Historiographical concepts of the development of France in the post-de Gaulle period are in the process of . In the French bourgeois historical and journalistic literature, there is no analysis of the connection between the country's domestic and foreign policy and the increased concentration of monopolistic capital in the 70s. Meanwhile, the apology for an" advanced liberal society " that took place during this period was only a disguise for the growing omnipotence of monopolies, the attack of capital on the vital interests and rights of workers. Changes in the system of class rule of the French bourgeoisie after 1968 resulted in an increase in the economic and political role of monopolistic groups, in a more complete use of levers of state regulation of the economy in the interests of big capital, in increased repression against the working class, along with the implementation of social maneuvering, in a large-scale ideological campaign to "neutralize" socialist and left-wing radical ideas.

In the 1970s, the capitalist world entered a period of declining economic growth and cyclical recessions, accompanied by monetary and financial turmoil, energy and raw material crises, and mass unemployment. The capitalist world's energy crisis, which began at the end of 1973, largely affected the French economy, which imported 70% of the energy resources used .2 A cyclical downturn soon followed. Industrial production in the Fifth Republic declined by 10% in 1975.3 The crisis of 1974-1975 covered all the main sectors of the national economy - energy, raw materials complexes, production of equipment and consumer goods.

France has not been aloof from the radical technological restructuring of the production base that has begun at a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution. However, this process, carried out mainly by monopolies in their interests, was associated with social costs at the expense of workers.

In the second half of the 70s and early 80s, the French economy developed at a slow pace: from mid-1974 to the end of 1979, industrial production increased by only 3% 4 . In the second half of 1980, a new economic downturn began. Industrial production declined by 2% yoy5. The automotive industry has been particularly affected. Automobile production in January 1981 was 24.3% lower than a year ago .6 An indicator of economic distress was a reduction in capital investment

1 Вredin J. -D. La république de Monsieur Pompidou. P. 1974; Debbasch Ch. La France de Pompidou. P. 1974; Duhamel A. La république giscardienne. P. 1980; Petitfils J. -C. La démocratic giscardienne. .P. 19.81..

2 Le Monde, 17.IV.1974. .

3 Parodi M. L'économie "et la société francaise depuis 1945. P. 1981, p, 61. La Vie ouvrière, 31.III - 6.IV.1980, p. 16.

5 Economie et politique, mai-juin 1981, p. 7.

6 L'Humanité, 28.11.1981.

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(from 1974 to 1981 - by 10% 7), which was a reflection of both cyclical recessions and the desire of large capital to look abroad for more profitable areas of its application. The franc depreciated by 30% against the West German mark during the presidency of V. Giscard d'Estaing .8
The monopolies tried to compensate for the economic complications by further concentration of capital and even greater pressure on the state authorities. In the 70s, French state-monopoly capitalism began to boost the efficiency of social production and the creation of powerful monopolistic groups, including transnational ones. France began to specialize in industries that required highly skilled labor , such as aerospace, automotive, electronics, telecommunications, nuclear power, and applied biology9 , while traditional industries such as coal, textiles, shipbuilding, and metallurgy were declining.

A notable feature of the organization of the French capitalist economy was not a large enterprise, but a monopolistic group that was more efficient in terms of rationalizing production, representing a federation of enterprises of various sizes and specializations. These groups seek to gain access to sources of raw materials and energy, exploit differences in production costs in a particular country or geographical region, benefit from protectionist barriers, monopolistic possession of modern technology, and differences in the tax system.

The process of monopolization of capital in France noticeably increased already in the 60s (if in 1958 there were 541 operations for convergence and merger of capital, then in 1967-1752), but in the 70s the unification of the largest monopolies became remarkable. The period 1968-1976 was the period of the most intensive formation of the modern structure of monopolistic groups in France .11 Thus, in 1970, the Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson multi-industry group was formed, in 1971 - the chemical group Pescinet-Yuzhin-Culman, in 1974-the Imetal group, in 1976-the automobile group Peugeot-Citroen, etc. In the mid-1970s, 244 French and 75 foreign groups operated in the French economy, with 14 of the 295 industrial sectors having a monopolistic structure, 33 were dominated by one leading firm, and 34 had a dipoly12 . In 1979, the French companies that make up the groups had a total annual turnover of over 2000 billion francs and 4.6 million workers and employees, which was 45% and 41% of the total annual turnover and number of employees for all companies registered by the tax office, respectively .13 If we take into account the subcontracting system, the influence of groups was even more significant. The monopoly groups were led by two financial empires, Paribas and Suez. The first of them brought together 2,600 companies with 700,000 workers and employees and a gross turnover of 150 billion francs. The Suez Group controlled 1,600 companies with an annual turnover of 30 billion francs. They employed 550,000 people 14 .

7 Ibid., 4.V. 1982.

8 Ibid., 6.X. 1981.

9 Le Point, 12.1.1981, p. 40.

10 Cahiers du communisrne, 1970, N 2 - 3, p, 38.

11 Вellon B. Le pouvoir financier et 1'industrie en France. P. 1980, p. 43.

12 Les groupes de sociétés dans le système productif francais. P. 1980, p. 68.

13 Economie et politique, 1982. N 147, p. 9.

14 Allard P. et divers. Dictionnaire des groupes industriels et financiers en France. P. 1978, pp. 35 - 36, 93 - 94.

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Among the largest industrial groups were the oil companies Compagnie Française de Petrolle and ELF-Akitain (with state capital participation), the automobile companies Peugeot-Citroen and Renault (nationalized), the electrical and electronic companies Thomson-Brandt and Compagnie General d'Electricite, and the chemical companies Pescinet-Yuzhin.- Kuhlmann " and "Ron-Poulenc", multi-industry "Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson", etc.

The formation of monopoly groups clearly shows the falsity of the myth created by bourgeois ideologists about the "democratization of capital" and "people's capitalism". It is noteworthy that in the 70s in France, an average of 30 thousand enterprises disappeared annually, and 16-18 thousand were created. 15 Thus, there was an absolute reduction in the number of enterprises.

The Governments of the Fifth Republic fully promoted the development of the monopolization process. Under President Zh. Pompidou firms that merged were exempt from part of the taxes. The authorities simplified the legal procedure for liquidating failed companies: from now on, a month was enough time to put small businesses under the hammer. In March 1970, the Institute of Industrial Development was established with the participation of public and private capital, designed to promote structural adjustment of the economy .16 However, the state did not seek to strengthen the role of the nationalized sector.

The economic activity of the state was concentrated mainly in those parts that formed the infrastructure of the economy and were not characterized by high profitability (gas, coal, electric power industry, railway transport), as well as in some industries where the risk of capital investment is particularly high. Before partial nationalization in 1982, the public sector accounted for 10% of gross domestic product, more than a third of all capital expenditures, more than 80% of bank deposits, and two thirds of savings banks ' funds .17
Fiscal indulgences and government subsidies to monopolies have become the most prominent feature of French state-monopoly capitalism. Although the tax deduction on company profits has been set at 50% since 195818, the Governments of the Fifth Republic have selectively reduced taxes on monopolies. In 1978, government control over prices excluding petroleum products and pharmaceuticals was abolished .19
The State sector in industry has increasingly become an appendage of the capitalist economy. As Soviet economists note, " unlike in the first post-war years, by the end of the 70s, most of the old nationalized companies and almost all new branches were no longer fully owned by the state: they were mixed companies in which the state owned only a part of the share capital. " 20 The economic policy of state-owned and mixed enterprises was practically no different from that of private monopolies.

One of the ways to support monopolistic capital was the practice of the state's refusal of the rights of the largest shareholder in determining the policy of individual monopolies (Compagnie Française de Petroleum, Air Liquide, Compagnie General d'étrisité, etc.).

15 Elgozy G. L'entreprise en péril. P. 1975, p. 24.

16 L'Année politique 1970. P. 1971, p. 123.

17 Соlli H. La liberté a des idees. P. 1978, p. 98.

18 Вellon B. Op. cit., p. 160.

19 Simonnot Ph. Le grand bluff économique des soialistes. P. 1982, p. 153; Ardagh J. France in the 1980's. Lnd. 1982, p. 39.

20 France (Modern monopoly capitalism). Moscow, 1982, p. 92.

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Public and private firms often set up joint branches.

The strategy of French monopolies in the 70s was also expressed in the formation of multinational companies( TNCs), the creation of numerous branches abroad, and integration with foreign capital. At the same time, the anti-national nature of monopolies was particularly pronounced. Even those international trusts dominated by French capital preferred to set up their businesses abroad rather than in France, regardless of national interests. The mastodons of French monopoly capital - the parastatal Compagnie Française de Petrolle (Total), Compagnie General d'étrisité, Ron - Poulenc, Pescinet-Sougin-Culmann, Michelin - sold 45 to 70% of their turnover abroad .21 Ron-Poulenc closed five plants in France and expanded its production in Brazil at the same time. Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson reduced its investment in the country by 23% between 1974 and 1979, resulting in the dismissal of 12,000 workers, but the company's overall profits increased by 40% .22
Fearing nationalization and looking for" safe " places with a favorable tax regime, French multinational companies have established their headquarters outside the country. Thus, the Pescinet-Yuzhin-Kuhlmann and Michelin groups placed their financial holdings in Switzerland, Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson and Suez - in Switzerland and Panama, the Ampen-Schneider group - in Switzerland and Bermuda, and Riveau-in Switzerland and Bermuda. in Vanuatu and the Cayman Islands, Paternel Company du Midi in the Antilles and Panama 23 .

The manager of the largest financial group Paribas, J. de Fouchier, did not hide the fact that the strategy of forming multinational companies, among other things, pursues the interests of self-preservation of financial capital. "To internationalize," he said in 1974, " is to make nationalization in France psychologically absurd and technically difficult... Maximum internationalization has therefore become an urgent necessity. " 24
The Government promoted the internationalization of capital. President Zh. Pompidou acknowledged in 1970: "Contrary to widely held beliefs, almost all the proposals of American monopolies to invest in France were accepted by the French government." 25 During the presidency of V. Giscard d'Estaing, the so-called industrial deployment policy pursued by the government of R. Barr assumed maximum orientation towards the international division of labor, but in fact led to the subordination of the national economy to the interests of multinational companies, doomed a number of traditional French industries to slow extinction, and hindered the solution of socio-economic problems in the interests of workers. The essence of the economic course of the ruling circles, as the theoretical body of the PCF noted, was "to restructure the French economy in accordance with the interests of transnational groups" .26
Forced to seek economic and political support from American and West German imperialism in the global strategy of its transnational monopolies, France was paying the price

21 L'lmpérialisme francais aujourd'hui. P. 1977, pp. 20 - 22.

22 L'Humanité, 3.IX.1979.

23 Claude H. Les multinationales et l'impérialisme. P. 1978, p. 116.

24 Unité, 28.1 V. 1978.

25 Cit. by: Manyadas J. Expansion of TNCs and exploitation of Workers, Working Class and the Modern World, 1981, No. 1, pp. 84-85.

26 Cahiers du communisrne, 1980, N 7 - 8, p. 16.

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for this, certain concessions are made to their partners. The franc's breakaway from the dollar, which was successfully launched under de Gaulle, has stalled. The Fifth Republic began to reduce its trade with the United States, Germany and Japan with a huge deficit. In 1980, it amounted to 48.4 billion francs, and in 1981-55 billion francs .27 France's technological dependence on foreign countries, especially the United States, has increased. From 1970 to 1978, 27,000 French businesses came under foreign control. In total, 23.6% of investments in French industry were made by foreigners .28 The introduction of foreign capital into the electronics, nuclear power, chemical and food industries was particularly noticeable.

According to Jean Magniadas, director of the Center for Socio - Economic Research of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the policy of TNC expansion in France led to the redistribution of capital by industry and within each industry in order to maximize profits, during which there was a massive depreciation of capital in non - monopolistic sectors. At the same time, there is a tendency to curb domestic consumption (mainly at the expense of the working class) to achieve a balanced balance of payments, to increase the exploitation of the labor force, to eliminate many of the social gains of the workers, and to undermine the foundations of national independence .29
The close interweaving of French and foreign monopolistic capital could not but influence the strengthening of Atlanticism in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic. France also developed its own military-industrial complex, which began to exert an ever-increasing influence on the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

Under de Gaulle's successors, the influence of monopolies on determining government policy increased even more. J. Pompidou was for many years the manager of the Rothschild Bank. V. Giscard d'Estaing was connected through his father and grandfather with the Indochina Bank, through his wife-with the Schneider Group, through his brother-with branches of multinational corporations IBM, Ericsson"and" Gibbs " 30 . He himself was the epitome of technocratic power, having gone through the classic career of all technocrats from studying at the privileged Polytechnic Institute and the National Administrative School to serving as an inspector of finance.

French monopolies have skillfully used one of the country's established traditions - highly centralized power-for their own purposes. This tradition had its roots in the monarchy and Bonapartism. In the new conditions, it was primarily the presidential power. In the 70s, authoritarian methods of government continued to strengthen. Pompidou, in the first days of his stay at the Elysee Palace, said that his concept of presidential power would steadily follow the Gaullist one. It not only preserved the "presidential sector" (the area of personal involvement of the head of state in determining policy), but also expanded it. While de Gaulle gave the Prime Minister the right to play his part in everyday affairs, Pompidou sought to make all decisions, even the most insignificant ones, for himself. 31 If de Gaulle appointed a prime minister and suggested the names of two or three ministers, his successor selected all the members of the government himself, and sometimes even their advisers .32 Pointing out at a press conference on July 2, 1970, that "it does not exist-

27 Economie et politique, 1982, N 5, p. 55.

28 L'Humanité, 10.IV.1978.

29 Manyadas J. Uk. soch., p. 85-86.

30 Vellon V. Op. cit., p. 21.

31 Alexandre Ph. Le duel (De Gaulle - Pompidou). P. 1970, p. 409.

32 Вassi M., Campana A. Le grand tournoi. P. 1974, p. 42,

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in view of the risk of a crisis in relations between the head of state and his Prime Minister," Pompidou confirmed that he is the de facto head of the executive branch .33 During the discussion of the role of the president in the Senate in May 1973, the tendency of the regime to slide towards a "presidential monarchy" was not without reason noted .34
With the election of Giscard d'Estaing as President in May 1974, the prerogatives of the personal power of the head of State were not changed. At the first press conference at the Elysee Palace, Giscard d'Estaing described the regime of the Fifth Republic as "presidential." 36 Jacques Chirac, who served as Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976, was so constrained in his actions by presidential directives that in fact he only served as a representative of the executive branch in Parliament .36
Under Pompidou, the National Assembly continued to play a secondary role, although there were some tendencies to strengthen its independence. Since 1973, some parliamentarians have been "accredited" as observers to various ministries .37 However, while golists and centrists were given free access, communists and socialists were generally denied it .38 By the mid-1970s, the PCF deputies had submitted a total of about 200 draft laws to the National Assembly, but the obstruction of the ruling circles prevented even their discussion .39
The most important prerogative of the Parliament has always been to approve the budget. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic also introduced a significant limitation in this regard: amendments of the National Assembly and the Senate to budget items were not adopted if they were aimed at increasing state expenditures. The right of control of the Parliament over the expenditure of budget funds was significantly curtailed, since deputies did not have the opportunity to change the allocation of appropriations. If the Parliament did not approve the budget within 70 days, the Government could enact it by decree.

Rejection of the draft reform .The Senate's referendum on April 27, 1969, opened a new stage in reviving its traditional role as a counterweight to the first Chamber. The convergence of the party composition of the majority of the National Assembly and the Senate led to the fact that the government of Jacques Chirac on June 10, 1975 and the government of R. Barr on May 5, 1977 and May 11, 1978, put a program of their activities for discussion by the Senate. It was up to the Government to extend or limit the rights of the Senate on a case-by-case basis .40
In order to better coordinate their class strategy, the monopolies reorganized in 1969 the powers of the National Council of French Entrepreneurs (NSFP), which brought together the heads of 1,200 thousand enterprises. If earlier it was essentially an information club of entrepreneurs, now its functions have significantly expanded. The new charter provides for five main areas of its activity: to create the best reputation for entrepreneurs through all media channels, to protect the capitalist system, to negotiate with trade unions and the government, to provide professional training for entrepreneurs and managers, and to develop international relations with business unions.

33 L'Humanité, 3.VII.1970.

34 J. O. Débats. Le Sénat, 22.V.1973, p. 412. - .

35 Petitfil s J. -C. Op. cit, p. 58.

36 Duverger M Echec au roi. P. 1978, p. 183.

37 Debbasch Ch. La France de Pompidou. P. 1974, p. 66.

38 Suleiman E. Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France Princeton,, 1974 p. 362... ...

39 L'Humanité, 16.11.1976.

40 Revue francaise de science politique, 1981, N 1, pp. 35, 41.

41 Cahiers du communisme, 1980, N 5, p. 68.

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One of the most important tasks of the unions of entrepreneurs included in the NSFP is the "processing" of government agencies, especially those involved in social and economic policy. At one time, the General Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, which unites 700 thousand industrial and commercial enterprises, developed great political activity. The leadership of this organization represented the interests not of artisans and small merchants, but of medium-sized entrepreneurs. The Confederation was engaged in selecting candidates for elections, threatening governments with the refusal of their members to pay taxes and calling for general strikes of merchants .42
The dominant role in the NSFP was played by Zh. Zh., who was created in September 1969 under the leadership of the Chairman of the Union of Metallurgical and Mining Industries. Ferry Association of Large French Enterprises (AGREF). Its participants are "Compagnie Generale d'étrisité", "Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson", "Ron-Poulenc", "Pescinet-Sougin - Culmann", "Thomson", "Usinor" and other whales of the French economy.

The main task of the NSFP was to counteract the protests of the working class and coordinate the policies of entrepreneurs on a national scale. The staff of some full-time employees of the NSFP totals 6.5 thousand people. The NSFP has always advocated curbing wage growth and discouraging the expansion of trade union activity in enterprises. He strongly opposed the introduction of a scale that establishes a relationship between prices and wages. In order to curb class-based workers, French entrepreneurs have increased the role of bonuses in the wage system .43 They introduced bonuses for "diligence" - in other words, for non-participation in strikes. In 1972, the Union of Metallurgical and Mining Industries established a special fund of solidarity of entrepreneurs to disrupt strikes. Regular contributions are made to this fund in the amount of 0.2% of the total amount of salary paid 44 .

The NSFP made many efforts to change the social insurance system established in 1945-1946, during the rise of the democratic movement. Entrepreneurs sought to reduce social insurance costs, most of which (79.2%) were borne by themselves, and put insurance resources under their own control .45
Directorate for the Study of legislative proposals as part of the NSFP, which since 1947 is headed by E. A. Kolesnikov. Ober not only controlled the passage of all bills affecting entrepreneurs until 1981, but also financed the election campaign of desirable candidates for deputies, as well as monitored the activities of opposition parties. The election campaign cost each candidate for the National Assembly 50-60 thousand francs. 46 Considering that the monthly salary of a deputy was 12 thousand francs , it is safe to say that not everyone was able to pay even a part of these expenses.

Unions of entrepreneurs have become an organic part of the system of French state-monopoly capitalism. "Associations of entrepreneurs," the FKP magazine noted, " through their leaders, whether they are members of the oligarchy or their henchmen, represent one of the mechanisms by which business activity is carried out in our time.

42 Lavroff D. -G. Le systeme politique francais. La Vеrépublique. P. 1975, p. 160; Reynaud J. -D. Les syndicats en France. P. 1963, p. 39.

43 Bouvard M. Labor Movements in Common Market Countries. N. Y 1973, p. 33.

44 Branciard M Société francaise et luttes de classes. T. III. Lyon. 1977, p. 196.

45 CN'PF, février 1979, p. 3.

46 Campana A. L'argent secret. P. 1976, pp. 30, 80 - 85.

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merger of monopolies with the state " 47 . Not only the NSFP and its member unions, but also individual monopolies represent powerful "pressure groups".

France was no exception to the general tendency of state-monopoly capitalism to create parallel structures of power-clubs, circles, and associations where businessmen and politicians meet informally. Among them are the clubs "Century", "Jockey Club", "Circle of the Bois de Boulogne", "New Circle", "Club-100", etc.

The Vek Club has existed in France since 1944. However, few people knew about it until the fall of 1977. The members of this club were about 350 people. It is noteworthy that only persons with a prominent position in the system that connects the state with the business world were admitted to the club. The president of the club was the director of the newspaper "Le Monde" J. Fauvet, and the administrative council consisted of the President-General Director of "Paribas" P. Moussa, Deputy Director of "Bank National de Paris" J. Dromer, director of the state bank "Credit Agricole" J. Lalemand, manager of the firm "Creusot-Loire" F. Boulain, director of the firm "Peugeot-Citroen" by J.-P. Pareire et al. Among the members of the club were the President of the Republic Pompidou and the President of the National Assembly Chaban-Delmas. 42% of the members of the government of Chaban Delmas (1969-1972) were members of the Vek club, and in the third government of R. Barr, formed in April 1973, 22 out of 38 members were members of 48 . Creating a homogeneous and monolithic ruling caste was, in fact, the main task of the Vek Club and its ilk.

In 1973, the president of the third largest banking group in the capitalist world, Chase Manhattan Bank, D. Rockefeller created something like an international club - the "Trilateral Commission", where prominent politicians and businessmen from the United States, Western Europe and Japan were invited to coordinate their views. The French members of this commission were R. Barr, the banker E. Rothschild, the president of Paribas J. Fouchier, the president of Pescinet-Sougin-Culmann P. Jouvin, the president of Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson R. Martin, the president of the Paternel-Vi insurance company B. Pagezi, and others. 49 .

In order to maintain its class dominance, the French bourgeoisie began to transform its "cadre parties" into mass and disciplined organizations. Again, the Gaullists had the greatest experience in this respect. Their party, the Union for the Support of the Republic, had 700,000 members. Supporters of Giscard d'Estaing created their own coalition-the Union for French Democracy, which included the Republican Party, the radicals and the Democratic and Social Center. The total number of this group was 300 thousand people .50 The programs of the bourgeois parties did not differ much from each other.

In the system of bourgeois parties under J. Pompidou's monopoly position continued to be maintained by the Gaullians. By the early 1970s, about two dozen Gaullist organizations had infiltrated or "patronized" all parts of the state apparatus .51 A key role in this process belonged to the "Civil Action Service", created in 1958 with the participation of Jacques Foccard, who officially coordinated relations with the former colonies, and in fact led the secret services. The Civil Action Service, headed by P. Debise, P. Comiti and S. Pasca, was rarely mentioned in the press, with the exception of

47 France nouvelle, 27.I. -2.II 1965, p. 12.

48 Bothorel J. La république mondaine. P. 1979, pp. 42 - 44, 52 - 54.

49 Poulain J. -C. CFDT. La Réve et la vie. P. 1981, pp. 162 - 163.

58 Le Monde, 18, 20.III.1980.

51 CM. Passeron A. De Gaulle 1958 - 1969. P. -Montreal. 1972.

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a short period of preventive actions against the OAS terror in 1961-1962 and the May - July events of 1968 , when it became known that weapons were distributed to all members of this organization.

On May 24, 1968, the Civil Action Service prepared a plan for the internment of all "undesirable" leftists and trade unionists at the Stade de Charleti in Paris. Only the compromise made by the Government and entrepreneurs prevented the implementation of this plan .52 This organization was responsible for many political murders, acts of terror against workers ' pickets, against local organizations of the Communist Party and CGT, against Corsican separatists. This organization did not disdain robberies, drug trafficking and weapons, and provided assistance to foreign fascist groups .53 Its members have infiltrated the state apparatus, especially the army, police, and intelligence services.

Although France has a strong democratic tradition, it is no exception to the system of state-monopoly capitalism, which seeks to restrict the civil and social rights of workers. During the presidencies of Zh. Pompidou and V. Giscard d'Estaing began to speak less often about "direct democracy", While de Gaulle resorted to referendums five times, then Pompidou - only once in 1972 in connection with plans to expand the" Common Market", and this experiment turned out to be a semi-reflection for the government.

The events of May 1968 prompted the Government of Zh. Shaban-Delmas to strengthen the repressive apparatus. In 1970, it was decided to increase the gendarmerie corps by 8 thousand people within five years, bringing its number to 70,900 people. "The authorities," wrote J.-D. Bredin, a professor at the University of Paris-1, " have never ceased to feel fear. Before what? Before everything that resembles the great chaos, the shaken government, the collapse of the Gaullist state-before student riots, before the "wild" strike. " 54 In an attempt to prevent more student protests, the authorities have broken up large university complexes: in 1970, 65 new universities were created, including 13 in Paris. Many faculties were moved out of the city limits 55 .

In the event of new serious clashes with the working class, the Government of J. On 4 June 1970, Chaban - Delmas succeeded in enacting a law that indirectly restricted the right to strike .56 Under the pretext of "protecting public order" from actions related to causing material damage, the authorities were given the right to subject demonstrators to prison terms ranging from 1 to 5 years. This law introduced the concept of collective responsibility into French jurisdiction, which could be used to target democratic organizations. Trade unions and left-wing parties have described the act as a"vile law." A vote of no confidence submitted to the National Assembly by the Socialists on April 14, 1971, stated that "only violent actions will allow various categories of citizens to get the State authorities to take their demands into account." 57
Special restrictions on the right to strike were introduced for civil servants. Since 1961, there has been a law that obliges employees to:

52 Dumont S. Les brigades noires. Bruxelles. 1983, p. 114.

53 L'Humanité, 29.VII.1982.

54 Вredin J. -D. Op. cit., p. 20.

55 J. O. Débats. Le Sénat, 15.X.1970, p. 1484; Poivre d'Arvor P. Mai 68 - mai 78. P. 1978, p. 57.

56 L'Année politique 1970. P. 1971, p. 45.

57 L'Humanité, 15.IV. 1971.

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the public sector should give five days ' notice of the start of the strike. On September 6, 1970, a law came into force that effectively prohibited strikes by radio and television workers. Finally, in 1977, another law was passed prohibiting civil servants from carrying out a strike with the occupation of institutions. The authorities often used the aforementioned "Civil Action Service"to deal with strikers and trade union activists.

The problem of trade union rights in enterprises was far from eliminated by the 1968 law. Forced to accept it and make significant concessions to the working class, entrepreneurs launched an avalanche of reprisals against trade unions and workers ' activists they disliked, although the law of March 27, 1966 formally prohibits entrepreneurs from discriminating in hiring and firing workers on the grounds of trade union affiliation.

Pay on the lowest scale, refusal of promotion, dismissal of CGT professional workers - such repressions are widespread. Only 282 machine - building enterprises in 1968-1971 dismissed 304 trade unionists and 35 staff delegates, not counting many other cases of violation of trade union freedoms (fines, refusal to provide trade unions with premises at enterprises, etc.) 58. On November 14, 1972, the General Secretary of the CGT, Zh. Segui sent a letter of protest to the Minister of the Interior against police measures against trade unionists. As stated in the letter, the police commissariats have introduced an illegal practice of requiring released trade union workers to provide information about their salaries, trade union and political activities, and the occupations and political activities of their relatives. From 1974 to May 1976, according to the CGT, tens of thousands of violations of trade union freedoms were registered in enterprises .59 In 1976-1979, more than 10 thousand trade union activists were dismissed. This did not happen without the approval of the Minister of Labor .60
Monopolies made extensive use of agent information when hiring workers and employees. Entrepreneurs paid a certain fee to information providers for data related to professional qualities, standards of behavior,habits, views, political and trade union activities of employees. Membership in the Communist Party or holding an elected trade union position, as well as active participation in strikes, often served as a reason for refusing to work .61 "Trade union freedom in the enterprise is still permissible," the chairman of the NSFP once said. Seyrak - but not freedom of expression of political views " 62 . Communists were banned from entering businesses for public speaking.

A. Krazyuki, Secretary of the CGT, correctly noted that "under the conditions of capitalism, enterprises have been transformed into genuine feudal fiefdoms." 63 Entrepreneurs sought to include in collective agreements a provision that they can dismiss any employee after three warnings .64 French law allowed them to dismiss trade unionists without warning and without severance pay by accusing them of having committed a "gross act" or "gross fault." Since the law did not contain a clear definition of the concept of "rude act", everything depended on the position of the court. But even if

58 Ibid.. 2.VII.1971.

59 J. O. Débats. L'Assemblée rationale, 12.V.1976, p. 2873.

60 L'Humanité, 22.III.1980, 8.VIII.1981.

61 Ibid., 10.IV.1972,

62 Revue politique et parlementaire, avril 1962, p. 6.

63 Trud, 23. XI. 1978.

64 L'Humanité, 7.VIII.1981.

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the court acquitted the dismissed person, it could only recommend, and not oblige the employer to restore the latter to the enterprise 65 .

A form of repression against trade unions was the frequent appeal of entrepreneurs to the court with a claim for compensation for losses caused by strikers. In 1975, the administration of the nationalized Renault and Air France companies also resorted to this measure. The class character of French justice was also evident in the fact that the excessively harsh sentences imposed on working people, especially trade unionists and foreigners, contrasted sharply with the lenient rulings against bourgeois elements, who very often evaded responsibility altogether for crimes such as corruption, embezzlement of government money, financial fraud, illegal currency trading,etc. According to experts, administrative justice, which is entrusted with the function of protecting the population from abuse by the authorities, is not very effective. The results of the audit of 350 cases considered in 1972-1973 showed that 20.5% of them were dealt with from 18 to 24 months, 9.7% - from 24 to 30 months, 11.8% - from 30 to 36 months, and 34% - over 3 years 66 .

The French labor relations court practice has in principle condemned the creation of "obedient trade unions" at the initiative of entrepreneurs as an attack on trade union freedom. 67 But this did not stop the initiators of their creation. "Yellow", strikebreaker unions under the banner of the French Confederation of Labor (FCT) exist at a number of Citroen, Simca, Kreisler, Peugeot and Berliet enterprises. As M. Michaud, one of the former managers of the FCT at the Berliet factories, admitted, without subsidies from the owners, this "trade union"would not have existed for two days. For participating in repressive operations against workers, the thugs hired by this "trade union" received a "fee" of up to 1 thousand francs .68 One of the main goals that entrepreneurs pursued in this case was to eliminate the support of the CGT and FDKT trade unions 69 .

Many large enterprises created private police. Only in the Paris region, it numbered 15-20 thousand people .70 Thugs hired by monopolies terrorized strike participants and trade unionists. Such methods were especially widely used by such companies as Citroen, Simka, Peugeot and Creusot-Loire .71 At Citroen plants, less than 5% of workers dared to join a trade union.

Since 1975, a new system of classification and remuneration was introduced at metallurgical enterprises, which further linked wages not to the worker's qualifications, but to the method of work, to the individual qualities of the worker, which provided the directorate with great opportunities to underestimate wages. 72 12% of workers received bonuses for" labor productivity", which amounted to an average of 10% of the salary, but in fact-for non-participation in strikes 73 .

A serious violation of democratic freedoms was the preparation for "bans on professions", which gradually began following the example of Germany. The CGT brought to the public's attention the contents of an instruction sent on February 26, 1979 by the Prime Minister's Secretariat to VO

65 Реllssiеr J. La réforme du licenciement. P. 1974, pp. 163 - 164. 66 Charvin R. La justice en France. P. 1976, p. 111.

67 Droit social, 1963, N 8, p. 488.

68 L'Humanité, 29. III.1974.

69 Ibid., 16.III.1974.

70 Ibid., 12.VI.1975.

71 J. O. Débats. L'Assernblée rationale, 12.V.1976, pp. 2848, 2854.

72 International Labor Movement. Handbook, Moscow, 1978, p. 392.

73 L'Humanité, 2.IV. 1981.

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all ministries, which stated that it was necessary to indicate in the personal files of civil servants "the main features of their social behavior", i.e. their political views and membership in trade unions and parties 74 . An integral part of the monopolies 'strategy was a kind of" political dismantling " of industrial areas, which proved to be the stronghold of class battles. The Politburo of the PCF noted in one of its statements that the government, together with the monopolies, "is trying to weaken such traditional bastions of the working class as the North and East of the country and the Paris district." 75
The new anti-labor "Peyrefit Law", which came into force in February 1981, allowed the authorities to impose a ban on any demonstrations and street processions. Strike participants who occupied industrial premises could be held criminally liable by the authorities, while striking railway workers could be punished with up to two years ' imprisonment.

Throughout the 1970s, France felt the tremendous impact of the May-July 1968 events on the rule of capital in France. The class struggle of the working people testified to the growth of the anti-monopoly movement. The range of democratic demands was extremely wide and diverse. First of all, this included the struggle against authoritarian methods of government, in defense of the political and social rights of workers, demands for the democratization of education, the elimination of discrimination against women, the development of national suburbs, the protection of the environment, the struggle for peace and disarmament, and others.

The joint government program developed on June 27, 1972 by the PCF and the Socialist Party was a challenge to the policy of French state-monopoly capitalism. Unlike all the agreements that the Communists had concluded with the Socialists until then, this program was in the most extensive form of commitments covering all areas of politics. Its main significance was that it proposed a set of reforms aimed at a profound transformation of the economic, social and political structure of society. Left-wing parties declared the need to nationalize business banks, financial and insurance companies, and the nine largest industrial monopolies, democratize the state system, and pursue a foreign policy of national independence and international cooperation.

The program included an increase in wages and benefits, the elimination of all forms of wage discrimination, the introduction of a" mobile scale " of wages that takes into account price increases, the establishment of a 40-hour working week, the resolution of unemployment, and the development of a new labor code. The left-wing parties were in favor of improving the health care system, for a new democratic policy in the field of education. They demanded, in particular, the allocation of a fourth part of the state budget for the needs of public education. The task was set to democratize the economy and planning, and a proposal was put forward to introduce control over price growth .76 The program provided for extensive measures to support the peasants and the middle classes.

In order to democratize state institutions, left-wing parties proposed introducing a proportional electoral system and lowering the age limit for participation in elections from 21 to 18 years. They demanded more rights for communes, departments, and economic districts-

74 ibid., п.IV. 1979.

75 Ibid., 23.VII.1980.

76 Programme commun de gouvernement du Parti communiste et du Parti socialiste. P. 1972, pp. 53 - 59, 125.

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onov. The main mass media-radio and television-were required to fairly distribute the time of radio and television broadcasts between parties, trade unions and other public organizations.

The joint government program of the PCF and the Socialist Party, therefore, proposed deep anti-monopoly reforms. In many respects, it went beyond the Popular Front program. With the conclusion of this program, an important step was taken in overcoming the split in the French labor movement.

The emergence of a real alternative to the state-monopoly system caused a rapid "politicization" of mass consciousness. The percentage of people who said they were interested in politics rose from 20% in 1969 to 63% in 197777 . An opinion poll conducted in 1974 showed that 68% of French people agreed to the participation of communists in the government .78
Never in post-war France has there been such a polarization of class and political forces as in the 70s. All the election campaigns were conducted in an atmosphere of clear separation of the two camps. In the 1973 National Assembly elections, 45.3% of the votes were cast for left-wing candidates, and in the 1974 presidential elections, for a single left-wing candidate, Fr. Mitterrand - 49.2%, in the cantonal elections of 1976, left-wing parties received 51% of the vote, in the municipal elections of 1977-51%, and in the parliamentary elections of 1978-49.3%. It was an expression of a broad popular desire for profound social and democratic change.

Despite the well-known weakness of the subjective factor in the anti-monopoly movement, which was reflected in the actual collapse of the union of left forces in the autumn of 1977, by the presidential elections of 1981, widespread popular discontent had accumulated in the country, not only in the working class, but also in the peasantry and middle strata. Even according to official data, the standard of living of peasants decreased by 19.4% from 1974 to 1980. Every year, 30 thousand small and medium-sized farms went bankrupt 79 . A remarkable phenomenon in the second half of the 70s was the transition of organizations of the small and middle bourgeoisie in opposition to the regime of the 80's . A survey conducted in February 1981 by the French Institute of Public Opinion showed that 51% of French people were dissatisfied with the policies of President Giscard d'Estaing, 63% - with the policies of Prime Minister Barras .81
The election of the Socialist candidate F. P. as President of the Republic on May 10, 1981. Mitterrand's introduction opened a new stage in the relationship between monopolies and the state. In some areas, big capital had to give up its influence, but in general, its dominance was not shaken. State-monopoly capitalism continues to be the main obstacle to progressive socio-political changes in France.

77 Sondages, 1969, N 1 - 2, р. 12; Le Nouvel Observateur, 12.IX.1977, p. 33.

78 Le Nouvel Observateur, 28.X.I974, p. 43.

79 L'Humanité, 27. XI. 1981. 80 France, pp. 273-274. 81 L'Humanité, 14. II. 1981.

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