Raoul SALAN. Memoires. Fin (Tun Empire. "Algerie frangaise". 1-er novembre 1954 - 6 juin 1958. "Presses de la Cite". Paris. 1972. 445 p. Memoires. Fin d'un Empire. "L'Algerie de Gaulle et moi". 7 juin 1958 - 10 juin 1960. "Presses de la Cite". Paris. 1974. 380 p.

"French Algeria". November 1, 1954-June 6, 1958. Memories. The end of the Empire. "Algeria, de Gaulle and I". June 7, 1958-June 10, 1960.

Raoul Salan is not one of the little-known figures. The "hero" of the French colonial wars of the 1920s and 1950s, the leader of a secret armed organization (SLA), who was sentenced to life imprisonment for his criminal activities and released six years later by French President de Gaulle in June 1968, Salan took up his pen and published four volumes of his memoirs in 1970-1974 .1 The third and fourth volumes are entirely devoted to the colonial war in Algeria, launched by the ruling circles of the Fourth Republic shortly after the inglorious collapse of the Indochina adventure.

For two years, from the end of 1956 to the end of 1958, Salan was commander-in-chief of the French forces in Algeria. It was during these years that the military mutiny of the colonialist military matured there and was carried out, which led to the liquidation of the regime of the Fourth Republic. Salan's memoirs and all his activities in Algeria show that he was in the thick of the action and bears a significant share of responsibility for the May 13, 1958 coup and subsequent anti-Republican plots and riots.

Salan does not consider it necessary to hide what methods he used to fight the Algerian patriots. He turned widespread terror, mass raids and arrests into the norm of behavior of the colonial authorities towards the indigenous Arab population. However, neither the huge number of French troops, nor their technical equipment with all types of modern weapons, nor the colossal military allocations did not bring success to the colonialists. The Army of National Liberation of Algeria was not only not defeated, but, on the contrary, hardened in battles and successfully resisted the French expeditionary forces. The inability of the ruling circles of the Fourth Republic to achieve victory in Algeria, the constant growth of political instability in France caused sharp discontent of the colonialist military, who longed for firm power and decisive actions against the left forces inside the country and the national liberation movement in Algeria.

The catalyst for discontent with the "rotten democracy" was primarily the army, which had long been thoroughly imbued with reactionary views, suffered continuous defeats in colonial adventures since the end of World War II and turned into one of the most powerful pressure groups in France in the late 50s. The closest ally of the colonial military was the large Algerian landowners and planters, whose ancestors settled in Algeria in the XIX century. They, in turn, relied on hundreds of thousands of European settlers in the United States.

1 Reviews of tt. I and II, see Voprosy Istorii, 1972, No. 10; 1973, No. 8.

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Algiers (the so-called blackfeet) - small proprietors, employees, artisans, merchants who were afraid of losing their privileges as a result of the victory of the Algerian Revolution. The colonialist-militarist bloc, which emerged on the basis of common interests, methodically and persistently prepared the overthrow of the Fourth Republic and the establishment of a "firm government", the main and primary task of which was to achieve victory in Algeria.

The description of the events of May 13, 1958 in Algeria occupies a large place in Salan's memoirs. He covers them with obvious pleasure, emphasizing his leading role, as well as the role of his closest assistants - Generals Allard, Zhuo, Massu, Obuaino, etc. Speaking at a 100,000-strong rally in the Algerian capital on May 14, Salan said:: "First of all, know that I am with you... I've been in charge of military operations for 18 months now. I will lead them to victory." The crowd of "blackfeet" met Salan's words with a standing ovation and shouts: "Long live French Algeria!" (pages 310-311).

In the book, the reader will find many testimonies of direct and decisive intervention of the Algerian military in the formation of the government in Paris during the May days of 1958, where Salan's emissaries arrive one after another. The Algerian putschists are developing an operation codenamed "Rebirth", according to which, if their demands were rejected, troops would land in the metropolis and a military dictatorship would be established. When on the evening of May 29, President R. Coty entrusted the formation of a government to de Gaulle, which the putschists insisted on, some of the generals, as Salan testifies, tried to persuade him to carry out Operation Renaissance, since de Gaulle's position on the Algerian issue caused them doubts. Salan describes a conversation he had with General Michel, who had flown in from Toulouse to persuade him to send troops to the metropolis. Salan refused to carry out Operation Renaissance, believing that he would be able to keep de Gaulle under control (pp. 363-364).

The third volume concludes with a description of de Gaulle's first trip to Algeria on June 4-6, 1958, during which Salan and his entourage constantly and on every occasion reminded de Gaulle to whom he owed his rise to power and what was expected of him (pp. 374-375).In her memoir of Nadezhda de Gaulle, she expected a lot from my return to power, especially in the highest circles of the generals... It believed that the restoration of national power would give it the time and means to win. " 2 In other words, the military hoped that de Gaulle would implement its "French Algeria" slogans. The subsequent development of events showed, however, that the new head of government intended to take into account not the opinion of presumptuous generals, but the objective reality that demanded an end to the Algerian war. Naturally, de Gaulle could not reveal his plans at a time when the passions caused by the putsch of May 13 had not yet subsided, and yesterday's rebels had considerable forces at their disposal. He later admitted :" If I had said in June 1958 that I intended to grant Algeria independence, I would have been overthrown on the same day and there was nothing I could have done about it."3
At first, de Gaulle was faced with the task of calming the inflamed passions, for which he makes trips to Algeria, where he speaks publicly together with Salan and other organizers of the May coup. He even appoints Salan as the government's general delegate in Algeria, extending his military powers to civilian prerogatives. Salan gathers around him in Algeria the most ardent supporters of "French Algeria". At his insistence and initiative, Generals A. Zeller, E. Zhuo, J. Faure and others were sent there, who became conspirators and putschists a few years later. For tactical reasons, Salan tried to attract as many collaborators from the indigenous population of Algeria as possible to the side of the colonial administration. "I count on them to carry out my integration policy," Salan notes in the fourth volume of his memoirs (p.25).

The central problem for the French colonial administration in Algeria during August and September 1958 was the preparation of a referendum on a new constitution, conceived by de Gaulle. The Interior Minister sent instructions to the prefects of departments regarding possible mass protests against the referendum, calling on local authorities to act quickly.-

2 Ch. de Gaulle. Memoires d'Espoir. Le Renouveau 1958 - 1962. P. 1970, p. 48.

3 M. Ferro. De Gaulle et FAmerique. Une amitie tumultueuse. P. 1973, p. 358.

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extremely effective. It was suggested that special attention should be paid to the actions of the FKP. Salan has launched intensive activities in Algeria. Colonel Lacheroy, a well-known expert on "psychological warfare", and a representative of the Minister of Information, L. Neuvirth, were appointed responsible for radio propaganda in Algeria. Salan himself appeals to the army to win the " battle for the referendum." He is making a long trip to Algeria, checking the progress of preparations for the referendum. As a result of a series of propaganda measures supported by a demonstration of military force, 96% of Algerians who took part in the September 28 vote approved the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The right-wing press immediately concluded that the entire population of Algeria was" sincerely " striving to remain under French sovereignty forever. The right-wing bourgeois newspaper Le Figaro published an article in those days under the significant headline "Algeria voted' no ' to the FLN." Parliamentary elections were soon held under the same conditions as the referendum.

On October 2, 1958, de Gaulle again arrived in Algeria and informed the surprised Salan of his intention to transfer him to Paris, where a special, hitherto nonexistent, post of Inspector General of National Defense was established for him. At the same time, General E. Zhuo was also transferred from Algeria to the metropolis. Salan and his entourage noted a change in the nature and tone of de Gaulle's speeches on the Algerian issue: "I no longer hear him say' Long live French Algeria!', but I hear 'Long live Algeria and long live France!' all the time. (page 136). Having strengthened his position, achieved the adoption of a new constitution and secured the support of a new parliament, de Gaulle began to implement long-cherished plans to reform France's domestic and foreign policy. The main issue at that time was, of course, the Algerian problem. The removal from Algeria of the most ardent supporters of the "military solution", who also had strong positions and believed that the government in Paris should at least listen to their opinion, if not immediately implement it, was the first step in de Gaulle's new Algerian policy. The Government has ordered all military personnel in Algeria to immediately withdraw from the "public safety committees" set up during the May coup.

Military-colonialist circles were seriously alarmed by this unexpected turn. Anti-government leaflets are being distributed in Algeria. There were even calls for a general strike. Salan persuades the leaders of ultra activists to abandon the planned actions: "Do not arrange twice "May 13" for five months" (p. 148). On December 12, 1958, Salan is appointed to the post of Inspector General of National Defense with indefinite advisory functions. And in his new post, he actively promotes the idea of"French Algeria". Speaking to the nationalist "Republican Circle" on the eve of the May 13 anniversary, he says in front of numerous correspondents: "We must lose the war in Algeria. The army will never allow these departments to be abandoned, as France would cease to be France without the NCD, and this would deprive us of the energy resources that our Sahara supplies us with " (pp. 213-214). In a private conversation with de Gaulle, Salan says:: "You do not make any political decision", which causes discontent among Algerian Europeans, who fear for their fate (p. 214). When September 16, 1959 de Gaulle first used the word "self-determination "in reference to Algeria, Salan wrote in his diary:" Black clouds are gathering in the sky of our Algeria " (p.229).

During the" week of barricades " (January 24 - February 1, 1960), when there were armed clashes in the Algerian capital between the ultra and the police, Salan together with Joue sent a letter to de Gaulle, in which they sharply criticized his Algerian policy and justified the actions of the ultra leaders. Ortiza, J. -J. Susini et al. Sent to Prime Minister M. Debray for an explanation of the letter, Salan continued to defend his point of view. "Algeria is France," he told Debray, and said that if this was not understood, " then be sure that blood will be shed again "(p. 240). On June 8, 1960, de Gaulle received Salan on the occasion of the latter's impending retirement. De Gaulle used to say good-bye to him: "Let me give you some advice. Don't rush into politics; politics makes a man dirty" (p.251). Prezi-

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dent allowed the retired general to settle in Algeria.

However, less than a month after this meeting, the security service was forced to expel Salan from Algeria for open anti-government activities. He had settled down in Paris, under police surveillance, and was plotting his escape. On October 30, accompanied by his former aide-de-camp, Captain Ferrandi, Salan fled Paris and crossed the Spanish border with forged documents. After settling in Madrid under the patronage of a relative of the Spanish dictator, Serrano Sunier, Salan established contacts with the leaders of the Algerian ultra and together with them began to prepare a new plot. This was the final stage in Salan's career, which led him to the dock two years later.

The third and fourth volumes of Salan's memoirs, which contain many documents (correspondence with de Gaulle and other political figures and military personnel, Salan's speeches, orders and directives, leaflets of the committees of public safety, etc.), are undoubtedly of interest to a researcher of the Algerian war and French colonialist ideology of the late 50s, as well as in the early 1950s. the study of anti-republican plots and putschs in France at the turn of the 50s and 60s. Salan's memoirs are characterized by the fact that the author does not try to hide his true views. Another feature is their sharp anti-Doll orientation. The old colonialist sincerely believed that if de Gaulle had followed the line of supporters of "French Algeria", Algeria would still continue to be under French sovereignty.

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