In this report, I would like to focus on several aspects of the question of the relationship between the concepts of "freedom" and" slavery " and the general system of moral values and social life of the Roman civil community.

If in Plautus 'comedies the slave, serving objectively as an instrument of punishment for vice, appears in the traditional mask of a being devoid of moral principles and, moreover, an exponent of a kind of "anti-morals" (although even here he is opposed by a slave-reasoner who corrects his "philosophy"), then in Roman stoicism at the turn of our era the concepts of "slave" and "slave" are different. the "free" ones break away from their social media. A free person can be a "slave" to passions, circumstances, etc., and a slave can have inner freedom. "High" and" low " exist regardless of the household background. Thus, a gladiator slave who puts a sponge filled with sewage down his throat in a latrine in order to commit suicide and thereby avoid a slave death in the arena is equated by Seneca with the high image of Cato of Utica himself (Ep. 70.19 sqq.). But when it comes to the social (as we would say) evaluation of slaves in general, they can be called " lost and evil souls "(animi perditi quoque noxiosi-Sen. Ep. 70.27). It seems that we are not talking about a" crisis "of the value system or a" contradiction " between the ideal and reality, but about a growing awareness of the complexity of their relationship, which can manifest itself in different ways for different authors, depending not only on their views, but also on the genre in which they write. If Tacitus, the historian, writes less about slaves than Seneca, the philosopher, then isn't this the same ratio between Horace, the chronicler, and Horace, the author of satires? In any case, slavery is organically included in the range of topics of Roman literature and philosophy. This alone allows us to take a different view of the thesis about the "non-position" of slaves in the civil community.

How to imagine this"out-of-position"? Like a complete lack of common ground? Here Peregrine (i.e., a stranger), from the point of view of the Roman civil community, should not have had any connection (nulla necessitudo) with the Romans (1). Can these words also be applied to slaves? In other words: were the Roman slaves an amorphous mass, left to the mercy of the" private right " of their masters, or were the slaves, despite all the degradation of their position, an integrated part of society, a social organism whose structuring core was the civil community?

Let's try to consider this issue on the material of legal regulations and legal thought of the Romans. The institution of Roman emancipation (or rather, some aspects of it) will be of the most significant importance for us, but we will start not with it, but with the "dichotomy of Gaius" (2): "All people are either free or slaves." These concepts are thought of as opposing each other. "For what is so contrary to slavery as freedom? "(3). Freedom is" inestimable "(4), although it can be purchased with a ransom (5); freedom is "not valuable" (5).

1. Macroh. Sat. I. 6.12: libertinis vero nullo iure uti praetextis licebat ac multo minus peregrinis, quibus nulla esset cum Romanis necessitudo.

2. Gai. I. 9: summa divisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi. cm. read more: Smirin V. M. Roman slavery through the eyes of the Romans (system and incident) / / Odyssey. 1998. Moscow, 1999. p. 99;

3. Pap. 19 quaest. = D. 40. 5. 21: quid enim tarn contrarium est servituti quam libertas?

4. Libertas inaestimabilis res est (Paul. 2 ad ed. = D.50. 17. 106); cf. Paul. 13 ad Plaut. = D. 50. 17. 176. 1: infinita aestimatio est libertatis et necessitudinis.

5. Cf., for example: Alf. 4 dig. = D. 40. 1.6 (Servus pecuniam ob libertatem pactus erat et earn domino dederat...).

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it can be given for a while" (6), although we also meet with cases when a slave who received freedom lost it again. Finally, freedom is indivisible - a slave of two masters cannot become partially free as a result of letting one of them go free (7); just as one cannot become partially a slave who is claimed in court by two people at once, but only one of them gets his own way, because "it is ridiculous to think that he is half free." he is taken into slavery, and half becomes free." Such a slave either remains enslaved to the second master, or is given the opportunity to redeem himself (8). From all this, it follows that, at least in theory, the condition of any person could be defined as either free or slave. The legal thought of Rome did not know the average state. But to establish this clear polarization of states would not be to imagine the social and even legal picture of Roman society.

Far from being separated by an impenetrable wall, as, say, the Spartiates and Helots of Greece were. In Rome, freemen and slaves not only belonged to the same "mixed" society - the possibility of transition from one state to another, which is organic for Roman society, gave rise to many interesting situations. We have already had occasion to say that in Roman society, a status trial (causa liberalis) was a common occurrence, and it was given the whole title of Digest (40.12) (9). It is clear that when the status of a free man was disputed, the case was initiated by the one who claimed to be his master. But who initiated a case on the free status of a person who was actually in slavery?

In some situations, the slave himself could declare himself free (for example, when examining a case of a criminal offense committed or simulated by him).: this led to legal proceedings, and then he could declare his free state). But in most cases, the person whose status was questionable could not bring their own claims in court, and therefore the claim on their behalf was initiated by the so-called adsertor libertatis (10). If the" person in possession as a slave "(qui in possessione servitutis constitutusest) did not agree to a dispute about his status (11), for example, because he wanted to harm both himself and his relatives (generi suo), then it was considered" fair " (aequum est) to grant some of the rights of the individual to be a slave.other persons to sue for it. What kind of person they are: first of all, a father who could claim that this is his son, who is in his power, that is, he could oppose the power of the alleged master - his own, paternal. This means that the law presupposes a case where a Roman citizen (no one else could have had a son in power) there was a son who was enslaved. But even if the son was not in the power of the father, the same right was still given to the father, for "it is always the father's interest that his son should not be in the power of the father."

6. Libertas ad tempus dari non potest (Paul. 12 quaest. = D. 40. 4. 33).

7. Communis servus ab uno ex sociis manumissus neque ad libertatem pervenit et alterius domini totus fit servus iure adcrescendi (Fr. dos. 10).

8. Duobus petentibus hominem in servitutem pro parte dimidia separatim, si uno iudicio liber, altero servus iudicatus est, commodissimum est eo usque cogi iudices, donee consentiant: si id non continget, Sabinum refertur existimasse duci servum debere ab eo qui vicisset; cuius sententiae Cassius quoque est et ego sum. et sane ridiculum est arbitrari eum pro parte dimidia duci, pro parte libertatem eius tueri. commodius autem est favore libertatis liberum quidem eum esse, compelli autem pretii sui partem viri boni arbitratu victori suo praestare (lul. 5 ex Minic. = D.40.12. 30).

9. Smirin. Uk. soch. p. 99.

10. Buckland W.W. The Roman Law of Slavery. The Condition of the Slave from Augustus to Justinian. Cambr., 1908 (repr. 1970). P. 655 ff.

11. An example of the reluctance to exchange slavery for freedom is found in Suetonius ' account of the grammarian Gaius Melissa of Spoletius. He was a freeborn, but his parents quarreled and threw him away. When, years later, the mother tried to prove that he was not a slave, the son, favored by the Patron of the Arts (to whom he was given), remained in slavery, preferring his present position to that of his birth (quamquam adserente matre permansit tamen in statu servitutis praesentemque condicionem verae origini anteposuit). He was soon released, and gained the confidence of Augustus (Suet. De gramm. et rhet 21).

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slavery "(12), and, on the other hand, the same right was given to the son of one who was enslaved, "for it is no small disgrace to a son if he has a slave father" (130), and to all relatives (14), since the slavery of relatives "both grieves and offends us" (15).

It should be noted that so far the conversation has been about kinship, presumably originating from a legitimate marriage, i.e., about free and, apparently, citizens whose relative was enslaved. But the same right was also granted to "natural", more precisely, actual relatives (i.e., those whose kinship did not originate from a legitimate marriage).:

in this way, a father could sue a son whom he had once raised in slavery, and now proves that he was later released (16). This right was granted to the soldier (17), whose family was always "illegitimate", since he did not have the right to marry (at least until the reign of Septimius Severus). It also mentions" even " female relatives. And "even" the wife, who was not considered a "relative" and was not included in the husband's surname during the marriage sine manu, could nevertheless apply to the praetor (18). Patrons could also compete about the status of their released prisoners (19) if they were sold into slavery without their knowledge (20) (apparently, not because such a sale could have taken place with their knowledge, but because, knowing about it, they were obliged to oppose it), because "we are interested in to have freedmen and freedwomen" (21) (hence, the right of the supposed master is here opposed to the right of the patron). And if several of the mentioned persons want to initiate proceedings at once, then the choice of the plaintiff belongs to the praetor (22).

So we have a society in which a free member of a civil community, whether freeborn or not, could have a relative, whether legitimate or only "natural," who suddenly found himself in slavery. Two sides of the question are essential here.

First, in addition to legal kinship, it turns out that the right is also considered with the slave "natural" kinship. It turns out that although it was not recognized by law (after all, the released person officially did not have a father, but only a patron), it was still recognized. In this context, it can be added that "natural" kinship was considered a" legitimate cause " (causa iusta) for manumission. What does it mean? Although there were age restrictions (concerning both the age of the person being released and the age of the person being released) for free leave with citizenship rights (as discussed below), they were not an insurmountable obstacle if there was a "legitimate reason". In other words, a citizen who has-

12. Si quando is, qui in possessione servitutis constitutus est, litigare de condicione sua non patitur, quod forte sibi suoque generi vellet aliquam iniuriam inferre, in hoc casu aequum est quibusdam personis dari licentiam pro eo litigare: ut puta parenti, qui dicat filium in sua potestate esse: nam etiamsi nolit filius, pro eo litigabit. sed et si in potestate non sit, parenti dabitur hoc ius, quia semper parentis interest filium servitutem non subire (Ulp. 54 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 1 pr.).

13. Versa etiam vice dicemus liberis parentium etiam invitorum eandem facultatem dari: neque enim modica filii ignominia est, si parentem servum habeat (ibid., ? 1).

14. Idcirco visum est cognatis etiam hoc dari debere (ibid., ? 2).

15. Gai. ad ed. pr. urb. de liberali causa = D. 40. 12. 2: quoniam servitus eorum ad dolorem nostrum iniuriamque nostram pomgitur.

16. Amplius puto naturalibus quoque hoc idem praestandum, ut parens filium in servitute quaesitum et manumissum possit in libertatem vindicare (Ulp. 54 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 3 pr.).

17. Militi etiam pro necessariis sibi personis de libertate litigare permittitur (ibid., ? 1).

18. Cum vero talis nemo alius est, qui pro eo litiget, tune necessarium est dari facultatem etiam matri vel filiabus vel sororibus eius ceterisque mulieribus quae de cognatione sunt vel etiam uxori adire praetorem et hoc indicare, ut causa cognita et invito ei succurratur (ibid., ? 2; курсив мой. - B.C.).

19. Sed et si libertum meum vel libertam dicam, idem erit dicendum (ibid. ? 3).

20. Sed tune patrono conceditur pro libertate liberti litigare, si eo ignorante libertus venire se passus est (Gai. ad ed. pr. urb. de liberali causa = D. 40. 12. 4).

21. Interest enim nostra libertos libertasque habere (Ulp. 54. ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 5 pr.).

22. Quod si plures ex memoratis personis existant, qui velint pro his litigare, praetoris partes interponendae sunt, ut eligat, quern potissimum in hoc esse existimat. quod et in pluribus patronis observari debet (ibid., ? 1).

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those who held a "natural" son, daughter, brother, or sister in slavery (23) or any blood relative in general (240) were free to release them, regardless of their age (25). Where did he get such relatives? He or his father might have introduced them to the slaves. But something else is also possible. Letting go (despite his youth) he could be released himself, and get his relatives from his former master as property (as happened when he was on vacation with Peculius), so that he could release them himself. One way or another, we are talking about the release to freedom of "illegal", "slave" relatives with the granting of citizenship rights. This should also include leave of absence for a slave matrimonii causa - that is, for entering into a legal marriage with her (if, according to the status of a master, "it is not shameful (indigne) for him to take a wife of this position" (26) - marriage with a released woman was forbidden to the senator). In this case, an oath was taken from the released person that he would marry the released person within six months (27). Often it was a question of legalizing actual marriage, for example, for soldiers, for whom this was a common occurrence. But the Digests also indicate this possibility: even a woman can release a male slave matrimonii causa, if she is released, and her cohabitant slave was transferred to her by will (according to which she herself was released) (28). Replenishment of the number of citizens in this way was not condemned, although for a freeborn woman, marriage with her released person was considered shameful. But we will also talk about letting go with the rights of citizenship.

In the meantime, let us ask, where did the Roman citizens have legitimate relatives, or at least freedmen who fell into slavery? Our surprise may increase when we learn that claims related to these people have not always been settled. We are faced with a very interesting phenomenon, which, in my opinion, is rarely noted in the literature (at least historically): it turns out that any Roman (well, not a senator, of course) he could have been enslaved and lost the protection of the law. And not for debts (this was forbidden, and the bonded debtor was firmly considered free), not for a crime (this was a special case and was regulated in a special way), but just like that, by an unfortunate combination of circumstances. If someone - robbers (latrones, plagiarii), swindlers-sold a free person as a slave, then the buyer did not enjoy any protection of the law only if he knew that he was buying a free person (D. 40. 12. 7.2; 40.12.16.2-4; 40.12.33), although it is illegal Of course, he could have exploited the bought and captured for quite a long time: accusations against the rich, whose ergastulae are full of free ones, are a common place among Roman rhetoricians. The buyer could bring a claim against the sellers that he did not know about the true status of the purchased item, and it is not for nothing that the heroes of Plavtov's "Persian", selling a free girl to a pimp in order to deceive him and embezzle money, consider it necessary to warn the pimp: she is free, the purchase is at your risk (29). Note that fraud this sort of thing seems to have been common: Ulpian writes that the praetor must resist "the cunning (calliditati) of those who, knowing their free state, maliciously (dolo malo) allowed themselves to be sold for slaves "(30).

23. Si minor annis viginti manumittit, huiusmodi solent causae manumissionis recipi: si filius filiave frater sororve naturalis sit... (Ulp. 6 de off. procons. = D. 40. 2. 11).

24. Ulp. 2 ad I. Ael. Sent. = D. 40. 2. 12: vel si sanguine eum contingit (habetur enim ratio cognationis).

25. Cf.Cai. I. 18-19; 38 sqq.

26. Matrimonii causa manumittere si quis velit et is sit, qui non indigne huiusmodi condicionis uxorem sortiturus sit, erit ei concedendum (Ulp. 2 de off. cons. = D. 40. 2. 20. 2).

27. ...si matrimonii causa virgo vel mulier manumittatur, exacto prius iureiurando, ut intra sex menses uxorem earn duci oporteat: ita enim senatus censuit (Ulp. libro de off. procons. = D. 40.2.13).

28. Sunt qui putant etiam feminas posse rnatrimonii causa manumittere, sed ita, si forte conservus suus in hoc ei legatus est (Marcian. 4 reg. = D. 40. 2. 14. 1).

29. Plaut. Pers. 824-825: ас suo pericio is emat qui earn mercabitur: / mancipio neque promittet neque quisquam dabit ("Who will buy, the risk of that purchase takes on itself, / You do not promise ownership, no one will give"; trans. by A. Artyushkov).

30. Rectissime praetor calliditati eorum, qui, cum se liberos scirent, dolo malo passi sunt se pro servis venum dari, occurrit (Ulp. 55 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 14pr.).

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the one who is guilty of evil intent ("be it a man, be it a woman" - added from Paul (31)), who "pretends to be a slave and thus sells herself to deceive the buyer" (32). Note that Plautius ' heroine is also cleared of reproach here - she allows herself to be sold, obeying her father's authority, and those who allow themselves to be sold "in obedience to force or fear" are "free from malice" (33). More significantly, however, something else: from the above quotes, it seems that even without knowing about the status of the person being sold, the first buyer could not have been deceived. This is sometimes associated with the ruling that if the free person being sold is older than 20 years and has received part of the price, then he remains in slavery (34). Buckland and Barrow believe that this regulation was adopted to combat fraudulent sales (35), but usually it is considered a self-sale permit (36). For us, his motive is now, however, irrelevant.

But if the first buyer, even knowing about the status of the sold item, resold it to someone who did not know, then the trap was closed. The sold person remained a slave, and the claim for his freedom was denied (37). The law protects the right of the "bona fide" buyer, not the right of the sold person. Even if a free man who is resold is bought into common ownership by two people: the one who knows and the one who does not know, the former loses his money, but the latter gets the slave "entirely" (38). A free man could have been enslaved in another way:

"If I sell and transfer to you a usufruct (i.e., right of use) on a free person, that person, according to Quintus Mucius, becomes a slave, but the dominium (on him - B.C.) will only be mine if I made the sale in good faith (bona fide), otherwise it will be mine." he will be a slave without a master " (39). This way of enslaving the free is interesting because the testimony dates back to the Republican period (Paul refers to Quintus Mucius Scaevola), i.e. one should not try to see in it signs of the disintegration of the institutions of the civil community.

How can we explain this possibility, which existed in Roman law, of enslaving free, moreover Roman citizens, and without any fault of their own? It is difficult to understand this from the point of view of our logic, but apparently the explanation must be sought in the meaning of the principles of bona fides (good faith, i.e. conscientious error) and dolus malus (malicious intent) in Roman law. For now, we will confine ourselves to stating the facts.

Since we are talking about "bona fide" and "dolo malo", we note that according to the Roman

31. Paul. 51 ad. ed. = D. 40. 12. 15: (id est sive virilis sexus sive feminini sit, dummodo eius aetatis sit, ut dolum capiat).

32. ...qui finxit se servum et sic veniit decipiendi emptoris causa (Ulp. 55 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 16 pr.).

33. Si tamen vi metuque compulsus fuit hie qui distractus est, dicemus eum dolo carere (Ulp. 55 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 16. 1).

34. For the legal regulation of the situation of self-sale, see Morabito M. Les realites de 1'esclavage d'apres Ie Digeste. P., 1981. P. 72-74.

35. Buckland W.W. Op. cit. P. 427-433; Barrow R.H. Slavery in the Roman Empire. L., 1928. P. 11 f.

36. Shtaerman E. M., Trofimova M. K. Slaveholding relations in the early Roman Empire. (Italy). Moscow, 1971, pp. 23, 226.

37. Ulp. 54 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 7. 2: ... sed enim si postea alius eum emerit ab hoc, qui scivit, ignorans, deneganda est ei libertas; Paul. l.s. de liberal! c. = D. 40. 12. 33: Qui sciens liberum emit, quamvis et ille se pateretur venire, tamen non potest contradicere ei qui ad libertatem proclamat: sed si alii eum ignoranti vendiderit, denegabitur ei proclamatio.

38. Si duo liberum hominem maiorem annis viginti emerimus, unus sciens eius condicionem, alter ignorans, non propter eum qui scit ad libertatem ei proclamare permittitur, sed propter eum qui ignorat servus efficietur, sed non etiam eius qui scit, sed tantum alterius (Paul. l.s. ad SC Claud. = D. 40. 13. 5). Si duo simul emerint partes, alter sciens, alter ignorans, videndum erit, numquid is qui scit non debeat nocere ignoranti: quod quidem magis est. sed enim ilia erit quaestio, partem solam habebit is qui ignoravit an totum? et quid dicemus de alia parte? an ad eum qui scit pertineat? sed ille indignus est quid habere, quia sciens emerit. rursum qui ignoravit, non potest maiorem partem dominii habere quam emit: evenit igitur, ut ei prosit qui eum comparavit sciens, quod alius ignoravit (Ulp. 54 ad ed.=D.40. 12.7. 3).

39. Si usum fructum tibi vendidero liberi hominis et cessero, servum effici eum dicebat Quintus Mucius, sed dominium ita demum fieri meum, si bona fide vendidissem, alioquin sine domino fore (Paul. 50 ad ed. = D. 40. 12.23pr.).

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according to these concepts, both the free man could be free dolo malo, and the slave could be free sine dolo malo (40). The first occurs when the free man was stolen as a child and was enslaved bona fide (due to the conscientious error of the master and, apparently, his own), and then "left" (i.e., escaped) and began to" secretly " (clam) live in freedom (in libertate morari) (41). The second took place when the slave was released by a master who wrongly considered him his own, or when the slave was brought up as a free man (42).

So, the above material shows that the completely opposite statuses of freedom and slavery in Roman society were not only not separated by an impassable wall, but often could not be established with sufficient reliability. It was not for nothing that the court's decision on the establishment of free status was formulated in the cautious terms" does not seem to be a slave " (servus non videri-D. 40. 12. 27. 1), and the establishment of the status of a freeborn required special investigation, and it was not for nothing that the status of the deceased could be investigated for five years after death (title D. 40. 15: Ne de statu defunctorum post quinquennium quaeratur).

A clear "Guy's dichotomy" does not yet lead in practice to a clear separation of slaves from free people. On the contrary, we can say that it was carried out in not always successful attempts to understand the confusing reality. The status of a particular person could only be one or the other. But it was not fixed, and it was sometimes difficult to establish it. We can say that the" ideal " image of a civic community has become confused and clogged up in the course of its development. But in the "ideal" (if this is what we will call legal thought) and in the tradition, the connection of Roman slavery with the civil community was, on the contrary, more organic. This can be shown by the example of the institute of emancipation. Let's try to do this briefly.

We are talking about a manumission with the rights of citizenship. Roman tradition considers this institution to be primordial, linking it with Servius Tullius as the founder of the qualification (43). In the so-called Pre-Tithe fragment, we read: "Previously, there was a single freedom and freedom was granted by vindict, will or qualification, and the released belonged to the Roman citizenship "(44). The "Dositheus fragment" is an excerpt from the work of a Roman lawyer, which served to teach the Greeks Latin (45). Apparently, it was not by chance that the legal text, the text about released persons, and the text that pays special attention to granting freedom to released persons were chosen for this purpose .citizenship - that is, an institution that was alien to Greek law, at least in "classical" times.

Based on this discrepancy with the Greek data, attempts have been made, and sometimes are still being made, to challenge the origin of this Roman institution and come up with a reason for its "invention" in historical times. We join those historians who do not see any grounds for this.

Moreover, we have evidence to suggest that the earliest Roman law allowed the freedman to apply not only to Roman law, but also to the equation

40. Igitur sciendum est et liberum posse dolo malo in libertate esse et servum posse sine dolo malo in libertate esse (Ulp. 55 ad ed. = D. 40. 12. 12 pr.).

41. Infans subreptus bona fide in servitute fuit, cum liber esset, deinde, cum de statu ignarus esset, recessit et clam in libertate morari coepit: hie non sine dolo malo in libertate moratur (ibid., ? 1).

42. Potest et servus sine dolo malo in libertate morari, ut puta testamento accepit libertatem, quod nullius momenti esse ignorat, vel vindicta ei imposita est ab eo, quern dominum esse putavit, cum non esset, vel educatus est quasi liber, cum servus esset (ibid., ? 2).

43. Dinnys. IV. 22. 4: 6 8 TuXXio? koi. -rots ' eXeuOepoup. eroi.? tuv beratgbtyg, eav [ii} bshshslr els-ta? eavTUv tt6X?1? dmeva\., [ie-reew tt? 1. stottoH. te!. a? etgetrefe. keHsista? yap ciJ.a tol? aXXoi? attastsh e-XcuOepoi.? koi. toutou? tsrsgastba!, ta? avoids, b1? (puXa? Kateta aitoi? that one? kata tgbHi / tettara? an ittarchoist?...

44. Antea enim una libertas erat et manumissio fiebat vindicta vel testamento vel censu, et civitas Romana competebat manumissis (Fr. dos. 5).

45. See. /ors. Fragmentum Dositheanum // RE. Bd 5 (1905). Sp. 1603-1606.

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its with the freeborn. Aulus Gellius tells us about one of the jurists of the first century A.D.: "Masurius Sabinus wrote that freedmen, in fact, according to the law, can be adopted by free-born. But he said that this was not permitted; indeed, he did not think that it should ever be permitted that people of the freed class should be introduced into the rights of freeborn children by adoption. Otherwise, "he says," if we consider this legal antiquity to be still valid, then the master can even give a slave for adoption through the praetor (to a third person - B.C.). Most ancient legal writers wrote about this, according to him, as possible" (46). The adoption of released persons by the patron was subsequently formally prohibited, and the "single freedom" with the right of citizenship was preserved only for those released to freedom in compliance with all formalities (iusta manumissio). It should be noted that sources very strongly emphasize the connection between the granting of citizenship and the right on which these slaves belonged to the master. So, about the oldest method of manumission - censors-in the Pre-Tithe fragment we read: "Anyone who is released by the censor, if he is already 30 years old, receives Roman citizenship. But it is necessary that this slave should belong to the one who releases him by right of the Quirites, in order that he may become a Roman citizen " (47).

In later times, slaves released into the wild were divided into three categories. For the lowest of them, the "Peregrine dedititii," as Gaius points out, admission to Roman or Latin citizenship was forbidden, "even if they belonged to the lords in full right (pleno iure)" (48). In order for a slave to become a Roman citizen, i.e., to receive a Quirite right himself (ad ius Quiritium perveniat; ius Quiritium consequuntur - Gai. I. 32-35), three conditions were necessary: the age of 30, belonging to the master by Quirite right, and legal (iusta ac legitima) manumission. If one of the conditions was missing, the slave received Latin citizenship (49), from which he could then transfer to Roman citizenship.

In fact, Latin citizenship for a certain category of freedmen-first of all, those released without official formalities-was established under Tiberius. Before that, they were considered slaves, free at the master's will and freed only from " servile fear "(serviendi metu) (50). However, even this position was not determined in a private way, but was protected by the praetor (51).

In general, the manumission had two sides: negative and positive, so to speak. The first was limited to the slave's escape from the power of a given master, and it was private. The second, in fact, gave freedom and dictated the subsequent status of free, and it was determined by the civil community, represented by the praetor, proconsul or other official. "A private agreement," we read in the Digests, "cannot make anyone either a slave or someone else's freedman" (52). You can include

46. Libertines vero ab ingenuis adoptari quidem iure posse Masurius Sabinus scripsit. Sed id neque permitti dicit neque permittendum esse umquam putat, ut homines libertini ordinis per adoptiones in iura ingenuorum invadant. "Alioquin", inquit "si iuris ista antiquitas servetur, etiam servus a domino per praetorem dari in adoptionem potest". Idque ait plerosque iuris veteris auctores posse fieri scripsisse (Cell. 5. 19. 11-14).

47. Et qui censu manumittitur, si triginta annos habeat, civitatem Romanam nanciscitur... Sed debet hie servus ex iure Quiritium manumissoris esse, ut civis Romanus fiat (Fr. dos. 17).

48. Gai. I. 15: ...etsi pleno iure dominorum fuerint, numquam aut cives Romanes aut Latinos fieri dicemus...

49. Nam in cuius personam tria haec concurrunt, ut maior sit annorum triginta et ex iure Quiritium domini et iusta ac legitima manumussione liberetur, id est vindicta aut censu aut testamento, is civis Romanus fit; sin vero aliquid eorum deerit, Latinus erit (Gai. \. 17).

50. Fr. dos. 4: ... dicitur de eis, qui inter amicos olim manumittebantur, non esse liberos, sed domini voluntate in libertate morari et tantum serviendi metu dimitti.

51. Fr. dos. 5: hi autem, qui domini voluntate in libertate erant, manebant servi: sed si manumissores ausi erant in servitutem denuo eos per vim ducere, interveniebat praetor et non patiebatur manumissum servire.

52. Conventio privata neque servum quemquam neque libertum alicuius facere potest (Call. 2 quaest. = D. 40. 12. 37).

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there are many examples of state regulation of relations related to slavery and emancipation, but we will leave this for another time.

The conditionality of the position of a freedman in the civil community due to the belonging of his former master to this civil community, as a number of researchers, apparently rightly, believe, is rooted in ancient Italian institutions.

Thus, through the personality of the master (in whose power the slave was and who could make the slave a citizen), the slave was indirectly connected with the civil community as a kind of latent citizen. The historian and rhetorician of the second century AD Florus wrote: "The shame of the slave war can still be borne, for although fortune has made them subject to everything, they are still a second class of people and even approach the benefits of our freedom "(53). This phrase seems to be a reminiscence from Cicero's speech for Balbus. Speaking of the fact that the Romans also granted citizenship to former enemies, Cicero concludes:"...finally, the slaves, whose rights and destinies (ius, fortuna, condicio) are the lowest, have very often been granted freedom, i.e. citizenship, on behalf of the state (publice) for their services to the republic" (54).

But the issue of the released person, his freedom, his citizenship needs special consideration. In the present report, we have considered it necessary to touch on this topic as well, in order to better describe the relationship of slaves to the civil community and, consequently, their position in Roman society.

SLAVE'S LIBERTY AND FREE MAN'S SLAVERY (Some Aspects of the History of Roman Civic Community) V.M. Smirin

The paper tries to give a more precise outline of slaves' relation to the civic community (and thus of their position in Roman society) on the basis of Roman legal regulations and legal science.

Every man's status could be described, at least theoretically, either as that of a free man or a slave. Roman legal science knew no intermediate grade. Still, not only there was no blind wall between the opposite statuses of freedom and slavery, more often than not the status could not even be ascertained.

"Gaius' dichotomy" (Gai. 1.9: omnes homines aut liheri sunt aut servi) does not imply the sharp border between the two statuses in practice. Every man's status could be either free or servile, but it was not necessarily unchangeable and was sometimes hard to be proved. The possibility of transition from one to the other produced many curious situations; legal actions concerning the status (causa liheralis) was not uncommon, and a whole titulus of the Digesta (40.12) was dedicated to it. Jurist's writings portray a society where a free member of the civic community (freeborn or not) could have a relative, legal or only "natural", who was a slave. What is more, any Roman could become a slave and lose the protection of the law - not for a crime or debt, but as a result of an unfortunate coincidence. When such an unfortunate man was sold, the law, regulated by the principles of hona fides and dolus malus, sided with the good-faith buyer, not with the sold man.

The innr'te connection between Roman slavery and the civic community is better seen in the institution of manumission, which had both "negative" and "positive" aspects. The former concerned slave's liberation from his master's power and was private. The latter, determined by the civic community, consisted in the acquisition of liberal status from the praetor or other magistrate (cf. Dig. 40. 12. 37). The practice of granting Roman citizenship to freedmen had existed since the earliest times. There is even some evidence that the Roman law of the earliest times might have admitted the equalisation of a freedman's rights with the rights of a free-born citizen (Cell. 5. 19. 1-14).

Through his master (who had the power to make him citizen) a slave was connected with the civic community and turned to be a "latent" citizen. The slaves, in spite of their low status, constituted an integrated part of the society whose structural core was the civic community.

53. Enimvero et servilium armorum dedecus feras; nam etsi per fortunam in omnia obnoxii, tamen quasi secundum hominum genus sunt et in bona libertatis nostrae adoptantur (Flor. II. 8).

54. Cic. Pro Balb. 24: ... servos denique, quorum ius, fortuna, condicio infima est, bene de re publica meritos persaepe libertate, id est civitate, publice donari videmus.

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