Criticism and bibliography. Reviews

Al-Kuwait: Dar ' Alam al-Ma'arifa, 1999. 339 p. ^*

The works of Masoud Daher are hardly well known to a wide circle of domestic Arabists ^.1 Meanwhile, for any Western researcher of the problems of modern Lebanon, and more generally of the Arab world, familiarity with his works is almost mandatory.

M. Daher received his doctorate from the Sorbonne, where he was a student of the famous French Arabist J. Berk, and since 1973 he has been a professor of Modern and contemporary History at the Lebanese University (Beirut). However, the scope of his interests is broader and includes a significant range of Oriental (primarily Arabic) political science and cultural subjects, considered mainly in their historical aspect.

In the reviewed work of M. Daher makes an attempt to compare the experience of modernizing Japan and Egypt - the central link of the modern Arab world, then one of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Following in the footsteps of his American counterpart, H. Sharabi ², a Lebanese researcher, argues that the Arab world is neo-patriarchal, i.e. the existing state entities are authoritarian, and the system of relations between them and their citizens (actually subjects) is based on coercion. Drawing on the experience of the Meiji era and drawing a parallel between Japan at that time and the Egypt of Muhammad Ali and his successors, M. Daher seeks an answer to the question: has the Arab geopolitical community experienced a stage of genuine modernization? Well, this question interests many historians today, not only in the Arab countries, but also in the West and in Russia. The problem lies only in what considerations are guided by one or another author involved in its solution.

^{Daher Masood.} * Arabic and Japanese revival. Similarity of assumptions and differences in results. Al-Kuwait: Alam al-Ma'arifa Publishing House, 1999, 399 p.

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M. Daher is an Arabic-language author. This does not mean that there are no studies published in European languages among his works, but they are sporadic and not so significant. Writing in Arabic for him (as for many of his colleagues in the Arab world) is a choice that is determined not only by the place of his permanent work (Lebanese University, in contrast, for example, to the American University and the University of St. John's in Beirut). Joseph, "national" and therefore primarily Arabic-speaking), but also to a considerable extent for political and intellectual reasons: the Arab community is a self - sufficient quantity both geopolitically and, perhaps more significantly, civilizationally. However, this neo-patriarchal community is still marginalized in the modern world. For M. Daher, it is obvious that this gap between civilizational self - sufficiency, on the one hand, and marginality in the current international context, on the other, can only be overcome through genuine modernization. Therefore, he appeals to those readers to whom the reviewed monograph is devoted.: "To the long-awaited new generation of Arabs, the generation that can benefit from the lessons of the first Arab Renaissance that ended with only Westernization (at-taghrib) ³, the generation that can learn from the successful modernization of the world and, above all, from its Japanese experience." Then " this generation will fearlessly and without feeling inferior open itself to all the sciences of today and introduce the Arabs to the era of genuine modernization, preserving the heritage of national culture. This generation will participate in the creation of world culture as its true creator, and not as a consumer of the achievements of other cultures." This is the author's credo, and he is guided by it in his research.

But what if the reviewed monograph is in the hands of a reader who does not belong to the "new generation of Arabs" and is interested in other questions, for example: what are the criteria for modernization? where is the line between it and westernization? why is it necessary to assume that the path followed by (almost all) the former vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, and now modern Arab countries, was not "true modernization"? The author does not answer them.

The book written in Arabic, which won the Kuwait Foundation for Literature, Arts and Humanities 'Best Book of the Year' award in 2000, is the result of a long-term stay of the Lebanese researcher in Japan, where he worked as a visiting professor in the country's university centers, maintaining contacts with representatives of the intellectual elite of the Japanese language. companies. It is the first time that the author's intended audience receives such a well-documented study based on a huge list of works by Japanese authors. According to M. Daher, his book carries "genuine knowledge about the experience of Japanese modernization", but the reader, far from the "young generation of Arabs", again raises the question: does his work make unnecessary further scientific research related to the analysis of the Japanese phenomenon, which can be undertaken by a compatriot of M. Daher, or a scientist from any other country of the Arab world? The East?

At least economically, Japan, by the author's definition, is a modern "global giant", which is the best proof of the success of its modernization experience ^.4 This already implies (once again confirming the marginal status of the Arab world) that the relevant Egyptian experience "failed". In the introduction to the monograph, M. Daher puts forward a seemingly logical explanation for what happened: "The most important reason for the success of the Japanese experience, unlike the Egyptian or, in general, the Ottoman, was the rejection of Western culture that threatened Westernization. The Japanese modernization movement was content only to assimilate Western technology. This technology was adapted to the Japanese soil, assimilated and developed in such a way that the country did not discard the originality of its own social traditions, customs coming from the depths of centuries, magnificent art and humanistic culture that distinguishes the Japanese from other peoples." Moreover, Japanese modernization was successful because it "preserved the continuity of the nation's spiritual principles", allowing the country to become an integral part of today's world.

There is much to be objected to in this argument. For example, the Japanese modernization movement assimilated not only Western technology, but also, of course, the norms of Western law and government. Japan was not much different from the westernized Arab world. Only the high degree of political commitment of the Lebanese researcher makes him claim the opposite. This also applies to qualifiers-

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In addition, the author calls for the recognition of Japanese culture as "humanistic", and for the noted "preservation of continuity" of Japanese spirituality.

For the Lebanese researcher, modernization is a controversial phenomenon associated with the emergence of "the capitalist stage and the accompanying fundamental changes in the sphere of production", as well as with "the formation of democratic regimes and genuine popular representation". This is a "historical process" that should not "stop at the beginning of its own path". If it is interrupted, its result will be "Westernization, which is only the transfer of ready-made foreign ideas to a ground that cannot perceive them". M. Daher, as a historian, feels the controversy of this position and seeks to prove its validity. I will try to follow, of course, largely leaving aside the well-known domestic Arabists and Japanese factology, for the author's interpretation of this problem. However, I will immediately note that it is sometimes severely dominated by the political and intellectual "national" choice made by him.

XVIII century, writes M. Daher, was a time when both Japan and the Ottoman Empire (including its Arab vilayets) were forced to take the path of modernization due to the threat of European military invasion and the establishment of direct foreign rule over part or all of the territory of each of the two states. M. Daher is right that the Ottoman situation was in many ways more complicated than the Japanese one. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, it was a state entity that was "on the line of direct contact with the forces of Europe that sought to establish their domination over them," while far from the European powers, island Japan could pursue a policy of voluntary isolation until the middle of the XIX century. and only in the second half of the same century was forced to open its own ports for international trade. However, is the author of the monograph significantly correct if he clearly and unambiguously focuses on the situation in the Arab world?

However, the problem for him is not only that both the Ottoman Empire and Japan faced the threat of foreign invasion, but also that their response to it was not completely identical. By the time of the Meiji Revolution, Japanese society, according to M. Daher, was able to create "a united internal front of forces interested in the implementation of a radical and successful renewal of the country." Moreover, the Tokugawa period was an era of " important and multidimensional, if sometimes hidden, changes that helped to create the foundations of Japanese political thought." It was about moving towards the centralization of the country, about changing the status of the samurai class, about the emergence of the first centers of financial and industrial entrepreneurship that shaped the nation, which became the basis for the emergence of "the dominant Japanese ideology that promotes the fundamental importance of the growth of the middle class, as well as class cooperation instead of class antagonism between rich and poor."

It seems to me that M. Daher's analysis, to put it mildly, is not accurate. Moreover, everything that he attributes to the Tokugawa period took place in the Meiji era. I think that the explanation for its inaccuracy is only due to the need to say that the general Ottoman situation and the situation in the Arab vilayets of the empire were radically different from what was happening in Japan. M. Daher is far from a correct comparison, arguing that "The Ottoman Empire and its Arab vilayets borrowed European achievements" in order to " preserve their economic basis, which was increasingly degraded by the blows of internal forces that endlessly fought among themselves, "as well as"corruption that reigned in the Ottoman political, administrative, financial and military apparatus." In other words, Japan's seemingly definitive movement toward radical renewal in the Meiji era was based on previously established economic, administrative, and ideological premises. Muhammad Ali had yet to create them. His reforms were to be largely "catch-up" (even if historically they preceded the largely identical Japanese initiatives), combining both the creation of the basic foundations of the state and actions aimed at shaping its basic parameters. But, as follows from the reasoning of M. Daher himself, the result is clear in advance: could these reforms have been successful if their goal was to preserve the past? In fact, M. Daher's analysis of the time of Muhammad Ali's reign shows how the harsh pressure of the "national" choice on the historian is actually embodied.

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According to M. Daher, the beginning of the XIX century, marked by the coming to power of Muhammad Ali, was a turning point in the development of Egypt. After the defeat of the Mamluks, the Egyptian ruler was interested in the" strategic rear "of the country - Sudan and Syria, which saved"Egypt and the Egyptians from political, military and administrative degradation, as well as from economic stagnation." The defeat of Bonaparte's forces at Akka, and then at Abu Kir, was almost decisive for the new ruler: he became "the true and indisputable ruler of Egypt, voluntarily submitting to the will of the High Porte." The anti-Western motive of the Lebanese researcher's monograph is growing stronger: in his opinion, only the victories over Napoleon allowed Muhammad Ali to start implementing initiatives in the field of renewal of the country, but their essence was only to create the "nerve of modernization" - an army built on the European model and open the necessary enterprises for it, specializing in the production of weapons and ammunition.

Modernization immediately came to a standstill, since the reforms initiated by Muhammad Ali could only take place in conditions of "a rigid monopoly of the state in the economic sphere and absolutely despotic power of the ruler, which did not allow the emergence of any independent forms of life of civil society and its institutions." The author's further interpretation of the development of events is predictable. The "national" choice leads him to say that modernization in Egypt was bound to turn into "Westernization" if Muhammad Ali became acting at his own discretion "the only ruler, the only industrialist and the only merchant where he ruled." M. Daher's previous praise of Japan is thus justified, which is confirmed by his further reasoning that Muhammad Ali's reforms were " military modernization carried out by and for the military." For the sake of this version of it, transformations were carried out in the agricultural sector, the industrial and craft sector and in the field of education. The state became an all-encompassing force, " monopolizing the economic and financial capabilities of the country."

Not the last place in M. Daher's monograph is occupied by the question of Egyptian - Ottoman relations, which, in his opinion, experienced the intervention of the great European powers, which weakened the impact of Muhammad Ali's reform activities in Egypt. According to the researcher, Egypt and Portugal pursued a fundamentally different course in relations with European powers. While Egypt's state monopoly on trade and production, as well as its strong reluctance to receive long-term European loans, sharply reduced the opportunities for foreign entrepreneurs, the political elite of the empire considered the literal implementation of the principle of "freedom of trade", which implied the introduction of capitulations for citizens of European countries and their local counterparties, as well as foreign loans, in the as the "backbone" of its economic course. I would like to note that even here the estimates proposed by M. Daher are at least controversial. However, the point is not in them, but in the author's noticeably growing anti-Western discourse.

Maintaining relations with the Ottoman capital, Muhammad Ali tried, according to M. Daher, to turn them into a means of countering the West. Egypt, as he writes, in the era of the great ruler of this country became "the center of attraction of forces seeking to renew the empire," and Muhammad Ali himself allegedly " firmly believed in the need for radical modernization of the Ottoman Empire and its vilayets, fearing that otherwise both the empire and its provinces would become prey to European colonizers." Moreover, by encouraging immigrants from other Arab vilayets to move to Egypt (the settlers are "connected to this country by historical, cultural and spiritual ties dating back to antiquity"), Muhammad Ali already in the XIX century contributed to "the formation of pan-Arab national unity". The" national "choice forces the researcher to supplement his idea by pointing out that" pan - Arab unity " also arose due to material reasons: Napoleon sought to capture not only Egypt, but also Syria, and the British also acted in the late XIX-early XX centuries. The Arab peoples were united and "felt the danger of establishing direct European rule." This point of view also gets an additional development: "the modernization movement of the era of Muhammad Ali stemmed from the circumstances of history, geography, common heritage, unity of culture and civilization, as well as common economic interests and the importance of preserving and developing the unity of Egypt and its regional environment." And finally, the final chord: since " the vast majority of prozhe-

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The majority of the population in Egypt was associated with a single Arab - Muslim heritage, insofar as Muhammad Ali "turned into a man who led the movement for the solution of the problem of uniting the Nile Valley and Syria (Bilad Al-Sham)."

M. Daher's monograph shows that the Arab national mythology in no way goes back to the past, but, on the contrary, successfully demonstrates its need for regeneration in the new conditions of existence of both the Middle East and the world as a whole, which makes it rethink its own history, confirming the importance of this reinterpretation by references to the experience of other countries. Muhammad Ali became the builder of "Arab national unity", and for this he can be forgiven even the flawed "military modernization", even the" despotism "of the ruler and its result - "Westernization". After all, he opposed the European powers, and today we are talking about the "West". Both yesterday and today, the "plan" of the West is aimed at "splitting a single region into many tribal, racial and religious entities", because "immediately after the desire of Muhammad Ali to unite Egypt and Syria was defeated, world Zionism began to implement its tasks."

Muhammad Ali's pre-doomed modernization process was, in the author's opinion, finally buried by the rulers of the Khedive dynasty he founded, because they were only interested in "huge foreign loans" and a "wastefully luxurious" way of life. They destroyed the Egyptian economy, allowed foreigners to participate in the government of Egypt, dismissed "thousands of patriotic soldiers and officers" from the army, and finally "agreed to rule Egypt" after its occupation by Britain, becoming "accomplices of the colonialists". As a result, unlike in Japan, the Egyptian modernization experience ended only in "Westernization".

This is a sad but still far from certain conclusion. However, the book, in my opinion, belongs more to politics than to historiography. It is a kind of manifesto, and this is how it is viewed not only by the author himself, but also by the Arab community. However, this is exactly why it seemed to me worthy of attention.

notes

¹ The most significant ones written in Arabic: A Social History of Lebanon. 1914 - 1926. Beirut, 1974; Lebanon: nezavisimosti. National Charter, formula of the state. Beirut, 1977; Historical roots of the confessional problem. 1697 - 1861. Beirut, 1981; Modern Arab East: from Nomadism to the Modern State. Beirut, 1986; State and Society in the Arab East. 1840 - 1990. Beirut, 1991; Problems of building a modern state within the Arab Homeland. Damascus, 1994.

² For H. Sharabi, the Arab world is socially heterogeneous. The basis of social relations, as well as the institution of social organization in the Arab world region, is the family, clan, tribe, religion or denomination. These social relations are authoritarian. In other words, the domination, coercion, and management methods characteristic of the patriarchal father's behavior in his relations with his children are all principles of interpersonal relations not only at the family level, but also at the state level. Other variants of public relations and contacts based on the principles of interaction, mutual recognition and equality either do not exist or are in their infancy. Social life in the Arab world is largely determined by persistent behavioral patterns that create a sense of social isolation and a belief in otherworldly forces. Awareness of the diversity of the surrounding world is barely beginning to realize itself. Finally, it is the traditionalism of social behavior, which is based on following established customs, rather than spontaneity, creativity and creativity. Neopatriarchy. A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society. N.Y., 1988.

³ The root used to convey the concept of "Westernization" in Arabic is ambiguous, but the main thing in this ambiguity is a clearly felt rejection and unacceptability of this phenomenon. It is certainly alien and unworthy of a people who associate themselves with a great civilization.

⁴ Concluding the introduction to the peer-reviewed monograph, M. Daher writes: "This is the first study in a series of works prepared for future publication, which aims to show the Arab reader the true nature of the Japanese renaissance, as well as the sacrifices required to preserve national identity in the face of the openness of a modernized Japan, constant renewal and the full range of modern cultures."

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