More than a decade has passed since Peter Berger1 introduced the concept of desecularization to point out the many manifestations of the worldwide revival of religion. He described desecularization as counter-secularization and offered a new perspective on the viability of religion in the context of global modernity. The study of the interactions between secularizing and counter-secularizing tendencies and forces, Berger wrote, is one of the most important tasks of the sociology of religion.2
Looking back on Berger's strong language, one might expect that it will trigger an explosive growth of research on counter-secularization trends and attempts to uncover desecularization patterns across cultures and societies. This would mean a serious shift in the research angle within the framework of the sociology of religion. However, it is still difficult to talk about such a shift. Modern studies of the revival of religion and its social impact around the world 3 have added evidence in favor of the thesis of Ber-

The article was sent to the editor by the author. The author is eternally grateful to Professor Elena Lisovskaya (Western Michigan University and Baylor University) and Professor Christopher Marsh (Baylor University) for their advice and support, without which this article would not have been written. An earlier version of the article was published as: Karpov V. Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework // Journal of Church and State. 2010. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 232 - 270.

1. Berger P.L. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview//The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics/Ed. Peter L. Berger. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999.

2. Ibid. P. 7.

3. See, for example, Kepel G. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994; Hefner R. Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; Greeley A. Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003; Sutton P., Vertigans S. Resurgent Islam: A Sociological Approach. Maiden: Polity, 2005; Thomas S.M. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-

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hera on desecularization. However, surprisingly little effort has been made so far to conceptualize desecularization and to use this theoretical concept heuristically in comparative studies of the revival of religions in the modern world. Moreover, the term "desecularization" itself has been used infrequently and for the most part without clarifying its meaning, as if the concept were self-evident.4 The existing literature does not attempt to give an analytical definition of desecularization, indicating its constituent processes, levels, actors, social forces, patterns, and trajectories. The lack of such a general conceptual framework makes it difficult to conduct a large-scale comparative analysis of known cases of desecularization, which in turn hinders theoretical generalization, as well as the development of the theory of desecularization.

This is in sharp contrast to the abundance of works devoted to the definition, conceptualization, and construction of theories of secularization (which is understood as a general decline in the influence of religion in society). Despite the controversy and controversy, secularization research has led to the formation of a fairly solid scientific field that allows for theoretical generalizations and hypothesis testing. Thus, today the sociology of religion is still much better equipped to deal with secularizing tendencies and forces rather than desecularizing ones. As a result, the important task of systematically investigating the interaction of these forces and trends remains elusive.

Why this happens is an important question. Answering it would require research far beyond the scope of a journal article. Here I will limit myself to the assumption that the relatively low level of development of the theory of desecularization-

First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Garrard J., Garrard C. Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Marsh Ch. Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and Revival. New York, NY: Continuum, 2011; Martin D. Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002; Banchoff Th. (ed.). Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

4. The only paper that offers an analytical definition of desecularization is: Lisouskaya E., Karpou V. Orthodoxy, Islam, and Desecularization of Russia's State Schools//Politics and Religion. 2010. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 276 - 302.

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it reflects a certain "cultural lag"5. The intellectual culture of sociology is too inert to reflect the dramatic changes taking place in the world religious arena. Discussions continue to focus mainly on the agenda of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which was initially associated with the proclamation of religious decline in the West. This applies as much to the critics of the secularization thesis as to its proponents. Ultimately, both are still focused on the question of how, where, and why religion and /or its social role are in decline. It's still a question of whether Comte was right or wrong. Meanwhile, the growth of Christianity in the "Global South", the revival of Islam around the world, the revival of religion in Russia and China, and other examples of desecularization have become well-known facts. Sociologists, on the other hand, are still caught up in theoretical skirmishes in the rearguard of science and are completely unprepared to comprehend and theoretically explain these new realities. The existing literature sheds light on the origins of this"cultural lag". According to Stark, the sociological canon was largely shaped by proponents of the classical atheist idea of secularism6. The continuing influence of this canon is due to what Stark calls "ancestral cults," 7 that is, " uncritical reception of classical ideas." Philippe Rieff put it even more bluntly: "Sociology as we know it began as the deathwork of the European Catholic social order. This murder is committed every day in the halls of our highly illiterate institutes."8. In addition, as Berger points out, the prevailing climate in the "academic" environment

5. This concept was first introduced in order to indicate that non-material culture with a lag reflects changes in the material environment (OgburnW. F. Cultural Lag as Theory/ / Sociology and Social Research. 1957. Vol. 41. No. 3. P. 167-74). I apply it more generally, meaning that the culturally formed ideations that we use to understand the world around us are inert and unable to reflect rapidly occurring social changes.

6. Stark R., Finke R. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. P. 1 - 21.

7. Stark R. SSSR Presidential Address, 2004: Putting an End to Ancestor Worship // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 2004. Vol. 43. No. 4. P. 465 - 75.

8. Rieff Ph. My Life among the Deathworks: Illustrations of the Aesthetics of Authority. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006. P. 16.

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secularism and its isolation from the religious masses 9 leads to a widespread view of any undying religiosity as fundamentalism, which makes it difficult to objectively analyze the religious revival. As a result, sociology, which often boastfully presents itself as the embodiment of critical thinking and a reflexive force leading to social change, fails in both respects. If this situation continues, whatever its causes, sociology will be less able to understand and predict changes in the social role of religions.

This work is an attempt to help overcome the aforementioned backlog. It offers a conceptual framework for the analysis and development of the theory of desecularization, based on modern and classical concepts of the sociology of religion. Thus, it draws on the work of Peter Berger and includes the ideas of Daniel Bell, Jose Casanova, Grace Davey, Emile Durkheim, Philip Riff, Pitirim Sorokin, Christian Smith, Rodney Stark, Charles Taylor and other theorists. Although these scientists present different and sometimes competing views, the paper shows that their ideas shed light, albeit from different theoretical sources, on the nature and meaning of desecularization.

The article begins with the development of an analytical definition of desecularization as counter-secularization. This definition reveals in detail the component processes of desecularization, which include changes in collective perceptions and institutions (both formal and informal) and ultimately transform the material substratum of society. Next, we discuss the non-integration of desecularization, which is associated with the dynamics of systemic socio-cultural transitions. The analysis then focuses on the actors and activists of desecularization. This leads me to identify patterns of "bottom-up" and "top-down" desecularization, depending on which actors play a leading role in the counter-secularization process. Following this, I introduce the concept, as well as the typology, of "desecularization regimes", which reflect

9. Berger wittily compares academic elites to secular "Swedes" living in the midst of masses of religious " Indians." Berger P. Davie G., Fokas E. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. Burlington: Ashgate, 2008. P. 12.

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societal scope of counter-secularization, its institutional structure, ideologies and degrees of pluralism and coercion allowed in its context. In this connection, a typology of mass reactions to desecularization regimes is proposed. Next, I look at the analytical levels and time scales required for desecularization analysis. So, I believe that the time frame that we use to study desecularization is important for understanding its social forces and foundations. In particular, the "megahistorical" perspective can help us focus on the cultural dynamics underlying secularization and desecularization, and redefine the usual ideas about their relationship to modernity (modernity). Finally, I introduce the concept of multiple, overlapping and colliding desecularizations and briefly touch on the role of globalization in their development.

Desecularization as counter-secularization: towards a definition of the concept

Starting point

Although the key paper in this case, Peter Berger10, does not contain a sufficiently developed definition of desecularization, it contains the most important prerequisites for its formulation. In particular, Berger's notion of desecularization as counter-secularization is crucial for further discussion. The latter is "no less important phenomenon in the modern world than secularization" 11. Moreover, counter-secularization reflects the presence of secularization tendencies and forces and develops as a reaction to them 12. Thus, Berger sees desecularization as a revival of religion and its societal influence in response to secularization 13.

10. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview.

11. Ibid. P. 6.

12. Ibid. P. 7.

13. Berger also sees desecularization as a response to the uncertainty of modernity. However, this idea concerns a discussion about the social foundations of desecularization, which will be discussed later in this article.

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What desecularization is and isn't

Berger's ideas help us distinguish desecularization proper from a much broader class of phenomena related to religious growth and the expansion of religious influence on societies. This difference, which may seem obvious, is still important to note if we are going to remain within the strict logical framework of the definition of desecularization. If we speak in terms of the Aristotelian logic of definition, then secularization is a species difference (differentia specified), which distinguishes the phenomena of desecularization from the closest generic concept (genus proximus) of historical cases of religious expansion. All known cases of desecularization relate to the growth of religions and the expansion of their social role. However, the growing societal influence of religions can be called desecularization if and only if it occurs as a reaction to previous and / or current secularization trends. Take, for example, Finke and Stark's Ecclesiastical America survey, 14 which found that religious affiliation in the United States increased from 17% to 62% between 1776 and 2000. This is an indicator of religious growth, but not of the desecularization of America-simply because the initially low level of religious affiliation cannot be attributed to the country's previous secularization.15 Conversely, the religious revival taking place in Russia is an obvious case of desecularization because it takes place as a reaction to forced secularization under communism. Similarly, Berger's ideas distinguish between desecularization itself as a religious revival and the wide range of manifestations of the viability, sustainability, and variability of religions in secularized contexts,

14. Finke R., Stark R. The Churching of America, 1776 - 2005. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005.

15. Finke and Stark see the secularization-rebirth cycle as driving growth at the level of individual churches and sects, but not at the national level. I will return to their cyclical model below.

16. The forms of such vitality and adaptation to secular conditions are well captured in Grace Davie's concepts of "faith without belonging" and "vicarious religion" (Davie G. Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Equally important concepts that reflect different manifestations of persisting religions are "public religions" (Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago

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such as Western European societies. The survival of religions under secular regimes can lead to their subsequent revival. It also proves that even in the most modern Western contexts, the impact of secularization on society is limited. However, survival and adaptation are clearly different from rebirth and cannot be considered within the framework of the concept of desecularization. I wouldn't have drawn attention to this obvious distinction if it hadn't been blurred in recent discussions. Even Peter Berger's book, The Desecularization of the World, discusses the sustainability of religions side by side with clear cases of their resurgence. 17 There is a reason why the topic of the survival of religions under secular regimes is occasionally discussed along with the topic of counter-secular revival. Both classes of phenomena show the limits of secularization and are quite logically considered together when discussing the defects of theories of religious decline.18 Yet theorizing about desecularization does not imply a complete refutation of the secularization thesis. Moreover, as stated above in accordance with Berger's original idea, the very conceptualization of desecularization as counter-secularization is based on the recognition of secularization tendencies and forces. Only then can we approach the important task of studying the interaction between secularization and counter-secularization trends. Therefore, in my opinion, the development of the theory of desecularization will be successful only when it is more clearly separated from the endless discussions about whether and to what extent secularization is a reality. Some proponents and opponents of the secularization thesis may view this kind of discussion as a zero-sum game. However, studies of desecularization and secularization are not mutually exclusive. Conversely,

Press, 1994) and Belonging without Faith (Hervieu-Leger D. Religion as a Chain of Memory. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000 [1993]).

17. Consider, for example, the article by Grace Davie in this collection (Davie G. Europe: The Exception that Proves the Rule//The Desecularization of the World/Ed. P. Berger. P. 65 - 84). It clearly shows that the secularized countries of Western Europe are not irreligious, but rather religious in a different way. However, this case can hardly be compared with the cases of the Islamic, Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish Revival described in the same book.

18. For example, a critique of old secularization theories is an important part of P. Berger's article "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview".

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they tell complementary stories about the complex relationship between religion and society - to the extent that both theories are understood as scientific rather than conflicting, normatively prescribed models of modern society.19
Desecularization as a social change

Peter Berger's original thesis on desecularization focused more on the nature and social origins of religious revivals than on their social influences. This emphasis was justified against the background of previous studies that often ignored counter-secularization movements or explained them as "fundamentalist" deviations in the supposedly irreversible process of secularization. However, this article highlights another, no less important, aspect of desecularization that was overlooked in the original thesis. Desecularization is seen as a process of social change associated with the revival of religions and the expansion of their influence on society as a whole. This approach is quite consistent with the interpretation of desecularization as counter-secularization. Secularization is generally seen as a multi-faceted social transformation, during which the influence of religion on society is reduced. Therefore, it is logical to consider counter-secularization as a process of social change unfolding in the opposite direction. This approach allows us to identify the components of the process of desecularizing social change.

Components of the desecularization process

If desecularization is a counter-secularization social change, then logically, the components of this process can be defined as the opposite of the corresponding trends of secularization. So we are mo-

19. I use the terms of Casanova, who notes that "theories of secularization are twofold: they are, on the one hand, empirically descriptive theories of modern social processes, and, on the other, normative prescriptive theories of modern societies, and this serves as an ideological legitimization of a certain historical form of institutionalization of modernity." See Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 41.

20. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview.

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We will draw on existing conceptualizations of secularization in order to identify social transformations potentially involved in counter-secularization.

Existing conceptualizations reflect the evolution of the concept of secularization. The original wording boldly predicted the complete decline (or even death) of religion in modern society. However, the new formulations of the last three decades offer an increasingly complex, nuanced and multifaceted vision.21 The evolution of these conceptualizations reflects attempts to adapt secularization theory not only to the growing body of evidence for the viability of religion in the modern era, but also to the sharp and harsh criticism of opponents of this theory. Later formulations portray secularization as a multi-faceted process involving potentially inconsistent and uneven changes in various social spheres and at different levels of social organization: from individual beliefs to institutions and structures that affect society as a whole. Taking into account data on the sustainability of religions at some of these levels, the new formulations allow for gaps and contradictions in the overall secularization process. As a result, secularization increasingly looks like a combination of relatively autonomous, poorly (if at all) interconnected trends in various societal spheres.22
21. For the evolution of the concept of secularization and the complexity of its modern interpretations, see (in chronological order): Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 11 - 39; Yamane D. In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm//Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1997. Vol. 36. No. 1. P. 109 - 22; Swatos W., Christiana K. Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept // The Secularization Debate/Ed. William H. Swatos and Daniel V. A. Olson. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. P. 1 - 21; Beckford J. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. P. 30 - 72; Martin D. On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. P. 17 - 25; Davie G. The Sociology of Religion. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2007. P. 46 - 66; Pollack D. Introduction: Religious Change in Modern Societies - Perspectives Offered by the Sociology of Religion//The Role of Religion in Modern Society/Eds. Pollack D. and D. Olson. New York and London: Routledge, 2008. P. 1 - 22.

22. This is most clearly reflected in the influential conceptualizations of secularization by Brian Wilson: Wilson B. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. P. 149; Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 211; Bruce S. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002. P. 3.

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First approximation

Recently proposed clear statements about the relatively autonomous elements of the secularization process make it possible to also clearly identify the potential components of the counter-secularization process. As a first approximation, I suggest relying on Casanova's influential view of secularization as a phenomenon involving three non-integrated processes: the differentiation of societal institutions from religious norms, the decline of religious beliefs and practices, and the privatization of religion (i.e., its isolation from the public sphere).23. Accordingly, desecularization can be symmetrically conceptualized as involving three counter-secularization processes. Thus, desecularization includes: (a) the convergence between once secularized institutions and religious norms, (b) the revival of religious beliefs and practices, and (c) the return of religion to the public sphere. In this case, it is important to note that counter-secularization processes may be weakly or completely unrelated to each other, as well as the above-mentioned secularization trends. For example, the revival of religious beliefs may or may not lead to an increase in the role of religion in public institutions. Or, conversely, an increase in the public role of religion does not necessarily imply an increase in religiosity among the population. The components of the desecularization process may develop inconsistently and unevenly. In theory, secularization trends in one area (for example, at the level of individual religiosity) can even co-exist with desecularization trends in other areas (for example, in the field of public institutions). However, the question of the correlation and connection of counter-secularization trends is actually more complex and will be discussed in more detail below.

Missing components: towards a more complete definition

Casanova's concise and insightful conceptualization bypasses important components of secularization, some of which were prominent in earlier theories. So obra-

23. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World.

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However, the definition of countersecularization and its components that I proposed above is incomplete. The following discussion will lead us to a more complete presentation.

Culture. The gaping hole in our original definition concerns secularization and desecularization trends in culture. The cultural aspect that has fallen out of Casanova's definition (but not from his other works) is clearly indicated in Berger's classical formulation:

Secularization... It has an impact on the whole cultural life and the ability to form and perceive ideas and is manifested in the reduction of religious content in art, philosophy, literature, but most importantly-in the rise of science as an autonomous, completely secular view of the world.24
Accordingly, I define counter-secularization tendencies in culture as manifested in the revival of religious content in the diversity of its symbolic subsystems, including in art, philosophy and literature, as well as in the decline of the status of science in relation to the resurgent role of religion in world construction and world maintenance.25 Some clarifications need to be made here. First, as is the case with the general process of desecularization, counter-secularization tendencies in a culture can reveal inconsistencies and affect some of its subsystems more than others. Second, the counter-secularization of some cultural spheres can theoretically occur simultaneously with the secularization of others. Third, we note that the proposed definition refers to a relative (in comparison with religion) decline in the status of science. The scientific component of culture can grow in absolute terms and at the same time play a smaller role as a way of maintaining the world. For example, the inclusion of creationist views in biology textbooks weakens the monopoly of science as a radically secular cultural tool for world-building, but this does not mean the decline of biological science as such.

24. Berger P. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books, 1990 [1967]. P. 107.

25. I use the terms "world-construction" and "world-maintenance" in the sense in which they are described in Berger: Berger P. The Sacred Canopy. P. 3 - 51.

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Finally, the proposed formulation implies a certain understanding of culture. If we speak in terms of Lamont and Vuznau 26, it is based more on the" European "than on the" American " cultural tradition. The former tends to view culture as a set of superindividual symbolic systems and avoid methodological individualism in its analysis. The second group usually perceives culture as a set of beliefs, values, dispositions and norms shared by members of society and related to the position of individuals in it. The above point of view of Berger has its roots in the "European" tradition, since he clearly distinguishes cultural secularization from secularization at the individual level of subjective consciousness.27 Similarly, the proposed view of cultural counter-secularization analytically separates the trends of religious revival in superindividual symbolic systems and the growth of religiosity at the level of individual beliefs. The emphasis here is on Durkheim's "collective representations", which are crystallized into stable symbolic systems (for example, mythologies, theologies, and ideologies) that form individual beliefs, but at the same time are not reduced to them.

This aspect of culture is still poorly developed in modern studies of secularization and desecularization trends. Recent empirical studies of large-scale "cultural shifts" 28 rely mainly on surveys. Thus, the shifts they talk about are cumulative trends at the individual level of subjective consciousness and respondents ' messages about their behavior. Such studies are necessary for recording the decline and revival of mass beliefs and practices, but they are not very informative when it comes to assessing trends characteristic of the religious content of a culture.29
26. Lamont M., Wuthnow R. Betwixt and Between: Recent Cultural Sociology in Europe and the United States // Frontiers of Social Theory/Ed. George Ritzer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. P. 287 - 315.

27. Berger P. The Sacred Canopy. P. 107 - 8.

28. The term was introduced by Ronald Inglehart: Inglehart R. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

29. This refers to the study of religious and socio-political orientations in a global context, conducted by Norris and Inglehart (Norris R.,

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While survey-based assessments of religious trends have only multiplied in recent decades, large-scale content-analytical studies of art, literature, philosophy, and other cultural subsystems have been marginalized, if not forgotten, by social scientists.30 Today's science does not even attempt to do anything like Sorokin's grandiose study of the 31 " ideational "(essentially religious) and" sensate " elements in the content of art, philosophy, and other cultural forms, which spans approximately 2,500 years of Western civilization's history.

In the absence of large-scale content-analytical studies of culture (including its modern audio-visual and digital manifestations), the study of current trends in secularization and counter-secularization provides an incomplete and potentially distorted picture of the position of religion in modern society. For example, if we tried to predict the trajectory of secularization in France based on measurements of individual religiosity in the eighteenth century, completely ignoring the content of Enlightenment literature, our prediction would probably be wrong. Similarly, actual and potential impact

Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). This useful study contains a wealth of data on trends in individual religiosity, values, and dispositions in different countries and civilizations. However, it demonstrates a fundamentally reductionist view of culture when, for example, it relies on individual-level variables to identify similarities and differences between Western and Islamic civilizations (Ibid., pp. 133-55). The problem is that civilizations are cultural formations that are defined by religious traditions and consist of superindividual elements (institutions, customs, mythologies, etc.) that cannot be reduced to individual values.

30. A rare exception in sociology is the work of Philip Rieff: Rieff Ph. My Life among the Deathworks. Riff's in-depth analysis of the meaning of specific works of art Nouveau as "deathworks" , i.e. destruction (or "killing") The concept of sacred order symbolism is directly related to understanding the impact of secularization on culture. However, Riff's research focuses on a small number of selected works of art and cannot be used to explain long-term trends.

31. Sorokin P. Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law, and Social Relationships. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006 [1957]. In general, the study considers approximately 100,000 works of art and philosophical works (see Richard M. Introduction to the Transaction edition / / Sorokin P. Social and Cultural Dynamics. P. ix.).

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radical Islamism may seem very insignificant if we use only Muslim survey data to assess it32. However, a very different assessment of the impact of radical Islamism could be made on the basis of studies of religious and political ideas prevailing in school textbooks, on state-controlled television, and on numerous radical Internet sites.

Moreover, the dominance of the" American " cultural tradition prevents the use of potentially important theoretical ideas about late Modern culture in empirical studies of desecularization. These views relate to the internal limits and dead ends of secularized culture, the sustainability of religious components, and the potential for cultural desecularization. In particular, thirty-four years ago, Daniel Bell predicted the emergence of a religious response to the" profanation " of culture (that is, to its secularization, expressed in the removal of the sacred element from the culture)33. The dominant emphasis in secularized culture on unrestricted self-expression, on transgression, or overstepping previously considered sacred boundaries, and on "freeing" oneself from all limitations and belonging to the human community creates a powerful tendency towards nihilism, which ultimately makes human existence meaningless and coexistence impossible. The coming religious response, Bell says, reflects a cultural pattern."

32. This is what Esposito and Mogahed did when, based on Gallup polls, they reported that only 7% of the world's Muslims believe the September 11 terrorist attack was "fully" justified, and therefore only a small minority of Muslims are politically radicalized. See Esposito J., Mogahed D. Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think. New York: Gallup Press, 2007. P. 97. Moreover, these authors presented poorly even the data they had. It is impossible to determine the accuracy of this assessment, since the full range of possible answers to the question of radicalism is not given (for example, it remains unknown what proportion of Muslims consider the terrorist attack "partially" justified). The book also does not distribute the responses received by country, which gives the potentially incorrect impression that the level of radicalism does not differ from country to country. An interesting analogy comes to mind. A 1945 survey found that not a single German (0%) agreed that Hitler was right in his treatment of Jews, 19% thought he went too far, and 77% thought there was no justification for Hitler's actions. See Gordon S. Hitler, Germans, and the "Jewish question". Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. P. 198. Based on this post-factum research, the Holocaust becomes a completely inexplicable event.

33. Bell D. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 1996. P. 169.

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return", as a result of which the sacred is again confirmed. It gives people answers to the ultimate questions about their existence. D. Bell's argument is the same as Riff's. According to the latter, the essence of modern secular culture (in his terms, the "third" or "third world" culture) consists in the " destruction "or dismantling of the sacred orders of the "second" (theistic) culture. However, this "second" culture, although suppressed by the onslaught of secularization, is not eliminated in any way, since transgressions and destructions ("deathworks", i.e. killing) inevitably refer to what is being destroyed. Therefore, the Riff method is a method of destroying destructive acts of the third world culture (for example, in art), which reveal what these acts are directed against, that is, sacred meanings. The stability of sacred orders puts limits on cultural modernity, and the entire field of culture becomes a battleground between, in Berger's words, secularizing and desecularizing forces. 34"The Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) between the second world sacred order and the third world anti-sacral order is currently going on all over the world," says Riff 35. He also suggested that we may be nearing the end of a period of modernist inversion of the sacred order.36
These ideas allow us to look at secularization and desecularization as trends that reflect a broader picture of cultural dynamics that fluctuates between the predominantly religious and secular poles, or, to use Sorokin's terms, between the "ideational" and "sensational" systems. This theoretical twist will be discussed below. Let us now note that the heuristic potential of the ideas of Bell, Berger, and Riff concerning the stability and revival of the transcendent content of symbolic cultural systems remains virtually untapped in the prevailing empirical approaches to the study of secularization and desecularization. As a result, our empirical knowledge of significant cultural trends remains incomplete and unreliable.

34. Some similarities between Rieff's ideas and Berger's theory of desecularization are discussed in passing in: Zondervan A. Sociology and the Sacred: An Introduction to Philip Rieff's Theory of Culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. P. 145 - 47.

35. Rieff Ph. My Life among the Deathworks. P. 2.

36. Zondervan A. Sociology and the Sacred. P. 160.

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The substrate. There is another often overlooked aspect of secularizing and counter-secularizing social change. It is associated with declining or increasing religious influences on the material substratum of society. If we apply Durkheim's typology of social phenomena 37 to existing research on secularization and counter-secularization, we find that most of the discussions involve all the types of social facts he is talking about, with the exception of the material substrate. In fact, these discussions are devoted to (if we move from the least to the most crystallized social facts): (a) spontaneous changes in collective beliefs and related behaviors (such as changes in religious beliefs and practices); (b) crystallized collective beliefs (such as cultural symbolic systems such as theology, ideology, mythology, science, etc.); and (c) the institutional (normative) sphere, where we observe the separation and /or reunification of secular and religious norms and institutions. What Durkheim called the substratum - the most crystallized and tangible type of social fact-is clearly missing here. Due to its rigidity, the substrate has a powerful effect on human behavior and perception 38, but at the same time it can be considered as the ultimate crystallization and materialization of collective ideas and institutions. Substrates include elements that are "anatomical" or "morphological" for societies: population size, distribution and territorial organization, material objects such as buildings and communications, and so on.39 Given the largely materialistic tendencies of modern sociology, it is rather surprising that the analysis of the changing societal role of religion has so rarely focused on such material indicators.

37. A brief overview of Durkheim's typology can be found in: Thompson K. Emile Durkheim. London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1982. P. 9.

38. To clarify the evolution and meaning of Durkheim's concept of substrate, see Nemedi D. Collective Consciousness, Morphology, and Collective Representations: Durkheim's Sociology of Knowledge, 1894 - 1900//Sociological Perspectives. 1995. Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 41-56. Nemody shows, in particular, that Durkheim's emphasis on the substrate should not be interpreted as a form of materialistic determinism.

39. See Durkheim E. The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press, 1982 [1895]. P. 57, 241.

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(Ironically, the origin of the term "secularization" is associated with quite material processes - with the confiscation of church property by the state.40)

Consider the demographic aspects of the substrate, such as changes in birth rate and population size. Demographers take seriously the impact of religion on birth rates and population growth. However, the demographic factor remains largely on the periphery when it comes to conceptualizing and clarifying the extent of secularization and counter-secularization. Moreover, there is a tendency to believe that a high level of both religiosity and fertility is a consequence of a low level of socio-economic development. For example, Norris and Inglehart believe that a high level of human development (and therefore human security) leads to cultural changes that result in a reduction in religiosity and birth rates. Because less developed societies maintain a high birth rate, the world does not become less religious, despite secularization in more developed countries. 41 (note that if the same argument is formulated differently, it would mean that the desecularization of the world is manifested in the growth of its religious population). Following this logic, religiosity is nothing more than a link or intermediate variable between socio-economic security and fertility. This is a materialistic argument: economic growth reduces religiosity and, consequently, reduces the birth rate.

However, numerous data indicate that among groups living in similar socio-economic conditions, a higher birth rate is observed in those groups that have a higher level of religiosity and /or this religiosity is more conservative. For example, Howth argues that the American baby boom has occurred mainly among women belonging to Catholic, Evangelical, and fundamentalist backgrounds, while "moderate Protestant denominations have experienced only a minor increase in birth rates."42 More recent studies have shown that the number of children born in the United States has increased significantly.

40. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 13.

41. Norris P., Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. P. 6, 62 - 79.

42. Hout M. Demographic Methods for the Sociology of Religion // Handbook of the Sociology of Religion/Ed. M. Dillon. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. P. 82.

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Data from the United States show that religious beliefs (when adjusted for race and ethnicity, as well as income and education) have a significant positive impact on both female and male fertility.43 Similarly, conservative religiosity largely predicts American teen birth rates regardless of economic well-being.44 In Western European countries , the level of human development (and, accordingly, the level of human security) is similar to that of the United States. However, if women in Western Europe had the same degree of religiosity as Americans-under the same socio-economic conditions - their birth rate would be 19% higher, and in France it would be 35% higher.45 In Islamic countries, there is a link between a high level of individual Muslim religiosity and adherence to Sharia law, on the one hand, and a high birth rate, on the other, resulting in an increase in the number of Islamists.46 These patterns are nothing new: as Stark points out, the rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire was partly due to the fact that Christian communities had higher birth rates and lower mortality rates than pagans.47
Thus, the relationship between religion, birth rate, and population growth is reproduced in various national, civilizational (at least some), and historical contexts.48 High birth rate and how to trace-

43. Zhang L. Religious Affiliation, Religiosity, and Male and Female Fertility// Demographic Research. 2008. Vol. 18. No. 8. P. 233-62, http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Voll8/8/(accessed March 24, 2010).

44. Strayhorn J.M, Strayhorn J.C. Religiosity and Teen Birth Rate in the United States// Reproductive Health. 2009. Vol. 6. No. 14. R1 - 7, http://www.reproductive-health-journal.com/content/6/1/14 (доступ от 26 марта, 2010).

45ю Frejka T., Westoff Ch. Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the US and in Europe// European Journal of Population. 2008. Vol. 24. P. 5 - 31.

46. Kaufmann E. Islamism, Religiosity and Fertility in the Muslim World. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting for the International Studies Association, New York, February 15-18, 2009. P. 39. Quoted with permission.

47. Stark R. The Rise of Christianity: How the Obscure, Marginal Jesus Movement Became the Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a Few Centuries. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997 [1996]. P. 115 - 28.

48. Kaufmann's recent large-scale comparative survey of the relationship between religion and fertility across faiths, civilizations, and countries confirms this pattern. See Kaufmann E. Shall the Religious Inherit

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Population growth is an essential feature rather than an accidental manifestation of strong religions. Accordingly, an increase in the birth rate and the associated growth of religious communities can be seen as an indicator of the revival of the power of religion and thus of desecularization. This point of view becomes even more convincing if we reject the "external" causal interpretations of the relationship between religion and fertility (religion is the "cause" of fertility, being something external to the latter). Strong religions usually try to have a formative effect on the entire lifestyle of their adherents, and especially on such a fundamental aspect as family relationships. Thus, the birth and rearing of multiple children can be considered a religious practice (at least in conservative groups belonging to the Abrahamic traditions), as something that is connected with religion internally, not externally, and that relates to it no less than prayer or participation in rituals.

Another often overlooked aspect of secularization and counter-secularization related to the substrate relates to the territoriality of religions, i.e. the fact of the connection between religions and certain territories and how religion defines these territories and the population living in them. Berger, Davey, and Fokas, when speaking about the sustainability of religion in European countries, attach great importance to this aspect. The historic churches of Europe, they say, are built into their own territory. Their continued presence is reflected in spatial organization, urban planning, and architectural styles. Church buildings dominate the surrounding landscape and serve as important physical reference points 49. It is also quite possible to say that both religions are embedded in the territory, and territories with their populations are placed in a symbolic space defined by the presence of religious objects. Accordingly, a change in the number and significance of material objects related to religion can be considered as a sign of the decline or increase in the importance of religion for the social organization of territories and their population. Expropriation of church lands in France

the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books, 2010.

49. Berger et al. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. P. 25, 27.

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The eighteenth century and the mass destruction of churches under Soviet rule were clear signs of secularization. The return of church property, the large-scale restoration of old churches and the construction of new ones in post-Soviet Russia are signs of desecularization. Consider, for example, the history of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in the XIX and XX centuries. The huge cathedral was designed in the 1830s and consecrated in 1883. It was demolished in 1931 and replaced by an open-air swimming pool in the 1960s. During the 1990s, the cathedral was rebuilt from scratch, then consecrated in 2000, and now again dominates the urban landscape of central Moscow. This story symbolizes the secularization and counter-secularization of Russia. Similarly, the construction of huge mosques in England, Italy and other European countries indicates the growing presence of Islam on the continent.

Many other changes in society's substrates can also be interpreted as indicators of desecularization. The nature of traffic on Sundays and religious holidays reflects changes in mass religious behavior. It is important to note that a tangible indicator of changes in the impact of religion on the economy is the volume and total cost of religion-related goods and services on the national and local markets. Such indicators may be more objective than the changing opinions recorded by opinion polls, but the latter still occupy a more prominent place in the study of desecularization.

Desecularization as a non-integrated process: in what sense and why?

As mentioned above, since secularization is a non-integrated process, the counter-process of desecularization can also be non-integrated: this means that the components of counter-secularization changes can develop inconsistently and unevenly, as well as in parallel with secularization trends. This thesis is based on Casanova's view of secularism50. It should be noted, however, that Casanova's definition does not explain the notion of non-integration of various components of the secularization process (and, accordingly, counter-integration).-

50. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 211.

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secularization), as well as does not justify this non-integration theoretically. We will see below that Sorokin's theory of cultural dynamics can help us overcome these limitations.

According to Sorokin 51, sociocultural systems cyclically fluctuate between the "ideational" and "sensate" poles. Ideational systems focus on beliefs in supernatural truths; they attach particular importance to transcendental knowledge and spiritual-religious value orientations. Sensuous cultures focus on empirically and rationally established truths and forms of knowledge; they are essentially secular and materialistic in their values and aspirations. However, sociocultural systems are never completely integrated. A fully religious or fully secular society is at best an "ideal type" and at worst a pure fiction. Ideational systems have sensory inclusions, and vice versa. In addition, there are transitional systems - "idealistic" - that combine the basic principles of both ideational and sensational cultures. Thus, Sorokin's theory postulates a certain degree of non-integration in any socio-cultural system.

Logically, non-integration should increase in the process of cyclical transition from the ideational phase to the sensual one and back again. This is important for understanding the non-integration of both secularization and desecularization. Both types of social change are essentially transitions from predominantly (but never entirely) religious socio-cultural systems to predominantly secular systems, or in the opposite direction. Thus, the inconsistency and contradictions between counter-secularization trends, their unevenness and potential parallelism with respect to secularization changes reflect the transitional nature of the desecularization process.

Moreover, Sorokin's ideas clarify in what sense the processes of secularization and counter-secularization are non-integrated. He speaks of different types of relationships between elements and processes that co-exist and are parallel in society.52 The simplest of them is-

51. Sorokin P. Social and Cultural Dynamics.

52. Ibid. P. 2 - 19.

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congeries, a disjointed combination of dissimilar components that are neither causally nor functionally related to each other. Another type of correlation is "causal or functional integration", when phenomena are in a functional relationship and /or there are causal relationships between them. The third type is "logico - meaningful integration", when elements are logically united by common cultural principles and ideas.

From this point of view, the ideal types of "ideational" and "sensational" sociocultural systems are held together primarily by logical-semantic integration, while transitional systems that are in the process of secularization or desecularization are poorly integrated, if in this case we can even talk about integration. Indeed, the coexistence of counter-secularization tendencies with a stable or growing secularity in some societal zones can be considered as a "conglomerate" that includes elements that are logically and meaningfully incompatible. At the same time, when some components of the counter-secularization process reflect the revival of the influence of one religion, this may indicate a higher level of semantic integration. However, a more pluralistic counter-secularization (that is, when several faiths are revived simultaneously) will result not in semantic integration, but in conglomeration.

The possible functional interdependence between secularization and counter-secularization trends should also be considered. For example, the sustainability and / or resurgence of public religions supported by the state can become a functional support for such forms of mass religiosity as"believing without belonging" (i.e., a combination of the sustainability of individual beliefs and a decrease in the level of belonging to religious communities) and "vicarious religion"54 (vicarious religion, i.e., a combination of the stability of individual beliefs e. when religious leaders, hierarchy and a small number of parishioners perform religious functions as if on behalf of the entire society). Religious education-

53. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Davie G. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

54. Forms of vicarious (or vicarious) religion are discussed in: Berger et al. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. R 40.

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In some European public education systems, taxpayer-funded education is functional to the extent that it supports churches that are so poorly attended that mass catechesis becomes impossible. The resurgence of a sense of Christian identity in some European societies may be a hidden function of the growing Muslim presence, etc. Thus, what on the surface looks like a lack of integration may actually indicate complex and hidden interdependencies.

A working definition of desecularization is proposed below. It includes components that are omitted in our "first approximation" definition. It also reflects the previous discussion on the integration of desecularization components. So, desecularization can be defined as follows.

Desecularization is a process of counter-secularization, in which religion regains its influence on society as a whole by reacting to previous and /or concomitant secularization processes. This process is a combination of some or all of the following trends: (a) convergence between previously secularized institutions and religious norms, both formal and informal; (b) the revival of religious beliefs and practices; (c) the return of religion to the public domain (deprivation); (d) the return of religious content to various cultural subsystems, including art, philosophy and literature, as well as the decline in the status of science in relation to the resurgent role of religion in world construction and world maintenance; (e) religious-related changes in the substratum of society (including religiously driven demographic changes, redefinition of territories and their populations on religious grounds, restoration of faith-related material structures, increasing the share of religion-related goods in the general economic market, etc.). These trends may be functionally interdependent to varying degrees and integrated in a logical and semantic way due to a common religious source (or semantic integration may be absent if there is a simultaneous revival of different religions). Counter-secularization trends can also accompany sustained or deepening secularization in certain societal spheres and, moreover, reveal a hidden interdependence with them.

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Actors, patterns, and modes of desecularization

Actors and activists of counter-secularization

It should not be assumed that changes in societal status and the role of religion automatically follow socio-structural transformations, such as modernization. This is an important lesson that desecularization researchers can learn from studying secularization research. The notion that modernization leads, as it were, to a decline in the societal role of religion has long dominated research on secularization, and its influence is still noticeable.55 Nevertheless, modern theoretical and empirical studies are critical of this structuralist assumption and focus on the role of the human factor - social actors whose specific activities change the status of religion in various social spheres.

Berger, Davey, and Fokas clearly delineated this theme by comparing religious changes in Europe and America, 56 drawing attention to the attitudes of intellectual elites, differences in the interpretation of Enlightenment ideology, and other aspects related to the role of the activity factor in the secularization process. According to Chavez, "secularization occurs or does not occur as a result of social and political conflicts between those social actors who increase or maintain the social significance of religion and those who reduce it. The social significance of the religious sphere at this time and place is the result of previous conflicts of this kind"57. Christian Smith develops this research area both theoretically and empirically 58. Drawing on the ideas of the sociology of revolutions and social movements, Smith summarizes factors that are usually ignored.-

55. This view is expressed, for example, in: Norris P., Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. A recent refinement of secularization theory by Bruce S. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West), retains this assumption, although in a relaxed, less deterministic form.

56. Berger et al. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations.

57. Chaves M. Secularization as Declining Religious Authority// Social Forces. 1994. Vol. 72. No. 3. P. 752.

58. Smith Ch. (ed.) The Secular Revolution: Power, Interests, and Conflict in the Secularization of American Public Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

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they participate in research on secularization. These include issues related to "activities, interests, mobilizations, alliances, resources, organizations, power, and strategies in social transformation." 59 The marginalization of religion in public institutions, he argues, has historically been carried out by a certain group of "secularization activists" - actors whose participation in secularization processes has been associated with certain interests, discontents,and attitudes. as well as cultural and ideological attitudes 60.

To avoid repeating the mistakes of previous secularization theorists, researchers of desecularization should take this activity factor into account. This implies a view of counter-secularization as the activity of desecularization activists and, more generally, special social actors with specific interests, ideologies, and a certain degree of access to resources. Unlike Smith, who in some ways equates activists with actors, I propose to distinguish between them. Desecularization activists are individuals or groups directly and actively involved in restoring the role of religion in public institutions and culture. Actors of desecularization are a broader concept. It refers to larger groups whose interests, discontent, cultural and ideological attitudes coincide with those of activists, but who are more passive in their support of counter-secularization, do not actively participate in it, but rather serve as the social and political basis for counter-secularization activities. For example, only small groups of activists are usually involved in the fight for the preservation or return of the Ten Commandments in American courts. However, these activists can rely on the broader support of conservative Christian groups, which in this case act as actors of desecularization.

Religious masses - secular elites?

Who acts as activists and actors of counter-secularization depends on the specific religious, cultural, and socio-political contexts in which desecularization takes place-

59. Smith Ch. Introduction: Rethinking the Secularization of American Public Life//The Secular Revolution. P. 29.

60. Ibid. P. 32 - 33.

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rization. However, in a broader, conceptual sense, this issue remains poorly understood. Berger's thesis on desecularization suggests that counter-secularization movements express mass discontent with secular elites and their elitist ideology of secularism. 61 Here, the idea of a revolt of the religious masses against non-religious and anti-religious elites is implicit. Indeed, religious masses can be seen as actors of counter-secularization, especially when the masses are mobilized against relatively secular elites. Secularist political and ideological regimes marginalize the religious masses, who may constitute the majority of the population living under their control. These regimes, according to Riff, "transform the moral majority of the second world into a fundamentalist minority of the third world." 62 The political and ideological disenfranchisement of the religious majority is a potential source of massive counter-secularization movements.

However, mass movements usually have a vanguard (in our case, groups of counter - secularization activists) and intellectuals who formulate people's discontent and wishes in the form of understandable ideologies and political programs. Intellectuals can "organically" belong to popular movements or act as their external allies. Thus, conflicts between secular and counter-secular forces manifest themselves in clashes between groups of activists and intellectuals who lead them. Accordingly, the "religious masses - secular elites" model points to only one aspect of counter-secularization movements. Another aspect, no less important sociologically, is related, in Riff's terms, to the struggle between the "officer classes" leading secular and counter-secular forces.

The question of the emergence and development of the counter-secularization intellectual avant-garde is intriguing, but poorly understood. Berger notes that, "in the best tradition of Karl Marx, a relatively small group of American intellectuals became' traitors to their class ' and joined la-

61. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview. P. 11.

62. Rieff Ph. My Life among the Deathworks. P. 6. As shown earlier, Rieff's "second world" supports the sacred order of theistic culture, while the "third world" is a social order devoid of the sacred element.

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hero of the enemy " 63. The witty reference to Marx, however, does not make clear what prompted some of the educated elite to "switch sides" during the battle. This question deserves serious research, because our answer to it can provide a key to predicting potential transformations of the intellectual culture of secularized societies. For example, it would be important to understand how and to what extent intellectuals ' "betrayal" of secular principles reflects their understanding of the limits and existential pitfalls of secularism. Another hypothetical explanation is related to the understanding of "betrayal" as an innovative behavior. Indeed, in a completely secularized society, loyalty to secularism is essentially conformism. Conversely, following religious principles is innovative and nonconformist. Innovators tend to be more privileged and educated, which, according to Stark, partly explains why Christianity as a new religious movement initially embraced purposeful, affluent city dwellers.64 From this point of view, it is not so surprising that segments of the intellectual elite are returning to religious traditions previously marginalized by secular regimes. An ancient and long-suppressed tradition can have the sound and appeal of a "new religion" for those who have socialized in a secularized environment. This may partly explain the fact that the current revival of the Russian Orthodox Church was preceded and partly prepared for by the significant return to Orthodoxy of a large number of representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, 65 "among whom were the most educated and most gifted people in the country."66
Another largely ignored aspect of the mass - elite model relates to the active role that secular elites, including statesmen and other political leaders, can and do play in the process of desecularization. In this respect, the Russian post-communist and Chinese communist governments played a key role.-

63. Berger et al. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations.

64. Stark R. The Rise of Christianity. P. 29 - 47.

65. Ellis J. The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History. London and New York: Routledge, 1986. R287.

66. Ibid. P. 184.

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It's a good idea. Of course, secular political elites are not part of counter-secularization movements. However, for reasons of political gain, they can provide these movements with more opportunities and resources to succeed. In particular, in the case of Russia, secular political elites have played a crucial role in the partial desecularization of public institutions such as public schools, prisons, and the armed forces.67
Bottom and top desecularization

Depending on who the social actors are, we can talk about the desecularization of social institutions and culture and the deprivation of religion "from below "and /or"from above". When grassroots movements and groups representing the religious masses act as activists and actors, we are dealing with desecularization "from below"; when they mostly belong to religious or secular leadership, we are dealing with desecularization "from above". These two models are ideal types that indicate the dominant patterns of counter-secularization. We can assume that the empirical cases are somewhere in the middle and include various combinations of trends that develop in both directions.

Bottom-up and top-down processes will be consistent or uncoordinated, depending on the interests, ideological and cultural orientations, and resources of the actors involved. For example, the resurgence of popular religiosity may not lead to the desecularization of public institutions, because grassroots organizations are weak and lack resources, while elites tend to maintain the secular status quo. Or, conversely, well-organized and resourced elites can desecularize public institutions even in the absence of a visible religious revival from below.

Prerequisites for bottom-up desecularization

Theoretically, once secularized institutions can be desecularized at the request of the people, that is, from below. However, this would imply a high degree of mass involvement in usi-

67. Lisovskaya E., Karpov V. Orthodoxy, Islam, and Desecularization of Russia's State Schools.

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This would be possible, in turn, if the following three conditions were met: First, a broad grassroots movement to desecularize public institutions (such as schools) is possible where and when there is a high level of religiosity - after all, it is difficult to expect non-religious populations to demand that religion be returned to schools. Secondly, such a movement presupposes organized efforts and, consequently, the emergence of voluntary associations that put forward a desecularization agenda. Third, significant resources are required for such a religious movement to achieve its goals. Resources include both material resources and political levers. The latter include opportunities to exert political influence through governance, representative institutions, democratic procedures, etc. In the absence of these three conditions, the masses of ordinary believers can at best play a passive role in desecularization, allowing elites to independently increase the role of religion in society.

Desecularization modes

As soon as the activists and actors of counter-secularization achieve a sufficient degree of influence on society or on a part of its institutions, as soon as they occupy, to use Lenin's term, "commanding heights", a special "desecularization regime"arises and strengthens. By this term, I mean a certain normative and political-ideological mode of action through which desecularization is carried out, expanded and maintained. It includes: (a) the scope of the proposed desecularization, from the desecularization of several institutions and cultural spheres to the complete religious transformation of society; (b) institutional mechanisms (both formal and informal) that grant certain amounts of power and authority to religious and secular actors and define the limits of religious and civil liberties for religious and secular groups; (c) the specific way in which these mechanisms are implemented; (d) the ideologies that legitimize these mechanisms.

This multidimensional definition can be used to develop a conceptual approach in comparative cross-country studies.-

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cultural and historical studies of desecularization regimes, from post-revolutionary France to post-communist Russia and Eastern Europe, from revolutionary Iran and the Taliban era in Afghanistan to modern Indonesia and China. Desecularization modes will be very different from each other. Some of them, aimed at the total desecularization of society, claim power to control the totality of public and private institutions, as was the case with the Taliban. Others have limited influence, trying to modify only some public institutions and not affecting the private sphere (as in the case of Romania, Bulgaria and Russia). Depending on the degree of power that allows religious and secular actors to make decisions, some regimes place the secular state at the center, controlling the development of counter-secularization processes (as in the case of China), while others grant supreme power to religious structures (as in Iran after 1979). If we look at the degree of religious freedom and civil liberties granted to religious and secular groups, some regimes are at least as diverse as others. Formally, they allow pluralism in the expression of faith, as well as atheism (as was the case in Russia before the adoption of the Law on Religious Associations of 1997), while others combine limited pluralism with the hegemony of one denomination (for example, Russia after 1997). And still others are monistic and exclusivist (that is, they recognize only one legitimate faith, for example, Shiite Islam in the case of Iran after 1979). In addition, some desecularization regimes are highly coercive, while others are quite liberal. The former use harsh, violent measures to impose religious norms, including religious supervision of public and private life (as in the case of the Taliban), while the latter implement counter-secularization reforms within the framework of a law that excludes enforcement of religious norms. The ideologies used to legitimize desecularization regimes also vary widely. Some regimes impose ideologies derived from resurgent religions (such as radical Islamism), while others legitimize counter-secularization through inherently secular ideological principles. Examples of secular ideological legitimation

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They can be found in the political discourse of Russian leaders. Since the early 1990s, they have emphasized the importance of Orthodoxy and other traditional religions for improving the moral climate in Russia, curbing crime, solving demographic problems, and improving national security. Pitirim Sorokin calls the mentality expressed by such rhetoric "cynically sensuous", meaning that it cynically seeks to find spiritual means to achieve the invariably materialistic goals of sensuous culture.

Thus, the proposed conceptualization can lead to a multidimensional typology of desecularization modes. The empirically discovered types of modes are most likely somewhere between the two main types. The former is a monistic, exclusivist, and coercive theocracy that justifies its power by a political ideology derived from the dominant faith, and seeks a total religious transformation of society. The archetype of such a regime is the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The opposite type is a pluralistic, inclusive, and liberal regime that leaves a significant amount of decision - making and control power to the secular authorities, who use secular ideologies to legitimize their policies aimed at desecularizing a limited number of social institutions and cultural areas. A good illustration of this second type is the post-Soviet Ukraine.

One of the main theoretical questions that still remains unanswered is what explains the differences in desecularization regimes and their types. Potential explanations may focus on various factors. The first is the nature of resurgent faiths. The theology of some, such as Islam, traditionally does not involve the separation of religious and secular authorities and laws and provides for restrictions on freedom for non-believers (for example, in the form of dhimmi status). Others, like Orthodox Christianity, developed the theology of the church-state symphony and firmly linked themselves to individual nations (as in the Russian, Greek, Serbian, and other Orthodox Churches). In such cases, theocratic and hegemonic models are likely to develop, while pluralism and protection of the rights of religious and secular minorities can be either limited or completely reduced to zero. On the other hand, we can expect that the counter-

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secularization associated with the global expansion of Pentecostalism and evangelical churches will follow a more pluralistic scenario and take into account the traditional principle of separation of church and state for these faiths. Another potential development factor is the situation in the religious market. For example, in the context of Ukrainian religious pluralism, where the three main Orthodox jurisdictions compete, the Russian hegemonic style does not work and opens up the possibility of a pluralistic model in which the secular state plays the role of an arbiter and determines the rules governing religious rivalry. Other non-religious factors that determine the diversity of regimes are related to the level of socio-economic development and the historical path of desecularized societies. For example, within the same religious-civilizational framework, more modernized and functionally differentiated societies may show greater resistance to totalizing and monistic desecularization projects. In addition, we can expect that societies that have purposefully been subjected to a long and comprehensive secularization (as was the case in Russia) will continue to experience the inertia of secular attitudes, limiting the impact of desecularization regimes.

Another research issue related to the types of desecularization regimes is the typology of mass reactions to the establishment and functioning of these regimes. After all, a desecularized socio-political order will be effective to the extent that it can stimulate mass commitment to a resurgent faith. Creating a reliable typology of mass reactions is an empirical task. Nevertheless, a preliminary conceptual framework may be useful for conducting empirical research on this issue. I believe that such a scheme can be created on the basis of Merton's classification of types of attitudes and behaviors that depend on people's acceptance of normative societal goals and means. In particular, Merton's typology distinguishes the following main types: conformism, innovation, ritualism, self-withdrawal (retreat) and rebellion (rebellion)68.

68. Merton R. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1968 [1949]. P. 186 - 209.

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Similar terms can also be used to describe reactions to goals and means that become normative in desecularization regimes. Desecularization regimes, especially those that are rapidly emerging and have far-reaching goals, dramatically change the prevailing normative concepts. Thus, societally normative commitment to religion again becomes. It is not so easy for a secularized, and especially deeply secularized, population to become religious. The means to achieve this goal must be provided by the religious tradition (s) recognized as legitimate by this counter-secularization regime. Just as secularist regimes turn the religious majority into a disenfranchised minority, so harsh counter-secularization can almost instantly marginalize the secular majority (for example, those who grew up under state atheism). A "conformist" response to this situation (for example, accepting both new goals and legitimate means to achieve them) isconversion in a broad sense, including the transition from nonreligion to specific religiosity or from amorphous, private beliefs to practicing one of the faiths legitimized by the new regime. An "innovative" response involves accepting religiosity as a new norm, along with rejecting the institutional means (especially organized religion or religions) recommended by the desecularization regime. Consequently, innovators will look for alternative religions. They will join new religious movements, cults and sects or churches that the current regime considers illegitimate or "non-traditional". The "ritualistic" response is to accept religious means, not ends. In this way, ritualists will recognize the importance of reviving religions without becoming adherents to them. This inevitably leads to the spread of the "belonging without believingand. Therefore, rioters will gravitate towards established forms of secularism, including outright atheism. Finally, the "self-withdrawal" from the normative pressure of counter-secularization manifests itself in religious indifference. Those who respond

69. Hervieu-Leger D. Religion as a Chain of Memory.

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thus, they do not support either religious or secular norms and develop a worldview and lifestyle to which neither one nor the other has anything to do.

Thus, we can expect that the reaction to the establishment of desecularization regimes will be: conversion to "legitimate" faiths, innovative search for alternatives, ritualistic "belonging without faith", religious indifference and secularist rebellion. Which of these reactions will become statistically predominant will depend on the situations that preceded desecularization at the societal, group, and individual levels, as well as on the degree of influence and sustainability of counter-secularization regimes. For example, hegemonic, but not totalizing, and not particularly forced desecularization in post-atheist Russia generates a very widespread ritualistic "belonging without faith" reaction, accompanied by a relatively small proportion of more authentic appeals. More than 80 percent of Russians, including half of non-believers, declare themselves Orthodox, but the number of those who consistently combine Orthodox beliefs with regular church attendance is measured in units of percent.

Analytical levels, time frames, and implications for desecularization theory

There are two different approaches to studying social change. One focuses on relatively small-scale, short-term social transformations. The other is related to long-term changes affecting entire cultures and social systems. Sociological theories of social change focus primarily on the latter type of transformation. 70 This distinction also applies to studies and theories of desecularization as social change. One can look at the resurgent religious influence on relatively small social units and look at them in the short term. However, when developing a generalized theory of desecularization, it is impossible to do without large-scale and long-term studies

70. Appelabaum R.P. Theories of Social Change. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. P. 7 - 8.

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religious revival. At the same time, of course, you need to determine how large the scale and time frame are. Our answers to this question, as the following discussion shows, have important implications for the theoretical understanding of desecularization, its social foundations, and its relationship to the modern era. To explain why this is the case, consider the possible analytical levels and time frames of the desecularization analysis.

Analysis Levels

The question of analytical levels has already been raised in theoretical and methodological discussions about secularization. M. Chavez distinguished between" laicization "at the societal level (reduction of the impact of religious authority on societal institutions), "internal secularization" of religious organizations, and "religious disinvolvement" (decline of individual religious beliefs and practices).71. These three concepts correspond to the three levels of analysis identified by Dobbelaere72: the macro level (affecting society as a whole), the meso level (organizational), and the micro level (individual).

This classification of analytical levels can serve as a starting point for the study of desecularization. However, I believe that this classification is somewhat problematic and incomplete. Its problematic nature and incompleteness are mainly related to the interpretation of the macro-level (societal) of religious changes 73. In particular, it remains unclear what constitutes

71. Chaves M. Secularization as Declining Religious Authority. P. 757.

72. Dobbelaere K. Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization//Sociology of Religion. 1999. Vol. 60. No. 3. P. 229 - 47.

73. Microlevel interpretation is also problematic. Strictly speaking, individual-level facts are beyond the scope of sociological analysis in general and the sociological study of religion in particular. Sociologists do collect data at the individual level, but they do so to analyze processes occurring in larger categories, groups, and societies. Thus, individual-level data is usually combined to identify trends prevailing in the populations to which individual individuals belong. In this context, individuals are, to borrow a term from the content analysis technique," units of calculus", while" units of analysis " are large conglomerates of people, including the populations of entire countries, or, in the case of global survey studies (for example, the World Values Project), on the basis of a large scale.-

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the "societal" level at which we analyze the influence of religion on other social institutions. What are the spatial and temporal boundaries of "societal" units that we should focus on at the macro level? How large and stable must these units be for us to understand whether societal desecularization (or, if you prefer, secularization) is taking place? Do we mean countries, regions within countries, or large formations such as civilizations? The answers to these questions directly influence the empirical verification of theoretical assumptions about secularization and desecularization. The Chavez and Dobbeler classifications do not address this important issue directly. Their discussions on the societal level revolve around such abstract concepts as" modern society", while the actual examples are most often associated with nation states, be it Iran, France, Belgium or other countries. Indeed, sociologists usually deal with data sources for individual countries, and this is convenient for separating the analysis of religious change by country. In addition, the data that we usually use in studies of secularization and desecularization are themselves products of the modern state and its institutions: for example, archival materials, census data, and other statistical calculations; indeed, the very word "statistics" comes from the word "state". Yet, even if we ignore the nature of these data, we should ask ourselves about the conceptual reasons for the concentration of macroanalysis of secularization on interaction between the two countries.-

villages of entire parts of the world. Relevant trends are measured by the number of individuals affected by them, but are not analyzed at the individual level. And even qualitative research that delves into the life worlds of individuals is only sociologically relevant to the extent that it sheds light on social processes occurring on a larger scale. Thus, a sociologically more accurate term for this analytical level might be " population-level "analysis. Sociologically, a more correct use of the term "micro-level" is associated with religious changes (in our case, with counter-secularization) occurring in small social structures. These include families, small informal groups (such as prayer groups at work), as well as more institutionalized entities, including religious communities. This kind of micro-level analysis captures the superindividual components of counter-secularization, which are not deduced from the religious transformations of individual individuals that make up microstructural units, and are not reduced to them.

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relations between religion and other institutions within national states.

There are arguments both for and against focusing societal analysis on the level of state entities. Such an analytical strategy can be supported by the fact that States create political power structures and regulatory frameworks to control and regulate all institutions, including religion, economics, politics, education, etc., that operate within their own borders. Thus, it is quite natural to study how religion interacts with other institutions within the political and territorial complex of a given State. However, there are at least two serious arguments against this approach. The first argument is related to the well-known critique of "methodological nationalism"74, according to which society and the state are proportionate, and therefore states are understood as "receptacles" of societal systems. Focusing on nation-states as units of analysis hinders proper consideration of increasingly influential transnational and global forces. I will temporarily put aside this globalizing argument, but I will return to it later in this article. Now let us consider another argument against limiting the societal level of analysis to the boundaries of the state. States in the Weberian sense (as territorial monopolies on the use of force)-the phenomenon is relatively recent. Even more modern are the nation-states, which derive their legitimacy from the mythology of nations as horizontal fraternal communities.75 Thus, focusing on the societal analysis of institutional systems "contained" in states (and especially in nation-states) limits the time frame in which we can understand secularization and desecularization, by new and recent history. In contrast, the religions whose changing societal influence we seek to study are older and more stable entities. Compare, for example, the length of the history of Catholicism and the state of Poland, the Great Patriotic War.-

74. См. Beck U. What Is Globalization? Maiden: Polity Press, 2000. P. 64 - 65.

75. This concept is based on the work of: Anderson B. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso, 1983.

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voslavia and modern Greece, Islam and Saudi Arabia. Long-lasting religious influences form developing civilizational complexes, within which modern states have emerged relatively recently. This framework covers systems of religiously influenced institutions, collective representations, and various configurations of the material substrate that predate the emergence of modern States and some of which the latter inherit and modify.76 Thus, these frameworks encompass societal systems whose scale and durability differ from those "contained" within the borders of a modern State. When analyzing secularization and desecularization, it is (at least) no less legitimate and important to pay attention to changes in the impact of religion on these societal systems than to changes that occur at the state level. Moreover, the paradigmatic theoretical arguments about secularization contained in the works of Weber and Comte, social change was considered within the framework of Western civilization and beyond, and not within national borders. Similarly, Berger's thesis on desecularization refers to the civilizational and global scale, not to the state level.

However, I am in no way opposed to societal analysis limited to specific States. Such an analysis is often justified, especially when it deals with religious influences specific to the political context of a particular country. However, I propose to distinguish between two types of societal analysis: secularization and desecularization. One focuses on the influence of religions on societal systems that function within the borders of nation states. I will leave out Dobbeler's term "macro level"to refer to this analytical level. The second one examines the influence of religions commensurate with the geographical scale and historical duration of civilizations. Following the logic of the "micro-meso-macro" classification, I will use the term "mega-level".

76. For example, modern Western States have secularized the normative framework for marriage to varying degrees, but the predominance of the monogamous family reflects their more ancient Christian roots. European states have an extensive system of national universities, but the university institution itself is an earlier product of Christian civilization. And so on.

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Consequences of the transition of the analytical time frame to the mega-level

As mentioned above, the macro-level and mega-level of analysis assume different time frames for studying religious and social changes. For example, at the macro level, the study of the processes of secularization and desecularization observed in modern European countries will be limited to the last centuries. The study of the same processes in Western Christian civilization should take into account the historical period of approximately two thousand years. The transition from the macro-level time frame to the mega-level will have significant implications for the theoretical assessment of the trajectories and social bases of religious changes.

Corollary 1: Unidirectional or cyclical changes?

Moving to a mega-level time frame may force us to rethink our usual ideas about the direction and trajectory of religious change. Consider the following metaphorical example. Let's assume that there is a huge pendulum whose oscillation cycle is hundreds of years. Now imagine an observer looking at the pendulum as it approaches the lowest point of its oscillatory trajectory. If an observer applies a limited time frame (say, two hundred years) to understand what is happening, he will probably limit himself to telling about a recent linear movement. The trajectory that he will honestly report will most likely be directed down in a straight line, which in relation to the actual curve of the pendulum is a tangent near the bottom point of the semicircle. It will be difficult for the observer to imagine the observed decline as a fragment of a longer oscillatory movement that is about to enter its upward phase. Our reports of secularization (and desecularization) are somewhat similar to these honest but short-sighted calculations of a hypothetical observer. As a rule, these are reports about relatively recent and more or less linear trends. Empirical sociologists argue, for example, about the extent to which and why Europe and /or America have become more secular in the last fifty or sixty years (when survey data is involved) or at least in the last century and a half or two (when historical data is used). Meanwhile, the megahistorical perspective-

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The study of religious change could help us problematize popular ideas about linearity and unidirectionality. However, this prospect was practically abandoned.

In particular, megahistorical models that delineate the cycles of birth, growth, decline and death of civilizations (as in Oswald Spengler), or cyclical fluctuations between ideational and sensational sociocultural systems (as in Pitirim Sorokin)are practically excluded from modern discussions77. Identifying the reasons for abandoning these paradigms could be the task of a separate and important study.78
However, whatever these reasons, the rejection of them has led to a marked impoverishment of the sociological imagination in terms of understanding the trajectories and social correlates of religious change. Therefore, bringing these approaches back into the sociological mainstream can breathe new life into the theories of secularization and desecularization. This primarily concerns Sorokin, whose work, unlike Spengler's, is undoubtedly sociological and richly empirical. As already mentioned, Sorokin's model of pendulum swings between ideational and sensational systems 79 is particularly important for understanding the nature of changes in the societal role of religion. In his opinion, the growing dominance of sensuous culture in the period from the XVI to XX centuries. The period usually associated with secularization in the West has parallels with the era that the Greco-Roman world experienced in the third and first centuries BC, which was followed by a crisis and a transition to an ideational system, which was dominated in the fifth and twelfth centuries. In his works of the mid-20th century, Sorokin diagnosed a deep crisis of Western sensuous culture.-

77. Curiously, even Parsons ' linear-evolutionary megamodel has been largely abandoned, despite the fact that it has generated so much theoretical speculation about modernization and secularization.

78. It can be assumed that the rejection of Spengler and Sorokin is largely connected with the suicidal self-separation of modern sociology from universal history, its " methodological fetishism "(obsession with detailing the research technique to the detriment of its content; see Berger P. Whatever Happened to Sociology? / / First Things. 2002. Vol. 126 [October 2002] P. 127-29), steadily narrowing areas of research and a secularist aversion to theories that suggest that the growth of religions can play a constructive, cultural-civilizational-forming role, while religious decline can cause a societal crisis.

79. Sorokin P. Social and Cultural Dynamics.

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It is also entering a transitional phase marked by a resurgence of ideational influence. This vision is extremely consonant with what was called desecularization half a century later.

desecularization. Corollary 2: Internal dynamics of the secularization cycle - Looking at religion over the last few centuries, the early macrotheories of secularization in the West inevitably saw it as a process accompanying societal modernization and growing with it. So it was tempting to explain the former as a reflection of the latter. As a result, secularization began to be derived from contemporary social processes and forces external to religion (for example, such as general functional differentiation; economic growth leading to greater existential certainty; the growth of modern science, etc.). It is noteworthy that a symmetrical argument has recently been developed that considers modernity as an external cause of desecularization. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler have summarized the existing versions of this argument, listing as many as seven reasons why modernity "leads to the revival of religions"80. Note that Berger also establishes a link between modernity and desecularization 81, but does not suggest that there is a direct causal relationship between the latter and the former.

In contrast, from the point of view of Sorokin's megahistorical model, neither secularization nor desecularization are unique characteristics or consequences of modernity.82 The decline and revival of the societal influence of religion can take unique historical forms in the modern era. However, they are essentially two inseparable phases of a historically repeated cycle rooted in the internal dynamics of socio-cultural systems. The return to an ideational culture (i.e., one centered on the belief in the supernatural) occurs when the boundless expansion of the destructive, nihilistic tendencies of the sensory system begins to threaten its very existence and existence.-

80. Fox J., Sandler Sh. Bringing Religion into International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. P. 12 - 14.

81. Berger P. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview. P. 11.

82. Ibid. P. 13. Berger notes, in passing and in parentheses, that pre-modern forms of secularism existed earlier, as in the case of Confucianism and Hellenistic culture. However, his understanding of desecularization revolves around modernity.

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the existence of people. Thus, the expansion of sensational culture (which is accompanied by the decline of the influence of religion on society as a whole) leads to the return of ideational culture (along with religious revival). At the same time, neither the decline nor the revival of religious influence on society and culture is caused from outside (for example, modernism). Rather, we are dealing with the internal dynamics of socio-cultural cycles.

In this regard, Sorokin's ideas largely coincide with what leading sociologists of religion with very different theoretical attitudes began to say half a century later: Stark, Bainbridge and Finke, on the one hand, and Peter Berger, on the other. In particular, Stark and his co-authors have argued theoretically and empirically that secularization restricts itself and generates oppositely directed and counterbalancing processes of rebirth and religious innovation.83 The difference between this thesis and Sorokin's is that the former limits the analysis to processes inherent in the religious sphere itself and the specific dynamics of the church-sect within it, while the latter points to cycles of religious decline and rebirth that encompass sociocultural systems as a whole. However, in both versions, we are dealing with immanent forces, not external ones, that make changes. The basic theoretical concepts of the enduring human need for non-mundane, supernatural grounds for belief and action are also similar. It is this need that drives people from mundane religions to non-mundane sects-in Stark's analysis-and from the emptiness of late sensuous culture to ideational culture - in Sorokin's model. Here, too, both theories agree with Berger's view of the general foundations of various counter-secularization movements as a reaction to the modern secular order. These movements, Berger says, express the eternal human quest for transcendent meaning. They react to secularism, which they perceive as an exorcism of transcendence, condemning people to an "impoverished and ultimately unbearable state." 84 Thus, three different theoretical approaches converge in understanding the dynamics of sekul-

83. Stark R., Bainbridge W. The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. P. 2; Stark R., Bainbridge W.A. Theory of Religion. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996 [1987]. P. 279 - 314; Finke R., Stark R. The Churching of America. P. 46.

84. Berger E. The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview. P. 13.

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desecularization and its rootedness in the incessant human search for the transcendent. However, among these three, Sorokin's theory represents the most general, mega-historical approach and framework for comparative studies of these dynamics at the scale of historical epochs and civilizations.

What is the role of modernity in the proposed scheme? If it is not the "cause" of secularization and / or desecularization, what is its relationship to these processes? This fundamental question is beyond the scope of this paper, and the answer to it would require writing entire books. However, the proposed scheme allows us to outline, albeit roughly and tentatively, an approach that provides some answers. To simplify the task, we will focus on the original concept of Western (European) modernity and omit the more complex concept of "multiple modernities" 85.

Viewed through the proposed time frame, modernity is a relatively recent and brief episode in the history of Western Christian civilization. It was preceded by a long period of development of Christianity. Since causes must precede effects, it would be logical to look at Christian pre-modern history in search of the origins of modernity. From the Weberian point of view, the attempt to find the Christian roots of modernity is unlikely to seem strange. Research of this kind is already underway. For example, the origins of modernity are found in the nominalist revolution (which, we note, in Sorokin coincides with the beginning of the "idealistic" transition from ideational culture) and the subsequent theological reaction to it. 86 Charles Taylor also recognizes the importance of nominalism, but still emphasizes the key role of the Reformation for secularization and modernity.87 I suggest a less researched way: to look at the societal consequences not only of specific religious beliefs, but also of their evolving organization into systems supported by specialized institutional mechanisms. For example, Douglas North believes that the medieval Christian system, the general structure of its beliefs, is a religious one.-

85. Eisenstadt S.N. (ed.). Multiple Modernities. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

86. Gillespie M.A. The Theological Origins of Modernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.

87. Taylor Ch. A SecularAge. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. P. 773 - 76.

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The Church was the only repository of knowledge and its capacity for evolution favored the accumulation of knowledge and adaptive shifts leading to modern civil liberties and economic growth. 88 The Church was the only repository of knowledge.89 It has developed functionally specialized institutions for the accumulation and development of knowledge and learning, such as monastic libraries and universities. Stark's description of the medieval Christian roots of modern science is very revealing in this respect90. We should add that the development of functionally specialized institutions necessary for the accumulation and growth of knowledge and education was impossible without defining specialized intellectual roles, such as librarian, scientist, and theologian. Moreover, according to Fr. Alexander Schmemann, theology in the West, in contrast to the eastern Orthodox, developed as a rationalistic enterprise, separated from the liturgical context, at least from the scholastic era.91 It reduced the " ontological symbolism "of the early Christian liturgy to a simple" expressive "or" pictorial " symbolism, which was later considered superfluous for the true faith in many Protestant denominations. Thus, functional differentiation, the designation of specialized intellectual roles, the development of a theology that is institutionally separate from the liturgy and a science that is separate from theology - that is, processes that are usually attributed to the secularization of the Modern era - developed in the Christian context even before the advent of the modern era. In this sense, we can speak of an increasing "internal secularization" in pre-modern Christianity. Secularism, as Schmemann wrote, is the stepchild of Christianity, and its development can be traced back to at least the twelfth century.92
In this perspective, the usual view of the relationship between modernity and secularization can be replaced by the opposite. Instead of

88. North D.N. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. P. 136 - 37.

89. Ibid. P. 130.

90. Stark R. For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witchhunts, and the End of Slavery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. P. 121 - 200.

91. Schmemann A. The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997; Schmemann A. Introduction to Liturgical Theology. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003.

92. Schmemann A. For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1963. P. 117 - 34.

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Instead of assuming that modernity externally engenders secularization, we can think of Western modernity as the institutional embodiment of an internally and gradually secularizing Christianity. In turn, this institutional " body "further constrains the manifestations of the Christian"soul" contained in it. This reinterpretation is consistent, by the way, with Sorokin's theory of immanent (internal) sociocultural changes. As secularization culminates in the late Modern period, the opposite, counter-secular tendencies become more pronounced. Thus, modernity is not the "cause" of desecularization, but rather the starting point for its modern historical form and the fertile ground for its development. The desecularization of modern society can nevertheless be as gradual and prolonged as it was with the centuries-long emergence of modern secularism or with the transition from the late Roman "sensuous" secularism to the Christian "ideational" era. Or it can develop faster through the use of mass media and mass education, which were not available to actors of desecularization in pre-modern eras. In any case, sociologists of religion cannot provide direct "proof" that complete desecularization has actually occurred. However, they can monitor emerging and growing counter-secularization trends and their impact on society as a whole.

Multiple, overlapping, and colliding desecularizations

Just as modern theories have recognized the existence of "multiple moderns" and "many globalizations," we must recognize the diversity of desecularization processes around the world. Some sources of" multiple desecularization " related to various religious grounds and societal conjuncture of counter-secularization regimes have already been discussed above. However, in addition to varying according to religious and national contexts, different but overlapping and potentially conflicting counter-secularization impulses can develop within the same religious and national context.

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Charles Taylor's periodization of the West's transition to the "secular era" is useful for understanding the origins of plurality and conflict.93 It starts from the ideal-typical" Old Order " (Ancien Regime), integrated, vertically organized, based on faith in the universe with God at the head, monarchs and lords below Him, and individuals firmly embedded in the parish system at the very bottom. Following the collapse of the Old Order comes the "age of mobilization" (1800-1960), when secular forces and ideologies clash with their religious competitors in the struggle to define the principles of horizontal social reintegration. Then comes the "age of authenticity", which is centered on the individualistic desire for authentic self-expression. In the religious sphere, this leads either to the search for new types of spirituality, or to voluntary submission to traditional authority.

From this point of view, the counter-secularization movements of the "age of mobilization" most likely take the form of organic religious ideologies of mass mobilization and horizontal integration (for example, the ideology of religious nationalism) and act in accordance with them. Counter-secularization movements of the "age of authenticity", on the contrary, lead to the spread of new religious movements and /or the revival of extremely conservative and traditionalist groups that are not necessarily associated with national integration or other" horizontal " ideologies. Can such movements occur simultaneously? Casanova argues that, at least in Western Europe, the era of "reactive organicism", which included secular - religious and clerical - anti-clerical cultural and political wars, is over.94 However, his assessment may not apply to less and unevenly modernized contexts, where the mobilization agenda remains relevant for entire segments of society and the political elite, while other groups are already gravitating towards models of individualistic authenticity of religious quest and self-expression. This applies, at least to some extent, to the situation in Poland and especially in Russia, where reactionary religious nationalists and those who follow tradition in search of spiritual authenticity put forward a conflicting theory.-

93. Taylor Ch. A Secular Age. P. 424 - 535.

94. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. P. 61.

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shared visions of the social role of Catholicism and Orthodoxy, respectively. In addition, in the camp of supporters of authenticity, there may be tension between those who choose the path of religious innovation and those who follow the path of traditionalism.

In the global context, the pattern of overlapping and clashing counter-secularizations becomes even more complex. Globalization leads to the global spread of transnational communities, real and imagined. People and groups from different modernized and individualized national contexts are involved in these communities. As a result, previously unthinkable patterns arise. Second-and third-generation British citizens from middle-class families are fulfilling their need for genuine religious commitment by joining jihad in the Middle East. Evangelical and Pentecostal churches, which are among the most influential agents of globalization95, advocate models of modern civic and economic behavior and religious autonomy in contexts that are socially and economically backward. Some of these churches located in Africa are opening their parishes in Western Europe. Christian missionaries from Korea are being detained in war-torn Afghanistan. What we see in such cases is the development of diverse and competing counter-secularization forces that can combine mobilization impulses and the desire for authenticity to form powerful transnational movements.

Conclusion

This paper offers a conceptual approach for developing the theory and comparative studies of desecularization processes, forces, patterns, modes, and historical trajectories. I hope that the proposed concepts will prove useful for much-needed systematic comparative studies of desecularization. In particular, the proposed multidimensional definition clarifies the components of desecularization processes,

95. Berger P. The Cultural Dynamics of Globalization // Many Globalizations. Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World/Ed. Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. P. 8.

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It includes the entire spectrum of social facts: from collective representations that have crystallized into symbolic cultural systems and institutional norms, to the material substratum of society. This definition can serve as a basis for developing a number of empirical indicators for a comparative assessment of the scale of desecularization processes in society. Similarly, the proposed definitions and typologies of counter-secularization actors, patterns, regimes, and reactions to them can be used in a comparative study of the political and ideological dynamics of desecularization. In addition, although this paper does not offer a ready-made theory of desecularization, the concepts proposed in it are, in fact, building blocks for the development of such a theory. A well-founded theory can be created through generalizations based on comparative studies of multiple desecularization processes in the world (a concept introduced in the last section). The proposed revision of analytical levels and time frames will hopefully help remove some of the conceptual obstacles to further development of such a theory. In particular, the article proposed to return the almost completely rejected megahistorical perspective back to the mainstream of studies of the decline and rebirth of religions. This leads us logically to rethink the usual interpretations of the relationship between modernity, secularization, and desecularization. It also enables us to construct a theory of the internal dynamics of the cycles of secularization and desecularization. Finally, I hope that this article shows the possibility and necessity of integrating ideas from divergent and competing schools of classical and modern sociology in order to understand the social origins, patterns, and consequences of desecularization.

Translated from English by Andrey Shishkov, edited by Elena Lisovskaya

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