1870), the French army was defeated by the Germans. Napoleon III was captured. The news of the Sedan crash shocked France. Two more days passed, and the Second Empire fell. "Everything collapsed at once," wrote P. Merime. A republic was proclaimed. The people celebrated the overthrow of the hated regime. However, taking advantage of the situation, power was usurped by bourgeois Republicans and Orleanists-supporters of the constitutional monarchy, whose leaders declared themselves the "government of national defense". General Trochu became its head, and the Orleanists took over the posts of Minister of War and Navy. The bourgeois Republicans " managed to get the portfolios of ministers: Jules Favre-foreign affairs, Gambetta-Internal affairs, Picard-finance, Simon-education, etc.

The machinations of Jules Favre and his colleagues were primarily aimed at preventing workers from running the country. We must "save France" from the social explosion that threatens it,they kept repeating. Of course, then it was said in a narrow circle. And in official declarations intended for the broad masses, bourgeois ministers portrayed themselves as adherents of progress and democratic freedoms, unyielding fighters for the honor of the motherland and its territorial integrity. They called for unity and harmony of the interests of all sectors of society in the face of an external enemy - Prussia, whose troops were moving on Paris. We will not give up "a single inch of our land, not a single stone of our fortresses," the Foreign Minister's circular said on September 6.

At first, the majority of the people accepted statements of this kind on faith1 . The ordinary Frenchman didn't know much

1 Many leaders of revolutionary organizations and groups, not sharing this naive confidence and reminding them of their vigilance against the bourgeois Republicans, nevertheless found it necessary to support them. This was, for example, according to-

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about the political past of Favre, Simon and other new ministers who in 1848 insisted on the massacre of Parisian workers, and later groveled before Louis-Bonaparte. Favre's clever move was to include the talented publicist A. Rochefort, who had just been released from prison and was popular for denouncing the clique of Napoleon III, in the cabinet. Favre therefore decided that it was better to have Rochefort "inside the government than outside it." Another notable figure among the ministers was the ambitious and energetic Gambetta. He sincerely hoped that France would be able to resist the foreign invasion. General Jules Trochu had a reputation for bravery and intelligence. It was he who, three years before the Franco-Prussian war began, published a book in which he revealed some of the shortcomings of the French military machine, and in mid-August 1870 recommended that the emperor concentrate troops near Paris, however, not so much to prevent new defeats in the war, but in order to save the dynasty and curb the capital's " rabble"2 . An ardent monarchist Trochu assured of his loyalty to the republic after September 4. But most notably, this general was a staunch defeatist. "All is lost," he said in a panic on August 18; "it would be sheer madness to attempt to withstand the siege of Paris," Trochu replied to a question from his colleagues on the first day of the proclamation of the republic.

Trochu assigned General Ducrot to command the "regular" troops in the Paris area. The bourgeois press described Ducrot's daring escape from German captivity in every possible way. But the main feature of this man was something else: he was burning with hatred for the Parisian workers, he wanted to drown the impending revolution in blood. With rare exceptions, other Bonapartist generals appointed to positions of responsibility in the capital and provinces "shone" with the same qualities. "The French generals,"wrote a Russian journalist," have maintained their routine and persistently confirm public opinion in their incapacity, cowardice, or treachery. " 3
Those who seized key positions in the political and military leadership of the country were alien to genuine patriotism, they were preparing to collude with the Prussians. True, the bourgeois leaders had to disguise their true goals, because, as Trochu admitted, "if at that moment the government decided to declare that it intended to make peace..., it would be swept away within an hour." 4 In his lengthy and pompous proclamations and speeches, Trochu spoke about the defense of the fatherland. The official press supported his duplicitous assurances with arguments about the commander's remarkable strategic talents: he had already prepared a "plan" that ensured the salvation of the capital and the entire country.

By the time of the collapse of the empire, the army of the former French commander-in-chief, Marshal Bazin, was blockaded in Metz; the garrisons of Strasbourg and a number of other cities and fortresses were surrounded. At the disposal of the new authorities were two regiments withdrawn from Rome, and several more units that made up the XIII and XIV corps. Together with the sailors deployed to Paris, the number of these regular troops reached 80-90 thousand. 5 In addition, 90 mobile battalions (over 100 thousand), formed earlier in the province, were stationed in the capital. Trochu's reserve included the Paris National Guard and volunteer detachments of "free riflemen" (up to 350,000 by October 1870).

The military training and discipline of the Mobiles and especially the National Guardsmen left much to be desired. It was soon discovered that the sons of aristocrats and shopkeepers were not eager to get into the line of fire. On October 11, the English liberal publicist G. Labouchere noted the contrast between the bourgeois, who "defends only his shop" and is already "tired of war", and the worker, who is full of self-confidence and capable of self-sacrifice. "The working man," he wrote, " is the only reality among the depraved and relaxed-

the Blanquist tradition (see M. Dommanget. Blanqui. La Guerre de 1870 - 71 et la Commune. P. 1947, pp. 27 - 28).

2 After becoming Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Paris, Trochu proclaimed: "Whatever I can do to prevent a revolution, I will do." Cit. by: M. Shur". Paris was betrayed. M. 1961, p. 55.

3 "Bulletin of Europe", 1870, N 11, p. 472.

4 "Journal, officieb, 3.VII.1871.

5 In a recent study, the figure is 106 thousand (M. Howard. The Franco-Prussia War. L. 1961, p. 320).

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they are deceivers " 6 . In general, Trochu had a considerable number of men under arms. It was, in the words of F. Engels, "excellent material"; on its basis, a combat-ready army could be created in a short time 7 . But Trochu and Favre were extremely suspicious of the proletarian core of the National Guard. Therefore, for a long time she was denied combat weapons (instead of Chaspo guns, she was equipped with outdated Tabatier muskets) and deliberately condemned to forced inactivity. Meanwhile, it was the workers who were the best defenders of the city. In the words of a Russian journalist, they are "every single person more likely to be blown up than to give up." 8
And Paris in 1870 was a magnificent fortress. It was surrounded by an earthen rampart more than a hume high with numerous bastions. A three-meter ditch was dug in front of the rampart. And the main defense force of the capital was 15 forts, built at a distance of 1.5 to 4.5 km outside the rampart. By the autumn of 1870, after the delivery of heavy naval guns, their total number in the forts and in the entire Paris area exceeded 3 thousand. However, there was an acute shortage of field artillery. So, the Paris fortified area was a very impressive obstacle to Prussian aggression. It could not only bind large enemy forces, but also be a springboard for a serious counteroffensive. Highly appreciating the role of the fortifications of Paris, F. Engels wrote on September 7, 1870, that they were "adapted not so much for passive as for active defense." 9 The first condition for success in the struggle for the capital and France was to be the firm will of the new state and military leadership.

The fall of the empire alarmed Bismarck, Moltke, and Wilhelm I. The revolutionary traditions of the French proletariat terrified them. The Prussian First Minister remarked on September 12 that peace was still a long way off .10 "The war is just beginning," the Prussian king echoed Bismarck. In mid-September, the 3rd and 4th German armies approached Paris and circled it from the north and south. On September 20, the ring of encirclement closed at Saint-Germain. The Prussian troops that surrounded the city numbered up to 150 thousand people. Moltke's headquarters did not plan any assault on Paris (the bourgeois ministers only frightened the citizens and themselves with the upcoming assault).

The events of September 16-21 allow us to understand the true intentions of the Trochu government and the methods by which it was going to "fight". Nothing was done to take advantage of the advantageous position of Paris at a time when German units were moving cautiously in the vicinity of its forts. Only on September 19 did Ducrot attempt to gain a foothold on the Chatillon plateau, which dominated the southern forts. Not believing in the success of even this operation, which had a limited purpose, Trochu provided him with a small force. The capitulators were much more interested in the outcome of another maneuver. On September 18, Favre secretly went to Bismarck. Although the first attempt at collusion did not lead to a truce, the chosen course was not changed in October.

Since early September, France's democratic press has been sounding the alarm, emphasizing that Paris is ill-prepared for a prolonged siege. The population of the city, together with military personnel and refugees from the surrounding area and eastern regions, exceeded 2 million people. The Government did not take any measures to evacuate the population. The problem of food supply was becoming one of the central ones. Officials made optimistic statements about the large stocks of flour and grain in warehouses, and boasted that since the end of August, flocks of sheep have been driven to Paris parks. But how were these resources spent? Even before the siege began, the socialists and the left press demanded the strictest control over prices and food distribution, expropriating all supplies, while Trochu limited himself to belatedly requisitioning grain (some of it, however, was hidden by wholesalers). There was a mouth-

6 H. Labouchere. Diary of the Besieqed Resident in Paris. L. 1871, pp. 95, 100 - 101.

7 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 17, p. 250.

8 "Scenes from life in a besieged city". "Nedelya", 8 (20). X. 1870, p. 1320.

9 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 17, p. 87.

10 M. Busch. Bismarck und seine Leute. B. 1940, S. 83, 88.

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the meat delivery rate has also been updated 11 . Food prices were skyrocketing. "High prices and endless queues have become the only effective method of rationing,"writes A. Horn. As the Russian weekly reported, many rich people, who "hastily forgot" even about their military service, 13 "hurried to get out of Paris in advance."

Going through hardships and adversities, Parisians did not lose their spirits. The siege did not paralyze the cultural life of the city. In October, performances in theaters resumed, and classical music concerts in the circus premises were very popular. Performances were often preceded by speeches on the topic of the day. So, one of the speakers under the friendly laughter of the audience said:: "Alas, Parisian cuisine has lost its high style and traditions" 14 . On the Quai de la Seine, people were still crowding the second-hand bookstores, new books were being printed, and newspapers were in great demand, and the number of them had increased markedly. Advanced proletarians and progressive intellectuals exposed alarmists who spread various rumors. In Paris, the music of German composers continued to be played; a large cannon, cast with money collected by the artists, was called "Beethoven", and one of the balloons was called"Union of Peoples". Inventions and military-technical innovations could play a huge role in the fight against the enemy. A lot of them were made. So, the forts were equipped with a searchlight; chemists and food specialists mastered the production of a new food product from bones and gelatin. However, the authorities and the" Scientific Committee " were not very enthusiastic about many, even very effective proposals. An informed journalist sadly stated: "The government doesn't want to know about new inventions." 15
From the first days of the siege, a stable connection between the capital and the province became very important. Attempts to establish it failed: a cable laid along the bottom of the Seine was discovered by the enemy; zinc containers with mail sent downstream also did not reach the addressees. Balloons were used more successfully. The first of them took off from Paris on September 23 and landed in unoccupied territory. A few days later, Parisians were happy to read the official announcement of the establishment of the "air mail". There were less than a dozen usable balloons in the city at that time. But thanks to the dedicated work of women workers, technicians and engineers, the production of new balloons in special rooms soon began in full swing. Each ball received a special name. On October 7, a huge crowd gathered in the Place Saint-Pierre, saw off the balloon "Armand Barbe", in the basket of which was together with the pilot of the Minister of the Interior Gambetta. His flight was caused by the need to put one of the leading figures at the head of the Tura "branch" of the government. Trochu said that the presence of his commander-in-chief in Paris does not need proof. Favre, who was too scared, also chose not to take any chances. Only Gambetta readily agreed. After experiencing several dangerous adventures in flight, he safely reached Mondidier. When he arrived in Tours, he did a lot to help mobilize forces to fight the Prussians.

During the siege of Paris, according to J. Brunel's calculations, 65 balloons with 164 passengers and 10,675 tons of cargo flew out, and only 5 balloons did not reach the target. The return delivery of dispatches from Tours had to be entrusted to carrier pigeons.

The German command, trying to completely isolate Paris, began to adapt cannons to fire balloons, and against pigeons they released specially imported falcons and hawks. It also resorted to disinformation, sending to Paris in December several pigeons captured by them on the balloon "Daguerre" with false news. But the Parisians quickly recognized that the Prussian "ducks"had flown to them.

During the first month of the siege, Trochu maintained a very passive tactic, making only occasional sorties with small forces. The discontent of the residents of the capital grew. "We believed in your famous plan," Lefren wrote on October 20, referring to the mythical "Trochu plan, "" but a long time has passed, and

11 Proposals for an even distribution of food products bourgeois Minister Zh. Ferry dubbed "chimera" and " madness "(M. Howard. Op. cit., p. 326).

12 A. Home. The Fall of Paris. N. Y. 1965, p. 66.

13 "Week", 8 (20), X. 1870, pp. 1316-1317.

14 "Vestnik Evropy", 1871, N 1, p. 427. 15 J. Lefren. Diary of a Parisian. Delo, 1870, No. 12, p. 125.

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we do not see what this plan is, why it is still not being implemented. " 16 At the end of October, a successful attack launched by the Frantirers in the area of the current Le Bourget airfield was drowned in blood due to the betrayal of the command. At the same time, news arrived in Paris of the surrender of Bazaine's army and the pilgrimage of the" king of the capitulators " Thiers to Bismarck. The patriots responded with violent demonstrations, which on October 31 almost overthrew the provisional government of Trochu. Once again, its head had to assure the people that "the governor of Paris will never capitulate", that there will be no humiliating peace.

After the fall of Metz, was there any possibility of turning the tide of the war? Undoubtedly, it still remained, because the nature of the war had changed and the masses of France were fighting the invaders to the death. The left-wing Parisian newspaper Combat advocated partisan raids and actions on enemy communications. "To disturb the Germans everywhere, to interrupt their communications, to destroy bridges and railways, to destroy food and military supplies in their rear ..." 17 - this is F.'s advice. Engels, contained in his article of October 11. In November-December 1870, the raids of the Frantirers took on a significant scale. Patriots inflicted increasingly sensitive blows on the German troops. For example, on November 19, a detachment of R. Garibaldi, the son of a famous Italian revolutionary, defeated a numerically superior Prussian garrison in the upper reaches of the Seine, taking many prisoners. The French also had high hopes for new regular armies being created in the unoccupied zones of the country. The victory of the Loire army at Culmier and the liberation of Orleans (November 9-10) showed that the enemy can be defeated in battles of the "traditional" type.

Perhaps the two main operations could have caused a crisis in the war and cast doubt on the victory of Prussia. The first of them is a purposeful attack aimed at breaking the main German communications from the Moselle River to Versailles. But it was too late for Gambetta to carry out this plan. No less important could be the concerted actions of the Loire army and Trochu's troops, in which Paris, as it were, went on a frontal offensive. On November 23, Engels noted that the German units were in a difficult situation and Moltke, in order to avoid serious complications, was considering lifting the siege of the French capital .18 Materials that became known later (the diaries of General Blumenthal and the Crown Prince, Moltke's "War Correspondences", etc.) fully confirmed the validity of Engels ' words.

Let's look at how events unfolded. General d'Aurelle, who led the army of the Loire as well as Trochu, showed a rare indecision in critical days that bordered on treachery. Trochu himself put off breaking through for a long time. Until November 24, he kept Gambetta in the dark about where and when this breakthrough would take place. [19 ] Finally, on November 30, Ducrot launched an offensive in the Lower Marne area. The German army by that time had built many trenches and other fortifications around Paris, knowing in advance about the main direction of the French breakthrough. Ducrot had at his disposal an army of one hundred thousand men and a field artillery that had been replenished by that time (many cannons had already been cast in Paris, mainly with funds raised by the population by subscription and intended for the National Guard), which caused the Prussians "considerable embarrassment"20 . In the Prussian headquarters, the prospects for lifting the blockade of Paris were again discussed. However, there was no turning point in the war. "I will return victorious or die," Ducrot vowed on November 28. The general survived, but did not achieve victory. December 3

16 J. Lefren. Op. op. "Delo", 1870, N 11, p. 106.

17 K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 17, p. 130. F. Engels also wrote about the conditions under which "popular resistance" can radically change the picture of war in the article "Military situation in France "(see ibid., p. 188).

18 Ibid., p. 183.

19 In a dispatch received in Paris on November 18, Gambetta recommended a breakthrough to the south, but did not object to a strike to the northwest (which Ducrot was preparing). If only Trochu's troops would start real combat operations! On November 24, a communications officer who was privy to all the secrets of Ducrot's planned offensive took off from Paris in the City of Orleans balloon. But the balloon landed in Norway.

20 "Conversations about the Franco-Prussian War", Otechestvennye Zapiski, 1871, No. 2, p. 264.

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Trochu ordered a retreat, although the outcome of the battle was not yet decided. Generals, Lefren wrote, "stop the rush of troops and cool their ardent enthusiasm again." 21
Trochu's move to the defensive added to the gravity of Paris ' situation. A famine was beginning in the city 22 . First of all, the poorest segments of the population suffered severely from the lack and high cost of food. At the same time, rich idlers continued to hold Lucullus ' feasts. Even the reactionary chronicler F. Sarsay admitted that the well-to-do citizens did not feel hungry. And they didn't have a hard time without fuel and warm clothes when severe frosts hit in December. But it was the bourgeoisie and the nobility who were inclined to capitulate. "Our bourgeoisie," one of our contemporaries noted, " is weak and tries to intimidate courageous people. The newspapers devoted to her do not stop... cowardly talk of a truce." However, "the workers from the suburbs are still determined to hold firm until the last possible moment." 23
The prolonged campaign caused growing irritation among the Prussians. Bismarck hastened the end of the war, fearing the intervention of other powers .24 He authorized a new and brutal crackdown on French patriots. On December 17, the German command decided to launch a bombardment of Paris. After the first fire raids on Mont Avron (December 27), from January 5, 1871, Prussian artillery began to bombard the southern forts and residential areas of the city. The guns were installed on the Chatillon plateau. From here, for the most part at night, the Prussians fired on the city, not sparing the hospitals.

Even in this tragic situation, the Parisians continued their heroic resistance. The counter-battery fire of the French artillery was effective. Residents of the city bravely endured the shelling. For example, a history teacher at the Collège de France calmly suggested to the audience after a nearby shell explosion: "If it doesn't bother you, gentlemen, let's continue!"

Meanwhile, the big French bourgeoisie and its political leaders, the members of the government who were in Paris, finally slipped down the path of treachery. "Why are you inactive?" - Gambetta asked Favre on January 13, urging him to organize a mass sortie against the enemy on January 25 . Gambetta was wrong: Favre and Trochu were not idle. They planned to expose the National Guard units to attack during the sortie, draining them of blood on the eve of the expected class battles. Their main plan was to convince the population that a breakthrough of the Prussian lines was impossible, that there was no other way out but a truce. "Public opinion will not calm down until 10 thousand National guardsmen fall on the battlefield," one of the ministers argued at a meeting on January 16. The ill-prepared attack at Busenval on January 19 was indeed accompanied by heavy losses. And then Trochu, refusing to throw the reserves into battle, ordered: "Let's stop the battle, they (the National Guardsmen. - K. V.) have already been killed enough!" 26 .

On January 22, having barely suppressed another "mutiny", Favre and the new commander Vinois decided to immediately begin negotiations for surrender. The bourgeois ministry at the time of the siege of Paris was called a" government of national weakening " by the democratic publicist Jean-Claude Juncker. Lefren, others called it the "government of national defeat". "The government of national treason" - this is the famous and much clearer assessment given by Karl Marx. Reactionary politicians, memoirists, and historians have been trying in vain for a hundred years to "forget" it!

On January 28, 1871, Favre signed the terms of the armistice proposed by Bismarck at Versailles. But neither Favre nor Bismarck dared to include in the surrender agreement a clause to disarm the National Guard. The will of the working people of France to fight for freedom, for a better life, for the honor and independence of the motherland was not broken. The great days of the Paris Commune were coming.

21 J. Lefren. Op. op. "Delo", 1871, No. 1, p. 39.

22 After there were no sheep or horses left in the city, other animals went to eat, including kangaroos, camels, and two elephants from the zoological garden. An American observer estimated that 5,000 cats and 1,200 dogs were eaten.

23 J. Lefren. Op. op. "Delo", 1870, N 12, p. 113.

24 O. Bismarck. Gesamraeite Werke. Bd. VI b. B. 1931, N 1933.

25 "Lettres de Gambetta 1868 - 1882". P. 1938, N 109.

26 M. Shuri. Op. ed., pp. 164, 166.

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