Message. Middle East hub

The conflict in the Middle East remains one of the sources of constant tension in international relations. The interests of many countries of the world are intertwined in this region, and the Arab-Israeli conflict has long turned into a global problem. One of the external factors in relation to the conflict situation in the Middle East is the policy of France, which has its own "special" political, economic and cultural interests in the Middle East and has the opportunity to participate constructively in the resolution of the Middle East conflict. France's activity in the Middle East settlement process almost since the beginning of the Arab - Israeli conflict indicates the intentions of the French leadership in no case to lose sight of the possibility of its country's participation in peace initiatives in the Middle East as an "impartial arbiter".

There are a number of subjective factors that influence France's foreign policy in the Middle East to one degree or another. Among them is the attitude of ordinary citizens of the Fifth Republic to the situation in this region and the events unfolding around it. And the point here is not only that public opinion in one way or another reflects the attitude of society to foreign policy in general and its individual manifestations in particular. In certain circumstances, it can have both direct and indirect effects on the decision-making process on foreign policy issues.

The study of numerous French public opinion polls on the conflict in the Middle East allows us to look at France's ability to resolve the Arab-Israeli contradictions from a new angle.

It is known that already in 1948, the first survey was conducted in France among the inhabitants of the country about the attitude of the French to the conflict that was then raging in the Middle East. As a result, it turned out that 26% of French residents are interested in events in the Middle East regularly, 43% - sometimes, and 31% of respondents were not interested in them at all. 16% of the French gave their sympathies in the Arab-Israeli conflict to Arab countries, and 25% to Israelis. 11% gave some other answer, and 48% could not decide on their preferences at all. [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 86].

Thus, initially, the French position on the Middle East conflict turned out to be more uncertain, although the sympathies of a significant part of the respondents were quite obvious.

The events that unfolded in the Middle East in connection with the Suez crisis caused a significant public response in France. During 1955-1957, it was possible to observe a certain evolution of the views of the French, in particular:,

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Their sympathies are increasingly shifting in favor of Israel. Thus, in December 1955, when asked "Whose side do you take in the heated dispute between Israel and Arab countries, especially Egypt?" 11% gave their preference to Israel, 3% to Arab countries, 3% to both, 34% to no one, and 49% could not decide on the answer. A year later, in November 1956, when the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt began, 40% of the French sympathized with Israel, 4% with the Arab countries, 35% with no one, and only 21% could not understand the situation in the Middle East. In May 1957, 43% of respondents took the side of Israel, 3% supported the Arabs, 28% believed that there was no need to take sides at all, and 26% did not know what to say [ La politique etrangere..., 1958].

Thus, in the 1950s, the overwhelming majority of French residents took the side of the State of Israel in the conflict in the Middle East. And this, in general, did not go beyond the framework of the foreign policy course that France was pursuing in the Middle East at that time. The sympathies of the average French citizen coincided with the preferences of the leadership of the Fourth Republic, which since 1953 has developed a "special" relationship with the State of Israel.

French researchers attributed the support of France and its residents for the State of Israel to a number of circumstances. First of all, a great, if not decisive, role was played by the feeling of deep sympathy that the French had for the Jewish population of Western Europe, which was subjected to severe repression during the Second World War. In addition, they regarded the State of Israel as a country belonging to the camp of the West, a kind of "outpost of democracy in the East." Finally, the ties between the State of Israel and the French Jewish community were of some significance. All this, in the end, influenced the rather positive attitude of the French towards the Israelis [Cohen, 1974, p. 187-188].

Since Charles de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958, the mood of French society regarding the conflict in the Middle East has changed little. The French were still more sympathetic to Israel than to the Arabs. Although in 1965 only 1% of respondents considered the State of Israel to be the "best friend" of France [ Les Francais et De Gaulle..., 1971, p. 265], nevertheless, in critical situations, the French invariably took the side of Israel, and not the Arab countries. So, in June 1967, during the "Six-Day War", 56% of citizens of the Fifth Republic favored Israel, only 2% supported the Arabs, 28% - no one, and 14% did not know what to say. In September 1967, the differences of opinion were even more pronounced: 68% of the French gave their sympathies to Israel, but already 6% - to Arab countries, 16% did not support anyone, and 10% could not decide on their answer [Les Francais et De Gaulle..., 1971, p. 87-88]. The current situation in French society at that time was unique in that the opinion of French residents radically diverged from the general course of the leadership of the Fifth Republic led by de Gaulle, who took a pro-Arab position during the" Six-Day War " in 1967.

At the same time, it is paradoxical that the French, who were generally more sympathetic to Israel than to Arab countries, were quite loyal to de Gaulle's actions in the Middle East and, in particular, to his position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Even before the start of the" Six-Day War " in 1967, the French government declared a position of so-called "active neutrality" (June 2, 1967), and the French, almost completely (71% of respondents), supported this initiative. Thus, according to French sociologists, the clear pacifism of the French nation was once again demonstrated (Cohen, 1974, p. 186). At the same time, in June 1967, 59% of French people approved of de Gaulle's position in the Middle East conflict, and only 18% disagreed with it [see: Le Monde, 21.06.1967]. In a survey conducted in August 1967, support for de

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Goll 36%, did not support-30% and vaguely answered 34%. In December 1967, these figures were 30, 33, and 37%, and in January 1969, 31.33 and 36%, respectively [Les Frangais et De Gaulle..., 1971, p. 88].

This, at first glance, is quite a serious contradiction, most likely due to the fact that the French considered almost all de Gaulle's steps in the international arena, including in the Middle East, through the prism of the concept of "greatness of France". That is why they believed that everything that is being done by the country's leadership in the field of foreign policy is for the benefit of France, contributes to the establishment of its "greatness". Hence the rather high level of support for the actions of de Gaulle and his government in the Middle East, which to a certain extent also contributed to the growth of the popularity of the head of France within the country.

However, the French tendency to support Israel rather than Arab countries in the conflict in the Middle East continued after June 1967. French residents considered the Arabs more responsible for the 1967 Six-Day War than the Israelis, but the percentage of French sympathizers with Israel significantly decreased. In January 1969, only 35% of respondents preferred to support Israelis, 7% - Arabs, already 39% did not support anyone, and 19% did not give an answer [Les Frangais et De Gaulle..., 1971, p. 87-88]. In January 1970, these figures were 33, 6, 43, and 18%, respectively [Public opinion..., 1987, p. 102].

As a result, while the French attitude towards the Arabs remained generally unchanged, there was a clear shift in emphasis from French support for Israel to a neutral attitude towards the Middle East conflict as a whole.

Moreover, the French increasingly began to criticize Israel for certain violent actions that it carried out against Arab countries. So, in January 1969, French residents expressed their opinion on the Israeli raid on the Beirut airport (Lebanon), committed on December 28, 1968. Only 8% fully supported this act, 11% were inclined to support it, 25% were inclined not to support it, and 28% strongly opposed it. At the same time, quite a significant part - 28% - did not express their own opinion [Public opinion..., 1987, p. 133]. It is also significant that in public opinion polls conducted in 1968 and 1969, Israel was excluded by the French from the list of "best friends" of France, to which it was ranked, for example, in 1965 [for details, see: Les Frangais et De Gaulle..., 1971, p. 265-266].

In the end, the French public's view of the Arab-Israeli conflict gradually converged with the position of the Fifth Republic's leadership, although it did not become completely pro-Arab. But a certain shift of emphasis in favor of Arab countries in the structure of French public opinion in the late 1960s and 1970s was still felt. This was probably due to the emergence and formation of three trends in the social psychology of the inhabitants of France. First, the process of revising assessments of Israel's policy in the Middle East began - violent methods of its implementation forced the French to change their attitude towards the State of Israel and condemn its actions. Secondly, at the end of the 1960s, the psychological syndrome associated with the actual defeat of France in the war in Algeria (1954-1962) was overcome. By the end of the 1960s, a significant part of the French no longer saw the Arab countries as the enemy of France's national interests, as they were submitted earlier. To a certain extent, this was also facilitated by a certain radicalization of French society, which is associated with the well-known events of May-June 1968. And third, a certain part of the French population realized the importance that the Arab countries acquired in the 1960s and 1970s, when the" oil interests " of the Fifth Republic were concentrated precisely in oil-producing countries

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states of the Arab East. As a result, taking into account the national interests of France by its citizens led to a certain change in their attitude towards the State of Israel and the Arab countries, and in favor of the latter.

This was most evident during the presidency of J. P. Blavatsky. Pompidou (1969-1974). Thus, in October 1973, when the Arab - Israeli conflict escalated again in the Middle East, Israel was still supported by a significant part of the French population - 45%, 16% were already sympathetic to Arab countries, 8% gave their preference to both sides and 30% - neither one nor the other, 1% did not decide on the answer [Cohen, 1974, p. 194].

The political component of this survey is interesting. Thus, the French, whose political views were close to the PCF, were more sympathetic to Arab countries (37%) than to Israel (26%). At the same time, there was a high percentage of them (32%) who took the position of neutrality. Both sides were favored by 3%. French Socialists, given their traditional ties to the Israeli Labor Party, were more sympathetic to Israel (50%) than to Arab countries (15%). A neutral position was taken by 28%, and 6% gave their sympathies to both sides. Individuals who identified themselves as members of the" ruling majority "(YUDR - "Union of Democrats in Defense of the Republic"), as well as socialists, in contrast to the official position of the leadership of the Fifth Republic, preferred to support Israel (56%), rather than Arab countries (7%). 23% showed neutrality, while 12% supported both sides. The largest number of supporters of Israel (71%) was among the so-called "reformers". Only 3% of them gave their sympathies to Arab countries, 14% took a neutral position, and 12% supported both sides. "Political marginals", i.e. those who were undecided about their political preferences were inclined to take a neutral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict (45%). 25% supported Israel, 15% supported Arab countries, and 12% supported both sides (Cohen, 1974, p. 194).

Following the principle of continuity, Pompidou continued the generally pro-Arab course of France in the Middle East, and the French themselves stated this. For example, in January 1970, 41% of respondents believed that France's policy in the Middle East was "more favorable" to Arab countries than to the State of Israel (11%). At the same time, 18% believed that the Fifth Republic pursues a policy of neutrality in the Middle East [Cohen, 1974, p.191].

At the same time, the actions of the Government of Zh. Pompidou in the Middle East was supported by only 17%, while 49% expressed their disagreement with them, and 34% were undecided. In political terms, the ratings were distributed as follows: PCF - 20, 66 and 14%, left (non-communists) - 13, 64 and 23%, UDR-30, 35 and 35%, Democratic Center (Jean Lecanue) - 7, 67 and 26%, Duhamel supporters-23, 54 and 23%, independent Republicans - 22.52 and 26%, respectively [Cohen, 1974, p. 193].

The disagreement of a significant part of the French with the Middle East policy of the government was even more pronounced during the "October War" of 1973, when already 55% of the French noted their dissatisfaction with the French policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict (against 30%, for whom the Middle East policy of the Fifth Republic in October 1973 was generally acceptable) [Cohen, 1974, p. 193].

The French also considered the differentiation of French policy towards Arab countries unjustified. 71% of respondents did not support the division of the Arab world by the French leadership in October 1973 into countries that are part of the "fighting camp" and other states. Only 24% considered it justified (Cohen, 1974, p. 195).

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French attention was also drawn to the problems associated with the arms embargo on countries involved in the conflict in the Middle East. In June 1967, when asked: "If the conflict drags on, does France need to maintain the arms embargo on Israel?" 47% said yes, 26% disagreed, and 27% did not answer. Moreover, the French believed that during the crisis there is no need to supply weapons to the Middle East at all-neither to Israel (58% opposed, 23% - for, and 19% did not give an answer), nor, moreover, to the Arabs-76, 4 and 20%, respectively [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 125].

A survey conducted on January 21-27, 1969, found that 37% of French people supported de Gaulle's decision to impose an arms embargo on Israel. Among them, 25% thought that it would contribute to peace in the Middle East, 4% - would be useful, but only if other countries do the same, 4% found that Israel "went beyond what was allowed", 3% gave a different answer, and 3% did not define their own attitude. However, it turned out that the same 37% do not support this act of the leadership of the Fifth Republic. Of these, 11% believed that Israel is a small state whose potential is not comparable to the capabilities of the Arab world around it, and therefore it needs military assistance; 10% believed that it is impossible to make concessions to Arab countries; 6% explained their disagreement with de Gaulle's policy by saying that France is bound by treaty obligations with the United States. Israel; 3% blamed it for its pro-Lebanon stance; 7% mentioned some other factor, and 3% had no opinion. Finally, 26% of French people did not give any answer at all [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 126].

A year later, January 7-12, 1970, the situation changed, but not very significantly. The question put to the French consisted of two parts: "Regardless of your personal position regarding the French military embargo in the Middle East, is it desirable or undesirable for the French government to send Israel at this time: a) weapons paid for before the embargo was adopted, b) new, not yet paid weapons?". As a result, 50% of respondents said that France should not abandon its previous commitments on military supplies, especially those already paid for, 20% were against it, and 30% did not give an answer. The second part of the question was answered by citizens of the Fifth Republic as follows: desirable-23%, undesirable-36%, I don't know - 41% [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 127].

On January 20-25, 1970, another public opinion poll was conducted in France on this aspect of the country's Middle East policy. As a result, it turned out that 49% of the French believe that it is necessary to stop military supplies to all states participating in the conflict. 3% believed that the arms embargo should be maintained only in relation to Israel, and 1% - only in relation to Arab countries, 34% were in favor of not supplying weapons to any of the parties, and 13% did not give an answer [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 128]. In connection with the sale of 50 Mirage aircraft to Libya by France during the Middle East arms embargo, only 19% of French respondents supported the actions of the Fifth Republic's leadership, 56% did not support it, and 25% did not define their attitude to the problem [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 128].

In general, the French opinion on the arms embargo against the Middle East countries coincided with the official position of the French leadership. There was a national consensus, stemming from the pacifist sentiment prevailing in French society at the time; however, there were quite a few people who did not agree with the actions of the French government.

Finally, the Palestinian issue was another subject of concern to the French public about the conflict in the Middle East. For the first time, the French opinion on this issue was determined in the late 1960s. Relationship

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The attitude of French society towards the Palestinians turned out to be quite definite: only 5% of French respondents supported the Palestinians in their unwillingness to leave the Arab territories occupied by Israel and demand to clear these territories of Israelis; 69% of French people did not support the Palestinians, and 26% did not know what to answer [ Public opinion..., 1987, p. 133].

As a result, it turned out that the views of the French public on this issue differed from the official position of the country's leadership. While the leadership of the Fifth Republic was inclined to support the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination up to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the future, the absolute majority of the French expressed their negative attitude towards the Palestinians.

Perhaps this was due to the fact that at that time in Western countries, including France, the image of a "Palestinian terrorist" was formed, who was able to achieve his goal of creating an independent Palestinian state by any means, up to the use of violence against civilians. The numerous terrorist attacks carried out with the participation of Palestinians and their sympathizers in various countries of the world in the late 1960s, and especially in the early 1970s, only served to strengthen this image in French society, strengthening its negative image.

Thus, the sympathy of French residents for Israel arose immediately after the emergence of this state on the political map of the Middle East. They intensified and reached their climax during the" Six-Day War " of 1967. Later, especially after the "October War" of 1973, sympathy for Israelis began to decline. The preferences of the French were increasingly moving into the sphere of a neutral attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, the number of Frenchmen who supported the Arabs, although slightly, increased. It is important, however, that the French people no longer radically differed in their opinion on the conflict in the Middle East from the official position of the leadership of the Fifth Republic. But the differences, though not very significant, still persisted.

During the presidency of F. Mitterrand (1981 - 1995), clarification of the French attitude to various components of the conflict in the Middle East became more frequent, which was explained by the widespread practice of conducting public opinion polls in France in general.

Initially, as before 1981, public opinion in France was dominated by sympathies towards Israel, but over time, the French public began to sympathize more and more with the Arabs.

Thus, in 1987, 47% of French people expressed their preference for Israel, 9% disliked Israelis, and 35% expressed their neutral attitude towards them, 7% did not give an answer [Public opinion..., 1987, p. 133]. At the same time, the percentage of French people who have a positive attitude towards Arab countries has significantly increased. The only exceptions were those Arab regimes that the French suspected of organizing terrorist acts on the territory of France [for details, see L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 59, 62].

Two years later, French sociologists found further shifts in public opinion. The French have become even less sympathetic to Israel, while at the same time growing sympathy for Arab countries. In 1989, 44% preferred to support Israel, 15% had a negative attitude towards it, 36% - neutral, and 5% could not decide on their sympathies [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1990, p. 143].

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Thus, the tendency to follow a neutral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was outlined in French public opinion back in the 1970s, is supported by the fact that the French government has been trying to maintain a neutral position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mitterrand has become quite distinct. And this "balanced" attitude of French society towards the Middle East coincided with the so-called "balanced" course of France in this region of the world proclaimed in the 1980s. By pursuing this line, the Fifth Republic sought to maintain good relations with both conflicting parties, as it valued the role of a possible mediator, an "impartial arbitrator" in the Middle East settlement process.

Nevertheless, French residents were quite skeptical about the role of the Fifth Republic in the Middle East peace process. A public opinion poll conducted by Paris-Match magazine on June 2-8, 1982, found that 52% of French people had reason to be skeptical. They believed that " the French government has found itself in a difficult situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this reduces the chances of peace." Only 38% believed that the leadership of the Fifth Republic took the initiative "in order to reduce tensions in the Middle East and establish peace." 10% could not decide on the answer [Public opinion..., 1987, p. 124]. But at the same time, in 1986, 61% of French residents (against 23%) were in favor of France "continuously playing its role in the Middle East" [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1987, p. 234].

It is noteworthy that the French were almost always skeptical about the capabilities of the international community, in particular the UN, in resolving conflicts. The percentage of trusting international organizations even declined in the 1990s, when the Middle East peace process came under the "exclusive control" of the United States, and the role of the UN as a mediator in the negotiation process declined accordingly [for details, see: Cassan, 1985; La France a l'ONU, 1979; Merle, 1995, p. 325-340].

In the 1980s, the situation around Lebanon became the focus of public attention in France. The actions of the French contingent as part of the" multinational force " in Lebanon and the participation of the Fifth Republic in deciding its future fate caused quite a strong public response in France.

First of all, the French were concerned about the circumstances related to the very necessity (justified or unjustified) of their country's direct participation in the events in Lebanon. On September 9-13, 1983, a public opinion poll was conducted to find out the attitude of French residents to the participation of the French in the Lebanese events. 37% of those polled felt that France had a "special responsibility" towards the Maronite Christian community living in Lebanon. 40% doubted its very existence, and 19% were undecided. The overwhelming majority of French people (63%) considered the participation of French troops in the events in Lebanon unjustified, where the lives of soldiers and officers were at risk. Only 30% considered it justified, and 7% did not give an answer at all. The preferences of French residents about Mitterrand's decision to send a French contingent to Lebanon were also approximately distributed. 56% considered this decision incorrect, 31% agreed with it, and 13% did not give an answer [Public opinion..., 1987, p. 123-124].

Thus, the majority of the French considered their country's participation in the Lebanese events of 1982-1984, when the French contingent suffered losses, completely unjustified and associated with a serious risk. And this opinion was further strengthened after the terrorist attack of October 23, 1983 against the French and US contingents stationed in West Beirut. The death of several dozen French soldiers and officers in Lebanon caused an explosion of negative attitude of French residents towards Lebanese politics. Mitterrand.

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Moreover, the events in Lebanon in the autumn of 1983 increased the French discontent with the French foreign policy. Mitterrand in general. In October 1983, almost half of the respondents (49%) were dissatisfied with the actions of the French President in the international arena, and only 38% were satisfied with them. According to statistics, this was the lowest level of evaluation of the Company's performance since November 1982. Mitterrand in the field of foreign policy of the country. However, the situation soon began to level out. In November 1983, these percentages were 47 and 40, respectively. The rather significant difference between the results of October and November 1983 was explained, according to French sociologists, by the changes that occurred in the situation in Lebanon in such a short period of time, as well as by the rapid evolution of French policy in this country [ SOFRES..., 1984, p.41-42].

The events in Lebanon also affected Mitterrand's personal rating. In September 1983, exactly one year after French troops were sent to Lebanon, the popularity of the French president declined to its lowest level (since May 1981). Only 28% of French people rated Mitterrand's actions positively, while 57% rated him negatively. In October 1983, the situation was still difficult: 38% trusted the French president, while 56% did not. And only since November 1983 has there been a tendency to change in public opinion in France (42 and 54%, respectively) [ SOFRES..., 1984, p. 36-37, 91]. In December 1983, the French president's confidence rating was 46% (against 50%), and in January 1984, it was 47% (against 48%) [ SOFRES..., 1985, p. 143]. As noted by French sociologists, the growth of F. Mitterrand's personal rating was also promoted by the position taken by France during the events in Lebanon in the autumn of 1983 [ SOFRES..., 1985, p. 130].

It is noteworthy that the changing situation in and around Lebanon has led to changes in French public opinion not only about France's policy in the Middle East, but also in the overall assessment of the role of the Fifth Republic in the international arena. For example, in November 1983, 48% of French people noted a decline in their country's role in the world, while only 18% believed that it had increased. However, already in December of the same year, these figures were 42 and 26%, respectively [ SOFRES..., 1986, p. 207]. According to French sociologists, " this change may be partly due to the events that took place in Lebanon at that time. The raid on Baalbek, carried out by French aviation in response to actions against our armed contingent in Beirut, created an effect of approval from the population " [SOFRES..., 1986, p. 205-206].

It seems paradoxical, but the French withdrawal from Lebanon caused disapproval among French residents [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 55]. It would seem that the termination of the participation of the French contingent of troops in the "multinational force" in Lebanon should have been positively assessed by the French. However, the citizens of the Fifth Republic, who negatively assessed France's participation in the Lebanese events and the associated losses, at the same time believed that the withdrawal from Lebanon led to a certain reduction in the role of France in the Middle East in particular and in the world as a whole. In April 1984, i.e., almost immediately after the withdrawal of French troops from Lebanon, 47% of respondents rated Mitterrand's actions and their role in strengthening France's position in the world more negatively than positively (only 36% did) [SOFRES..., 1985, p. 119].

Such a contradiction in views, which stems from the discrepancy between the claims of the French to participate in world affairs and the actual situation in various regions of the world, is one of the characteristic features of French public opinion in the field of international problems, including the Arab - Israeli conflict.

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It can be assumed that the situation around Lebanon, as well as the participation of Americans in the Lebanese events, also had a certain influence on the attitude of the French towards the US President. To Reagan. This assumption is confirmed by the data of public opinion polls conducted in France in 1981-1985. If in 1981 58% of French people approved of Reagan's actions during his term as president of the United States, and only 28% disapproved, then in 1982 - 1983, when Americans took the most active part in the events in Lebanon, these figures were 44 and 46%, respectively. Only in 1984-1985 did the situation return to its former state [SOFRES..., 1985, p.215]. But even then, the French continued to be critical of American diplomacy in the Middle East: only 25% of respondents rated it positively, while 33% rated it negatively (SOFRES, 1985, p. 255).

Of course, this was not the only factor influencing French public opinion regarding the US president and Americans in general. But it would also be wrong to ignore it. The difficulties faced by the Americans in Lebanon did not add to Reagan's popularity in France.

Since 1986, in connection with a whole series of terrorist acts committed on the territory of France, as well as in connection with the seizure of French hostages in Lebanon, the problems of terrorism have become relevant in French society. The first surveys on terrorism were conducted by the Le Figaro newspaper on May 23-28 and September 16-17, 1986. 64% of French respondents considered that France was the "main victim of terrorism" [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1987, p. 13]. In addition, 65% versus 27% of French residents believed that terrorism jeopardizes the functioning of the entire French state [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1987, p. 24]. And on the eve of the French presidential election in 1988, terrorism was named by the French as one of the most urgent problems for the country (41%) [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1989, p. 127].

It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of the French public limited terrorism to the Middle East. According to the French, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in France were "agents of Libya" (52%) and Palestinians (42%) [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1987, p. 14]. It was they, as the French believed, who bore the "main responsibility" for the acts of terrorism that occurred on the territory of France. At the same time, 31% of French people attributed "religious extremism", which, in their opinion, was the root cause of terrorism, to the Palestinian problem [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1987, p. 14].

At the same time, in 1986, the situation around the French hostages in Lebanon caused a great resonance in French society. In May 1986, when asked whether you would allow the release of terrorists from French prisons in exchange for the release of French hostages, 42% of French people said yes, while 45% disagreed. In September 1986, the overwhelming majority of French citizens-70% (against 10%) - spoke out against granting freedom to the well-known terrorist in France, J. R. R. Tolkien. To Ibrahim Abdallah [L'etat de l? opinion..., 1987, p. 21]. He was one of the leaders of the leftist extremist organization Lebanese Revolutionary Armed Factions (FARL), which, according to the French leadership, was involved in organizing terrorist attacks in Paris in late 1985-early 1986 and in September 1986.

In 1987, the situation remained virtually unchanged. 71% of the French confirmed their position of refusing any concessions to terrorists, but already 18% believed that the French government should still make concessions. 11 % did not give a definite answer [L'etat de l?opinion..., 1988, p. 71].

At the same time, the French public reacted extremely negatively to the possibility of France using all existing methods (including violence).-

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fight against terrorism. According to 60% of respondents, "democracy cannot allow the use of any methods in the fight against terrorism," and only 31% believed that "all means are good"for this. According to their political views, the respondents were distributed as follows: FKP (31 and 67%), FSP (24 and 70%), SPD (32 and 58%), ODA (40 and 53%), NF (43 and 50%) [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 71].

At F. Mitterrand maintained the disagreement of a significant part of French society with the official course of the Fifth Republic in the Middle East in general and with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Thus, in contrast to the official position of the French leadership, the bombing of Tripoli by American aircraft in April 1986 was approved by the majority of the French [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 55], which was primarily due to their generally negative perception of Libya and "Colonel Gaddafi".

In the 1980s, the Palestinian problem continued to be relevant to French society. The French were generally positive about the idea of creating a Palestinian State, considering that this would contribute to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the opinion of 43% of the French [Duhamel, 1987, p. 136]. However, the negative attitude of French residents towards the Palestinians persisted, which was primarily due to the fact that the French continued to suspect the Palestinians of involvement in the terrorist attacks carried out in 1986 on the territory of their country.

French residents also generally viewed the Palestinian political leader, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee Ya., negatively. Arafat. So, in 1987, only 11% of French people were sympathetic to him. 45% expressed their negative attitude, 27% expressed their neutrality. 17% could not answer unequivocally [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 61]. But already in 1988, 16% of French residents had a positive attitude towards Arafat [see: Le Figaro, 21-23 December 1988].

On the eve of Arafat's official visit to France, which took place in May 1989, the Nouvel Observateur magazine conducted another public opinion poll [see: Sondage SOFRES..., p. 32-35]. 45% of French people expressed their approval of Arafat's trip to France (17% "approve in everything" and 28% "rather approve"). But 32% did not approve of it (15%- "I rather do not approve" and 17%- "I do not approve of everything"). 23% found it difficult to answer [Sondage SOFRES..., p. 33].

Thus, gradually in the eyes of the French public, Ya. Arafat turned into an international political figure with all the signs of legitimacy. 21% of respondents in France agreed with this. However, a significant number of Frenchmen still viewed Ya. Arafat in a negative light. Thus, 28% considered him an "enemy of the State of Israel", the same 28% believed that he was a "terrorist", 27% rated him as a "revolutionary", 11% - as a "liberal" [Sondage SOFRES..., p. 33].

In addition, the French accused the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee of "insincerity" regarding his actions aimed at getting out of the state of conflict with the State of Israel. Only 17% believed that Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to live "in peace and security" and his declaration of renouncing the use of terrorism was "sincere." The majority (56%) believed that these statements were "propaganda". 27% remained without a definite point of view [Sondage SOFRES..., p. 33].

At the same time, in April 1989, the attitude of the French towards both sides involved in the confrontation in the Middle East - towards the Arabs, primarily the Palestinians, and towards the State of Israel-was determined. As a result, it turned out that the French increasingly began to give preference to Palestinian-Arabs,

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in particular, the PLO, while sympathy for the Israelis gradually weakened. Israel was supported by only 25% of respondents, while the PLO - 12%. At the same time, 25% took a neutral position, not giving preference to either side, and 6% - to both sides at the same time. Compared to the survey conducted back in May 1976, when the votes of respondents were distributed as follows: 39, 5, 23 and 8%, respectively, the situation has changed. In political terms, the votes of the French people surveyed in 1989 were distributed as follows:: FKP (19, 36, 16 and 4%), FSP (20, 16, 26 and 8%), SPD (41, 7, 27 and 5%), ODA (41, 4, 24 and 5%), NF (25, 17, 32 and 0%) [L'etat de l? opinion..., 1990, p. 226].

The generally positive attitude of French residents towards the PLO and the actions of the Palestinian political leader Ya. Arafat was not accidental. As French sociologists have noted in this connection, "the course of the Palestinian revolution in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip confirmed the process of changes in society: cooling towards Israel and the growing popularity of the PLO" [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1990, p. 226]. The French nation, being itself historically extremely revolutionized, perceived the intifada that began in December 1987 precisely as an event of a revolutionary nature, the essence of which was the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their freedom and independence, the creation of a Palestinian state. Hence the French emphatic desire to support the Palestinians and express their solidarity with them.

This, in particular, is evidenced by the changes that took place in French public opinion in relation to one of the leading political figures of the State of Israel at that time, I. Shamir. If in 1987 16% of French people viewed it in general positively, 10% - negatively, 27% - neutrally, and 47% were still unable to express their opinion [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1988, p. 61], then in 1989 only 1% of French people believed that it was a good idea to have a positive opinion. that I. Shamir "scored the most points" in the international arena [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1990, p. 224].

Thus, indirectly, French residents expressed their disapproval of the actions of the Israeli leadership in the context of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By the end of the 1980s, the prevailing mood in French public opinion was the desire to take a neutral position in the Middle East conflict, to promote its early settlement and, first of all, to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem. In 1989, when assessing the prospects for the development of the situation in the Middle East for the next two years, the majority (36%) believed that a Palestinian State would soon emerge that would coexist with the State of Israel. 24% believed that Israel would continue to exist, but would never accept the existence of a Palestinian State on its borders. And only 4% said that with the advent of the Palestinian State, Israel will cease to exist. Quite a significant part of the respondents remained without a definite opinion on this issue - 36% [Sondage SOFRES..., p. 33].

After the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991, when the international community intensified its efforts to normalize the situation in the Middle East, the desire to promote the beginning of a peace process in this region was clearly expressed in the French mood. When asked on February 27, 1991," After the resolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, what tasks do you think should be set in order to establish peace in the Middle East?", citizens of the Fifth Republic distributed their preferences as follows: control over the sale of weapons (56%), settlement of contradictions between Israel and the PLO (54%), redistribution of oil revenues between rich and poor countries of the Arab world (47%), peace treaty between Iraq and Kuwait (39%), normals-

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The situation in Lebanon remained stable (35%) and the existing borders in the Middle East remained unchanged (33%), but 11% did not respond (L'etat de l'opinion..., 1992, p. 143).

The French expected that the Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 would open up new opportunities for achieving peace in the Middle East. 51% of French residents believed that the conflict in the Persian Gulf region would contribute to the establishment of "universal peace" in the Middle East, 39% - that it would help resolve the contradictions between Israel and the Palestinians, and 30% - that it would help stabilize the situation in Lebanon [L'etat de l'opinion..., 1992, p. 143].

This expectation effect was observed in French public opinion during the first half of the 1990s, when the international community was doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East. However, it is still preserved at the present time. Thus, according to a public opinion poll conducted by SOFRES, 64% of French people supported the signing on September 13, 1993 of the" Declaration of Principles... " between the State of Israel and the PLO [see: L'Humanite, 14.09.1993].

Summing up all of the above, it should be emphasized that French public opinion regarding the conflict in the Middle East and its many components during the period under review demonstrated pluralism and presented a number of different points of view. French opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of France in the process of its settlement were different, and sometimes even opposite. It is impossible, however, to call the mood of ordinary citizens of the French Republic unambiguously either pro-Arab or pro-Israeli. The cross-section of French public opinion is rather an equivalent (in quantitative terms) attitude of the French towards the parties who took part in the events that took place in the Middle East. It reflects the desire of the French people for a "balanced" position. Quite adequately assessing the situation in the Middle East, the French expressed their desire to achieve peace in this region. To the greatest extent, these trends were manifested precisely during the presidency of F. Mitterrand (1981-1995), by the end of whose reign, mainly in the 1990s, the French public in its views on the Arab-Israeli conflict became so close to the position of the country's leadership that it can even be said that there is a national consensus in this area. At the same time, it should be noted that there is a very high percentage of "ignorant" people, i.e. people who could not understand the situation in the Middle East, and therefore did not express a definite opinion.

Finally, the difference between the assessments of the French public and the official position of the leadership of the Fifth Republic regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict is another important point that characterizes one of the main features in the spectrum of opinions on the situation in the Middle East, not only in France, but also in other Western European countries.

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Cassan H. L'ONU et l'opinion publique francaise // La France aux Nations unies: Collogue du Centre de droit international de Nanterre, 26 mars 1985. Nanterre, 1985.

Cohen S. De Gaulle, les gaullistes et Israel. P.: Moreau, 1974.

Duhamel J. 100% Franqais. 55 millions de Francois en 801 sondages. P.: Pierre Belfond, 1987.

Duhamel J. Vous les Francais. 56 millions de Francois en 2200 sondages. P.: Albin Michel, 1989.

L'Etat de l'opinion. Cles pour 1987. P.: Seuil, 1987.

L'Etat de l'opinion. Cles pour 1988. P.: Seuil, 1988.

L' Etat de l?opinion. Cles pour 1989. P.: Seuil, 1989.

L'Etat de l'opinion. Cles pour 1990. P.: Seuil, 1990.

L'Etat de l'opinion. Cles pour 1992. P.: Seuil, 1992.

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L'Etat de l?opinion. Cles pour 1993. P.: Seuil, 1993.

Les Francois et De Gaulle. Institut Fransais d'Opinion Publique / Presentation et comrnentaire de J. Chariot. P.: IFOP, 1971.

La France a I'ONU. P.: Gallimard, 1979.

Lapolitique etrangere de la France et l?pinion publique, 1954 - 1957. Institut Francais de l'Opinion Publique / Preface de J. -B. Durosselle // Sondages. Numero special. P., 1958.

Public Opinion and the Palestine Question. L. -Sydney: Ed. E. Zureik, F. Moughrabi, 1987.

SOFRES. L'Opinion francais en France. P.: Presses de la foundation nationale de sciences politiques, 1978.

SOFRES, opinion publique 1984. P.: Gallimard, 1984.

SOFRES, opinion publique 1985. P.: Gallimard, 1985.

SOFRES, opinion publique 1986. P.: Gallimard, 1986.

Sondage SOFRES - Nouvel observateur: Le Chef de l'OLP vu par les Francais // Nouvel observateur. 1989. N 1278.

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