This is the text of a lecture that Dr. Kristina Stoeckl (University of Innsbruck, Austria) gave in the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) in March 2016. She presented the research project "Postsecular Conficts", 2016-2021, supported by the Austrian Science Fund and the European Research Council. This project in the feld of sociology of religion and political theory explores conficts over questions of public morality (f.e. visibility of religious symbols, defnitions of family and gender, etc.). It starts from the observation that in today's world these conficts no longer take place in national contexts, but have a global appeal. How can we understand this global struggle for traditional values? In order to answer this question two steps need to be taken: (1) a revised political sociology of traditionalist religious actors; (2) a revised political conception of moral confict. The Postsecular Conficts research project wants to achieve both of these steps, specifcally through

On March 2, 2016, RANEPA hosted a lecture by Professor Kristina Steckl (University of Innsbruck, Austria). The lecture was devoted to a detailed account of the research project "Post-secular Conflicts" (2016-2021), which was conducted by Prof. Steckl is now at the head of an international team of researchers. We publish the text of this lecture.

Shtekl K. Postsekulyarnye konfliktsii i global'naia borba za traditsionnye tsennosti [Post-secular conflicts and global struggle for traditional values]. 2016. N 4. pp. 222-240.

Stoeckl, Kristina (2016) "Postsecular Conficts and the Global Struggle for Traditional Values", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(4): 222-240.

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a thorough analysis of the role of Russian Orthodox traditionalist actors in the global struggle for traditional values.

Key words: postsecular, Russian Orthodox Church, Habermas, religion, norm entrepreneurship.

Introduction

In my presentation, I am going to present the research project "Postsecular Conflicts", of which I am the head.

As part of the project, we study the phenomenon of conflicts around religious or moral issues in modern societies from the point of view of the sociology of religion and political theory. Let me give you two examples of such conflicts.

I live in Italy. Recently, there has been intense public debate in Italy about the establishment of an institution of" civil unions " for same-sex couples. In Florence, where I live, two weeks ago, gender activists held events in support of the new law. A week later, their opponents organized a so-called "Family Day" to express their protest against the bill. Daily newspaper headlines report on various aspects of the discussion, and the Vatican issued a statement in which the Catholic Church insists on the semantic difference between the concepts of "civil union" and "marriage". In Parliament, representatives of all factions were divided on the issue, and even the ruling center-left majority did not vote unanimously in favor of the new law (which still has to go through several instances before it comes into force).

The second example concerns Austria, where I come from. Austria is a country where the vast majority of the population declares itself Catholic, although only a small percentage of citizens regularly attend church. Religious education in Austrian public schools is compulsory and accessible to representatives of all recognized religious communities. However, the school became a place of controversy over religious issues: parents complained that during a music lesson in an Austrian primary school, all children were taught to sing Christmas songs. The claims came down to the fact that it was a lesson of the muse-

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It was not an hour of religious education, and some parents felt that the school was not neutral towards all religions and worldviews.

I am sure that almost everyone knows about conflicts of this kind: we read about them in the news almost every day. What is common in the situations I have described is that they indicate a shift in public consciousness: from a situation where certain aspects of public life are considered indisputable (the heterosexual concept of marriage, both the secular and religious meaning of Christmas), to a situation where these aspects are re - evaluated. This is, to use the term of the Russian structuralist Viktor Shklovsky, the technique of estrangement, when something that was taken for granted, even to the point of self-evidence, becomes again "something", the object of dispute, the center of the struggle over the question of definition.

Conflicts like the ones just described involve issues not only of family or education, but also of life (for example, abortion, euthanasia, artificial insemination), as well as issues of religious freedom (such as the presence of crucifixes in public places).

Similar conflicts occur not only in secularized Western democracies, but also in Russia. 2012 is considered to be a" pivotal year " for Russia in terms of moral policy. This was the year when the Russian government placed unconditional support for traditional values on the domestic and foreign policy agenda, subsequently passing (2013) laws within the country protecting religious feelings and banning the promotion of non-traditional relations, 1 and outside of Russia upholding traditional values in the context of international human rights policy. 2 It should be noted, however, that in reality traditional values have previously occupied an important place in Russian domestic and foreign policy, which was manifested, in particular, in lobbying.-

1. Stepanova, E. (2015) "‘The Spiritual and Moral Foundations of Civilization in Every Nation for Thousands of Years': The Traditional Values Discourse in Russia", Politics, Religion and Ideology 16(2-3): 119-136.

2. McCrudden, Ch. (2015) "Transnational Culture Wars", University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper 447 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590336, accessed on 25. 10. 2015].

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promoting traditional values with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church 3.

In the course of public discussions around conflicts related to moral policy, opponents usually accuse each other of all the sins: backwardness, geopolitical ambitions, justifying death, instrumentalization of religion, protection of religion, forgetting values, destruction of the foundations of civilization, cruelty, violence, intolerance, discrimination, lack of restrictions, suppression etc. The level of public discussions and journalistic reporting about them is determined by the "friend/foe" scheme and violent recriminations. This, I believe, does not contribute to understanding the nature of such conflicts.

The research project "Post-secular Conflicts" is dedicated to just such conflicts, but we intend to rise above the usual level of disputes. Our project is not journalistic or political, but academic and sociological in nature. It implies the need to step back from public debate in order to ask a question: how can we understand today's post-secular conflicts and the global struggle for traditional values? The answer to this question, in my opinion, involves two steps:: (1) review of the political sociology of traditionalist religious actors; (2) revision of the political concept of moral conflict.

Post-secular society

Since our project is an academic, research project, the first mandatory step is to formulate the initial assumptions that guide this research, that is, our starting points. Such a starting point is the concept of "post-secular society". Let me explain what I mean.

The social sciences are by definition secular sciences; in other words, for them religion and religious actors serve as the object of research. However, today the social sciences are also "post-secular" in the sense that they do not think of their position as supra-religious. In contrast, postsecondary

3. Stoeckl, K. (2014) The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights. London, New York: Routledge.

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social sciences are in self-reflexive connection with their object of research - with religious 4. The term "post-secular society" was coined by the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas5. He uses it to describe a specific property of democratic debate, namely the ability to enact and possibly incorporate religious arguments.

The starting point of Habermas ' philosophy is the strict separation of religion and the state. The state as the quintessence of rules, regulations and institutions that organize the coexistence of people, according to Habermas, should not be religious in itself: it should not be a theocracy, it should not have a state church, and legislation should not resort to religious justifications. This is the political liberal and democratic starting point for Habermas, and it also serves as a normative starting point for the question I am considering in this project.

However, the religious neutrality of a State does not mean that religions cannot flourish within it or influence the ways in which people in a democracy discuss and approve the laws that will govern them. This is the idea of "overlapping consensus" that Habermas and John Rawls rely on.6 Overlapping consensus means that citizens of a democratic State can maintain a unified political order, even if they hold different or even contradictory worldviews.

From consensus conditions to conflict conditions

It is important to recognize that the concepts of post-secular society and overlapping consensus claim to describe exactly the kind of conflict situations discussed above. In religiously

4. For the corresponding definition of "post-secular religion" , see: A. Kyrlezhev. Postsekulyarnaya kontseptualizatsiya religii: k postanovke problemy [Post-secular conceptualization of religion: towards a problem statement]. 2012. 2(30), pp. 52-68. For an analysis of modern "post-secular philosophy" and the changing perception of theology and religious arguments, see: Uzlaner D. Vvedenie v postsekulyarnuyu filosofiyu [Introduction to Post-secular Philosophy]. 2011. 3 (82). pp. 3-32.

5. Habermas, J. (2006) "Religion in the Public Sphere", European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-25.

6. Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism. Expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press.

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in a neutral state-Italy-citizens and their representatives (political parties and the elected government) participate in the process of drafting a law - the law on civil unions, which encourages citizens of different and opposite worldviews to act, representing the parties "for" and "against" the bill. Is it possible to reach an overlapping consensus in this case? What complicates this task?

It is here, at this point in the argument, that my approach deviates from the answer given to this question by mainstream political liberalism, and Habermas in particular. The latter correctly describes the problem of pluralism of worldviews in democratic societies, but, in my opinion, is wrong in describing the conditions of consensus. I will give first Habermas ' answer, and then my objections to it.

According to Habermas, for religious consciousness to contribute to achieving overlapping consensus in democratic societies, it must undergo a process of" modernization " in response to three specific challenges. These calls are:

(1) religious pluralism,

(2) modern science,

(3) positive law and secular morality.

Modernization, according to Habermas, involves three steps, namely, the development by religious citizens of an "epistemic attitude" in relation to:

(I) to other religions and worldviews that they encounter in a space of discourse hitherto occupied only by their own religion;

(II) the independence of secular knowledge from sacred knowledge and the institutional monopoly of modern scientific experts;

(III) the priority of secular arguments in the political arena 7.

According to Habermas, in order for the modernization of religious consciousness to be considered "successful", religious citizens must develop the following three "epistemic attitudes"::

(i) they succeed to the extent that, in the course of self-reflection, they align their religious beliefs with the competing doctrines of salvation, without compromising their own exclusive claim to the truth;

7. Habermas, J. (2006) "Religion in the Public Sphere", p. 14.

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(ii) they can succeed if, from their religious point of view, they understand the relationship between dogmatic and secular beliefs in such a way that autonomous progress in secular knowledge cannot contradict their faith;

(iii)this can only be successful to the extent that they can convincingly link the egalitarian individualism and universalism of modern law and morality to the premises of their comprehensive teachings. 8
I believe that Habermas correctly identifies three defining thresholds for religious consciousness in modern society (1.I, 2.II, and 3.III), but his way of conceptualizing "successful stages" (i, ii, and iii) is problematic, as it sets too high a threshold for including religious arguments in official public policy. the sphere.

Here we must remember why it is so important for Habermas (and political liberals in general) that religious actors can be part of the overlapping consensus. The reason is that political liberalism rejects the idea of a "mode of life" (modus vivendi) as a realizable political device. What is modus vivendi? This is the reverse side of overlapping consensus: in a situation of such consensus, all citizens agree with the principles that guide their political communities, even if they agree with them for different reasons. In a modus vivendi situation, citizens do not agree with the principles that define their political community, but because they are in the minority or for other pragmatic reasons, they agree to abide by the rules, at least for the time being. The situation of overlapping consensus is, so to speak, internally stable, whereas the situation of modus vivendi is changeable: in a democracy, it can be overturned at any time, in any election, and can also develop into a tough conflict.

Political liberalism has been criticized for rejecting modus vivendi by two groups of thinkers: first, political liberals, who argue that modus vivendi can, in spite of everything, serve as a realizable political model9; second, postmodern critics, who argue that modus vivendi can be used as a viable political model9.-

8. Ibid.

9. См.: Horton, J. (2010) "Realism, Liberal Moralism and a Political Theory of Modus Vivendi", European Journal of Political Theory 9(4): 431-448.

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What liberalism does is lose sight of the conflict-ridden, agonizing dimension of politics. 10
My presentation does not claim to be a definitive solution to the issue, but I would like to add that I would like to help the first group of democratic theorists rather than the second group with this project. An agonistic theory that declares conflict to be the central point of politics (and cites authors like Karl Schmitt for its support) is, in my opinion, insufficient to guarantee those basic individual rights that even antagonist theorists probably would not relinquish.

Religious actors: Liberals, Traditionalists, and Fundamentalists

From a sociological point of view, Habermas ' definition of the approach of religious actors to these three modern challenges divides them into two camps: those religious actors who successfully respond to these problems, and those who fail to do so. The first group is "reasonable", the second - "unreasonable". As a consequence, most sociologists in their studies of religious actors focus either on "liberal" religious actors as belonging to the first group, or on "fundamentalists" from the second group who resist modernization and lead an attack on modern liberal and secular societies. However, in the empirical study of religious actors, along with liberal and fundamentalist representatives of the religious tradition, a third, intermediate group is also found. I call them "traditionalists." If we look at the empirical reality of religious actors in a democratic context (I will give some examples below to support my claim), we will see that the three "steps" described by Habermas are indeed key to the post-secular inclusion of religious arguments in the informal public sphere. However, his way of thinking about their "successful passage" is too narrow. If we follow Habermas literally, should we conclude that political liberalism concerns only liberal "reflective" religious actors, and that this problem is not the same as political liberalism?

10. См.: Mouffe, Ch. (2000) "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism", Prospects for Democracy 66(3): 745-758.

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the theory does not address all the other types of religious claims that are collectively declared "unreasonable" and "fundamentalist"from this point of view? I find this conclusion intellectually unsatisfactory, since it means avoiding what I consider to be real problems. I would also find it unsatisfactory in a practical sense, as it leaves a wide range of illiberal religious actors undifferentiated and unexplored. The Post-Secular Conflicts project was developed precisely because I believe that a group of traditionalists deserves the attention of sociologists and political scientists, and also because I am convinced that the study of moral and religious conflict situations is vital for the development of a more realistic post-secular political liberalism.

Religious traditionalists differ from religious liberals and fundamentalists in that their strategy takes into account the pluralism characteristic of modern secular societies. Let us consider the traditionalist position, keeping in mind the three steps on the path of modernization of religious consciousness that Habermas speaks of.

(1) Freedom of religion and the visible presence of religion in the public sphere.

In discussions about religious freedom and the visible presence of religion in the public sphere, the standard liberal response is: religious freedom must be protected, religion is primarily a personal matter and should not be used as a reason for gaining privileges in public life; the standard fundamentalist response is: religious freedom is a sign of apostasy. Traditionalist religious actors usually disagree with either answer. They defend the privileged role and visible presence of their religion at the expense of the rights of religious minorities and non-believers. However, they do this not by publicly defending the superiority of their faith over others, but by assuring that their faith is the faith of the majority and/ or has historically established privileges.

One example of such a strategy is the Italian defense line in the Lautsi case before the European Court of Human Rights. The case was that the mother demanded to remove the crucifix from the classroom where her child was studying, because

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the presence of a Christian symbol in a private school violates the neutrality of the Italian state (according to the Italian Constitution, religion and the state are separate from each other) and its right as a parent to educate children in accordance with its own (in this case non-religious) worldview. The Italian defense argued that the crucifix should not primarily be regarded as a religious symbol, but as a symbol of Italian history and culture, which was deeply influenced by Christianity. The representative of the Russian Orthodox Church in Strasbourg, Hegumen Philip (Ryabykh), commented on the case as follows::

In Europe, Christianity has historically been the main religious faith. Freedom of religion should also protect people's choice in favor of traditional Christianity, which is already rooted in Europe, and not just the freedom of religions that have emerged relatively recently... This explains why the Russian Orthodox Church disagrees with the 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights to remove crucifixes in classrooms in Italy and why Russia supported Italy in its appeal to the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court11.

This quote expresses the general position of traditionalists regarding religious freedom. According to the taxonomy developed by Habermas, such a position should be considered "reasonable", since it recognizes the existence and accepts the presence of other religions and worldviews in the space of discourse hitherto occupied only by one's own religion. Indeed, these actors" in the course of self-reflection compare their religious beliefs with the provisions of rival doctrines of salvation, " but they do so in terms that Habermas did not take into account at all. He talks exclusively about claims to truth, but they also talk about history and culture.

(2) Secular discourse

The second challenge identified by Habermas in relation to the modernization of religious consciousness is the coordination of religion-

11. Ryabykh, Igumen Filip (2013) "New Challenges to Religious Freedom in Europe", in P. Annicchino (ed.) Freedom of Religion or Belief in Foreign Policy. Which One? pp. 21-22. San Domenico (FI): European University Institute.

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religious teaching and scientific knowledge. Habermas believes that religious actors overcome this challenge successfully "if, from their religious point of view, they understand the relationship between dogmatic and secular beliefs in such a way that autonomous progress in secular knowledge cannot contradict their faith"; in other words, if they recognize the independence of scientific knowledge from their beliefs. The "unfortunate" or "fundamentalist" answer in this case would be to deny scientific knowledge. One example comes to mind: teaching biology exclusively from a creationist perspective, which is practiced by some fundamentalist evangelical groups in the United States in homeschooling models. Such a model means a retreat from secular society and secular scientific knowledge to religious space. Actors of religious traditionalism, as a rule, do not follow either the fundamentalist strategy of retreat or the liberal strategy of independence. Instead, they borrow arguments from the pluralism of secular discourse, from the postmodern type of relativism, and even from the postcolonial discourse of subordination, which questions the independence of knowledge and describes it as a product of power structures.

The example I am about to give is, I admit, not a scientific one, but a discourse on human rights. Despite this, it does a good job of demonstrating what I want to show, namely how traditionalists use an almost Foucault-like analysis of discourse, as well as an analysis of power, to deconstruct the dominant position in discourse. An example is taken from the debate over the correct interpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A couple of years ago (2012-2014), the UN Human Rights Council held a series of meetings on the topic of traditional values and what traditional values should add to the understanding and practical implementation of human rights. 12 The core of the debate was whether human rights discourse is inherently universalist and individualistic, or whether it can also be relativistic (meaning: contextual) and communitarian. The argumentative strategy proposed by the proponents of the latter view was not primarily about asserting superiority

12. McCrudden, Ch. (2014) "Human Rights, Southern Voices, and ‘Traditional Values' at the United Nations", University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper no. 419 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474241, accessed on 27.10.2015].

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Rather, it consists in defending the position that their exclusion from the discussion was the result of an unfair hierarchy of power within human rights institutions. The current Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill, who was then head of the Department for External Church Relations, said at a meeting in Geneva:

The development of the institution of human rights is increasingly being monopolized by a limited range of ideas about human nature that are not shared by the majority of people in the world. International organizations dealing with human rights are more likely to draw their conclusions based on the opinions of a narrow circle of experts, officials, or noisy but well-organized minorities. 13
This type of criticism is a common position among traditionalists when it comes to secular versus religious knowledge. This is also a position that, according to Habermas 'taxonomy, should be considered "reasonable", since it accepts and even welcomes the multiplicity of discourses. These traditionalist actors do not complain that secular knowledge contradicts their faith; they simply argue (and this is a serious argument) that secular knowledge cannot claim superiority over other forms of knowledge. This is a classic postmodern move that Habermas did not foresee when he formulated his criterion.

(3) Modern law and morality

Step (3) in Habermas ' taxonomy of modernization of religious consciousness refers to the reconciliation of religious doctrine "with egalitarian individualism and the universalism of modern law and morality." Religious traditionalists often argue that the egalitarian individualism and universalism of modern law and morality make society immoral and doomed. In this regard, they differ from liberal religious actors (who recognize priority).

+. Russian Orthodox Church (2008) "UN Human Rights Council 7th Session Geneva, 18 March 2008 Panel discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue", Ofcial Website of the Department for External Church Relations 18.03.2008 [https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2008/03/40148, accessed on 12.02.2016].

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and agree that their religious point of view represents the position of a minority in a larger pluralistic society) and agree with fundamentalist religious actors. However, traditionalists differ from fundamentalists in the strategic involvement in politics that results from their beliefs. Traditionalists do not withdraw from society and do not support violent means of transforming it; they rely on conservative religious and political institutions in their countries, attract political and civil society figures to their side, and form international alliances, while fundamentalists mostly remain outside of organized politics and church hierarchies.

As political actors, traditionalists participate in political discussions by presenting their own religious arguments. Often these arguments are formulated either in non-religious language adapted to the secular legal terminology of human rights, or in the language of natural law. In domestic politics, these figures use the mechanisms of democracy to promote their positions by lobbying parliamentarians, organizing demonstrations or holding referendums.14 They also settle disputes in court 15. Finally, traditionalists extend their activism beyond the nation-state.16 They try to influence international organizations in order to weaken the existing international human rights system within their own countries.17
14. The situation in America is described in the classic work: Hunter, J. D. (1991) Culture Wars. The Struggle to Defne America. New York: Basic Books; for Europe, see Engeli, I., Green-Pedersen, Ch. and Thorup Larsen, L. (2012) Morality Politics in Western Europe. Parties, Agendas and Policy Choices. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

15. Gedicks, F. M. & Annicchino, P. (2014) "Cross, Crucifx, Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols", First Amendment Law Review 13.

16. См.: Bob, C. (2012) The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

17. For the Russian Orthodox Church, see: Stoeckl, K. (2016) "The Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm-Entrepreneur", Religion, State & Society 44(2): 132-151; Rimestad, S. (2015) "The Interaction Between the Moscow Patriarchate and the European Court of Human Rights", Review of Central And East European Law 40: 31- 55; Annicchino, P. (2011) "Winning the Battle by Losing the War: The Lautsi case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox

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The standard solution for situations where religious considerations are incompatible with universal norms is, within the framework of political liberalism, to exempt certain groups from existing legislation. There are many examples of such exemptions based on freedom of conscience: religious barriers to military service or abortion (in the case of medical personnel). At first glance, such exemptions seem to be a reasonable solution in cases of religious (or non-religious) disagreement. The idea is that if there is no consensus on a particular law or norm, the legislator can create "voids" in the regulatory regime, where dissenting individuals are exempt from implementing the general law. However, such exemptions do not always work - for two reasons.

The first reason is that traditionalists themselves often demand more than just exemptions: they want to take part in shaping the political system as such. To quote Abbot Philip (Ryabykh):

Today, religions try to preserve their freedom by demanding not only that certain legal norms are not applied to religious communities, but also insisting on the right to contribute to the formation of general norms applied to society as a whole.18
The second reason is that the non-religious part of society is less inclined to consider exceptions to the law as justified decisions. A good example is Ladel v. Islington of Great Britain. This case concerned a marriage registrar who refused to register a same-sex partnership on religious grounds. The plaintiff lost the case because the court supported the idea that recognizing the registrar's right to exemption from the current norm on religious grounds would be a violation of the principle of equality proclaimed by the state (and, consequently, its employees)19.

Church and the Vatican to Reshape European Identity", Religion and Human Rights 6: 213-219.

18. Ryabykh, Igumen Filip (2013) "New Challenges to Religious Freedom in Europe", p. 23.

19. Smet, S. (2015) "Conscientious Objection to Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships: the Limits of Toleration in Pluralistic Liberal Democracies", in A. Bardon, L. Lee, M. Birnbaum and K. Stoeckl (eds) Religious Pluralism. A Resource Book, pp. 95-102. San Domenico di Fiesole (Florence): European University Institute (e-book).

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In cases where religious considerations are not consistent with universal norms or draft laws, as in the case of the new Italian law on civil unions, discussed in recent weeks, there is no simple solution, or perhaps no solution at all. There remains a conflict, a gap in the liberal-democratic system, a gap in the theory of political liberalism. The goal of the Post-Secular Conflicts project is to develop a theory of political liberalism that is closer to reality at this point and focuses on conflict where political liberalism imagines the possibility of consensus.20
The Russian Orthodox Church as a "normative entrepreneur" (norm-entrepreneur)

In the last section, I have already given examples that confirm that Russian actors play a role in modern traditionalist politics. I really think that the goal of this project - to review the political sociology of traditionalist religious actors-should be tested by examining the role of transnational moral politics regardless of national contexts. I do not consider Russian Orthodox Traditionalists to be a unique or special case, and I think they are part of a large, global political phenomenon from which they draw inspiration and contribute. However, the extent of their cooperation with traditionalist actors in Russia and outside of Russia has not yet been studied. I propose to do this within the framework of this project, because I believe that the revision of the political sociology of traditionalist religious actors cannot be complete without taking into account Russian actors.

Thus, the project aims to study the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian religious actors as "normative entrepreneurs".

"Normative entrepreneurship", or" promotion of norms " (norm entrepreneurship, norm protagonism), is a term used in the following areas:-

20. Walshe, G., De Wijze, S. (2015) "Civility within Confict - Managing Religious Pluralism", in A. Bardon, L. Lee, M. Birnbaum and K. Stoeckl (eds) Religious Pluralism. A Resource Book, pp. 54-58. San Domenico di Fiesole (Florence): European University Institute (e-book); Ferrara, A. (2014) The Democratic Horizon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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methods used in the study of international relations to describe the efforts of actors to promote certain norms in the context of transnational governance regimes 21. Researchers study normative entrepreneurship by distinguishing between the current proponents of norms (an individual or group) and the organizational platforms through which these actors operate (for example, a non-governmental organization or an international political body like the European Union or the United Nations). They also emphasize that "regulatory entrepreneurs and the organizations they work for generally need support from government officials, who should support these norms and make their implementation part of their program." 22 Thus, normative entrepreneurship is carried out at three levels: (1) norm promoters, (2) organizational platforms, and (3) public figures who support these actors.

Most research on normative entrepreneurship focuses on progressives who promote norms such as equality, freedom, education, or welfare through international organizations (such as the European Union or the United Nations) or through international non-governmental organizations (such as the Red Cross23). Recently, conservative, anti-liberal norm proponents have also come into the focus of research24. But it is only very recently that the Russian Orthodox Church has begun to be viewed from the perspective of international normative entrepreneurship.25 Using a real research project, I would like to contribute to this developing research field.

21. Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", International Organization 52(4): 887-917.

22. Ibid., p. 900.

23. Keck, M.E. & Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

24. Bob, C. (2012) The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics; Katzenstein, P.J. (2006) "Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular Europeanization?", in T.A. Byrnes and P.J. Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe, pp. 1-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

25. Curanovic, A. & Leustean, L.N. (2015) "The Guardians of Traditional Values. Russian and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Quest for Status", Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 1; Laruelle, M. (2015) "The ‘Russian World': Russia's Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination", Center on Global Interests May.

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The reason I mention the theories and conceptual tools of normative entrepreneurship is that this theory helps us distinguish between levels of analysis: in particular, the levels of (1) norm promoters, (2) organizational platforms, and (3) supportive statesmen. This distinction is key in the case of Russia, where these levels often remain indistinguishable in the analysis. Statements such as" Traditional values are a propaganda tool of the Putin administration "or" The Russian state uses traditional values as its soft power " may have some value in the field of political analysis, but from the point of view of political sociology they lack analytical rigor. In fact, the situation is much more complex, and as a researcher, I am interested in understanding how these three levels, on the one hand, differ, and on the other, interact with each other. In particular, I am interested in identifying the independent position of the Russian Orthodox Church as a promoter of norms.

I have already said that I do not consider Russian traditionalists to be a unique or special case at all, and that I see them as part of a larger political phenomenon from which they draw inspiration and contribute. However, there is something that separates Russian actors from other traditionalists (at least at the moment): This is the fact that the Russian government supports a program to promote traditional values. Thanks to this, Russia occupies a special place in the global struggle for traditional values, because state support has given the program of traditional values diplomatic and logistical weight.

Conclusion: European Research Project

"Post-secular Conflicts" is a research project in the field of social sciences. It is designed for the period from 2016 to 2021 and is being implemented at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) by an international team of researchers, which includes researchers from Russia, Austria, Italy, the United States and Brazil. I am leading this project and, together with two graduate students, I plan to conduct interviews with traditionalist figures in Russia and abroad. Our goal is to interview as many moral policy and pain actors as possible-

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learn more about their motivations, activities, and collaborations. The knowledge gained from these interviews will serve as a basis for developing a more complete political sociology of religious actors. It is intended to do "traditionalists" justice by adding an important element to the standard division between" liberals "and"fundamentalists." This knowledge will also form the basis for work in the field of normative theory, aimed at developing a more realistic version of political liberalism that would take into account the importance and inevitability of "conflict" where political liberals have so far seen only consensus.

Bibliography / References

Annicchino, P. (2011) "Winning the Battle by Losing the War: The Lautsi case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican to Reshape European Identity", Religion and Human Rights 6: 213-219.

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