R. NAZAREWICZ. Razem na iajnym froncie. Polsko - radzieckie wspoldzialanie wywiadowcze w latach II wojny swiatowe., Warszawa. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. 1983. 340 str.

R. NAZAREVICH. Together on the secret front. Polish-Soviet intelligence cooperation during World War II.

R. NAZAREWICZ. Drogi do wyzwolenia. Koncepcje walki z okupantem w Polsce i ich tresci polityczne 1939 - 1945. Warszawa. Wydawnictwo Ksiezka i Wiedza". 1979. 554 str.

R. NAZAREVICH. Paths to liberation. Concepts of the struggle against the invaders in Poland and their political content in 1939-1945.

The reviewed books of R. Nazarevich, a prominent Polish historian of the Second World War, are distinguished by a wide coverage of factual material, an in-depth study of the cardinal political and military issues of Poland's participation in the war against Hitler's Germany, the struggle of the Polish people together with its closest ally-the Soviet people - for the liberation of the country, for a new, truly popular Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for the defeat of the ancestral enemy Poland - German militarism and expansionism, for establishing fair, ethnographically and historically justified borders of the country and for entering it into an objectively necessary, in the author's opinion, historical alliance with the Soviet country, "which was created not so much by state-legal acts as by the consenting actions of millions of people who were ready to make the greatest sacrifices in order to achieve a common goal" ("Together on the Secret Front", p. 6) 1 .

1 See also Soviet studies on this issue: Klokov V. I. The struggle of the peoples of Slavic countries against the fascist enslavers (1939-1945). Kiev. 1961; Anti-fascist Resistance Movement in Europe during the Second World War. Moscow, 1962; Anti-fascist popular uprisings. Moscow, 1965; Gavrilenko I. P. Against the common enemy. From the history of the struggle of the Soviet and Polish peoples against German fascism and militarism, for freedom and independence of Poland. L. 1967; Zuev F. G. Polish people in the fight against fascism. M. 1967; Semiryaga M. I. Soviet people in European Resistance. M. 1970; Klokov V. I. World-historical feat. Kyiv. 1975; The Soviet Union and the struggle of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe for freedom and independence. 1941-1945 Moscow, 1978; Parsada-

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The objective necessity of an alliance between Poland and the USSR is not only the main scientific conclusion, but also the basis of the problems of Nazarevich's books, which makes them very important and relevant, especially in view of the attempts made in 1980 - 1981 by imperialist and counter-revolutionary forces to falsify Polish History during the Second World War and the political rehabilitation of organizations and their actions, including armed struggle, hindered the formation of the Soviet-Polish union in every possible way, which objectively delayed the defeat of the common enemy and the liberation of the country.

R. Nazarevich, based on historical facts and documents, shows that for almost the entire period of Hitler's occupation of Poland, the "London Government", the Union of Armed Struggle (SVB), the Home Army (AK) and other bourgeois-landowner organizations primarily advocated the restoration of a reactionary capitalist state, waged a fierce class struggle for power, while the Polish Workers ' Party (LGBTQ) and other organizations of the The Party, Ludov's Guard, and Ludov's Army waged a genuine national liberation and popular struggle to save the country.

R. Nazarevich's book "Paths to Liberation"is particularly important in this regard. In it, the author notes that in the conditions when at the end of 1939 the masses of the working people "were dominated by a feeling of hatred for the former ruling camp and everything connected with it" (p. 23), bourgeois Polish propaganda launched the main campaign around the question of the liberation campaign of the Soviet troops, which began on September 17, 1939, and which As the author rightly emphasizes, "I also took into account the desire of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples to reunite in their own state" (p.24). In particular, he points to the diary entry of the chief of intelligence of the London headquarters of the Polish troops dated July 4, 1940: "Another group called for starting negotiations with Germany through the mediation of Italy on the platform of joint participation in the war against the USSR. The defenders of this concept are representatives of the aristocratic spheres, landlords and the Polish plutocracy, but not a few of them are military and diplomats " (p. 26). Nazarevich also mentions one of the first strategic developments of the Polish General Staff (which was still in France at that time), dated May 15, 1940, signed by the Chief of this staff, A. A. Kolesnikov. During the Spanish Civil War, he was a Polish military observer at Franco's headquarters, which provided for "organizing sabotage actions on the territory of the USSR, especially inciting interethnic conflicts in Ukraine, Crimea, the Caucasus, and Turkestan", and launching propaganda against the USSR under the slogans of " restoring private property rights and religious freedom.""creating a military threat in the border areas of the USSR" was prescribed (p. 39).

Nazarevich recalls that on September 29, 1940, after the defeat of France and in anticipation of the war between Germany and the USSR, Rovetsky ("Grot"), who has recently been strongly described by some as a" patriot"," wise politician"," thunderstorm of the Germans "and" fighter for the freedom of Poland", handed over to his subordinates he gave the following order to the underground groups of the SVB on Soviet territory: "In the event of the advance of Soviet troops to the west, you must be ready, on my special order, to start a mass sabotage and guerrilla war, taking into account first of all the lines of communications, bridges and railway and highway junctions, as well as the material reserves of the Soviet troops" (p. 42). And Sosnkovsky, who commanded the SVB at that time, sought to activate intelligence against the USSR, demanded the transfer of conscripts of Polish nationality from Soviet territory to occupied Poland "even if they were threatened with being sent to work in Germany" (p. 43).

In his book "Together on the Secret Front", R. Nazarevich, describing the intelligence cooperation of Polish citizens - not only communists, but also mostly just true patriots of their homeland-with Soviet intelligence agencies in the period 1939-1941, shows its class-conscious character by numerous examples, gives numerous examples of courage and heroism, personal qualities and personal qualities. individual initiatives of ordinary people and patriotic organizations.

nova V. S. Soviet-Polish Relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Moscow, 1982; Semiryaga M. I. The struggle of the peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe against German-fascist oppression, Moscow, 1985.

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Along with this, Nazarevich provides documentary evidence in the book that even after the signing of the Soviet-Polish Union treaty on July 30, 1941, and in violation of it, the SVB and the bourgeois reaction in Poland continued to "fight the Soviets", not only prohibiting Poles from cooperating with Soviet intelligence groups and partisan detachments, but also trying to hinder their activities - this was at a time when they themselves did not conduct any real armed struggle against the invaders.

By virtue of the Soviet-Polish military agreement of August 14, 1941, official cooperation in the field of military intelligence was also assumed, and the author cites some facts of such cooperation, which the Soviet side tried to develop in the common interests. But he points out the blatant sabotage of this issue by the staffs of Sikorsky, Sosnkovsky, Grotrowiecki, and Anders, and, moreover,the actual brutal and anti-national struggle against the Poles, especially by officers who participated in the war with the common enemy in the ranks of Soviet intelligence. So, already on September 9, 1941, Sikorsky's order was transmitted to Grotrovetsky by a radio message "to suppress by all means - up to and including the death penalty - persons who cooperate with Soviet intelligence on the territory of Poland." The class interpretation of" allied loyalty "and" treaty loyalty " was obvious. Anders ' headquarters transmitted data on Polish officers who had joined the Soviet Army to Grot-Rovetsky in occupied Poland, and the counterintelligence of the SVB and Home Army tracked them down in Poland, then ensuring the success of more than one operation of the Hitlerite services against Poles-Soviet intelligence officers, patriots, communists-by treacherously betraying them to the Germans. "In some cases, arrests were also the result of direct denunciations to the Gestapo, which they did not even try to hide in reports to higher authorities" (p.104).

Nazarevich writes that Rovetsky on June 22, 1942 radioed to London the following:: "The struggle for independence is moving into a phase of struggle with Russia, the new occupier, the main enemy." These are the words of a Pole who fancied himself a politician and military leader from Warsaw, which was shot by the Nazis. He allowed an armed uprising in Poland against Hitler's troops "only if they concede to the preponderance of the Anglo-Saxons and begin to withdraw from the occupied territories" (p.114). All this made Rovetsky and others like him political and potentially military allies of Hitler, and it is not surprising that even the ruling conservative circles of Great Britain dissociated themselves from such "Polish" plans to actually betray the anti-Hitler coalition.

Despite this, Grotrovetsky confirmed his concept in a radio message to London on June 8, 1943 (p. 123). He announced his intentions to launch sabotage, subversive and even open armed actions of AK units against the advancing Soviet Army almost from the Dnieper line. "We will never know what General Sikorski's reaction would have been to this plan to prepare for the Polish-Soviet war. The decoding of the plan was completed in London on June 22, 1943, at a time when Sikorsky had already been in the Middle East since May 25" (p.124). The author points out that Sikorsky, a proponent of a more realistic position in relation to the Soviet Union, had many opponents in the London emigrant government, extreme reactionaries led by Sosnovsky, whose pathological anti-Soviet views were almost identical to those of Rovetsky (p.125).

The author emphasizes that these intrigues of Polish reactionaries were carried out even when " along with the wild terror and biological destruction of the Polish people, the Hitlerite authorities intensified the economic plunder of the country... This has led to increasingly frequent cases of famine among the urban population... The conviction grew that the ultimate goal of Hitler's policy was the complete annihilation of the Polish people" (pp. 169-170).

Grot-Rovetsky and AK did everything possible to prevent a popular uprising, a broad partisan war in order to protect the Polish people. The question arises: isn't this what the Nazis were counting on? However, as R. Nazarevich shows, in late 1942-early 1943, the PPR, the Ludow Army, the Khlopske Battalions and other patriotic forces of Poland, together with detachments of Soviet partisans and scouts, began an armed partisan struggle. For AK and the entire "London camp", a real threat of political exposure has been created, as a result of which they are forced to

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They were under pressure from "below", from ordinary members, patriots eager to fight, to adopt the concept of "limited" struggle against the occupier. The echo of Stalingrad roused the masses of Poland.

The author cites numerous evidences that the Abwehr and Hitler's elite knew the balance of forces and figures in the London emigrant government and in the AK command in Warsaw. The mysterious death of Sikorsky, who did not rule out military cooperation with the USSR, in a plane crash over Gibraltar on July 4, 1943, almost automatically promoted Sosnkovsky to the post of commander-in-chief, who completely excluded such cooperation. Goebbels ' earlier provocation using the savage and long-prepared "propaganda bomb" Katyn also served to strengthen anti-Soviet fanatics in the" London camp", whose pathological hatred of the Communists led them to abandon the fight against the Germans. The arrest by the Gestapo of Grottowiecki on June 30, 1943, in addition to a certain demoralization and disorganization of the AK, could also mean an attempt to persuade the Polish bourgeoisie, if not to an open alliance, then at least to secret but direct negotiations with the Hitlerites on an "anti-Bolshevik pact". This was an important moment, especially in the run-up to the Tehran conference, as something that in itself shakes the anti-Hitler coalition. Apparently, the Nazis did not fear changes in the AK strategy, which was justified. Bur-Komorovsky, whose pro-German sympathies were well known, who came to Grot-Rovetsky's place under far-from-clear circumstances, declared on October 14, 1943: "We cannot allow an uprising when Germany... he's still holding the front in the east and covering us on the other side. It is not in our interests to weaken Germany in this particular case." He also believed that a "decisive armed struggle with Russia" was possible (p. 258).

The Abwehr's foresight came true: Sosnkovsky, Boer-Komorowski and others launched such an anti-Soviet campaign that the British government was even forced to close the newspaper of the" London government ""Wiadomsci Polske" for "abusing British hospitality, sowing discord between the Allies and widespread use of this newspaper for German propaganda," explained February 16, 1944 in the House of Commons. British Minister of Information B. Bracken (p.267).

At the same time, the right-wing, pro-Fascist wing of the London camp and the AK, which openly called for an end to the struggle against Germany and for recognition as the main enemies of the USSR and the Polish communists, from April-May 1943 (even under Rovetsky) began extensive armed operations against the revolutionary patriotic forces and Soviet partisans in Poland. The author gives numerous examples of this. Detachments of the "special action" on April 29 attacked the Soviet detachment im. Zhukova in the Bialystok area. On August 9, 1943, such a detachment, on the orders of an officer who arrived from London, brutally executed 32 partisans of the Ludova Army and residents of the village of Borovo in the Lublin region who sympathized with them. In March 1944, 52 members of the PPR and the Ludova Army were brutally killed in the Kielets area, and in April, 19 Soviet partisans were killed in the Krosno area. Listing the bloody atrocities committed by class enemies (pp. 345-359), the author quotes the statement of AK Commander Bur-Komorovsky on August 30, 1943: "The Germans will be brought to order by the Allies, but with the Communists here, at home, we must do it ourselves. Now everything is devoted to the struggle against the Communists, and we should expect that a large-scale action will be taken in the near future " (p. 360).

According to Goebbels 'method, provocative leaflets were also used on behalf of the future" Polish Soviet Republic " about the expropriation of grain for the Soviet Army, about forced collectivization, about the occupation of school buildings, about the beating of priests and the pogrom of churches (p.377).

In the" government " of Polish reactionaries in London, a draft anti-communist law was already prepared, providing for at least 10 years in prison or the death penalty "for belonging to a communist organization or conducting communist propaganda", cadres of the future political police were being prepared, and concentration camps were being designed (p. 379). Comprehensive political and military preparations were made for the bourgeoisie to seize power in the country (pp. 381-384). In Lublin in October 1944. AK planned extermination (prevented by Polish authorities) Polish Committee for National Liberation (PCNO) (p. 408).

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On July 21, 1944, the AK headquarters decided on an armed uprising in occupied Warsaw. Bur-Komorovsky motivated it by "the necessity of launching a political struggle against the USSR", not excluding the "open struggle against the Soviets" (p. 439). The" London government " approved this decision on July 25. The uprising was planned primarily as an act of political demonstration in the struggle for power in the country (pp. 440-443). At the same time, "it was not reported to the country for 9 days that on July 29, the British military authorities refused to provide any assistance to the Warsaw uprising, if it starts. The news of this reached Warsaw only on August 6, 1944" (p. 444). The author emphasizes that the politicians who decided on the uprising knew that it should be primarily political, anti-Soviet in nature and that it would not receive help from the West (ibid.).

Nazarevich thoroughly exposes the lie that the Soviet Army and the Polish People's Army did not want to provide and did not provide all possible military assistance to the Warsaw uprising, bearing in mind its importance for launching a joint armed struggle against a common enemy. The facts presented in the book indisputably prove that it was the sabotage of Soviet aid by the AK command that led to the defeat of the uprising. The uprising began on August 1, and by mid-September, Soviet and Polish troops fought their way to the Vistula River, which was completely shot through by the enemy. In the absence of interaction with the AK headquarters, attempts to cross the river on the move led to huge (87%) losses, a stable connection for interaction between the AK headquarters and the headquarters of the 1st army of the Polish Army was established on September 22. Mass Soviet airdrops of weapons and ammunition were immediately launched, they were conducted from September 13 to September 30 - nevertheless, on September 30, AK Commander Bur-Komorowski, who had already been appointed commander-in-chief of all Polish troops in the West by the London "government", clinked champagne glasses with SS Obergruppenfuhrer von den Bach, with whom he had just met signed the act of surrender of the uprising. 17 thousand rubles. rebel fighters became prisoners of war, 10 thousand died, as well as about 200 thousand civilians, 165 thousand Warsaw residents were taken to work in Germany, 60 thousand were sent to concentration camps, hundreds of thousands fled the city that the Nazis razed to the ground (p.472).

"The tragedy of these victims," writes Nazarevich, " is further enhanced by the fact that they were not - on such a large scale-inevitable. They were the result of the policy of bourgeois "leaders" who were ready to do anything to impose their power on Poland" (p. 473). The tragedy of Poland's victims and losses in the war - 6 million dead (about 20% of the population), 38% of the national treasure (p. 512) - was compounded by the fact that since 1918 the Polish bourgeoisie and landlords, ignoring the interests and security of their own people, in the name of their class rule, tore up all the objectively necessary political, economic, and cultural resources and ethnic ties with the Soviet country, even on the verge of war, in the summer of 1939, rejecting their alliance against the aggressor.

But this vital union was formed in the most difficult, sometimes complex and contradictory struggle - and the topic of how, with what difficulties and achievements this people's union was formed is the basis of R. Nazarevich's research. With authentic historical facts, large and small, the author paints a picture of the emerging military and labor unity, brotherhood in arms of the Soviet and Polish peoples. The historical analysis of all the political forces active in Poland during the Second World War is carried out by him precisely from this, the only scientific point of view. This makes both his books - "Together on the Secret Front" and "Paths to Liberation" - relevant and useful not only for historians, but also for a wide range of readers.

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