Introduction

The modern world is witnessing many new trends in the religious space. These trends lead to a change and transformation of the place of religion on the world stage, and also mark the emergence of a new civilizational constellation.

These trends break down the usual ideas about "religion" and challenge the well-established assumptions of the dominant academic and public discourse until recently, according to which the expansion of modernity, the modernization of societies inevitably and naturally leads to secularization of the world, the weakening of the importance of religion for the dominant worldview and the loss of its central position in public spaces (especially in key modern revolutionary and national states that are institutional carriers of modern programs), followed by the complete withdrawal of religion from the public sphere.

In the first stages of the crystallization of the social and political space after the Second World War, indeed, it seemed that the main trends in the religious spheres of most modern societies gave every reason to agree with the basic assumptions regarding the ongoing coe-

Оригинал см. по изданию Eisenstadt Sh. N. The New Religious Constellations In The Frameworks Of Contemporary Globalization And Civilizational Transformation // World Religions and Multiculturalism (Eds. Ben-Rafael & Sternberg). Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010. P. 21 - 40. The rights to the translation and Russian edition are provided by Koninklijke Brill NV.

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cularization as a typical embodiment of modernization processes. Among the most important trends, we can note the following: first, the increasing crystallization of the religious sphere as only one of the institutional spheres along with all others; second, the loss of religion's dominant position in the constitution of dominant worldviews, especially in comparison with previous periods; third, the weakening of religious authorities and religious practices, accompanied by increasing deritualization and visible desacralization of key spaces, both private and public.

This state of affairs, which marks the apogee of the classical era or classical models of modernity, began to change-slowly at first, and then much faster and more intensively-in the last two or three decades of the twentieth century. These changes were directly related to the beginning - in the West, and then around the world - of a series of processes that were widely revealed in various constellations and led to large-scale changes in religious spheres.

Crystallization of new patterns of religiosity and religious constellations

In the modern world, a new religious constellation is being formed in almost all - and especially in the "world" - religions, although in different concrete forms, characterized, on the one hand, by the multiplication and privatization of religious attitudes, practices and forms of emotionality; the decline of institutional religion; and the development of many new "informal" types of religious attitudes and forms activities, movements, and organizations within, and among, the members of, until recently, the predominant official religious institutions and organizations. On the other hand, this new period is characterized by the activation and transfer of various religious attitudes and forms of activity to various political structures aimed at the constitution of new political identities. Religious identities and practices that in the classical nation-state model were narrowed or squeezed-in theory and to a much lesser extent in practice-into private or secondary semi-public spheres were transferred to national, transnational, and international public spaces (in some cases key ones). Indeed, one of the-

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The most significant trends shaping the political spaces and collective identities of the modern world are the "revival" of religious components-sometimes combined with national and ethnic ones - and their movement to the very center of national and international political activity, to the very center of the constitution of collective identities. At the same time, these trends have dramatically altered the relationship between "local" and "global" contexts, as well as the relationship between total metanarratives and more local social and cultural perspectives. However, such displacement has not simply resulted in the return of traditional forms of religious organizations, authorities, or practices; rather, it has contributed to a large-scale restructuring of the religious components of all cultural and institutional formations.

Closely related to these processes are changes in the structure of religious power, which manifest themselves in the widespread weakening of the main church institutions, as well as in the intensification of the struggle between various religious organizations, movements and leaders for the possession and legitimization of religious power. In addition, there is a struggle for the correct interpretation of the basic assumptions of the respective religions and their relationship to the modern world. These numerous changes have been further developed by the emergence of many new popular religious leaders (promoted - in contrast to the former "traditional" religious authorities-primarily through new electronic media), new religious concepts and interpretations of the underlying assumptions of the respective religions, as well as many previously non-existent practices. All this together leads to the formation of new national and international public spaces that are no longer regulated by either the once dominant religious or new political authorities.

As a result, in all religions - albeit to varying degrees-there are changes in the relationship between, on the one hand, religious beliefs and practices, and, on the other, "official" authoritative religious codes. Thus, there are large-scale changes concerning the relationships of various cosmological and doctrinal dimensions or components: in individual religious forms of emotionality and practices; in institutional and organizational aspects;

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in the structure of religious power, in its relation to the main political and institutional formations, as well as to the constitution of communities and collective identities; finally, in the relations between key religions.

Such trends do not necessarily mark the disappearance of powerful transcendent religious attitudes from the cultural and political landscape of modern societies. Rather, they lead to a multiplication of attitudes toward transcendent reality, often leading to new religious perceptions, new practices, and ways of participating. Nor do these trends lead to the disappearance of religion from the public spaces of the respective societies, as well as from the process of forming collective identities. On the contrary, these trends are closely connected with a new powerful invasion of religion in the very center of these spaces, but in a completely new way, signaling the emergence of new large-scale civilizational formations.

In addition, sectarian and semi - sectarian groups and activities have developed all over the world, with the most prominent Presbyterian groups and movements growing all over the world-in South America, Korea, and other Asian countries. Many of these sectarian groups, movements or informal associations, along with a number of new cults, have developed in other world religions, although this is less well known: for example, various Sufi orders or Buddhist groups. At the same time, the number of religious or "spiritual" ideas or trends in the spirit of "New Age"increases. Although these movements, groups and movements were not organized into any common national or international structures, many "transnational" links were established between them, which became a new element of the overall global scene.

Finally, another important trend in the modern global world is the growth of virtual transnational religious and ethnic associations and communities, including new diasporas. Diasporas, such as "overseas" Chinese or Indian communities, have existed for many centuries, and the same is true for similar transnational and trans-imperial religions, whether they are Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Buddhist and, of course, Jewish communities. However, under the influence of increasing migration flows associated with

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with globalization, as well as under the influence of the development of new electronic media, there is not just an explosive growth of such diaspora networks and organizations, many of which are completely new. Large-scale transformations also concern the structure of these networks, the forms of participation in them, as well as their presence in national and international public spaces and the formation of modern collective identities. The result is large-scale changes in the very structure of transnational religious organizations, in their relations with the state and civil society, as well as in international affairs.

Most of these communities still have some idea of a "home" in one way or another, but in general they are increasingly moving away from such ideas. In many communities, a powerful impulse is felt to reject various local traditions, to develop new universalist translocal identities, promoted, first of all, by innumerable translocal networks of "ideologically" related religions and communities that are directly connected to each other - bypassing the mediation of "home" or any particular territorial center. This leads to the emergence of new trans-State religious organizations that clash with each other, which leads to large-scale shifts in relations between the main religions.

All these communities and identities, including fundamentalist, communal-national, and sectarian ones, are characterized by new decentralized patterns of religious power, forms of subordination, and membership. Such trends are closely linked to disputes within each religion between various religious organizations, movements, and leaders regarding the "correct" interpretation of basic assumptions, attitudes to the modern world, and the question of power.

Such new global communities, networks and organizations form not only a new institutional or structural component of the modern world, but also an important axis for the reconstruction of collective identities, as well as new civilizational perspectives and contours.

These networks, movements, and communities, including fundamentalist ones, make large-scale claims to redefine citizenship, rights, and the powers that flow from these rights. They do not consider themselves limited strong homogenizing-

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They are the most important cultural presuppositions of the nation-State in its classical form, especially with regard to their presence in the public sphere. It does not follow that these movements and communities do not want to be "registered" in their respective societies. Their struggle is partly aimed precisely at the right to obtain a residence permit in their countries-much more serious than the classical models of assimilation suggest-but already under new, more pluralistic, multidimensional and multinational conditions. They want to achieve recognition in the public sphere, within civil society, and in relations with the State as a culturally separate group that forms its own collective identity. They don't want to be confined to a purely private space. They claim - as illustrated in particular by the laicite debate in France-to reconstruct the symbols of collective identities in their respective countries.

Crystallization of new civilizational constellations

The described new religious constellations have developed all over the world, and they have significant "local" differences from each other. These differences are due to different traditions, different historical experiences, and finally, different contemporary contexts. Many new religious networks, virtual communities, and movements persistently emphasize their authenticity, but in reality they are reconstructed traditions. Indeed, the reconstruction and dissemination of such traditions is a very important aspect of the activities of these groups.

Such variability of new religious networks not only entails parallel processes in different parts of the world, but also forms components of new civilizational structures of new civilizational constellations.

If we do not take into account numerous "local" differences, then the main constellations of the new religious space can be found all over the world and especially - but not only - among the classical "world religions". New global communities and networks do not just form a multitude of new organizational and structural elements of the modern world, far exceeding the multitude that can be found among the re-

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ligium of axial time. They also turn out to be important axes for reconstructing new civilizational perspectives, which represent a response to key changes in the aggregate structures of modernity, the modern civilization itself as it has crystallized to date. These new religious networks transcend the classical contours of modernity and lead to the emergence of a new civilizational constellation.

The global civilizational constellation generates large-scale cultural changes; a whole chain of changes in the structure of social relations and in the formation of key political borders, international arenas and processes of globalization.

These changes first made themselves felt in the West, but then spread all over the world, crystallizing in different parts of the world. Initially, they were related to modern civilizations - "pioneers", but then they went beyond them, giving rise to new civilizational constellations.

Patterns of social relations and institutional formations

Several phenomena formed the main core of the processes that transformed the prevailing patterns of social relations and institutional structures until recently. First, there is the growing separation of basic - social, economic, political, family, and tender-roles, organizations, and relationships from more general macro-formations, especially from the dominant formations of national and revolutionary states, as well as from the "classical" class foundations characteristic of the initial and mature stages of the development of industrial capitalism. Second, large-scale changes and transformations in the crystallization of general social formations, class and status relations. Third, the disidentification of political centers and major social and cultural communities. Fourth, the development of multiple networks and clusters that run parallel to a number of organizations and "societies". Under the influence of intensive globalization processes, large-scale changes are taking place in the constitution of a number of social borders, which weakens and diversifies until recently dominant communities and social spaces; new cultural and social identities are crystallizing,

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the role of territoriality in the structuring of social roles and collective identities is being reconstructed; the dominant relations between local and global structures are being weakened until recently. In sum, all this leads to the ongoing reorganization of relatively compact lifestyles, life worlds of various social sectors and classes, and the concepts of" civilized man " embodied in the classical nation-state. The process of crystallization of plurality, pluralism and diversification of semantic-ideological and institutional links between the main spheres of life - between public and private spheres, between work and culture, employment and living, as well as between primordial/sacred and civil components in the constitution of collective identities is connected with this. A number of ever-changing combinations of multiple cultural themes and tropes, drawn from different cultures around the world, are being developed, and new patterns of syncretism of various cultural traditions, so successfully analyzed by Ulf Hanner, among others, are making themselves felt.1 Often, such changes lead to the crystallization of changing "alternative" modernities that challenge existing mainstream models, as well as form new forms of exclusion and inclusion.

Cultural transformations

The crystallization of patterns of social relations and institutions was closely linked to new cultural trends that emerged in the West and then spread around the world. These cultural trends have led to widespread criticism of the cultural program of the Enlightenment, as well as its romantic rejection, in the form in which it emerged and was institutionalized as the dominant discourse of the classical period of modernity. A weakening of the understanding of reality that was actively spread in the Enlightenment era and which has managed to acquire since a hundred years has begun.-

1. Hannerz U. Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. London and New York: Routledge, 1996; Hannerz U. Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

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tus of the hegemon. The belief that the fate of man and nature can be determined through the conscious efforts of man and society has been particularly strongly criticized. Cognitive rationality, especially in its extreme forms of scientism, which was often seen as the standard of Enlightenment, was stripped of its dominant status, along with the idea of "conquering" or "taking over" the environment, which meant both society and nature. The validity of the scientific worldview's claim to dominance, as well as the claim to the truth of any image of the future that is supposedly inherent in all of humanity, an image based on ideas of progress, or another single criterion (for example, freedom), according to which all societies can be compared or evaluated, has been questioned or directly rejected.

In connection with this, the process of weakening until recently the dominant meta-narratives of modernity with their distinct emphasis on historical progress, which in its numerous enlightenment and revolutionary versions was a reinterpretation in "secular" terms of the eschatological perspectives of numerous sectarian movements, was going on. All this has led to the emergence of more pluralistic," multicultural " and postmodern attitudes with a strong relativistic bias characteristic of them.

Thus, there is a worldwide tendency to distinguish and even separate Zweckrationalitat2 and Wertrationalitat3; to recognize the vast array of different Wertrationalitaten; to emphasize the possible plurality of cosmological perspectives and the various ways in which the "bracketed" Zweckrationalitat can be combined with various forms of Wertrationalitaten - aesthetic, social, or moral.

Transformations of national and international political spaces

Changes in the structure of prevailing patterns of social and institutional relations, as well as cultural transformations that have taken place around the world-first in the West, and then abroad.-

2. purposefulness (German) - approx. per.

3. value rationality (German) - approx. trans.

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and beyond - were closely related to the transformation of the prerequisites and institutional characteristics of national states. These changes also affected all political constellations and led to a transformation of the boundaries of political and" national " communities.4
Despite the fact that the political centers of national and revolutionary states continued to exercise control over the allocation of resources, as well as maintain a decisive influence in key international arenas, the status of the national and revolutionary State as the dominant center regulating its economic and political affairs was severely curtailed, despite the continued strengthening of the "technocratic" and"rational" economy. It is important to take into account secular policies in various fields, whether it is education or, for example, family planning. Many global actors - primarily financial ones-have become very powerful. National and revolutionary States have lost some - but so far only a part-of their monopoly on internal and external violence, ceding some of their authority to a multitude of local and international groups of separatists or terrorists. Neither individual nation-States nor the coordinated actions of several nation-States can control the widespread outbreaks of violence. In addition, these states have lost their semi-monopoly on the creation of international platforms and the rules for their regulation. Finally, the ideological and symbolic significance of national and revolutionary states, their status as the main carriers of the cultural program of our time, their status as the key axis of building collective identity, as well as the regulator of various second-order identities, have been severely undermined; they are no longer identified with a special cultural or civilizing program.

Among the most important consequences of these changes are the following: increasing the importance of identity politics, redefining the boundaries of communities, and finding new ways to combine "local" and global transnational or trans-state components in the processes of constituting these communities. These changes mark the mas-

4. Sassen S. Territory-Authority-Rights: from Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

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structural transformations of cultural and political structures, public spaces, and civil society.

Most of the once" repressed " identities - ethnic, local, regional, and religious-have taken on a new significance. In some cases, they have managed to occupy a central position in modern national and international public spaces. They have been able to shift-albeit in a heavily reformed form-to the centers of their societies and to international arenas, and they persistently claim their own autonomous places in central symbolic and institutional spaces, whether through educational programs, social interaction, or the media. In addition, they claim to redefine citizenship, rights and powers derived from these rights.

These processes have led to the multiplication of new types of collective identity, rooted, on the one hand, in small, constantly changing "local" contexts, and, on the other, in transnational and trans-State structures; to the concomitant development of new political transnational and trans-State structures and organizations, the most impressive example of which is the European Union; to the reconfiguration of relations between primordial / sacred (religious) and civil components in the constitution of collective identities, which leads to new forms of exclusion and inclusion.

These new collective identities, promoted primarily by various "new" social movements-often in new social environments, especially among diasporas-challenge the hegemony of the former homogenizing programs of national and revolutionary States. In many such environments, local and transnational identities often take on universalist trans-State forms, such as in the case of Europe; or they are "rooted" in world religions-Islam, Buddhism, and various branches of Christianity, reinterpreted in a modern spirit.

This also includes the spread within various social sectors of new, less ideologically homogeneous interpretations of national identity and modernity, expressed in terms different from those that were characteristic of the Enlightenment, and allowing for a rethinking of modernity; for example, a rethinking of urban or regional values.-

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regional contexts based on the concepts of their own, special models - Greek, Turkish, Islamic, Indian, or Chinese.

International formations

The fourth component in the crystallization of new civilizational formations that emerged during this period was changes in the structure of hegemonies in the international order; the development of new power relations between different States; and the emergence of new actors, institutions, and regulatory rules in the international arena. These transformations marked the disintegration of the" Westphalian " international order and contributed to the formation of a "New World Disorder"5. The emergence of this disorder was accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the bipolar stability of the Cold War, and the steady ideological confrontation between communism and the West. As a result, when only one superpower, the United States, remained, regional and transstate structures began to gain more and more autonomy; in addition, a new conjuncture of geopolitical, cultural and ideological conflicts developed.

At the same time, international financial institutions established after World War II, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are becoming increasingly important. Although these organizations often pursue the interests of the United States, they still manage to gradually turn into relatively independent actors and regulators of international economic processes, capable of one day challenging American interests as well. In addition, new international non-governmental organizations are emerging that operate "on top "of any individual national State, and often even" on top " of more formalized international organizations.

Finally, the main international organizations - the UN and various regional structures, primarily those related to the European Union-are gaining more and more weight on the world stage. Да-

5. Jowitt K. New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

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However, many new legal institutions are emerging, such as the International Court of Justice and the European Constitutional Court, as well as many international regulatory professional, legal and economic networks.

At the same time, new principles of legitimation are being strengthened, undermining the foundations of State sovereignty that have dominated since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The most important of these principles are human rights, which operate "over" existing State borders and call State structures to account. Coalitions of various trans-state - as well as nation-state-related political actors, together with new social movements, are able to influence the political dynamics of States, including authoritarian States, based on these new principles. Some actors see these processes as harbingers of a future global civil society that transcends existing political boundaries.

Such transformations lead to large-scale changes in the distribution of power in national and, above all, international arenas. They entail a large-scale transfer of power from once dominant national states to new centers of hegemony, to various global political institutions and organizations. Hence the rise of many new and more dispersed centers of power, often associated with new actors in the international arena, each of which constantly challenges the existing international order and the prevailing institutions. Combined with changes in the internal institutional structure of various States, these trends contribute to increasing instability in the international system and lead to a new global disorder. This disarray is only compounded by the inability of various international actors and institutions to cope with the many challenges that accompany the growing process of globalization, whether they are environmental problems, epidemics, nuclear energy control, or social problems generated by the same globalization.

The rise of dispersed centers of power, often associated with new actors in the international arena, challenges the existing international order and its dominant institutions, thus constituting a fundamental component of the international order.

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a new civilizational structure that is rooted in the classical civilization of our time, but goes far beyond its limits.

New patterns of globalization

These many changes were indeed closely linked to the new patterns of globalization that have emerged on the international stage and become a central component of the new civilizational structures. The main distinguishing feature of modern globalization processes in comparison with its "previous" stages is not just the scope of the global flow of various resources, especially economic ones, and the concomitant development of new forms of global capital and economic formations, which were already discussed above. The global flows of economic resources characteristic of the current period are hardly more extensive than those of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather, the specific features of modern globalization should be considered, first, the dominance of new forms of international capitalism, replacing the " old "forms, largely based on "Fordist" principles; the transition from industry to services, finance and management; the reduction of various labor force clusters, especially those related to high technologies and technology. financial transactions; growing autonomy and relative preponderance "denationalized", "deterritorialized"," global " capitalist financial forces. Secondly, the emergence of a global economic neoliberal hegemony, which is being built up by the main international institutions - the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO-and which has been fully expressed in the Washington Consensus. Third, global migration processes leading to the impoverishment of many social sectors from a number of cultural and economic niches that until recently maintained a stable, albeit not very privileged position; the increasing activity of previously non-dominant, secondary or peripheral societies and social sectors, their movement to the centers of the relevant national and international systems, and the ability of the population to move to the act on top of national and transnational institutions.

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Fourth, the continuing growth of contradictions and inequalities between different central and peripheral sectors, both within and between societies. Of particular importance in this context is, first of all, the set of contradictions between the social sectors that have successfully incorporated into the dominant financial and "high-tech" economic structures, and those that have failed to do so; this implies a large-scale dislocation of a number of sectors that are experiencing a decline in living standards and an acute sense of deprivation. This dislocation is felt not only in relation to the lowest economic strata - the poor peasants or the urban lumpenized proletariat, although, of course, this process affects them as well. The most visible victims of dislocation are, first, groups from the middle and lower strata of traditional sectors, which until recently were embedded in relatively stable - if not very prosperous - social, economic, and cultural structures or niches that have now been displaced to the lowest strata of new urban centers; and, second, various highly mobile groups that have been displaced to the lowest strata of new urban centers. "modern" educated groups - professionals, graduates of modern universities and other people for whom autonomous access to new political centers or participation in their work was impossible; third, large social sectors excluded from the labor force.

An important aspect of these transformations is the fact that many of the inequalities and dislocations resulting from the processes of globalization have been superimposed on religious, ethnic or cultural differences. At the same time, there is a continuing increase in conflicts between social sectors belonging to "peripheral" societies and sectors of various centers of globalization around the world. This combination of dislocation and the concomitant movement of "peripheral" sectors or societies to various dominant centers is most eloquently illustrated by diaspora religious, ethnic and national virtual communities that have become a new significant factor in the international arena. To use the apt expression of Arjun Appadurai 6, they were the "power of small numbers", becoming

6. Appadurai A. Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

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an important element of new social movements, especially anti-globalist ones.

These changes were linked - and in fact, closely intertwined - with the crystallization of the main religious constellations analyzed above; first of all, with the" return " of religion to public spaces both at the national and international levels, which in a sense is a reference model of these changes. One of the most striking examples of the close interweaving of new religious constellations with emerging civilizational structures can be considered the global growth of protest movements of a new type, in particular, the anti-globalist movement, which developed during this period and became an important factor in global peace. The emergence of these movements was directly related to the large-scale transformation of protest movements and ideologies that took place around the world since the last decades of the XIX century.

Intercivilizational conjuncture - transformation of protest movements and ideologies

One of the most important manifestations of the new civilizational structure was the close interweaving of many new religious constellations with new types of protest movements and tendencies that have developed since the late 1960s.

Protest movements with revolutionary potential continue to be an important component of the social and political arena, but their structure, as well as their goals and prospects, are constantly being strengthened and radically transformed under the influence of the globalization process. Protest movements and symbols remain important in the political and cultural spheres , as well as in the constitution and development of modern States. The most important of these are the new student and anti-war movements of the late 1960s - the famous" movements of 1968", which left their mark on most subsequent protest movements. These movements were able to go beyond both the "classical" model of the national state and the "classical" liberal, nationalist and socialist movements, and they went in two main directions that outwardly opposed each other, but in fact closely intersected. On the one hand-

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For example, these were various "postmodern" and "post-materialist" movements, such as feminist, environmentalist, and anti-globalist movements. On the other hand, many movements emerged based on extremely ideologized, aggressive particularist, localist, ethnic, and cultural demands. Religious-fundamentalist and religious-communal movements have emerged. They are guided by various alternative models - first of all, concerning identity, but not only it; such movements were supported by various groups that felt deprived as a result of globalization processes.

The themes voiced by representatives of these movements, often portrayed as harbingers of large-scale changes in the modern cultural and institutional space, as well as the likely complete rejection of the "program of modernity", imply significant transformations both in the internal structure of the state and in the international arena; transformations of protest attitudes and themes, as well as the revolutionary "imaginary" (imaginaire), which was fundamental for the development of the modern social order, first of all, the social order of modern revolutionary states.7
The common denominator of these new-type movements, which distinguish them from the "classical" movements of the past, was, first, a shift in the focus of protest aspirations - away from the centers of national and revolutionary states, as well as away from the constitution of "national" and revolutionary communities as carriers of the principles of modernity. They are shifting their attention to various diversified areas in which already transformed nation-states are now only a special case. Second, the" classical "revolutionary" imaginaire", which used to be the main component of protest, has noticeably weakened. Third, new institutional structures have developed to enable the implementation of new strategies. Fourth, new prospects for inter-civilizational relations have emerged.

Contrary to the basic attitudes of the previous "classical" movements, which focused on the formation and potential role of the movement in the future.

7. Mann M. Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation State? // Review of International Political Economy. 1997. Vol. 4 (3). P. 472 - 496.

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transformations of socio-political centers (nation or state centers), as well as the borders of major macro-communities, new protest movements are focused on what one researcher described as expanding the scale of social life and participation. In particular, this was reflected in the claim to an increasing participation in various community structures, civil movements, and so on. Perhaps the first and simplest signal of the beginning of this change in attitudes was a shift in emphasis from the" standard of living "that was characteristic of the 1950s in the context of ongoing technological and economic progress, to" quality of life", which was designated in the 1970s as a transition from materialistic values to post-materialistic values. According to Habermas8, these movements have shifted their focus from distribution problems to the " grammar of life." A key aspect has been the growing emphasis on identity politics - especially in movements that have developed in sectors deprived of globalization processes; the emphasis on the constitution of new religious, ethnic and local collectives aimed at world-wide, particularistic problems, often described in the language of exclusive cultural identity with very aggressive overtones.

Closely related to these processes is the transformation of utopian and, above all, transcendent attitudes - whether they are total "Jacobin" attitudes characteristic of many revolutionary movements, or more static utopian perspectives that called for getting rid of various restrictions and burdens of modern society. The emphasis of transcendent utopian attitudes shifted from the centers of national states and integral political-national communities to more heterogeneous dispersed spaces, to various "authentic" forms of life worlds that have a "multicultural" and "postmodern" orientation.

In the discourse associated with these trends, first of all in the West, but also outside of it, much attention is paid to multiculturalism, which can be considered either as a possible addition to the hegemonic model of a homogeneous modern nation - state, or as a new model that will completely replace the old one.

8. Habermas J. New Social Movements // Telos. 1981. No. 49. P. 33.

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Various themes of protest and utopian attitudes were intertwined with numerous demands put forward by "single-issue groups", which also became widespread during this period. In addition, they have joined forces with various national, regional and trans-State movements that advocate forms of identity that often do not coincide with existing State borders. Among such movements, the innumerable anti-globalist movements that have gained momentum in the last two or three decades of the twentieth century are particularly important.

Such new protest attitudes are closely linked to the new religious constellations analyzed above, and in particular to various anti-globalist ideological movements.

Despite the fact that such inter-civilizational "anti-globalist" and anti-hegemonic trends that put forward an alternative to the cosmopolitan centers of globalization have always been present (be it Hellenistic, Roman, Sino-Confucian, Hindu civilizations, the "classical" Islamic era or the era of the beginning of Modern times), in today's situation they have intensified and transformed. First, they have spread all over the world thanks to the mass media. Secondly, these trends were politicized to the limit, they were embedded in the context of harsh contradictions described in extremely politicized ideological language. Third, their proliferation has led to the ongoing reconstruction of collective identities in a new global context and the accompanying conflicts between them. Fourthly, these movements have made efforts to reinterpret and reinterpret modernity, which has led to the emergence of new inter-civilizational attitudes and relations; they have tried to separate modernity and Westernization, to take away the monopoly on modernity from the "West", from the Western "Enlightenment" and Western romantic programs; they have wanted to comprehend modernity and define it on the basis of from their own concepts, most often rooted in the characteristic features of their civilizations. A key component of this discourse was a highly ambivalent attitude towards the West and, in particular, towards the United States, its dominance and hegemony; this was most clearly expressed in its spread throughout the world.

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the world of powerful anti-American movements that developed during this period, including in a number of European countries.

These trends were closely linked, on the one hand, to the changes described above in the main religions; this was especially evident in their "new entry" into both national and international public spaces. On the other hand, they have been linked to large-scale transformations of protest movements and ideologies that have developed around the world since the last decades of the 19th century.

These trends have been particularly evident in various diasporas and virtual communities and networks. At the same time, they manifested themselves in a multitude of new social movements that developed in almost all "established" societies. Indeed, it is within these virtual communities and networks that the most large-scale, intensely transformative "reactions" to the processes of globalization have emerged; to the hegemonic claims of various (often competing) centers of globalization. These "reactions", to quote again Arjun Appadurai 9, indicate the" power of small numbers "and form one of the most flexible and flammable components of the global world; they also represent an important factor in the transformation of inter-civilizational relations in the modern arena, contributing to the consolidation of the image of"clashes of civilizations".

Speaking about new civilizational attitudes, changing attitudes towards the presuppositions of the cultural and political program of our time, as well as attitudes towards the West, we should note significant differences between, on the one hand, the key "classical" national and religious movements, especially reformist ones, and, on the other hand, new communal religious movements, first of all, by fundamentalist movements. All these movements are closely related to the formation of new virtual communities.

These movements mark a departure from the earlier reformist and religious movements that developed in all non-Western societies from the nineteenth century onwards. A clash with the West for modern anti-globalist movements does not imply a search for ways to integrate into the modern dominant civilization on its terms; rather, it is a question of poi-

9. Appadurai A. Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger.

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It is necessary to learn the new international global order and modernity independently, based on our own traditions.

The goal of these movements is to take up the program of modernity, based on their own civilizational prerequisites, which would be rooted in the fundamental - albeit greatly reinterpreted-images and symbols of civilizational and religious identity. Often these images and symbols are described as universalist presuppositions of the respective religions and civilizations. The overall goal is to transform the entire global context based on these symbols.

These movements are part of a larger change taking place across the world in Muslim, Indian, and Buddhist societies. They continue, albeit in a clearly transformed form, the process of struggle between the former reformist and traditionalist religious movements that unfolded in many non-Western societies. These movements are indeed characterized by a pronounced confrontational attitude towards the West, towards everything that is somehow related to the West. They try to understand modernity and the global system based on their own non-Western and often anti-Western concepts. The confrontational attitude towards the West is associated with radical efforts aimed at" disconnecting " modernity from Westernization, at taking away the monopoly on modernity from the West, at assimilating the modern world, modernity in terms rooted in their own traditions.

At the same time, however, the perspectives based on these traditions are constantly being transformed under the influence of "modern" programs; paradoxically, they are being formulated - and this is becoming increasingly clear - in terms of the dispute about modernity. In some respects, these discourses and disputes resemble the dispute about modernity in its early forms, which developed in the very centers of European modernity. In particular, these discourses resemble a critique of the dominant enlightenment program of our time, its flaws and antinomies. For example, most of the criticism of the Enlightenment project by Said Qutb, probably the most interesting fundamentalist theologian, is very close, and often directly related to the main trends of European religious and "secular" criticism of the Enlightenment. These discourses go back to de Maistre, to the Romantics, to the Narodniks (Slavophiles, etc.) of Central and Eastern Europe

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(first of all, Russia), as well as to those who, according to Charles Taylor10, emphasized the sphere of human experience. In other words, various anti-globalist anti-Western movements and ideologies in their own way voice the main flaws and antinomies of modernity, thereby indicating that they are-paradoxically - components of a new general global civilizational structure, rooted in the program of modernity, but beyond its limits.

Another important component of the modern religious scene - if we take into account the fact that different religions now operate in a common civilizational context - is the changing relations between different, especially "world" religions. The competition and struggle between religions is becoming increasingly fierce, but at the same time there are trends towards the emergence of common denominators, to an increase in the number of encouraging meetings and gatherings aimed at developing a collective attitude to certain phenomena of the new civilizational structure.

The described efforts to reform civilizational presuppositions are made not only by these movements. Similar trends - albeit in less dramatic forms-can be seen in new institutional structures, such as the EU, in various local and regional structures, as well as in all sorts of attempts by different "peripheries" - for example, through discussions about Asian values-to challenge Western and especially American hegemony, as well as to form their own legitimate interests. modernity. Similar efforts to reform the rules and presuppositions are seen in many currents of "folk" culture that challenge the apparent predominance of the American perspective promoted by media that are generally considered to be under US control. The result is the growth of transnational Indian and East Asian media outlets with a large-scale coverage area.

Disputes and confrontations involving these movements and actors are often described in" civilizational " terms. Actually, "civilizations" arise in these disputes. However, these concepts themselves, even if they are rooted in religious traditions.-

10. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.

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They have already been passed through the language of modernity, through total, often essentialist and absolutist concepts that follow from the basic premises of the dispute about modernity with all its flaws and antinomies. When such clashes and disputes overlap with political, military, or economic conflicts and confrontations, the result can be an escalation of violence.

Indeed, large-scale changes in the international arena, coupled with the processes of globalization, lead to dramatic results. In particular, the number and intensity of aggressive movements and inter-civilizational confrontations are growing, which allow us to speak about the formation of a new international disorder. The reactions to this disorder lay the groundwork for the transformation of asymmetric warfare, as analyzed by Hermann Munkler11, into the main type of modern military conflicts, in which these multiple movements play a major role.

The analysis of trends in religious spheres presented above shows that these are not just important changes in various aspects or dimensions of religious behavior, practices, beliefs, and organizations, but also an extremely important component of a large-scale transformation of civilizational structures, as well as the place of religion within these structures-transformations that go far beyond the dynamics of Axial time and space. early Modern times, when the very constitution of basic hegemonic institutional and ideological formations was deeply rooted in religious premises and institutional structures. In the arena of the modern world, different facets of" religion " compete with each other for their place in this new structure.

Translated from English by Dmitry Uzlaner

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