The friendship and cooperation of Polish and Russian democrats has a long tradition, but the conditions that existed in Russia before 1917, as well as in bourgeois-landowner Poland, did not allow the aspirations and goals of many generations of Polish and Russian revolutionaries who fought to overcome all the negative aspects in relations between the two countries, to establish a friendly and fraternal union of the Polish people, people with the peoples of Russia. This became possible only in the new political and social conditions that emerged as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the transfer of power in Poland to the people.

The year 1939 crossed out the concepts of Polish policy implemented during the interwar twenties, forced a fundamental revision of the foundations, goals and priorities of Polish policy in the light of the consequences of the campaign lost in September 1939 and the alignment of forces on a European and global scale that changed during the Second World War. As a result, during the Second World War, in the conditions of the underground in occupied Poland, as well as outside its borders, there was an analysis of the hard lessons of the past. As a result of the discussions, new ideas were born, a new approach to understanding the goals and priorities of the Polish state and its place in the international arena; the language of facts, the logic of the historical process led to the formulation of the only real program that corresponds to the state interests of Poland-a fraternal union between the Polish and Soviet peoples, a political union areas of domestic and foreign policy.

The creator of the new principles of Polish politics was the Polish Workers ' Party( PPR), which formulated the program of the Polish-Soviet Union as the main principle of Polish foreign policy. On September 1, 1942, the newspaper Trybuna Wolnosci, an organ of the PPR, wrote that the Polish-Soviet union was "putting into legal form the true interests of the Polish people. These interests are the preservation and deepening of relations of mutual friendship and cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union. " 1
The study of the genesis of the Polish-Soviet union leads back to the first days of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, when its participation in the war created new opportunities for cooperation between all the forces that opposed fascism at that time. At that time, the Soviet state faced two main tasks: repelling fascist aggression and creating an anti-Hitler coalition in order to defeat the forces of aggression in Europe. In order to achieve the second task, the Soviet Union continued the comprehensive efforts it had made in 1934-1939 in Central Asia.-

1 "Rocznica ukladu polsko-radzieckiego". "Trybuna Wolnosci", 1.IX.1942.

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The goal is to create a collective security system in Europe and deter fascist aggression.

In the efforts to create an anti-Hitler coalition, the Polish question played an important role in Soviet politics. It was a question of developing a common policy in the war with Nazi Germany and in matters relating to the post-war system of international relations. Poland was a direct neighbor of the USSR, on its territory were concentrated Wehrmacht forces intended to attack the Soviet Union, through the territory of Poland passed important transport arteries that provided supplies to the army of the third Reich and its satellites fighting on the Eastern Front. During the war, a very important element in the policy of the USSR was the joint struggle of the Polish and Soviet armed forces against a common enemy.

These principles formed the basis of the Agreement between the USSR and Poland, signed on July 30, 1941 in London. The agreement provided for the resumption of diplomatic relations, the joint struggle of both countries against nazi Germany and the creation of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union to fight on the Eastern Front. During the visit of the head of the Polish emigrant Government, General Sikorski, to Moscow on December 3-4, 1941, the "Declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Republic of Poland on Friendship and Mutual Assistance" was signed, in which issues of military cooperation were expanded and deepened .2
After reaching these agreements, both sides began negotiations on the future, and especially on the post-war system of international relations on the European continent. In the concept of Soviet politics, the experience of the past provided concrete solutions for the future. On December 3, 1941, the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, told Sikorsky that this experience put an equal sign between Polish and Soviet state interests. Throughout the entire period of its existence, German imperialism, striving for expansion to the East, pursued a policy of pitting the Slavic peoples against each other in order to conquer them one by one, and the experience of recent history has shown that after the victory over Poland, Germany went to the Soviet Union. Of course, this practice should be put an end to once and for all, and the means leading to this goal will be the restoration of a strong, independent and independent Poland, bound by an alliance with the USSR. This will put an end to the drang nah osten policy. For these reasons, Stalin went on to say, the Soviet state is interested in restoring a strong Poland, because only a strong ally is a full-fledged one .3
A summary of this political philosophy was the statement of the head of the Soviet delegation at the Yalta conference on February 6, 1945: "Throughout history, Poland has always been a corridor through which the enemy who attacked Russia passed. It is enough to recall at least the last thirty years: during this period, the Germans twice passed through Poland to attack our country. Why did the enemy still pass through Poland so easily? First of all, because Poland was weak. The Polish corridor cannot be closed mechanically from the outside by Russian forces alone. It can only be securely closed from the inside by Poland's own forces. To do this, you need Poland to:

2 "Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War". Documents and materials. Т. I. M. 1946, стр. 137 - 138, 146, 191 - 192; W. T. Kowalski. Walka dyplomatyczna о miejsce Polski w Europie (1939 - 1945). Wyd. III. Warszawa. 1970, str. 201 - 202, 222 - 223; "Dokumenty i materiafy do historii stosunkow polsko-radzieckich". T. VII. Styezeri 1939-grudziein 1943. Warszawa. 1973, str. 232 - 233, 242 - 244.

3 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish Relations", Vol. VII. 1939-1943, Moscow, 1973, pp. 257-258; W. T. Kowalski. Op. cit., str. 222-232.

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it was strong. That is why the Soviet Union is interested in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state. " 4
At the same time, the USSR advocated the return of Poland to its ancestral lands in the west and already in December 1941 assured of its support for the Polish demand for the establishment of a border along the Oder.

The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreements in 1941 created great chances for the development of relations between the two peoples, but these agreements did not have a solid foundation. General Sikorski's Government, despite its disillusionment with the policies of the Western Allies, continued to plan for Poland's future on the basis of an alliance with Great Britain and the United States. Yielding to the onslaught of extremely anti-Soviet right-wing circles in Poland and in exile, as well as subordinating the interests of its policy to the requirements of British strategy, it agreed to the withdrawal of the Polish army formed on the territory of the Soviet Union to Iran. By simultaneously attempting to limit the role of the USSR in post-war European decisions and ignoring the rights of the Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian peoples to unity, General Sikorski's Government created a state of tension in Polish-Soviet relations. In the end, the heated border controversy, which was conducted publicly, and then the "Katyn affair" and related actions of Hitler's propaganda led on April 25, 1943, to the severance of diplomatic relations between the two governments, which was harmful to the unity of the nations fighting against fascism.

The severance of diplomatic relations with the government of General Sikorski did not affect the change in the position of the USSR towards the Polish people, since various twists of fate regarding relations with the emigrant government could not undermine the historically determined political thesis that equates Polish and Soviet state interests. Therefore, immediately after the severance of diplomatic relations with the government of General Sikorsky, on May 4, 1943, Stalin's answers to questions from the correspondent of the American newspaper "New York Times" and the English newspaper "Times" Parker were published. The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. noted that the Soviet Government certainly wants to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitler's Germany, and that post-war relations between the two countries should be based "on the basis of strong good-neighborly relations and mutual respect."5
The idea of a solid Polish-Soviet union, the great program of rebuilding Polish - Soviet relations in accordance with the true interests of the Polish people, was accepted by the camp of the Polish left forces in the country and a group of left-wing figures located on the territory of the USSR. In the country, the Polish Workers ' Party was a consistent advocate of the Polish - Soviet union. Fully recognizing the right of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian peoples to unity, the PPR called for using the common interests of Poland and the USSR to determine the most favorable borders for Poland in the west and obtain the most firm guarantees of Poland's security after the war. 6
4 "Tehran - Yalta - Potsdam". Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1970, p. 144.

5 J. V. Stalin. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Ed. 5-E. M. 1950, p. 105.

6 "Polski ruch robotniczy w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej. Wrzesieti 1939 - styczen 1945. Zarys historii". Warszawa. 1964, str. 369 nn. See M. Malinowski, E. Pavlovich, V. Poteransky, A. Przygonski, M. Vilyush. The Polish labor movement during the war and the Nazi occupation. September 1939-January 1945 Ocherki istorii [Essays on History], Moscow, 1968.

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The Union of Polish Patriots (SPP), created in the USSR, set the same goals. His most important task was to create, with the help of the USSR, the rudiments of a new Polish army that would fight side by side with the Soviet Army. "Through the formation of a Polish military unit in the U.S.S.R., through fraternity in arms with the Red Army in the war with Germany," the Union's ideological declaration said, " the U.S.S.R. seeks to strengthen the already existing ties of friendship between the Polish people and the peoples of the Soviet Union and contribute to their strengthening in the future... The only sensible policy today, as before 1939, is to ally with the Soviet Union , our natural ally. " 7
The SPP initiative to create a new Polish army in the USSR was supported by the Government of the USSR. In his opinion, this meant entering the path of close cooperation, which in the future, after the end of the war, should indicate the direction of development of relations between both countries, create emotional foundations that facilitate the change of historically determined ideas in the minds of both peoples. Based on this, the Soviet Union provided comprehensive material assistance, which ultimately made it possible to equip two Polish armies that took part in the last campaigns of World War II, including the Berlin Operation.

While the Soviet Government attached great importance to increasing Poland's contribution to the war against fascism, it also outlined its broader concepts of Poland's role in the international arena in post-war Europe. This line was carried out at international conferences during the Second World War, held in Moscow, Tehran and Yalta. A special place was given to determining the future position of Poland and the Soviet Union in the security system of post-war Europe and the struggle for the approval of a new political map of Europe. In Tehran, the Soviet government supported Poland's rights to the Oder border and once again guaranteed its assistance to the Polish people in achieving this goal. "The consequences that follow for Poland from the policy chosen in Tehran towards Germany," Stalin told one of the leaders of the Polish emigration in the United States, O. Lange, " are obvious. After the defeat of Germany, Poland will become the leading European power." According to J. V. Stalin, Poland should demand "all German territories up to the Oder together with Szczecin." He also said that President Roosevelt shared his view, while Churchill was somewhat hesitant. Churchill asked who guarantees the security of such Polish borders? : "Military power of the Soviet Union". J. V. Stalin added that the conversation took place in the presence of the British Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr. "The next day," wrote Professor O. Lange, "I asked Sir Archibald about this, and he fully confirmed Stalin's words." 8
The liberation of the Polish lands and the creation of the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKNO) in the country of the people's power were crucial for the formation of a new type of interstate relations between Poland and the USSR. From that moment, the authorities of the People's State began to implement a program of radical restructuring of the country's socio-political structure, and they began to implement the program of the Polish Workers ' Party in the field of foreign policy. The creation of the people's state made it possible to build Polish-Soviet relations on the basis of interstate relations.

7 "Wolna Polska", Moscow, 17. VI. 1943.

8 W. T. Kowalski. Op. cit, str. 462 - 463.

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The leading role of the party created the conditions for establishing a new class foundation of relations between the two states, the class union of Poland and the Soviet Union.

The Polish National Liberation Committee recognized as the main goal of its foreign policy the deepening of Polish-Soviet relations and bringing the matter to the signing of the treaty on the union of both states. According to the PCNO, this was a condition for ensuring the speedy restoration of the country and strengthening Poland's position in the international arena. "The history and experience of the present war show," read the Manifesto of the PCNO of July 22, 1944, " that only the creation of the great Slavic dam, based on the Polish-Soviet - Czechoslovak agreement, can save us from the pressure of German imperialism." This meant the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, signed in Moscow on December 12, 1943. The treaty included the so-called Polish clause, which provided for the transformation of a bilateral treaty into a trilateral one with the participation of Poland. However, in the following months, the Polish side moved away from this concept and, taking into account the special importance of relations with the USSR for Poland, decided to sign a bilateral treaty with the USSR. "Friendship and military cooperation, which was initiated by the fraternity in arms of the Polish and Red Army Troops," the PCNO Manifesto said, "must turn into a strong alliance and good-neighborly cooperation after the war." 9
On August 1, 1944, the Government of the USSR officially recognized the Polish Committee of National Liberation as an authority, and even before that, it concluded a number of agreements with it regulating current issues that arose in connection with the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Poland. On the night of July 26-27, 1944, an agreement on the Soviet-Polish border was signed. It was determined that the eastern borders of Poland will run along the line of ethnographic division approximately as it was planned by the Curzon line, designed after the First World War. An agreement was reached on the issue of the division line on the territory of East Prussia, and a common position was determined on the issue of the western border of Poland.

The Soviet Government supported Poland's rights to the original Polish lands east of the Oder and Neisse Lusatia. This was in line with the previously planned policy of restoring a strong allied Poland, a country that faced important tasks in ensuring the post-war security of Europe. In article 4 of the agreement, the Soviet Government assumed specific obligations on the issue of borders: "The Government of the USSR also recognized that the border between Poland and Germany should be established along a line west of Swinemunde to the Oder River, leaving Stettin on the Polish side, further upstream of the Oder River to the mouth of the Neisse River and from here along the Neisse to the Czechoslovak border. The Soviet Government undertakes, in determining the State border between Poland and Germany, to support the demand for establishing the border along the line indicated above."10
The Soviet Union's support for the concept of the western border of Poland along the Oder and Neisse Lusatian was very important for

9 "Zalacznik do "Dziennika Ustaw RP", N 1, Lipiec, 1944.

10 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. VIII. January 1944-December 1945, Moscow, 1974, pp. 156-157; see also I. I. Kostiuszko. Polityka Zwiazku Radzieckiego wobec Polski w latach 1943 - 1945; D. G. Tomaszewski. Walka Zwiqzku Radzieckiego na arenie miedzynarodoWej о uznanie ludowego panstwa polskiego (lipiec 1944- czerwiec 1945). "20 lat Ludowego Wojska Polskiego. II sesja naukowa poswigcona Wojnie Wyzwolenczej Narodu Polskiego 1939 - 1945". Warszawa. 1967.

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further negotiations conducted by the leaders of the USSR, the USA and England. The decisive role of the USSR in the defeat of fascism, the new type of Polish-Soviet relations, and the demands of post-war security in Europe greatly influenced their positive outcome.

In the following months, the Government of the USSR launched a broad campaign aimed at fulfilling its obligations assumed in the treaties with the PCNO. The Soviet Army, together with the Polish Army, liberated Polish lands, as well as territories in the west that were to become part of the Polish state. Immediately after the liberation of the lands in the west, the process of their unification with Poland began. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy began negotiations with the Western allies in order to obtain their consent to the western borders of Poland. Thanks to the resolute attitude of Soviet diplomacy, the Big Three conference in Potsdam adopted a unanimous decision defining the western borders of Poland along the Oder, Neisse Lusatian and the Baltic Sea. It was also decided to completely evict people of German origin from the new borders of Poland. At the suggestion of the Soviet side, the Polish delegation also took part in the Potsdam Conference; its arguments and explanations neutralized the reservations put forward earlier by Western delegations. The Potsdam Conference was the first manifestation of the Polish-Soviet political alliance in the international practice of post-war Europe .11
On December 31, 1944, after more than five months of activity in the liberated territories, the PKNO was transformed into the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland. On January 5, 1945, the Government of the USSR officially recognized the Provisional Government of Poland and in the following months fought for its official recognition by the rest of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Big Three conference in Yalta was a particularly expressive manifestation of this action.

The first official appearance of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland in the international arena was the visit of the Polish delegation to Moscow on January 22-24, 1945. During the negotiations, the Polish delegation presented a draft treaty that was supposed to give a political form to the real union that emerged between the two peoples during the Second World War. This proposal was accepted by the leadership of the USSR. It was decided that the Polish-Soviet treaty should contain the same provisions as the previously concluded Soviet-Czechoslovak (December 12, 1943) and Soviet-French (December 10, 1944) treaties, subject to amendments by the Polish side12 .

The Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was signed in the Kremlin on April 21, 1945. Foreign observers were particularly impressed by the fact that Stalin signed the treaty. Since the Soviet Union entered the war, it was the second international document (after the Sikorsky-Stalin Declaration of December 4, 1941) concerning bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and another country, signed by the supreme leader of the Soviet state. This fact was a testament to the great importance of the treaty and the importance that the Soviet Union attached to its relations with Poland.

11 For more information on the discussion on the Polish question at the Potsdam Conference, see W. T. Kowalski. Op. cit., str. 713 nn.

12 Ibid., sir. 595 - 597.

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The signing of the treaty was a fact that crowned the work of many generations of democrats and revolutionaries in Poland and Russia. Its origins lay in the joint struggle of the Polish and Russian working classes against tsarism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the participation of Poles in the October Revolution, as well as in the civil war and the struggle against interventionists. The Treaty was based on the tradition of Polish working class actions in the interwar years in support of the Soviet state's program and its peace policy. The Polish-Soviet Union also stemmed from the political and ideological commonality that was particularly evident during the Second World War between the Polish and Soviet peoples, who, under the leadership of their respective parties, entered a new stage of historical development. The class alliance between the two peoples, the ideological commonality and unity of both parties, and the convergence of political goals created comprehensive and deep foundations for the formation of post-war relations that met the vital interests of both peoples. 13
The main element of Polish foreign policy in the post-war period was Polish-Soviet cooperation, based on the provisions of the treaty of April 21, 1945, as well as on a number of agreements resulting from it. It has manifested itself in the diplomatic, military, economic and cultural fields. The practice of implementing these agreements has shown that the alliance and cooperation of Poland with the Soviet Union proved to be the surest guarantee of Poland's international security and the inviolability of its borders.

The Potsdam Conference closed the problem of defining Polish borders in the West, but imperialism did not reconcile itself to the political results of World War II and in the following months and years sought to change the political map of Europe and the world, which was characterized by a significant expansion of the borders of socialism. The policy of imperialism was aimed at turning this process around, at regaining the lost positions. In implementing these principles, the Western Powers have departed from the spirit and letter of Potsdam. This was especially clear during the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, when Western powers were making efforts to remilitarize it. But all attempts to revise the Oder and Neisse borders and weaken Poland's security faced a unified position of the Polish people and its Soviet ally.

The Government of the U.S.S.R., in numerous statements and declarations, resolutely rejected the policy of challenging the final character of the Potsdam decisions and repeatedly stated that any attempt to change these borders would be met with resistance from the Soviet people, with all the political and military consequences that would follow. The policy of the USSR on the security of Poland's western borders and the security of the Polish people suggests that never in the past did Poland have such an ally as the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union played a historic role in the formation of Poland's western borders. The Polish-Soviet Union became a guarantee of Poland's security and inviolability of its borders. Soviet diplomacy played a leading role in the process of recognizing the final and irrevocable nature of the territorial changes that occurred in Europe as a result of World War II. The culmination of this action was the signing in 1970-1973 of the system of treaties and agreements of the USSR, Poland, GDR and Czechoslovakia with Germany and the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, based on the recognition of existing realities created in Europe as a result of World War II .14
13 P. Yaroshevich. 30 years of fraternal union. "Kommunist", 1975, N 5.

14 Ibid., p. 91.

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Very important for Poland was the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of April 21, 1945 (extended on April 8, 1965 for the next 20 years) in the field of economic cooperation. In 1948, Poland and the USSR began the practice of concluding long-term agreements. Of particular importance were the agreements signed on January 4, 1948, which dealt with mutual supplies and Soviet investment loans. The system of these agreements ensured that Poland fulfilled the tasks of the 6-year plan. In the following years, agreements were signed to continuously strengthen this cooperation.

Long-term agreements made it possible to create completely new industries in Poland, including shipbuilding and aviation, to lay the foundations for the Polish nuclear industry, and long-term large-scale orders from Soviet contractors made it possible to plan the long-term development of individual sectors of the national economy, guaranteed profitability for enterprises, ensured sales of their products, and made it possible to deploy technical design and research, which put many sectors of the Polish economy on the leading positions in the world.

A special place in this joint work belongs to scientific and technical cooperation. On March 5, 1947, the first agreement on such cooperation was signed in Moscow, which became the prototype for similar agreements later concluded between the socialist countries. On the basis of this agreement, as well as subsequent special agreements, Poland received from the USSR the technical and technological documentation necessary for launching the main branches of production. This documentation has created opportunities for the development of many industries at the highest scientific and technical level.

As the scientific and technical base developed, Poland became an important partner of the Soviet Union. In recent years, it has caught up with the Soviet Union in terms of the amount of technical documentation transferred to it.

The huge investment and organizational efforts made by Poland in the post-war years, made possible by the comprehensive economic, scientific and technical assistance of the USSR, created the basis for the transition to the second phase of the country's industrialization, which falls on the next five-year plan, starting in 1961. The most important tasks of this period were to modernize the structure of the national economy. The main problem, the solution of which was possible only in cooperation with the USSR, was and remains the satisfaction of the long-term needs of the Polish economy in the main types of fuel and raw materials.

Thanks to the active assistance of the USSR and the work of Soviet specialists, a modern industrial and technical base was created in Poland. As a result, Poland has transformed from a backward country into a country of modern industry, one of the leading countries in terms of economy, occupying the 10th place in the world in terms of industrial production. The Soviet Union is now the most important trading partner of Poland: the Country of the Soviets accounts for about 7% of Polish foreign trade turnover.

The creation of a strong industrial base in Poland and other socialist countries strengthened their defense capabilities and became the material basis for a policy aimed at overcoming the cold war and rebuilding international relations based on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Military cooperation between Poland and the USSR in the post-war years became an important link in the defense system of the entire socialist community. "With the help of the USSR, a powerful oboro was created.-

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Our country's information base, " wrote P. P., a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PORP, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. Yaroshevich. - The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Poland have defense equipment that meets modern requirements of military equipment. " 15
In accordance with the directives drawn up at the seventh Congress of the PORP and the XXV Congress of the CPSU, both parties and both states attach the utmost importance to the development and strengthening of all-round cooperation with the countries of the socialist community. This cooperation directly contributes to strengthening the forces of socialism and communism of individual countries and the entire commonwealth. Experience has shown that combining their efforts is more than an arithmetic sum, it multiplies their power many times over. Experience has also shown, as stated in the document of the International Conference of Communist and Workers ' Parties of 1969, that comprehensive cooperation between socialist countries increases the influence of socialism on the course of world events and contributes to the growth of its role in the struggle against imperialism .16
Recent years have been characterized by a constant strengthening of cooperation between socialist countries both on a multilateral (COMECON, Warsaw Pact) and on a bilateral (inter-party and interstate) basis. Regular meetings of representatives of the party and state leadership, a system of bilateral and multilateral consultations at various levels are a constant manifestation of this cooperation. This is especially true of Polish-Soviet relations. These meetings contribute to the consideration of various aspects of building socialism in individual countries, serve as a place for exchanging experience, allow us to define a common line on political, economic and ideological issues, and at the same time provide an impetus for launching new initiatives on the international arena .17 Crimean bilateral and multilateral meetings of leaders of fraternal parties have already become traditional. As a result, the socialist countries have a common, coordinated line on all major problems of world politics.

Relations between the countries of the socialist community are based on the principles of voluntariness, equality of rights, sovereignty and proletarian internationalism. These principles, as well as fraternal mutual assistance, are an integral part of a new type of international relations, unknown in the previous history of Poland and other countries. Within the framework of these relations, diplomacy plays a completely new role: it has ceased to be a means of mutual struggle, but has become an important tool for rallying and developing fraternal cooperation in the name of common goals, in the name of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp as factors determining its position in the international arena.

The Polish-Soviet Union was and remains the central link in the defense system of the socialist states and an important factor of peace and security on the European continent. The Polish-Soviet Union grew out of joint struggle and joint experience, and the years and decades that have passed since its inception have shown that it fully meets the interests and goals of the Polish and Soviet peoples, and the interests of the world system of socialism as a whole.

15 Ibid.

16 See "International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. Documents and materials. Moscow, June 5-17, 1969". Moscow, 1969, pp. 301-305.

17 "Diplomacy of Socialism", Moscow, 1973, pp. 24-41.

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