Based on church documents and eyewitnesses' memories, the author attempts to present how the Stalin's "New Course" religious policy influenced church life under German occupation within Leningrad region from 1943 to 1944. The reinstatement of the Moscow patriarchate and the growing legality of the Russian Orthodox Church allowed the Soviet government to employ the religious factor in its solution to burning political issues. This was especially true within national outlying districts that were not included in the USSR till 1940. His conclusions about the New Course's negative affect on church life across the occupied Baltic, Ukrainian and Belorussian territories are also relevant to the situation in the districts of the occupied Leningrad region. The opportunities that opened up due to the "New Course" allowed the Soviet government to strengthen its position even before the liberation of these territories. This happened both through propaganda and church and canonical discrediting of collaborating Orthodox clergy and bishops, as well as through pressure on the church administration by the Soviet intelligence agency. Along with that, drastic measures were taken to eliminate the most opposed and implacable people, like the exarch Sergiy Voskresensky, for example, who was murdered.

Keywords: "The New Course", German occupation, the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarchate reinstatement, the Pskov Orthodox Mission.

Obozny K. The "New Course" of Stalin's religious Policy and the Church situation in the occupied Territories of the Leningrad Region (1943-1944). Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii I za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad]. 2017. N 3. pp. 360-387.

Obozny, Konstantin (2017) "'The New Course' in Stalin's Religious Policy and the Church Context within the Occupied Region of Leningrad (1943-1944)", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkou' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(3): 360-387.

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PERHAPS the most striking compromise and significant concession of the Stalinist government during the Second World War was the so-called "new course" of church policy, which primarily affected the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR. Today, Russian historical science offers a number of explanations for this unexpected turn of the Soviet government towards a tolerant attitude to the religious needs of the population. At the same time, modern Russian historiography does not yet know the experience of studying the influence of the "new deal" religious policy of the Soviet government on the ecclesiastical situation in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR. This is not only a little-studied problem, but also a topic that allows us to take a fresh look at church-state relations during the second half of the war. Taking into account the known facts and scientific research (including that of a Western scholar1), as well as using documents (including those from the FSB archive), we will try to show the special, instrumental effectiveness of the "new deal" under German occupation.

Some researchers believe that the determining factor in the beginning of this policy of Moscow is the need to create "the appearance of a democratic, tolerant state"2 in order to prepare for the Tehran conference and win over the allies to more active actions on the fronts of World War II. There is an opinion that the Kremlin viewed the new church course as a tool for consolidating the Soviet people, who were tired of communist slogans that were rapidly losing their appeal in wartime conditions.3 From the point of view of other scholars, the main reason for Stalin's "surprise" was the far-reaching plans for the post-war division of spheres of influence between world powers, in which, according to Stalin, the Moscow Patriarchate was to play a decisive role. Medieval ideologeme "Moscow - the Third Rome",

Miner S. M. 1. Stalinist Holy War. Religion, Nationalism and Allied Politics 1941-1945. Moscow: Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya (ROSSPEN), 2010.

Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva pri Stalinu i Khrushchev: (Gosudarstvenno-tserkvnye otnosheniya v SSSR v 1939-1964 gg.) [Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev: (State-church relations in the USSR in 1939-1964)]. Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye: Obshchestvo lyububov tserkvnoi istorii, 1999, p. 216.

Yakunin, V. 3. The change of Church-state relations in the years of the great Patriotic war // Power. 2002. N 12. P. 67.

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It would seem that it had a great chance of being realized after the defeat of the Third Reich and the establishment of Soviet control in most of Eastern Europe. Such grandiose plans required "the creation of an' Orthodox Vatican ' by uniting the autocephalous churches around the Moscow Patriarchate and moving the center of universal Orthodoxy to the capital of the Communist empire." 4
It is impossible not to agree with the thesis that Stalin was forced to make serious concessions in relations with the church in order not to be defeated on the agitation and propaganda front. The Ostministerium propaganda department actively used the negative experience of Soviet repressions against religious citizens of the USSR, trying to present Germany as the defender of the Russian people from godless Bolshevism. It should be noted that at first this propaganda fell on well-prepared ground and bore fruit.

By June 1941, no more than ten Orthodox churches remained officially active on the territory of the Leningrad Region, which then included the present Pskov and Novgorod regions and which was subjected to a long occupation (Pskov was liberated in July 1944), and most of the clergy and active laity were repressed. Although the results of the 1937 census showed that the majority of the population surveyed (56.7%) somehow connected their existence with faith in God5, active church life by the beginning of the war was mostly going underground. Do I need to explain the reasons for the hopes that civilians in the Leningrad region had with the beginning of the German occupation? Today, there are well-known examples of enthusiastic meetings by the local population of advanced detachments of German troops not only in the Baltic States and Western Ukraine, but also in the Pskov region. For example, the Orthodox missionary priest Jacob Nachis wrote in his report to the church authorities about his observations from the Porkhovsky district:

4. p. 106.
Shkarovsky M. V. 5. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva pri Stalinu i Khrushchev [Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khrushchev], p. 94.

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The Russian peasant is afraid of any change, mainly because of its uncertainty and fear for the future well-being. The arrival of the German troops by the Russian peasants was met with restraint, as if they were comparing their new owners with the old ones. And when churches began to open and worship services resumed, the sympathy of the people went over to the side of the Germans.6..

On the other hand, German influence should not be overestimated in this matter. A powerful spiritual surge was associated not so much with the occupation, but with the spiritual hunger experienced by the Orthodox part of Soviet citizens. As soon as the total persecution of believers and strict party control ceased after the Soviet government fled, the peasants, without waiting for resolutions from above, everywhere began to open the desecrated churches, repair and decorate the sacred space, return icons, liturgical utensils and saved shrines. German authorities (represented by the command of Army Group North, whose headquarters was located in Pskov) They did not interfere in the process of church revival, but at the same time they did not weaken propaganda work and control over the activities of parish communities. One of the historians of the Russian diaspora called this powerful spiritual surge "the second baptism of Rus'. " 7
Undoubtedly, all these facts reached the Soviet side and were well known in the Kremlin. Such a state of affairs could not but worry Stalin, who understood that the situation in the occupied territories was not developing in favor of the Soviet government, which first lost its military and political positions,and now almost completely lost its ideological influence. Thus, the" new course " of Stalin's policy was probably also a response to the church revival in the occupied territories, which took place with the consent and active agitation of the occupiers. According to Professor Alekseyev, "the power of religious revival manifested in the occupied territory forced Stalin to choose a course of temporary coexistence with the Church and religion." 8
6. GAPO (State Archive of the Pskov region). F. 1633. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 7.

Alekseev V. I., Stavru F. 7. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva na osoboy nemtsami territorii [Russian Orthodox Church in the German-occupied territory]. Independent Russian Orthodox national body. New York. Moscow. Paris. 1980. N 11. P. 94.

8. Ibid., p. 95.

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It would seem that the changes that began in the Soviet territories in the autumn of 1943 should have convinced the population on both sides of the front in the sincere religious tolerance of the communist regime and in its patronage of the Orthodox Church. The Council of Bishops and the election of Patriarch Sergius, the opening of churches and the revival of theological educational institutions, the cessation of anti - church propaganda and the possibility for some repressed clerics and bishops to openly return to church service-all this seemed to give hope that "time and war will change the essence of Soviet power"9.

Although the overwhelming majority of researchers emphasize the pragmatism of the" new course "of Stalin's church policy, they also unanimously write about positive, though not entirely thorough, changes in the situation of the church and believers in the USSR: "Unaware of Stalin's secret plans, the Church greedily inhaled the air of rebirth"10. To be fair, it should be noted that at the same time, the Church at that time (1943-1944), the Orthodox Church in the occupied territories of the Leningrad Region had much more opportunities for conducting spiritual, educational, missionary and charitable activities than the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate in the conditions of the "new deal"that had begun. This fact could not escape the attention of Soviet intelligence officers, who sent to the "mainland" not only data related to the enemy's military operations, but also information about the mood among the civilian population, including in the religious issue.

In this context, the version of the Western researcher S. M. Miner, according to which the "new deal" was launched by the Stalinist government, based on the urgent tasks of re-occupation, looks very attractive.11 It was during the period of the war, when the Red Army began to liberate large occupied territories of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States, that the Kremlin was developing a plan to change church policy. It was required to ensure that the local population of these territories, who had lived for more than two years under the conditions of Nazi propaganda and the new software-

Miner S. M. 9. Stalinist Holy War. Religion, Nationalism and Allied politics 1941-1945. p. 123.

10. Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva v politike Sovetskogo gosudarstva v 1943-1948 gg. [Russian Orthodox Church in the politics of the Soviet State in 1943-1948].

Miner S. M. 11. Stalinist Holy War. Religion, Nationalism and Allied politics 1941-1945. p. 185.

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as soon as possible and in the least painful way possible, it returned to the paradigm of the Soviet system and communist ideology. As is well known, for the majority of peaceful citizens, especially the peasant population, the Orthodox Church was a significant authority. The Soviet government could not fail to attract this powerful resource to solve its tasks.

Miner's monograph mainly deals with the re-occupation of the national outskirts of the USSR, those territories that Stalin acquired after the non-aggression pact (Ribbentrop and Molotov) of August 1939, shortly before the war with Germany. However, as the facts show, the ecclesiastical situation in the occupied part of the Leningrad region, especially in its border areas of Pskov, largely coincides with the picture of events that Miner offers. It can be said that in his presentation, the "new deal" gets a purely negative assessment, since it was an effective tool for firmly strengthening the Soviet regime in the territories conquered from Germany. However, even before the establishment of Soviet power, it was necessary to conduct thorough training, which, according to Miner, had three main directions. The first direction was propaganda, when the labels "fascist" and "Nazi" were hung "on the slightest manifestation of anti-Soviet, especially non-Russian nationalism." The second direction is church-canonical; in this case, the Moscow Patriarchate, revived by Stalin's order, " excommunicated rebellious clergymen, transferring their parishes and church property to priests loyal to Moscow." The third direction is connected with the direct actions of Soviet intelligence, whose agents worked "to penetrate into politically unreliable centers and decompose them." They also did not stop at physically removing "religious figures who could not be subdued or intimidated into cooperating"12.

To illustrate these three ways in which the Kremlin can influence church life in the occupied areas of the Leningrad Diocese, which is independent of Soviet influence, let us turn to some concrete facts. It should be pointed out at once that the "independence" from Soviet influence was not very long.-

12. Ibid., p. 190.

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It was conditional, since in the German rear the authorized representatives of the Soviet government were partisan detachments that tried to control the life of the occupied territories. In 1943, the partisan movement on the territory of the Leningrad region was especially strengthened, entire villages and even volosts were under the control of partisan brigades. Controlling functions, judicial and executive power were carried out by special bodies - organizational structures that operated in each squad. Despite the fact that these territories were under German occupation, members of the organizing committee strictly monitored how local residents implemented Soviet laws. One veteran of the partisan movement wrote: "The work of the organizing committee was based on the laws of the Soviet state, of course, taking into account the military situation and the peculiarities of the fascist occupation." 13 It was the members of the organizing committee (often from among police officers, prosecutors, party and Komsomol employees) who " also performed judicial functions, passing sentences and executing them against traitors to the Motherland, traitors, etc. accomplices of the invaders " 14. Since the Communist Party and its loyal servant, the NKVD, played a crucial role in organizing partisan resistance, it can be assumed that the attitude of the partisan underground to the processes of church revival that took place with the approval of the occupation authorities was extremely negative. For the Communist partisans, "churchmen", having legalized their ministry with the arrival of the German occupiers and thereby showing their treacherous nature, naturally fell into the category of" accomplices " of the occupiers.

The partisan reports sent to the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement contain characteristic evidence of the development of church life in the occupied territories of the Russian Northwest:

With the arrival of the invaders (their proteges), they immediately started opening churches. Zayanskaya, Bobrovskaya, and Ktinskaya churches were opened, and the Lyadsky Club (formerly a church) was turned into a church. Priests were sent from Germany, and German ones at that-

13. Essays on the history of the internal affairs bodies of the Pskov land. From ancient times to our days: a popular scientific publication / under the general editorship of S. E. Matveev. Pskov. 2002. p. 188.

14. Ibid., p. 188.

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The experts did not hesitate to take into account those who did not attend church. Fearing persecution, large numbers of the population attend churches where priests make anti-Soviet speeches during worship services.15
Describing the spiritual uplift among the civilian population, the author admits a number of serious inaccuracies and distortions. Priests could not come from Germany, as this was prohibited by directives from Berlin16, and the tasks of the occupation authorities did not include active assistance to the Orthodox Church and stimulating the processes of church revival. Thus, the mass visit of peasants to Orthodox churches was not connected with the fear of falling under the repression of the German occupiers.

In the thematic note of the task force of the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement (LSPD) on the north-western front on the situation in the occupied territory on November 20, 1992year, in the section devoted to the religious state of affairs, there is also information about church life, presented in a purely negative way:

At the end of 1941, the German invaders opened three true Orthodox churches in the city of Gdov and the Gdovsky district. Bishops ' cathedrals have been opened in Pskov and Ostrov... The opening of churches and cathedrals was carried out by a special decision of the Supreme Church Council, published (on one) of the Sundays, and was accompanied by a solemn divine service. A large number of the population was driven to these services through the village elders. A special representative, Exarch Sergius, came from Germany and brought with him the necessary number of priests, mostly gathered in Latvia and Estonia... On Sundays, after the service, sermons are necessarily held, designed for 1.5-2 hours. The sermons focus on praising the victorious movement of the German army... Right there

15. Behind enemy lines: the struggle of partisans and underground fighters in the occupied territory of the Leningrad region. 1942: collection of documents, Lenizdat Publ., 1981, p. 250.

16. Shkarovskiy M. V. Politika Tretego rekha po otnoshenija k Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi v svete archivnykh materialov 1935-1945 godov (Sbornik dokumentov) [The policy of the Third Reich in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church in the Light of archival materials of 1935-1945 (Collection of documents)]. Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye: Obshchestvo lyububov tserkvnoj istorii, 2003, p.194.

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countless curses are uttered against Bolshevism and the Soviet government. There are no official laws (requiring) citizens to perform church rites, but baptisms, marriages, confessions, etc. are mandatory 17.

Here again, fiction is mixed with objective facts, and the author of the report, apparently, had little command of church vocabulary and was unfamiliar with the Orthodox tradition. The name of Patriarchal Exarch Sergius (Voskresensky) mentioned in the document is particularly important for us. However, he did not come to the Baltic States from Germany, as stated in the report of the Leningrad task force, but was a protege of the Moscow Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky)and, according to some sources, was an agent of the NKVD. 18
In April 1941, Metropolitan Sergius headed the Baltic Exarchate, then remained in the occupied territory and launched a very active church activity, relying on the relative loyalty of the German authorities. On the initiative and blessing of Exarch Sergius in August 1941, the "Orthodox Mission in the liberated regions of Russia" was organized with the center in Pskov (since July 9, it was occupied by German troops). The core of the Mission was a small group of Orthodox priests of the Exarchate, which remained in canonical unity with the Moscow Patriarchate throughout the entire period of German occupation. Soon, the Mission's clergy was replenished by local clerics of the Leningrad Diocese, including those who had passed the test of Stalin's prisons and camps. Thanks to the activities of the Pskov mission, not only the parish structure was restored, which was completely destroyed in the pre-war decade, but also a broad charitable, educational, educational and missionary activity was launched, which covered territories with a population of two million and brought abundant fruits that were also important in the post-war years.19
17. Behind enemy lines: the struggle of partisans and underground fighters in the occupied territory of the Leningrad region. 1942: collection of documents, pp. 279-280.

Stalin, power, religion. (Religious and church factors in the internal policy of the Soviet state in 1922-53). Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2011, p. 543.

Obozny K. P. 19. Istoriya Pskovskaya Pravoslavnoi Missii 1941-1944 gg. [History of the Pskov Orthodox Mission in 1941-1944], Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye: Obshchestvo lyubiteley tserkovnoi istorii, 2008, pp. 514-515.

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Naturally, for the Soviet government, including in the German rear, the church revival and spiritual uplift of the Russian people in the occupied lands were irritating factors that caused quite specific actions. Eloquent testimonies of priests from among the Pskov mission staff have been preserved about this. Archpriest Alexy Ionov, dean of the Ostrovsky district in 1941-1943, left the following entry in his memoirs: "Partisans are all around. Meeting them is the end. You can't tell them that we preach Christ Crucified. We are on this side, so we are enemies. " 20
The missionary did not exaggerate the color; the sentence passed by the partisan organization was carried out without delay, and if for some reason this did not succeed, the "punishing sword of justice" overtook the victim already in the post-occupation period. For example, the priest Georgy Tailov, who served in the ranks of the Mission in the village of Pechani near the Pushkin Mountains, received a note from the people's avengers with the threat of imminent reprisal:

Once an unknown person gave me a note in Latvian that I would be tried after the end of the war. At the end of the war, I did not leave my homeland, not considering myself guilty before it, and considering that as a priest I had no right to abandon the spiritual flock. I was indeed arrested after the end of the war, tried and sentenced to 20 years in ITL 21.

Clergymen, church elders, and active members of the parish have been harassed and repressed by Soviet partisans, including arrests, interrogations, robbery, physical assault, and even murder.22
Many priests and clerics were forced to leave dangerous areas where the partisans held power. Those who stayed in their parish in the neighborhood of places

Ionov Alexy, prot. 20. Missionary Notes // Following in the footsteps of Christ. 1955. N 52. P. 15.

21. Memoirs of Fr. George Tailov about his work in the Pskov Orthodox Mission in 1941-1944. 2001. N 1 (612). P. 18.

Obozny K. P. 22. The Orthodox Church and partisans in the occupied territories of the North-West of Russia in 1941-1944: the experience of studying church-state relations in the German rear // Proceedings of the III International Historical Readings dedicated to the memory of Professor, General Staff of Lieutenant General Nikolai Nikolaevich Golovin (1875-1944). St. Petersburg, October 18-20, 2012. Collection of articles and materials, St. Petersburg: Scriptorium, 2013, pp. 489-492.

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partisan brigades were required to strictly comply with the requirements of their representatives, which were based on Soviet decrees regulating the activities of the church in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. First of all, Orthodox pastors were not allowed to criticize the Communist Party and the Soviet government in their sermons and public speeches; they were forbidden to teach lessons in the Law of God in schools and baptize children over the age of 7, as well as to distribute the church's print organ of the Pskov mission "Orthodox Christian" as a pro-Fascist newspaper that undermines the foundations of the Soviet system23.

In addition, we should not forget that without the support of the local population, the partisan resistance is doomed to perish. In this sense, it is very significant that in the Pskov region, the partisan region becomes a truly impressive force only by 1943, when Nazi propaganda fails and the occupation policy is tightened, as a result of which the local population, fearing export to Germany, replenishes partisan detachments. Since Orthodox parishes in the occupied territory became a place of accumulation of a certain number of material values, it was not uncommon for representatives of organizing organizations (who were also responsible for supplying food to the detachments) to turn to the clergy for help. Naturally, the facts of resistance to the seizure of food and material values were regarded as anti-Soviet, pro-Fascist activities and were punished to the full extent of wartime.

In this story, undoubtedly, the turning point is 1943. Moreover, the changes in partisan attitudes toward the church begin even before the patriarchal elections were held in Moscow and the Soviet government declared its favor for Orthodox citizens. The Office of the Baltic Exarchate began to receive the first reports of the Pskov mission employees on new trends in the attitude of Soviet partisans towards the Orthodox Church in February-March 1943,24

In the reports of Pskov missionary priests who were sent to the exarchate in Riga, a rather interesting picture emerged: "According to some, the partisans consider priests to be their own

23. GAPO. F. 1633. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 5-6, 11-12.

24. GAPO. F. 1633. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 1, 2, 7.

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enemies of the people, whom they seek to deal with. According to others, the partisans try to emphasize a tolerant and even benevolent attitude towards the Church and, in particular, to priests"25. The priest Vladimir Tolstoukhov reported that " a group of partisans temporarily occupied a village near his parishes, and their leader encouraged the peasants to attend church diligently, saying that in Soviet Russia the Church was now given complete freedom and that power... the Communists are coming to an end. " 26
This story is echoed by the testimony of another member of the Pskov mission priest Jacob Nachis:

The partisans promote freedom of religion, and the former struggle against religion is recognized for a big mistake in which, allegedly, the Soviet government apologizes to God and the Russian people. This propaganda takes place in the parishes of Sigoritsky, Vladimiretsky and Shilovsky (Pskov district). There, the partisans repeatedly told the peasants that they would also come to the church. ...when I had to serve on January 17 this year in the Vladimiretskaya church, the peasants... they told me that partisans came to their village and said: "Why are you all sitting at home today, yesterday my father came to Vladimirets and today is the service." The whole village went to church. After such cases, the people are less afraid of the partisans and even begin to sympathize with them.27
These excerpts from the reports of Orthodox clerics draw attention not only to the open sympathies of the partisans for the church and clergy, which were expressed in their willingness to attend church services and encourage the peasants to do so, but also to the statement about a positive change in the attitude of the Soviet government to religion. The statement that the Communists ' power was coming to an end may not have been made by a representative of the partisan group, but was an addition that was independently made by parishioners who told their priest about these meetings. However, this is a remarkable touch, which once again confirms the thesis of coldness to communist ideas not only among civilians in the occupied territories.-

25. Ibid., l. 1.

26. Ibid., l. 2.

27. Ibid., l. 7.

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of the North-West, but also in the midst of partisan brigades. The main conclusion that can be drawn from these reports is that the sympathy of the local population is gradually changing its vector from the German occupation authorities, who initially proclaimed freedom of religion, to the Soviet partisans, who provided patronage to Orthodox parishes and announced drastic changes in Moscow's policy. Once again, it is confirmed that for the Russian peasant, the religious question, along with the question of land, remained a priority. The government, which was ready to solve these issues constructively, had serious chances to win the sympathy and trust of the majority of the population. This was well understood in the Kremlin, and therefore they were forced to make temporary concessions until large territories of the Soviet Union were liberated and the war ended. It is well known that immediately after the liberation of the North-West and the Baltic States from German troops, the collective farm system was restored here again, which brought ruin and starvation in the difficult post-war years.28 A few years after the end of the war, the Soviet government will openly adopt an openly anti-church line, thereby confirming the pragmatic, superficial nature of the "new course" of Stalin's church policy.

Let's return to the events of the second half of 1943 in Moscow, information about which reached the occupied territories of the Leningrad region. At the Council of Bishops on September 8, not only did the second restoration of the patriarchate take place in Soviet Russia, but also important documents were adopted that reflected the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate, which correlated with the political tasks of the Stalinist government. First, the "Appeal of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet Government with gratitude for meeting the needs of the Church"was read out. With this appeal, the Council of Bishops emphasized not only the church's loyalty and gratitude to Comrade Stalin, but also promised to increase "our share of work in the national struggle for the salvation of the Motherland."29 Also, within the framework of the Moscow Cathedral, there were

28. In total, about 2 million people died of starvation in the USSR in the period 1946-47. See History of Russia XX century. The era of Stalinism (1923-1953). Volume 2. Under the general editorship of A. B. Zubov, Moscow: "E", 2016, p. 634.

29. "Condemnation of traitors to the faith and Fatherland". Resolution of the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on the excommunication and defrocking of those who have defected to Fascism-

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An appeal was made to all Christians of the world, which had an important foreign policy significance, including in the sense of implementing Stalin's plans to create an "Orthodox Vatican". But the most important document from the point of view of the task of re-occupation of the Soviet regions was the Resolution of the Council on excommunication of laity and defrocking of clergy representatives who had defected to the fascists, which had an eloquent subtitle: "Condemnation of traitors to the faith and Fatherland." The text of the decree says :" Among the clergy and laity there are those who, having forgotten the fear of God, dare to build their well-being on the common misfortune. They welcome the Germans as welcome guests, get a job in their service, and sometimes go so far as to outright betray them." The Council of Bishops called this line of conduct "Judaic betrayal" and decided:: "Anyone who is guilty of treason to the church-wide cause and has gone over to the side of fascism, as an opponent of the Holy Cross, may be considered excommunicated, and a bishop or cleric deprived of his dignity." 30
Commenting on this controversial decision of the Council of Bishops, SPbDA Professor Archpriest Georgy Mitrofanov rightly notes that almost all active participants in church life who find themselves in the territories of the USSR occupied by the Germans fall under the church ban.31
This decree excommunicated millions of Russian Orthodox Christians who were being cared for in almost 12,000 churches that operated in the occupied territory on the basis of official permission from the German-Fascist authorities. This decree disfranchised thousands of clerics who selflessly revived the Russian church life destroyed by the Bolsheviks, sincerely or forcibly serving prayers for the victory of the German army. By this decree, the entire city was thrown out of office.

ROC in the years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents, Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion: Society of lovers of Church History, 2009, p. 67.

30. Appeal of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet Government with gratitude for meeting the needs of the Church on September 8, 1943 / / ROC during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents, Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion: Society of lovers of Church History, 2009, pp. 68-69.

31. The post-war development of church life has shown that this decision of the council had not canonical, but ideological and propaganda significance, so significant in the upcoming process of re-occupation of Soviet territories.

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the Russian episcopate, which received the right to legalize its activities from the German-fascist authorities 32.

Georgy Mitrofanov adds that the exarch of the Baltic States, Sergius (Voskresensky), also fell under the ban of the council. Although no one is named in the document, there is no doubt that in the opinion of the episcopate loyal to Stalin, traitors to the faith and Fatherland were primarily representatives of the Baltic Exarchate and the Pskov mission headed by Metropolitan Sergius the Younger.

A year before the start of the" new deal", Patriarchal Locum Tenens Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) issued a special personal definition" In the case of Metropolitan Sergius of the Resurrection with others", which was a reaction to the bishops ' conference in Riga, which expressed its gratitude to Hitler in a welcome telegram and thereby announced its anti-Soviet attitude. In Moscow, they demanded that Exarch Sergius give an explanation about what happened and "immediately take all measures to correct their deviation from the line of behavior that is mandatory for bishops who are under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, with a report on the subsequent Patriarchate, so that the upcoming church court, when the case is finally decided, will have before it not only a misdemeanor, but also a correction." of it " 33.

It should be emphasized that the NKVD directly participated in the publication and distribution of this document (including in the occupied territory of the Baltic States). In October 1924, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs B. Z. Kobulov reported to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) A. S. Shcherbakov:

In order to expose the Baltic bishops who went to the service of the fascists, as well as to strengthen the importance of patriotic education.-

George Mitrofanov, prot. 32. State-political lies and church-historical truth. Some pages of the epistolary heritage of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) and Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) of the period of the Second World War / / ROC at the historical crossroads of the XX century. Moscow, Aref, Lepta-Kniga, 2011. pp. 94-95.

33." On the case of Metropolitan Sergius of the Resurrection with others " definition of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, head of the Orthodox Church in the USSR, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna from September 22, 1942 / / ROC during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents, Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion: Society of lovers of Church History, 2009, p. 51.

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In the eyes of international public opinion, Metropolitan Sergius of Stragorodsky and the 14-member Council of Bishops attached to him issue a special appeal to the faithful of the Baltic SSR with a special ecclesiastical definition condemning the Baltic bishops. Secretly contributing to this politically advantageous event for our country, the NKVD of the USSR takes measures to reproduce these patriotic documents in a typographic way and distribute them on the territory of the Baltic Union Republics temporarily occupied by the Germans.34
Thus, it is clear that even before Stalin's official "favor" for the needs of the faithful, the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate actively participates in solving the tasks set by the party and the government.

The NKVD also distributed messages from the Council of Bishops of 1943, including a document condemning church "traitors", in the occupied territories of the Leningrad Region and the Baltic States. Partisan detachments provided invaluable assistance in this regard, which, along with combat and sabotage, performed equally important political and propaganda tasks.

Here is just one fairly illustrative example that has been preserved for us in partisan memoirs.

In December 1943, an unusual parcel arrived from the Mainland. It contained several hundred copies of the address of Patriarch Sergius of All Russia to the population of the occupied territories. Printed on coated paper, decorated with a cross, it could not fail to attract attention. The command of the brigade singled out a group of representatives who dispersed to villages and towns to familiarize the people with the message of the head of the Russian Church. In the village of Vladimirovtsy, fighter Dmitry Petrov went up to the altar with the permission of the church minister. While he read the message, people knelt and prayed. In the church of the villages of Brodovichi and Zapolye, political instructor Shuster rose to the altar.

Nazistskaya Germania i Pravoslavnaya Tserkva: Nazistskaya politika v otnoshenii Pravoslavnoi Tserkva i religovoe vozrozhdenie na osoboyannoi territorii SSSR [Nazi Germany and the Orthodox Church: Nazi Policy in relation to the Orthodox Church and religious revival in the occupied territory of the USSR]. Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye: Obshchestvo lyubiteley tserkvnoi istorii, 2002, pp. 357-358.

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"We are here for you, Father," he said to the priest. "I have been instructed to give you a message from Metropolitan Sergius. The priest took the sheet of paper held out to him with great disbelief, saw a large cross with a crucifix on it, and began to cry. Then he pulled himself together, crossed himself, and read out the text of the appeal to all 35 parishioners.

It is not necessary to ponder for a long time why it was so important for the Soviet authorities to distribute the documents of the Bishops ' Council and the news of the revived patriarchate in the territories occupied by German troops. Returning to Miner's version, it can be noted that the messages of Patriarch Sergius condemning Christians for their "cooperation" with the enemy of the Fatherland performed two tasks simultaneously - propaganda and church-canonical. All Orthodox bishops and clerics of the Baltic Exarchate and Pskov mission, who performed their ministry with the permission of the invaders, fell into the category of accomplices of fascists and traitors to the faith and Fatherland. Until now, the clergy of the Pskov mission are being accused of "pro-Fascist" activities. The ecclesiastical canonical measure of influence on"traitorous" priests was their worldwide expulsion from holy orders, which meant that their ecclesiastical activities lost their legitimacy.

An important addition should be made here. In April 1944, when Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) had already completed his earthly journey, the Holy Synod in Moscow adopted a decision according to which " ordinations performed by him or his subordinate bishops... recognized as valid " 36. In the post-war years, no one questioned the Christian sacraments performed during the occupation by"traitorous" clerics in the Baltic States and Northwestern Russia.37 This suggests that the "Conviction" adopted at the co-

Gilev V. I. 35. On vital indications. Zapiski partizanskogo doktora [Notes of a partisan doctor], Lenizdat Publ., 1990, pp. 117-118.

Nazi Germany and the Orthodox Church: Nazi policy towards the Orthodox Church and religious revival in the occupied territory of the USSR. p. 358.

37. In this connection, it is worth noting the decree of the administrator of the Leningrad Diocese, Archbishop Grigory (Chukov), dated 9 June 1944, on the invalidity of the awards of the Exarch of Latvia and Estonia, Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky), issued to them during the occupation period. See Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collection of documents, Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion: Society of lovers of Church History, 2009, p. 114.

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bor in 1943, was forced and may have been the price that was set by the Kremlin for the opportunity to legalize the patriarchate and elect a patriarch.

Attempts to influence the church situation in the occupied territories were made by the Soviet leadership using the capabilities of intelligence agencies. In his declining years, the legendary Soviet General Sudoplatov wrote the following about these events::

It is also worth noting the role of the NKVD intelligence service in countering the cooperation of the German authorities with some figures of the Orthodox Church in the Pskov region... With the assistance of Bishop Ratmirov, one of the leaders of the "renovationist" church in Zhytomyr in the 1930s, and Metropolitan Sergius, the guardian of the Patriarchal throne, we managed to introduce our operatives V. M. Ivanov and I. I. Mikheev into the circles of churchmen who collaborated with the Germans in the occupied territory. At the same time, Mikheev successfully mastered the profession of a clergyman 38.

Through its agents, including those embedded in the church environment, Soviet intelligence not only collected information of operational and tactical significance, conducted "radio games", misinforming German counterintelligence, but also tried to recruit clergymen to establish control over church activities. Today, for obvious reasons, not all the facts are available to researchers, but some information confirms Miner's hypothesis about the third direction of Soviet influence: through their agents to infiltrate and corrupt the "unreliable" church leadership supporting the occupation authorities.

The archives of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region contain detailed evidence of how Soviet intelligence officers at the end of 1943 tried to establish contact with the head of the Pskov mission Department, Protopresbyter Kirill Zaits. The latter received two letters from an unknown person calling himself Major of Intelligence Mikhail Kudryavtsev. These letters were delivered to the Mission Office in Pskov by a priest

Sudoplatov P. 38. I remain the only living witness... (Memories of the confrontation between Soviet and German intelligence services) / / Molodaya Gvardiya. 1995. N 5. P. 40.

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Ilya Bogdanov, who served in the parish of the village of Beloe, in the partisan control zone. The priest repeatedly carried out their assignments, including passing letters in which Fr. K. Zayets was asked to stop anti-Soviet speeches, conduct military intelligence in the city of Pskov, and, finally, help Soviet intelligence officers establish contact with the Exarch of the Baltic States, Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky): "Would you take part and get permission from the German command to send to the Russian Orthodox Church?" to the exarch of the Baltic States... our man with the instruction letter." At the end of the letter was a warning: failure to cooperate will be regarded "as a betrayal and unwillingness to follow the path that indicates... Russian Orthodox Church " 39. Together with the letter, Priest Ilya Bogdanov handed over the first issue of the" Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate "(ZHMP) dated September 12, 1943, in which the documents of the bishops ' Council were published. The head of the Mission did not respond in writing, but verbally conveyed to the partisan contact that he could not fulfill the requirements of Soviet intelligence, since this type of activity was contrary to pastoral duty.

In response to this objection, Fr. Cyril's second letter from Partizansky krai stated::

Your oral response is about. Ilya doesn't satisfy us. Your references to the fact that you are not allowed to write as a pastor are at least not serious, since you should know from the history of the church when pastors speak in the press. I can say that His Beatitude Sergius, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, writes, and so does the well-known Metropolitan Alexey of Leningrad. In the end, it is not a matter of a letter, but of the help that you, as the head of the Mission and a person connected with Exarch Sergius (Maly) and the broad circles of the German command, should give us to the Red Army scouts 40.

Here, Fr. Cyril, the author of the partisan message, offered to acquaint the Exarch with the contents of the letters and give him the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate". The Soviet intelligence officer makes it clear to Fr. Kirill that by refusing to cooperate, the head of the Mission Department actually expresses distrust of that person.-

39. Archive of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. f. 19. d. 119. l. 89.

40. Archive of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. f. 19. d. 119. l. 93.

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the second church course of the Kremlin, which was supported by both Patriarch Sergiy and Metropolitan Alexy (Simansky) of Leningrad. By his intransigence, the head of the Pskov mission "signed" the charge of pro-Fascist activity, which the Soviet investigators of the prosecutor's office of the Leningrad Military District will bring against him in October 1944.41.

Protopresbyter Kirill Zaits, having fulfilled the will of the author of the mysterious letter, met with Exarch Sergius in Riga on December 22, and handed him two letters from Kudryavtsev and the corresponding number of the LMP. On the instructions of the exarch, Fr. Cyril the next day reported all these events and partisan letters to a German officer attached to the SD Commander-in-Chief in Ostland42.

All this illustrates the difficult situation in which the exarch found himself by the end of 1943. First, there is the inconsistency of the version that the head of the Baltic Exarchate actively conducted intelligence activities in favor of the Soviet side. Major Kudryavtsev's attempts to establish contacts with the exarch through Pskov confirm the idea that Metropolitan Sergius, being a secret employee of the NKVD before the war, being under occupation, actually refuses to conduct agent activities in favor of the USSR. His position with regard to the German occupation authorities is not only one of caution caused by possible provocations of the SD to test the degree of loyalty of the head of the Orthodox Church in the Baltic States. To some extent, this act of Metropolitan Sergius destroys the version of his involvement in both the activities of Soviet intelligence and serious cooperation with the German special services. Otherwise, the German counterintelligence agencies would have used Exarch Sergius in their plans as a double agent, inciting him to get in touch with Kudryavtsev's people.

In addition, for Exarch Sergius, the revival of the patriarchate in the USSR and the subsequent messages of Patriarch Sergius aggravated his difficult position as head of the Orthodox Church in the Baltic States. The occupation authorities demanded that the exarch

41. Protopresbyter Kirill Zaits (born in 1869) served as head of the Internal Orthodox Mission in Lithuania from 15.03 to 27.07.1944 after the Pskov Mission ended its activities. After the liberation of the Baltic States from German troops, he was arrested in Siauliai on 18.08.1944. In January 1945, he was convicted under articles 58-1 and 58-2 and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in correctional labor camps. He died in custody on 28.10.1948 in the village. Dolinka, Kazakhstan.

42. Archive of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. f. 19. d. 119. l. 90-94.

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he criticized the Moscow Council and did not recognize the election of the patriarch. Exarch Sergius tried in every possible way to delay the resolution of this issue, since until the last days of his life he remained in canonical communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, raising the name of Patriarch Sergius at the divine service. This fact, of course, caused irritation in Berlin, which from the beginning of 1943 began to lose out in competition with Soviet propaganda.

As a result, Exarch Sergius was forced to make concessions and convene the last episcopal conference in Riga on April 5, 1944 (during the German occupation and under his own chairmanship), which resulted in an appeal to "Orthodox people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia". It should be added that by this time the Pskov mission ceased to exist, as most of the Leningrad region was liberated and the front line approached Pskov directly. Many representatives of the Orthodox clergy, as well as Orthodox believers, by their own will or by order of the occupation authorities, were taken to the Baltic States by the spring of 1944, and therefore the Appeal was addressed to the refugees, whose fate was also discussed at the bishops ' meeting.

At the same time, not a word was said about the illegality of the election of the Moscow Patriarch, which was so desired by the German authorities, but the condemnation of the Bolshevik regime, which allegedly did the impossible, changed its anti - Christian nature, was very clear. The appeal, apparently written by Exarch Sergius himself, was a merciless rejection of the" new course " of Stalin's religious policy. It is noteworthy that, having refused to criticize the church course of the Moscow Patriarchate and Patriarch Sergius personally, Exarch Sergius continued to expose the communist regime, not being shy about the harshest expressions, which risked causing a mortal insult to the Kremlin rulers. Responding to Soviet propaganda, which was also carried out in the occupied territories through partisan detachments, Metropolitan Sergius urged his flock not to believe Moscow's promises, calling them "pretense". Here is the most striking part of the "Proclamation", which was published in the Russian-language press of the Baltic States and was widely distributed in the Orthodox parishes of the Exarchate:

Such pretense, such lies, and such propaganda attest to the weakness of the Bolsheviks, and to the fact that their unvarnished appearance is completely different from that of the Bolsheviks.-

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I am disgusted that their ideology has lost its appeal, that they cannot continue the war on their own, and that their only hope now is to win their Bolshevik war by non-Bolshevik forces and then crush them. Fighting for their own existence, the Bolsheviks now appeal to the patriotism and religiosity of the Russian people, but if they win, they will take revenge on them for such vitality of their original, non-Bolshevik spirit, finally destroy the Church and wipe out everything Russian from Russian life.

Orthodox people! We urge you not to give in to the Bolshevik instigations and not to believe the Bolshevik promises! Bolshevism is godlessness and inhumanity, violence and lies. This is its eternal essence, its unchanging nature. That's what it was a quarter of a century ago, and that's what it is now.

Is it possible to think that after 25 years of ferocious persecution of the Church, the Bolsheviks suddenly became Her champions, after 25 years of terrorist trampling on freedom, they suddenly became her defenders, after 25 years of slave-owning mockery of Russia, they suddenly became imbued with love for her? It would be madness to believe this-Stalin is not Saul and will not become Paul.43
Let us not forget that these words were spoken by the bishop of the Moscow Patriarchate on behalf of all the bishops of the Baltic Exarchate. This is the only and therefore unique example when the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate openly exposed Stalin's religious policy to scathing criticism. Exactly the policy for which the "Soviet" bishops on the other side of the front line tirelessly thanked Stalin.

The Kremlin's response was almost instantaneous. Less than a month after the publication of the accusatory appeal, on April 28, 1944, the car of Exarch Sergius (Voskresensky) was shot by an unknown sabotage group on a remote section of the Vilnius-Kaunas highway. Metropolitan Sergiy, his driver Pyotr Kulakov and their companions, the Redikultsevs, were killed.

Most modern researchers are inclined to believe that the murder of Metropolitan Sergius was prepared and accomplished.-

43. Appeal of the Bishops ' Council in Riga under the chairmanship of Metropolitan Sergius of April 5, 1944 / / Russian Bulletin. Riga. No. 42 (66), Saturday, April 8, 1944.

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but the German secret services 44. However, the above facts suggest that in this case we are dealing with the revenge of the NKVD against an uncooperative agent and an Orthodox bishop who dared to tell the truth about the Stalinist regime and its project of a new course of religious policy.45 Here it is appropriate to turn again to the Miner hypothesis and recall that the third direction of re-occupation was associated with the penetration of Soviet agents into church circles and with the physical elimination of objectionable and independent church figures.

Thus, we can see how successfully the "new course" of Stalin's religious policy worked in the occupied territory of the Leningrad region: Orthodox parishes become a place of distribution of Soviet propaganda; clergy who did not want to participate in this ideological work are banned from serving; Soviet agents penetrate the church environment and try to influence the leadership of the Pskov mission and the Baltic the exarchate. Many priests and laity who allowed themselves to engage in legal church activities during the German occupation were repressed by Soviet courts or liquidated by NKVD sabotage detachments, 46 and these are also the fruits of the New deal .

We can say that Novy Kurs played its role in preparing the civilian population for the re-occupation processes quite successfully. Although, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that in the post-war period, it was in the Pskov and Leningrad dioceses that the largest number of active parishes remained (in the RSFSR) - compared to those regions that were not occupied by German troops and where church life was restored.-

Nazistskaya Germania i Pravoslavnaya Tserkva: Nazistskaya politika v otnoshenii Pravoslavnoi Tserkva i religonnoe vozrozhdenie na osoboyannoi territorii SSSR [Nazi Germany and the Orthodox Church: Nazi Policy in relation to the Orthodox Church and religious Revival in the occupied territory of the USSR]. Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarshoe Podvorye: Obshchestvo lyubiteley tserkvnoi istorii, 2002, p.366.

45. In part, this version of the murder of Exarch Sergius by Soviet agents is held by Moscow. Ilya Solovyov. See Shkarovsky M. V., Solovyov Ilya, priest. The Church against Bolshevism (Metropolitan Sergiy (Voskresensky) and the Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Baltic States. 1941-1944). Moscow: Society of Lovers of Church History. 2013. pp. 137-138.

46. Numerous testimonies have been preserved about the deaths of active churchmen and civilians in the occupied areas of the Leningrad Region at the hands of Soviet partisans. See Cyril (Nachis), Archimandrite. "Let's save the best of our fathers". St. Petersburg: Pervotsvet. 2006. pp. 46, 48-49; Ivanov M. F. About whom do the bells ring? Pskov: LOGOS. 2008. pp. 89-91.

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It was imposed according to the instructions of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, that is, to the extent that was allowed by the Stalinist government.

At the same time, it is impossible not to agree with Miner's opinion about the fatal role of the "new deal" for the Soviet regime itself:

In order to defeat the Nazis, the Soviet state was forced to turn itself inside out, and - ironically, dialectically - the victorious Marxist state exacerbated the very "serious contradictions" that would eventually help sign its death sentence.47
Concluding this small study of the influence of the "new course" of Stalin's religious policy on the ecclesiastical situation in the regions occupied by German troops, we can conclude that in the territory of the Leningrad Diocese in 1943-1944, this course was propagandistic. Through church channels, active Soviet agitation was carried out in Orthodox parishes controlled by partisan detachments, aimed at convincing the local population of fundamental changes in relations between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state. As part of this propaganda, official church authorities, in particular the leadership of the Pskov Mission and the Baltic Exarchate, were discredited as accomplices of the occupation administration. In the course of this campaign, the decisions of the Moscow Council of Bishops of 1943 were used, according to which disciplinary punishments were imposed on priests and laity who "went over to the side of fascism." Finally, it was thanks to the "new deal" that Soviet intelligence carried out work on recruiting hierarchs and clerics, trying to push back the intractable, even allowing extreme measures, namely, their physical elimination.

In fact, this story has its origins in the events of ninety years ago - since the release of the Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) on loyalty to the Soviet government. This document caused great confusion and division in the Orthodox Church at that time. During the period of military trials, on the verge of death, the Stalinist government not only skillfully used the patriotic impulse of Orthodox citizens, but also on the ground-

Miner S. M. 47. Stalinist Holy War. Religion, Nationalism and Allied politics 1941-1945. p. 125.

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At this historical level, it was able to put the "loyal" church at the service of its political interests once again. Thus, the" new "course of Stalin's religious policy manifested itself as a logical development of the pro-Soviet ecclesiastical worldview, aimed at the unconditional acceptance of all the "joys and successes" and "failures" of the Soviet Union as strictly ecclesiastical.

Bibliography / References

Archival materials and sources

Archive of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. F. 19. d. 119. l. 89-94.

Appeal of the Bishops ' Conference in Riga under the chairmanship of Metropolitan Sergius of April 5, 1944. Russian Bulletin. Riga. No. 42 (66), Saturday, April 8, 1944.

Behind enemy lines: the struggle of partisans and underground fighters in the occupied territory of the Leningrad region. 1942: collection of documents, Lenizdat Publ., 1981.

Georgy Tailov's memoirs of his work in the Pskov Orthodox Mission in 1941-1944. 2001. N1 (612). pp. 5-19.

GAPO (State Archive of the Pskov region). F. 1633. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 1-20.

Gilev V. I. On vital signs. Zapiski partizanskogo doktora [Notes of a partisan doctor], Lenizdat Publ., 1990.

Ionov Alexy, prot. Missionary Notes // Following in the footsteps of Christ. 1955. N52. pp. 11-16.

Cyril (Nachis), Archimandrite "Let's save the best of our fathers". St. Petersburg: Pervotsvet. 2006.

The Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Collection of documents, Moscow: Krutitskoe Patriarchal Metochion: Society of Lovers of Church History, 2009.

Sudoplatov P. I remain the only living witness... (Memories of the confrontation between Soviet and German intelligence services) / / Molodaya Gvardiya. 1995. N5. pp. 18-43.

Shkarovsky M. V. Politika Tretii reikha v otnoshenii k Russkoy Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v svete archivnykh materialov 1935-1945 godov (Sbornik dokumentov) [The Policy of the Third Reich in Relation to the Russian Orthodox Church in the Light of archival Materials of 1935-1945 (Collection of documents)].

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V tylu vraga: bor'ba partisan i podpol'shchikov na okkupirovannoy territorii Leningradskoy oblasti. 1942 god: sbornik dokumentov [In the enemy's rear: The fight between partisans and member of the underground in the occupied Leningrad region, 1942: Collection of documents]. L.: Lenizdat.

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