The Iraq crisis, which has been complicating the situation in the Middle East for a long time, has always caused quite a significant public and political resonance in the world and, above all, in those countries that were somehow involved in the events taking place in the Persian Gulf region. These included both Arab countries located in the region and Western states, primarily the United States, as well as Western European countries - Great Britain (as the closest US ally in NATO) and states that traditionally actively acted as an external factor in relation to the situation around Iraq. Such Countries include, for example, France.

France's official position on the Iraq crisis has evolved considerably. If during the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991. France was part of a coalition of forces fighting against Iraq, and at the same time fully supported the United States, but later, after the end of the Gulf War, Paris gradually began to view the Iraqi crisis in a slightly different way. Throughout the 1990s, based on an understanding of the need to use exclusively the peacekeeping potential of international organizations, such as, for example, the UN, to resolve conflicts that arise in the world, France increased its criticism of the United States and its actions in the region, and eventually even became a pronounced opposition to the actions carried out by the United States. Americans, as was the case during the 2003 Iraq War.

There are many explanations for this phenomenon. These are also global trends in the development of the existing system of international relations, the impact of which led to the transformation of France's foreign policy in general and in the Middle East in particular in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is also its traditional, since the time of Charles de Gaulle, ties with Arab countries, including Iraq, which resulted in the inevitable return of the country's foreign policy to the channel of contacts with the Arab world, which corresponded to the national interests of the Fifth Republic. Finally, in addition to foreign policy issues, domestic factors also played a role. And although their influence was not as significant as the influence of circumstances associated with the existence of such a phenomenon as foreign policy, they nevertheless had a corrective effect on the process of implementing the foreign policy course of Paris. These factors include French public opinion*.

* The article deals with residents of France as a whole, grouped in the category of "average French". They were represented by a sample set - a sample, a part of the population, strictly reflecting the characteristics and ratio of all elements of the studied community as a whole. As a result, the opinion that "average French people"had about the Iraq crisis was analyzed.

page 74

* * *

The first, active phase of the Iraqi crisis occurred in 1990-1991. It was then that the so-called Kuwait crisis broke out in the Persian Gulf region, which included two periods: August 2, 1990-January 17, 1991 and January 17-February 28, 1991.

During the first period of the Kuwait crisis, public opinion polls were conducted repeatedly in France in order to find out the attitude of the population towards it. The first of them was carried out already on August 8-9, 1990, i.e. a week after the Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. At that time, 46% of respondents in France (against 34%) supported the United States, which began preparing for a military operation against Iraq, and 47% (against 43%) agreed with the participation of France in it [Le Point, N 934, 13.08.1990]. And soon, after another week, the French supported their country's accession to the embargo imposed on Iraq (61% of respondents approved of it, and 31% condemned it). At the same time, the number of those who supported the buildup of the US and British military presence in the Persian Gulf region increased (up to 65%) [Le Figaro, 18-19.08.1990]. At the same time, the French (47% against 16%) wanted their country to participate as well [Le Figaro, 30.08.1990].

The analysis of the polls that took place in the future revealed the presence of a number of significant points in the French public opinion.

First of all, it is a very stable pessimism of the French, which was formed in the conditions when the number of US armed forces and their allies in the Persian Gulf region was constantly growing, as well as under the influence of the media. For most people in France at the time, it seemed that the crisis would inevitably lead to an armed conflict with Iraq. On September 22-26, 1990, 61% of respondents agreed with this, while 30% disagreed [Liberation, 28.09.1990]. The opinion of the French public was not changed even by the fact that President F. Mitterrand (1981-1995), along with the proclaimed "logic of war", also applied the "logic of peace": initially using the UN rostrum, and later - official and unofficial channels, he proposed to bring the solution of the problem of Iraq to the global level by convening a peace conference on the Middle East with the participation of all interested parties.

Secondly, it is a contradiction, which was expressed in the fact that the French moods simultaneously had two opposite principles: a firm sense of solidarity with their allies, i.e. with the United States and Great Britain, and, as tensions in the Persian Gulf region increased, a desire to "stay out of events". Thus, a public opinion poll (August 22-23, 1990) showed the following: 53% of French people said that "France should be in solidarity with the United States and Great Britain" (against 37% who insisted on France's neutrality in these matters [Le Figaro, 24.08.1990]. In this regard, even more of the French - 66% (against 23%) - generally approved of the actions of US President George W. Bush in the Persian Gulf region. However, the absolute majority of French residents (75%) also approved of Mitterrand's actions [SOFRES..., 1991, p. 101]. The fact that the French, when speaking about the goals pursued in the event of an armed conflict with Iraq, believed that they should be maximized, also testified to the presence of solidarity feelings: first, the release of hostages from Western countries, second, the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and, third, the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussein (63%) [Liberation, 28.09.1990].

Changes in public opinion in France were recorded in November 1990, when 47% (against 43%) declared on November 7-8 that "France should stand in solidarity with the United States and Great Britain", and only 40% (against 47%) on November 20-22 [Le Figaro, 29.11.1990]. At the same time, the number of people who approved of US actions in the Persian Gulf region decreased (to 51-52%), and the number of those who condemned them increased (to 33%). As for the actions of France, 73% approved them on November 7-8%

page 75

its inhabitants (against 19%), and on November 20-22 - even less-67% (against 20%) [SOFRES..., 1991, p. 101].

All this, apparently, was due to the fact that the continuously growing tension in the Persian Gulf region at that time formed a fairly stable tendency in the country's public opinion to critically assess the actions of the heads of the United States and France, i.e., J. Bush and F. Trump. Mitterrand, who were then involved in the Kuwait crisis, but could not create the necessary conditions for its resolution. In addition, it was then, on November 29, 1990, that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 678, which contained an ultimatum to Iraq: to liberate Kuwait by January 15, 1991. The irreconcilable position of the Iraqi leadership, led by Saddam Hussein, has led to the emergence of confidence among French residents that an armed conflict with Iraq is almost inevitable. On November 7-8, 51% of respondents agreed with this (against 43% of those who disagree), and on November 20-22, 59% agreed (against 35% of those who disagree). [Le Figaro, 9, 29.11.1990].

In this regard, in the mass consciousness of the inhabitants of France, other feelings were strengthened along with the above-mentioned ones, namely, the desire of the French to be "at a distance from the war", i.e., a kind of pacifism. If at the end of August (28.08) 1990, 53% of the French (against 41%) wanted France to take part in a possible armed conflict with Iraq [Le Figaro, 30.08.1990], then at the end of September (22 - 26.09), this percentage drops to 46 (against 45) [Liberation, 28.09.1990]. In November, it was even lower: 7 - 8.11- 42% (against 52%), and 20-22.11-even 36% (against 57%) [Le Figaro, 9,29. 11. 1990].

In general, the absolute majority of French people (83%), who do not want their country to take part in a possible armed conflict with Iraq, believed that " war is not worth starting: it is always necessary to negotiate and find a compromise, even with people like S. Hussein "[SOFRES..., 1991, p. 95]. To do this, according to the French, the Iraqi leader had to fulfill one condition: withdraw troops from Kuwait. 58% of respondents agreed with this, while 22% believed that S. Hussein could only commit to withdraw from Kuwait, and 11% did not need any preconditions [Le Figaro, 9.11.1990].

The same is confirmed in the answers given by the French to questions about the extent of France's involvement in a possible armed conflict with Iraq. Only two forms of participation were approved by the majority of French residents: the participation of the French Air Force in raids on strategically important objects in Iraq (for example, weapons factories) - 62%, as well as on other military targets located in Iraq - 59%. All other acceptable options are the use of French conscripts, additional taxes to finance the armed conflict, French Air Force raids on Iraqi cities (for example, Baghdad), French participation in military actions that "may endanger the lives of hostages", the mobilization of certain categories of reservists in France, and, finally, the participation of French troops directly in clashes. with the troops of Iraq, they received condemnation from the French (76, 75, 72, 70, 60 and 46% of respondents did not support them, respectively) [Liberation, 28.09.1990]. Therefore, French residents believed that their country should first of all provide material or informational assistance to the Americans, without risking the lives of its soldiers and officers (44%), and only after that unite French troops with the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition to carry out a military operation against Iraq (33%) [Le Nouvel Observateur, N 1352, 11-17.10.1990].

The third significant feature that took place in the structure of French public opinion at that time was the difference in views related to political issues.

page 76

preferences of the French, with their gender and age characteristics, social status and professional affiliation.

It is a well-known fact that during the Kuwait crisis, the political parties of France were divided, in fact, into two groups: "government" and "marginal", which were respectively "for" and "against" the military operation against Iraq. The first group included the French Socialist Party (FSP), which had been in power since 1981, with the exception of Jean-P. Chevenemand and his supporters, as well as forces representing the right flank of the political space: The Association for the Republic (OPR) and the Union for French Democracy (SPD). The second group included the French Communist Party (PCF), which was joined by the extreme left (Trotskyists, Maoists, and anarchists), environmentalists, and the National Front (FN). The French point of view was generally consistent with the position officially taken by the above-mentioned political parties in relation to the Kuwait crisis. Indeed, public opinion polls show that the political preferences of French residents had the greatest impact on their views [SOFRES..., 1991, p. 100].

Supporters of France taking part in a possible armed conflict with Iraq were men older than 35 years (with age, the "militarization" of consciousness only increased), educated, with solid professions (higher and secondary technical personnel, knowledge workers, civil servants). The opponents were women under 35 years of age, without education or who had not yet managed to get it, peasants, merchants and artisans, workers [SOFRES..., 1991, p. 100]. All this was evidence of the lack of consensus in French society on this issue.

Thus, during the first period of the Kuwait crisis (August 2, 1990 - January 17, 1991), French public opinion was not stable. In general, the social climate in the country during this period, until November 1990, around France's participation in the conflict, despite the pessimistic attitude of the majority of French people towards it, continued to be favorable. However, in the future it was not so favorable. Since November 1990, solidarity with the allies, i.e. with the United States and Great Britain, approval of the actions of George W. Bush and F. Mitterrand in the Persian Gulf region, and a generally positive attitude towards France's participation in a possible armed conflict against Iraq - all these elements that took place in the structure of French public opinion earlier have become different explicit ones. Criticism from the French intensified, which was recorded in January 1991, just ten days before the start of Operation Desert Storm.

January 7-9, 1991 57% of French residents of all categories of respondents believed that their country should not take part in a possible armed conflict against Iraq, while 37% held the opposite view. At the same time, the lowest number of respondents (since August 1990) (53% vs. 33%) approved of the actions of US President George W. Bush in the Persian Gulf region. The same was true of Mitterrand's actions: only 60% of French people approved of them, while 27% condemned them [Le Figaro, 12-13 January 1991].

During Operation Desert Storm (January 17-February 28, 1991), another series of public opinion polls was conducted in France. In the context of the Gulf War, the French have become more categorical in their statements, and, in addition, the structure of the mass consciousness of the inhabitants of France has clearly manifested features that were previously absent. First of all, one very important change occurred almost instantly in the views of the French. Principled hostility to French participation in a possible armed conflict against Iraq, which existed in public opinion ten days before the start of the howl-

page 77

The situation in the Persian Gulf was transformed into the approval of the latter by almost all categories of the French. As early as January 17, 1991, 65% of respondents approved of France's participation in the military operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq, while 32% disapproved [Le Figaro, 19-20.01.1991].

The above change does not seem at all paradoxical. As noted by French sociologists, it was the result of a number of factors. First, this is the effect of the outbreak of the Gulf War, when public opinion can no longer practically or theoretically stop it, as a result of which there was an outflow of those individuals who could no longer oppose the existing reality. Secondly, the speech of the President of the Russian Federation played a role. Mitterrand's speech, which he delivered on French television on January 17, 1991, and thanks to which he managed to convey to the population of the country the idea of the need for France to participate in a military operation against Iraq. And finally, third, this is a consequence of the very powerful impact that the local media (and above all television, which broadcast the war in the Persian Gulf "live")had on the first day of Operation Desert Storm impact on the country's public. Throughout the day of January 17, 1991, French television, with a solid audience at its disposal, commented on the" triumph " of the United States and its allies. As a result, public opinion was also affected by this trend: the absolute majority (83%) were confident that the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition would win [SOFRES..., 1992, p.128]. At the same time, the French believed that the war in the Persian Gulf could last either "several weeks" or "several months". Few people believed that it could last "a few days" or "a few years" [Liberation, 19-20 January 1991].

In the future, the prevailing opinion of the French public only grew stronger. The French perception of the Gulf War turned out to be positive. The military operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq was approved: On January 17-67%, on January 23 - already 75%, on January 30 and February 13 this share decreased, but slightly (to 70 and 72%, respectively), and, finally, on February 27-80% of respondents. As a result, the number of those who condemned it also decreased (27, 21, 25, 25, and 17%, respectively) [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 130].

The situation was much the same with regard to the opinion of the French regarding the country's participation in the Gulf War. On January 17, 65% of respondents approved of it, on January 23 - already 70%, on January 30 and February 13 - 67 and 69%, and on February 27-76%. He was condemned by 32%, 26%, 29%, 29%, and 22%, respectively [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 131]. As for the actions of France in the Persian Gulf region, the situation was also obvious here. They were approved: On January 17-72%, on January 23-72%, on January 30 and February 13-70 and 72%, and on February 27-81% of respondents (22, 23, 25, 25 and 16% condemned, respectively). [Le Figaro, 19 - 20,25.01, 1, 15.02, 1.03.1991].

The majority of French residents (76%) believed that the US and its allies were "right" to launch a military operation against Iraq. Only 20% believed that they were "wrong" [Liberation, 28.01.1991]. However, while generally approving the military operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq, the French almost unanimously (87%) believed that "France has done everything possible to avoid armed conflict and achieve peace" [SOFRES..., 1992, p.133]. At the same time, 73% of the French believed that the responsibility for the Gulf War lay more with S. Hussein, "who captured Kuwait", than with J. R. R. Tolkien. President George W. Bush, "who gave the order to start military operations" (7%). Only in the opinion of 16% of the respondents, both S. Hussein and J. Abramovich were responsible at the same time. Bush [Le Figaro, 19-20.01.1991].

Another important point that characterized the situation in the mass consciousness of the French at that time, which was almost traditional for the country's public opinion, was that anti - Americanism was "blunted"in the conditions of the Gulf War. Due to

page 78

The opinion of the French public regarding the actions of the United States during Operation Desert Storm also turned out to be very positive. They were approved: January 17 - 66% of respondents, January 23-71%, January 30 and February 13-68 and 69%, and February 27-76% (convicted: 25, 22, 24, 26 and 20%, respectively) [Le Figaro, 19 - 20, 25.01, 1.15.02, 1.03.1991]. A kind of "trust rating" for the United States also increased during Operation Desert Storm. At that time, 77% of French residents trusted the latter, while 18% did not trust them [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 136].

Despite this, the French have clearly identified that the United States pursues only its own goals in the region, and primarily economic ones. For 54% of French people, it was obvious that the Americans were protecting their "oil interests" in the Persian Gulf region, and only then they want to liberate Kuwait (36%), as well as destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein (33%) and, in addition, destroy the military potential of Iraq (18%) [Liberation, 19 - 20.01.1991].

As for the arguments in favor of France's participation in the Gulf War, its residents distributed them in the following order: first, compliance with the principles of international law (58%); second, solidarity with the United States (30%); third, providing France with oil (25%); Fourthly, the strengthening of the role of France as one of the five great powers (19%) and, fifth, the destruction of the military potential of Iraq (8%) [Le Nouvel Observateur, N 1372, 21-27.02.1991]. All this, according to the French, justified France's participation in the Gulf War.

The peculiar "demonization" of Iraq, as well as the dramatization of the situation, especially with regard to the consequences of the Gulf War, turned into another factor in shaping public opinion in France. Both of these processes intensified as the armed conflict with Iraq itself escalated and were directly linked to the steps taken by the Iraqi leadership led by Saddam Hussein. Among them:: a series of rocket attacks carried out by Iraq on the territory of Israel (January 18, 22, 25, 1991); Iraq's use of hostages - citizens of Western countries as a kind of "humanitarian shield" in order to protect strategically important objects of the country from bombing by US aircraft and their allies; the burning of oil wells by Iraqi troops during the withdrawal from Kuwait. In addition, according to French sociologists, the French media again played a very important role in strengthening these processes [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 134, 137].

According to 77% of respondents in France, S. Hussein is a "war criminal" [Le Figaro, 1.02.1991]. As a result, the French believed that first of all it is necessary to liberate Kuwait (54%), but this is not limited to this. According to 42% of respondents, it is important to complete the work that has been started before the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussein [Liberation, 19-20 January 1991]. In addition, in the conditions of the already begun war in the Persian Gulf, the French dramatized the situation. 54% of them considered that there is a risk of transformation of the armed conflict with Iraq into a new war between the State of Israel and Arab countries [Le Figaro, 25.01.1991] and, moreover, its development into the Third World War: on February 2, 1991, 70% of respondents agreed with this (against 27%) [Paris Match, N 2177, 14.02.1991], but a week later (February 9) their number decreased to 56% (against 41%) [Paris Match, N 2178, 21.02.1991].

In general, pessimism became one of the characteristic features in the mood of the inhabitants of France, at least in the first weeks of the Gulf War. At that time, it was considered that in the coming months France might face problems affecting security interests: terrorist attacks (89%) and incidents with the country's Muslim community (70%), as well as economic difficulties - a decrease in the purchasing power of the population (70%) and difficulties with oil products (47-49%). Only in the political sphere, no major changes were expected. However, more than half of the respondents believed that the war in the Persian Gulf could lead to a calamity.-

page 79

some personal sacrifices on the part of the French. Nevertheless, they were ready to accept them, i.e. the French had a "propensity for sacrifice" [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 138].

Finally, another important point related to the mass consciousness of French residents is pacifism, which during the Gulf War, in comparison with the first period of the Kuwait crisis that preceded it, intensified. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm, which began on January 17, 1991, provoked a wave of pacifism in France. In January 1991, the actions of pacifists were very numerous. At that time, they, in solidarity with the socio-political forces of France that opposed the war in the Persian Gulf (PCF, extreme leftists and environmentalists, various pacifist organizations such as SOS-racism, etc.), took an active part in protest demonstrations. These demonstrations took place both in the French capital and in other cities of the country with calls to prevent the start of a military operation by the United States and its allies against Iraq. However, the peculiarity of French pacifism was that its representatives were represented mainly by young people, who were always more radical than the older generation. This is evidenced by the results of one of the public opinion polls, which was conducted in January 1991. among young people (persons aged 16 to 22 years) to determine its attitude to the Gulf War. It turned out that the French youth, its smaller (compared to the population of the country as a whole) number, approved of the military operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq (70%), as well as participation in the Gulf War of France (63%), respectively, a larger number - condemned (25% and 33%) [Le Nouvel Observateur, N 1369, 31.01-6.02.1991]. However, pacifism did not become widespread in the French public opinion at that time.

At the end of January 1991, i.e. at the height of the Gulf War, the attitude of the local Muslim community was revealed. Its number was then very significant - about 3 million people, and the French leadership could not help but take into account this important factor from the point of view of the country's internal security. As a result, the Muslims who lived in France, because of their common membership in the Islamic religion with Iraq and its population, were left out of the mainstream of the French, eventually forming a layer of the opposition-minded part of the country's society (Figure 1).

Diagram 1.

Attitude to the Gulf War on the part of French residents (French in general and Muslims), %

The opposition of the Muslim community of France, however, was expressed not so much in the fact that it criticized the war in the Persian Gulf, but in the fact that Muslims, being "above the fray", preferred to take a wait-and-see attitude towards the United States and its allies, as well as towards Iraq. Thus, more than half of the Muslims in France (54%) declared their neutrality, while an equal number of them (according to

page 80

22%) noted their "closeness" to the United States and its allies and to Iraq, respectively. This is confirmed by two other facts. First, a significant proportion of respondents (47%) answered the question " Who do you want to win the Gulf War?" "I chose not to say anything. Secondly, according to 42% of respondents, the Gulf War was the result of the actions of the leaders of both the United States and Iraq, i.e. Bush and Hussein, and it is they who, in the opinion of French Muslims, are "fundamentally responsible" for starting it. Their actions in the Persian Gulf region were not supported by 68 and 66% of respondents, respectively (against 20 and 21% who supported them) [Musulmans de France et guerre du Golfe..., 1992].

However, the characteristic hostility of the representatives of Islam towards the United States persisted: Bush was viewed "badly" by 71% of French Muslims (compared to 14% who viewed him "well"). The portrait of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was controversial: French Muslims described him as "brave" (55%), but also "dangerous" (43%). In addition, S. Hussein received such characteristics as "crazy" (29%) and "hero" (9%). Only 26% of the respondents believed that Saddam Hussein " protects the interests of the Arabs." Another figure who acted during the Kuwait crisis is F. Mitterrand, in the eyes of French Muslims, turned out to be a more positive person: the president's actions in the Persian Gulf region were approved by a relatively larger number of respondents - 37% (against 47% who condemned them) [Musulmans de France et guerre du Golfe..., 1992].

For 40% of French Muslims, the Gulf War pitted the international community against Iraq, as well as the West against the Arab world. However, the majority of French Muslims believed that the war would be limited to Iraq and Kuwait (68%), and only 14% considered the possibility of it escalating into a war "between the State of Israel and Arab countries" as quite real. Finally, France's Muslim community expressed concern for its future in the country. 66% of its representatives (against 26%) believed that the war in the Persian Gulf in relation to Muslims living in France would have negative consequences. This includes increasing racist tendencies (73%), difficulties in finding a job (73%), and deportation of immigrants of Arab origin to their "historical homeland" (57%). However, only 21% of respondents felt that since the beginning of the military operation against Iraq, the Arabs in France have become more hostile. For the majority (74%) no changes were observed, and 3% reported that they were more sympathetic to them than before [Musulmans de France et guerre du Golfe.., 1992].

One of the essential features that characterized the French public's attitude towards the Iraq crisis during Operation Desert Storm was the exceptional determination of the French. A week after it began (January 23), then another week later (January 30), February 13, and finally, on the day when the capital of Kuwait was liberated, i.e. February 27, 1991, half of the French residents surveyed consistently stated that it was necessary to continue the offensive of the coalition troops already on the territory of Kuwait. the territory of Iraq up to the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussein [Le Figaro, 25.01, 1, 15.02, 1.03.1991], since this, according to 77% of respondents, was one of the necessary conditions for establishing peace in the region [Liberation, 4.03.1991]. They were also supported by the 28% of respondents who believed that even after the liberation of Kuwait, the United States and its allies should continue their actions against Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Only 19% believed that it was necessary to limit themselves exclusively to the liberation of Kuwait [Le Figaro, 1.03.1991].

But, despite this, the French still hoped that with the end of the Gulf War, peace would come to the region, for which it was necessary to take a number of measures.

page 81

steps. Peace in the Middle East, in their view, depended on solving the following tasks: establishing control over the arms trade-56%; resolving contradictions between the State of Israel and the PLO-54%; redistributing oil revenues between rich and poor countries of the Arab world-47%; concluding a peace treaty between Iraq and Kuwait-39% normalization of the situation in Lebanon - 35%; maintaining the immutability of borders in the Middle East-3% [SOFRES..., 1992, p. 143].

In March 1991, a number of public opinion polls were conducted in France, during which the attitude of the French people to the consequences of the Gulf War was clarified. As sociologist A. Duhamel noted in this regard, " the French followed the events that took place in the Persian Gulf region with great attention, and therefore have an accurate idea of their consequences." As a result, A. Duhamel identified three important points in the mood of the inhabitants of France.

First of all, he stated that "the most clear, significant mass phenomenon is the general opinion about the strengthening of the United States." According to 84% of respondents, it was the United States that emerged from the Gulf War "stronger" [Paris Match, N 2181, 14.03.1991]. However, the period that began in the history of international relations, based on the dominance of the United States, did not alarm the French: 65% believed that the strengthening of America is "rather a good thing" (against 21%), since "it will help to establish balance in the world" [Liberation, 4.03.1991]. Moreover, the French felt sympathy for the United States, were grateful to the Americans, and even admired them. President J. R. R. Tolkien Bush is a "firm", "sensible", "competent", "intelligent", "bold" and "calm" politician, according to the French [Paris Match, N 2181, 14.03.1991]. In addition, it turned out that S. Hussein was discredited in the eyes of the French public. The majority of respondents (74%) believed that he should be convicted as a "war criminal", while 19% believed that he should be sent out of Iraq, and only 2% said that S. Hussein could continue to lead Iraq [see p. website: SOFRES: www.sofres.com].

At the same time, according to the French, the results of the war in the Persian Gulf turned out to be quite contradictory for the country. They were generally happy that France was taking part in the war. They were also satisfied with the contribution that it made in the framework of the anti-Iraqi coalition forces to the victory over Iraq. 86% of respondents believed that the French troops played a significant role in Operation Desert Storm (against 13%, for whom it was insignificant) [Le Figaro, 28.02.1991]. As a result, in the opinion of most French people, the country came out of the Gulf War "intensified". 68% agreed with this (against 15% who believed that France was "weakened" and 10% who believed that there were no changes for it) [Paris Match, N 2181. 14.03.1991]. For 72% of respondents (against 26%), it was obvious that France is a "great power" and that it also plays a "significant role" in the Middle East (77% of respondents agreed against 18%). However, the views of the French contrasted with those of the Americans and the British. For them, in the context of the Persian Gulf War, in which France was far from playing the "leading role", it was no longer a "great power" [L'Express, 1.03.1991, N2068]. At the same time, the French were concerned about the country's relations with the Arab world (for 70% of respondents, privileged relations with it were of "great importance"for France). Although 47% of respondents believed that relations would return to normal after the Gulf War, 42% of respondents believed that the country would be "thoroughly compromised" [L'Express, 8.03.1991, N 2069].

Thus, the first active phase of the Iraq crisis revealed the following: in France, a kind of "national consensus" was formed, which is almost identical to the previous one.-

page 82

meval expressed the solidarity of the French leadership and residents with their allies, i.e. with the United States and Great Britain, and the French approval of the actions of George Bush and F. Mitterrand in the Persian Gulf region. In general, a positive attitude towards the country's participation in the military operation against Iraq was recorded then among almost all categories of the French population.

* * *

The second, after the Kuwaiti crisis of 1990-1991, the active phase of the Iraqi crisis as a whole occurred in 2003, and its onset was accelerated by a number of circumstances.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 led to the intensification of US activities in the field of combating international terrorism. Having designated the so-called axis of evil, Washington ranked first Afghanistan, and later Iraq, among it. It was these countries that, in the view of the George W. Bush administration, were considered as States that support international terrorism, and, in particular, terrorists belonging to the Al-Qaeda organization led by W. Bin Laden. After the Americans invaded Afghanistan in November 2001, and soon after overthrowing the Taliban regime, established their own order there, their attention shifted to Iraq: threats against it from the United States were announced by President George W. Bush in September 2002 during the 57th session of the UN General Assembly.

Two public opinion polls conducted in France in August-September 2002 revealed the following trend: while in August only 22% of respondents believed that if the UN Security Council made an appropriate decision on a military operation against Iraq, they would "generally approve" of France's participation in it, then in September, there were already 34% of them [see website: IFOP: www.ifop.com]. Most likely, this was due to the fact that it was in September 2002, i.e. exactly one year after the terrorist attack on the United States took place, that this date was "marked" in the media, including the French ones: numerous publications appeared on the events of September 11, 2001, in which the United States they were presented as "victims" of international terrorism. As a result, the impact of the media on the mass consciousness of French residents had its effect: in just a month, the number of those who supported a military operation against Iraq and France's participation in it increased by 12 percentage points. Nevertheless, the majority of French people seem to have reacted to this "generally disapproving", which was recorded in polls both in August (75%) and in September (65%) [see fig. website: IFOP: www.ifop.com]. In January 2003, it turned out that France's participation in a military operation against Iraq would be viewed "generally favorably" - 19% of respondents, and "generally disapprove" - 76% [Le Journal du Dimanche, 12.01.2003].

Meanwhile, on February 5, 2003, the US Secretary of State, K. Powell presented the UN Security Council with a number of "proofs" in favor of conducting a military operation against Iraq. He accused Baghdad of "fraud", that the Iraqi leadership is deceiving the UN staff of the Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (CCVINU) headed by G. Blix, who are there, and also maintains links with the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. At that time, only 7% of French people said that they were "convinced" by the American "evidence". The majority (81%) stated the opposite [Le Journal du Dimanche, 10.02.2003]. It also turned out that the number of those who would "generally approve" of France's participation in a military operation against Iraq was 21%, and "generally disapprove" - 77% [Le Journal du Dimanche, 10.02.2003]. Therefore, while denying the very possibility of their country's participation in the war in Iraq, the French hoped to use other methods of resolving the crisis. So, they are the majority (81% of respondents against 15%, with 4% abstaining). declared about

page 83

that they would have a positive attitude to the fact that France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, uses its veto right if the issue of a military operation against Iraq is discussed at its meeting [Le Journal du Dimanche, 16.02.2003].

At the same time, the French were asked to "describe their feelings at the moment towards the Americans, if we talk about them in relation to the military operation against Iraq." As a result, of those who spoke out "against" the war in Iraq, and there were a majority of such people (85% of respondents), 70% treated Americans well, and 15% - poorly. [Le Journal du Dimanche, 3.02.2003]. Despite the critical attitude of the French towards the US policy towards Iraq, there was no place for pronounced anti-Americanism in the French public opinion.

As noted in this regard in France itself, this indicated an evolution in the views of the French. Earlier, in the 1980s and 1990s, anti-Americanism in the configuration of French public opinion was present and at the same time extended not only to the United States as a state entity, but also to the Americans themselves. However, in the future, the effect associated with the events of September 11, 2001, had an impact on the opinion of the French towards Americans (it was replaced by a positive perception of them by the inhabitants of France). As a result, anti - Americanism transformed into "anti-hegemonism": the French began to generally treat Americans well, but criticized the United States for its hegemonic aspirations [Rozes, 2003, p.44-47].

Just a few days before the start of the military operation against Iraq, another public opinion poll was conducted in France. Then it turned out that the absolute majority of respondents (86%) supported its position in the Iraqi crisis (by this time Paris had clearly indicated its position, namely, it spoke out against the use of armed force against Iraq and for the use of exclusively peaceful methods in resolving the Iraqi crisis). Only 6% of those who disagreed with it turned out to be [see fig. website: SOFRES: www.sofres.com].

Thus, during the seven months preceding the war in Iraq (September 2002 - March 2003), when the United States was preparing a military operation against Iraq, at least three components were revealed in the structure of French public opinion. First, there is an extremely negative attitude towards the very possibility of a military operation against Iraq. Secondly, the negative attitude of the French towards the country's participation in the war in Iraq. Third, their desire to use peaceful means to resolve the Iraqi crisis. At the same time, these points became more and more stable, eventually turning into a kind of foundation on which French public opinion was built directly during the war in Iraq.

On March 20, 2003, the day the military operation against Iraq began, a public opinion poll was conducted in France, which revealed the critical attitude of its population towards the war. As it turned out, 87% of French respondents condemned the war in Iraq (of which: "absolutely condemned" - 69%," rather condemned " - 18%), while only 12% approved (of which:" rather approved "- 8%, "absolutely approved" - 4%) [Le Figaro, 21.03.2003]. The war in Iraq was also unanimously condemned by representatives of all political parties in France: both from the left and from the right flank. At the same time, the position of the Muslim community in France no longer differed from the opinion of the French public as a whole.

By the way, the assessment given by the French regarding the heads of state who were then somehow involved in the Iraqi crisis is noteworthy. This concerned, first of all, the United States, Great Britain and Spain, which joined them, which were "for" the war in Iraq, as well as those who were "against" it - France, Germany and Russia. So, President J. R. R. Tolkien Bush and the British Prime Minister

page 84

T. Blair, as well as the Prime Minister of the Spanish government, Jose Marie Aznar, had a negative "sympathy index" (-70, -53 and -31, respectively). Representing France, Germany and Russia President Jacques Chirac, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Vladimir Putin had a positive index "sympathy" (+70, +54 and +3, respectively) [Le Journal du Dimanche, 23.03.2003]. As a result, the personification of the Iraq War was obvious.

Another important point at that time was the following: negative attitude to the military operation against Iraq, the French believed that the responsibility for the war in Iraq lies primarily with the United States (64%), and not Iraq (12%). Only 11% agreed that both Washington and Baghdad were responsible [Le Monde, 1.04.2003].

The motivation for the actions of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf region, according to the French, was mainly due to the growing hegemony of the United States. Among these factors, the French attributed: first, the establishment of control over the oil resources of Iraq (49%), and secondly, the establishment of American dominance in the Middle East (17%). In addition, according to the French, the United States sought to "punish the state, which they considered as an accomplice of terrorists involved in the events of September 11, 2001" (12% agreed with this), and in this regard "destroy the regime of S. Hussein" (11%). Further in the series of goals of the war in Iraq were: the establishment of a democratic system in Iraq (4%), the disarmament of Iraq (3%), ensuring the re-election of J. R. R. Tolkien. George W. Bush as President of the United States in 2004 (2%) [Le Figaro, 21.03.2003]. However, the French believed that, apart from one set task - the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Americans would not be able to achieve other goals, and above all those related to the need to reduce the danger from international terrorism and the influence of Muslim integrist movements, as well as establish democracy in Iraq. website: IFOP: www.ifop.com].

As for the official French position on the war in Iraq, it was approved by the absolute majority of French residents surveyed - 92%. Only 8% disapproved of it [Le Figaro, 21.03.2003].

The respondents ' statements about how long they think the war in Iraq will last are also interesting. 36% of respondents believed that "several months", 35% - "several weeks", 16% - "several days", 6% - "several years" [Le Figaro, 21.03.2003]. As a result, 43% of French residents regarded the victory of the anti-Iraqi coalition forces as "far from obvious". The fact that it is "probable" was considered by 33%, and "there is no doubt" - only 21% of respondents. However, according to the same survey, in the context of the war in Iraq, 1/3 of French residents (34%) still felt more on the side of the United States and its allies (against 25% who felt on the side of Iraq). 31% of respondents preferred to remain neutral [Le Monde, 1.04.2003].

Speaking about the possible consequences of the war in Iraq, the French did not believe that if Iraq was disarmed and Saddam Hussein was removed from power, there would be stability in the Middle East. 46% of respondents considered the situation in the region to be less stable than before, 42% - more stable, and 9% believed that the war in Iraq would not change anything at all [Le Figaro, 21.03.2003]. The French treated its consequences as well: 1) prolonged conflict between the Muslim world and Western countries (31%); 2) renewed terrorist attacks in France (23%); 3) the risk that the conflict will spread to neighboring countries with Iraq (23%); 4) deterioration of the economic situation and the emergence of difficulties in society (21%) [Le Journal du Dimanche, 23.03.2003]. Finally, for 7%, the possible consequences for relations between France and the United States were obvious [Le Monde, 1.04.2003].

At the end of April 2003, the public opinion polling service Gallup international conducted a comprehensive probe in Western countries: the United States, Great Britain and Spain, as well as in France and Germany. As a result, it turned out that the public opinion

page 85

France was different from the views of representatives of other Western countries, and above all the United States, as well as the British, Spaniards and even Germans.

It turned out that the French (along with the Germans) believed that the military operation of the United States and its allies against Iraq was not justified. 65% of respondents agreed with this (as opposed to 27% who believed that it was justified). In contrast, residents of the countries that participated in the military operation against Iraq-the United States (68%) and Great Britain (54%) - believed that it was "absolutely justified". 20% of Americans and 31% of Englishmen disagreed. Spanish residents, although their country supported the military operation against Iraq, agreed with the Europeans: the majority of Spaniards (68%) believed that it was not justified, and only 22% that it was justified [see fig. сайт: Gallup international: www.gallup.com].

As for the assessment of the consequences of the war in Iraq, the people of Europe were generally in solidarity with each other, and their position differed from the opinion of the people of the United States. However, the point of view of the French, in comparison with other inhabitants of Europe, as a rule, looked more prominent. Thus, the absolute majority of French people (82%) believed that after the US military action in Iraq (and initially in Afghanistan) ended by that time, "it became more dangerous to live in peace." Next came the Germans-72%, Spaniards-63%. Residents of the UK also generally agreed with this, but it was not so obvious to them (55%). The Americans, on the other hand, believed that after the war in Iraq, "security in the world was strengthened." 48% of respondents in the United States agreed with this opinion (against 36%). Also, the majority of French people (76%) did not agree with the opinion that "the war in Iraq brought peace and stability to the Middle East" (only 14% agreed). The German and Spanish votes were distributed as follows:: 70 and 26%, 60 and 27% of respondents, respectively. Only Americans (56% vs. 32%) and, not so obviously, the British (42% vs. 41%) thought otherwise. сайт: Gallup international: www.gallup.com].

However, residents of the countries in which this survey was conducted agreed with each other on two points: first, that the war in Iraq "did not lead to the elimination of the threat of terrorism"; and second, that the Iraqi crisis "encroached" on the role of the UN as an international organization.-a legal organization. Most of the respondents mentioned these negative consequences of the war in Iraq. However, even here the number of Frenchmen, in comparison with others, was large (82 and 79%, respectively). сайт: Gallup international: www.gallup.com].

When assessing American foreign policy in general, but in the context of the Iraq crisis, in April 2003, the French said that the US foreign policy course had negative consequences for France (59%) rather than positive (9%). The fact that it is held without any consequences for France, said 24% of respondents. For the French, it was also obvious that the US foreign policy tends to "resort to armed force against other countries too often": 87% of respondents agreed with this opinion (against 11%). Therefore, they believed that the diplomatic contradictions that arose during the Iraq crisis between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the countries that opposed the Americans (France, Germany), on the other, would not be easy to overcome. This was indicated by 47% of respondents (against 43%). сайт: Gallup international: www.gallup.com].

Thus, the second, active phase of the Iraq crisis revealed the following: a "national consensus" was re-formed in France, which was confirmed in the autumn of 2003, when the attitude of its inhabitants to the war in Iraq was again clarified. It turned out that it remained virtually unchanged. Six months after March 20, 2003, 86% of respondents said that, in their opinion, France was right not to take part in an armed action against Iraq. Only 11% said that France was wrong, 3% found it difficult to answer [Le Journal du Dimanche, 21.09.2003].

page 86

* * *

French public opinion regarding the Iraq crisis changed significantly during 1990-1991 and 2003, as was shown by numerous surveys conducted in the country at that time. It is possible to distinguish a number of transformations that were recorded in the structure of mass consciousness of the inhabitants of France during this period.

First, while the French approved the military operation against Iraq during the 1990 - 1991 Kuwait crisis, they condemned it in 2003 (figure 1).

Schedule 1

French attitude to the military operation against Iraq, %

Secondly, the positive attitude towards France's participation in the military operation against Iraq has changed to a negative one (figure 2).

Schedule 2

French attitude to France's participation in the military operation against Iraq, %

Third, there are changes that have taken place in the attitude of French residents towards the United States. As the characteristic hegemonic aspirations of the US leadership became more and more obvious, and the process of forming a new state of affairs was gradually becoming increasingly clear.-

page 87

The so-called new world order was entering a crucial stage, and at the same time a corresponding mood was emerging in French public opinion: criticism of the US foreign policy course from the French population was increasing.

One thing remained unchanged - the French support for the actions of their country's leadership in the Persian Gulf region both during the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 and during the Iraq war in 2003 .The "national consensus", which, although built around the opposite positions of the French leadership, continued to be one of the most significant features This article describes the position of the country's public on foreign policy issues, including the Iraq crisis.

At the same time, all of the above indicated that French public opinion is undergoing a slow but constant evolution. The latter grew stronger as changes took place in the world, which fixed certain stages in the formation of a new, post-Yalta-Potsdam, system of international relations. The mass consciousness of the inhabitants of France did not stay away from these processes and felt the impact of these, in fact, historical changes.

list of literature

Guerre du Golfe // Dictionnaire historique de la vie politique francaise au XX-e siecle / Sous la direction J. - L. Sirinelli. P.: PUF, 1995.

Musulmans de France et guerre du Golfe // SOFRES. L'Etat de l'opinion. 1992. P.: Seuil, 1992.

Rozes S. La crise irakienne a suscite une large opposition de l'opinion a l'unilateralisme et a l'hegemonie americains // L'Etat de la France. Un panorama unique et complet de la France 2003. P.: Decouverte, 2003.

SOFRES. L'Etat de l'opinion. 1991. P.: Seuil, 1991.

SOFRES. L'Etat de l'opinion. 1992. P.: Seuil, 1992.

SOFRES. L'Etat de l'opinion. 2003. P.: Seuil, 2003.

SOFRES. L'Etat de l'opinion. 2004. P.: Seuil, 2004.

Le Figaro.

Liberation.

Le Monde.

L'Express.

Le Nouvel Observateur.

Le Point.

Paris Match.

Le Journal du Dimanche.

Сайт Gallup international: http:// www.gallup.com.

IFOP website: http:// www.ifop.com.

SOFRES website: http:// www.sofres.com.

Permanent link to this publication: