Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1968, 403 p. 15,000. Price 2 rubles 5 kopecks.

The death of Napoleon's half - million-strong army in Russia is one of the most important events in modern history. "The annihilation of Napoleon's vast army in its retreat from Moscow," wrote F. S. Tolstoy. Engels, - served as a signal for a general uprising against French rule in the West " 1 . It had equally important consequences for Russian society. With the tragic events of the twelfth year, V. G. Belinsky noted, "a new life began for Russia"2 . Not only the social and ideological movement, but also the deeper processes of socio-economic development of the country have acquired new features. 1812 was followed by 1825 and 1861...

The pre-revolutionary and Soviet literature on the Patriotic War of 1812 is very extensive, and yet it still contains many "white spots", controversial points, contradictory or insufficiently convincing judgments. Many of them are eliminated by the book of corresponding members. Academy of Sciences of the USSR P. A. Zhilina.

In the introductory historiographical review, the author summarizes the results of studying the problem and identifies a range of issues that need clarification and more detailed and comprehensive coverage: about the preparation for war and its causes, about the initial strategic plans of the belligerents, about the main stages of the counteroffensive of M. I. Kutuzov, about the state and development of the military art of the Russian army, about participation in the war popular masses, etc. According to new sources, P. A. Zhilin clarifies the number of Russian and French troops in a number of major battles, paints a more complete and reliable picture of the Battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow, the preparation of M. I. Kutuzov's counteroffensive in the Tarutino camp and the brilliant implementation of the plan to defeat Napoleon's army during the second offensive period of the war.

Analyzing political and military events prior to the invasion of Russia by the "grand army", the author reveals V. I. Lenin's position on the transformation of France's national wars "against a coalition of counter-revolutionary monarchies" into wars of conquest, "which in turn gave rise to national liberation wars against Napoleon's imperialism."3 Under the impression of Napoleon's success in the wars with Austria and Prussia, where Russian troops also participated, many historians painted the state of the Russian army in black colors, belittled the military art of M. I. Kutuzov and other commanders .4 This was, in fact, an attempt to justify in hindsight the mistakes of Alexander I in the War of coalitions and in the initial period of the war of 1812. Without underestimating the achievements of Napoleon's military school, the power of his army, which used new and advanced methods of combat operations, P. A. Zhilin at the same time objectively assesses not only the weaknesses, but also the strengths of the Russian army, which stood in combat and moral relations "significantly higher than the armies of Western Europe" and absorbed in theory and practice advanced views of P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V. Suvorov (p. 39).

Unlike his predecessors, who covered the important issue of preparing Russia and France for the war of 1812 mainly in the aspect of political relations between both states, P. A. Zhilin characterizes the state of their economies, especially the military industry, weapons and human reserves, and measures to mobilize material resources. It shows that long before the war began, Napoleon was preparing an invading army designed to crush the Russian armed forces, and the scale of this preparation was such that the history of wars did not know. Napoleon's diplomacy also worked in this direction, and the fruit of its efforts were the allied treaties with Prussia and Austria. In this connection, it would probably be necessary to emphasize the undoubted success of Napoleon's foreign policy, which on the eve of the war managed to put together real military forces of the Allies, while Russian diplomacy gained, in fact, only symbolic support from England and Sweden, whose participation in the coalition almost did not tie Napoleon's hands, because the outcome of the war was decided by a armies.

1 See K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 22, p. 30.

2 V. G. Belinsky. Complete Works, vol. X. M. 1956, p. 19.

3 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 30, pp. 5-6.

4 See for more information: L. G. Beskrovny. Essays on the Military Historiography of Russia, Moscow, 1962, pp. 189-213.

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Analyzing the reasons for the unsuccessful start of the war for Russia, P. A. Zhilin concludes that the deep retreat of the Russian army was due to objective conditions, but was not a fatal inevitability, a consequence of a premeditated plan for the "Scythian war". Most of all, Alexander I and his military entourage are guilty of this. Wanting to crown himself with the laurels of the victor Napoleon and take revenge for the shame of Austerlitz, Alexander I chose the plan of his main "strategist" - the Prussian General Fule-from all possible options for military operations. Moreover, he tried to direct the implementation of this crazy plan himself. As a result, as is known, the 1st Western Army was trapped in the Drissa camp, precious time was lost for the concentration of armed forces located on the western border, and Napoleon had a real opportunity to force the isolated Russian armies to retreat. The failure of Napoleon's plan for the lightning-fast defeat of disparate Russian armies, the author writes, was the merit of Generals M. B. Barclay, P. I. Bagration and the troops led by them.

P. A. Zhilin rightly emphasizes that before the appointment of M. I. Kutuzov, the troops actually operated "without a single command and coordination of forces" (p. 81). This fact has often been overlooked or ignored.5 Meanwhile, the consequences of Fule's disastrous plan might have been less tragic if Alexander I had not persisted in his unwillingness to take into account the first and bitter lessons of the war and admit the complete collapse of his military leadership: he delayed the appointment of commander-in-chief until the fall of Smolensk. As it is emphasized in the book, Alexander I was no less afraid of the people's war against the invaders than Napoleon. This had a fatal impact on the further course of hostilities. Having appointed M. I. Kutuzov as commander-in-chief, the emperor accused the commander of what he was justly responsible for: a new withdrawal of the Russian army, the abandonment of Moscow. Pre-revolutionary official historiography readily quoted tsarist letters to M. I. Kutuzov, ignoring the real and inescapable situation in which he had to take command. The decisive factor that caused the need to leave Moscow was the complete lack of trained army reserves. "Behind us - from Gzhatsk to Moscow itself - there were no more regular troops, "points out P. A. Zhilin, while the regiments of the active army, as M. I. Kutuzov was immediately convinced upon arrival," were very exhausted from frequent battles " (p.118). Agreeing in general with the assessments that P. A. Zhilin gives to the major events of the Patriotic War of 1812, we will leave open for now the question of M. I. Kutuzov's intention to give another big battle after Borodin, which has long been discussed in the literature. This question is connected with another, no less important and interesting one: when exactly did the plan of the Tarutinsky maneuver with the abandonment of Moscow finally ripen and begin to be fulfilled? M. I. Kutuzov left no notes or memoirs about the war of 1812, and it is very difficult to accept his oral and written statements and even orders about the preparation of a new "decisive battle" after Borodin at face value. The true purpose of such statements and orders could be to disorient the enemy. The author clearly identifies the objective factors that made leaving Moscow without a new battle absolutely inevitable. It may be assumed that M. I. Kutuzov's plan for a flank march matured before the moment when he gave the order to retreat at the military council in Fili, and probably no later than the day (August 28) when the army began to withdraw from Mozhaisk to Moscow, and part of the baggage trains with cover was sent along the Kaluga Road to Borovsk. Highly appreciating the strategic consequences of the Battle of Borodino, P. A. Zhilin connects, however, the radical change in the course of the war with the period of the Russian army's stay in the Tarutino camp (p. 140, 161). "Kutuzov's greatness as a commander," he emphasizes, " was primarily reflected in his correct understanding of the role of the masses in the national liberation war"(p. 192). He led not only regular army units, but also regiments of the people's militia, armed peasant detachments and compiled instructions for them "As a party-

5 M. N. Pokrovsky argued that with the appointment of M. I. Kutuzov and until the end of the campaign, in fact, the army was deprived of any central leadership (see M. N. Pokrovsky. Diplomacy and Wars of Tsarist Russia in the XIX century, Moscow, 1924, pp. 51, 54). Pre-revolutionary historians (M. Bogdanovich, A. P. Karpov, etc.) represented M. I. Kutuzov only as the executor of Alexander I's military - strategic destinies.

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Zanu-PF", ensured close cooperation between the army and the people during the war, which was "a decisive force in defeating the enemy" (p.219). A detailed description of this interaction forms a new page in the literature devoted to the War of 1812.

P. A. Zhilin's book revisits the evidence of sources about the military operations of the Russian army during the period of persecution and destruction of the main forces of Napoleon. Refuting the erroneous concepts about M. I. Kutuzov's intentions to build a "golden bridge" to the retreating enemy and limit his task to passive, so-called "parallel pursuit" of it (p. 266-269), the author characterizes "the high offensive activity of the Russian army and the wide scope of partisan struggle" (p.247) during the counteroffensive. Ideas about the weakness of the French army (when leaving Moscow, it included 100 thousand soldiers and officers) and the version of its "voluntary" withdrawal P. A. Zhilin considers untenable. And after leaving Moscow, Napoleon nurtured plans to destroy the Russian troops, made desperate attempts to take revenge for each new defeat in battle, for each failure of his marshals. The counteroffensive took place "with the greatest exertion of forces" and was accompanied by "very significant blows to the enemy in battles and battles" (p. 270). P. A. Zhilin confirms these conclusions with data on the enemy's losses in battles and the rapid pace of the Russian army's advance.

The book provides an in-depth assessment of the military and political events of 1813-1814. P. A. Zhilin convincingly refutes the incorrect views of those pre-revolutionary historians who considered the battle of the Berezina the end of the war, represented M. I. Kutuzov as a supporter of the war "to the Neman", singled out the liberation campaign of the Russian army as a separate campaign, not allegedly connected with the whole course The Patriotic War of 1812 6 . "The War of 1813 was a direct continuation of the Patriotic War. Its preparation and planning took place at the final stage of the war of 1812. The question of transferring military operations abroad did not raise doubts among the Russian command. Kutuzov did not doubt the necessity of this either" (p. 278). The author justifies these important points with a thorough analysis of facts and documents.

The book contains a comparative analysis of the military art of the Russian and French armies, the strategy and tactics of Napoleon and Mikhail Kutuzov is of interest not only to military specialists. However, the origins of military-theoretical views of M. I. Kutuzov, his strategies and tactics should be attributed not to the times of P. A. Rumyantsev and A.V. Suvorov, but to an earlier period, at least to the extensive military legacy of Peter I. The author rightly emphasizes that the superiority of Russian military art in the war of 1812 did not only stem from the nature of this war, it was generated by the age-old traditions of Russian "regular combat". This was also facilitated by the fact that both belligerent armies fought with the same type of weapon. Both France of the Napoleonic Wars and Russia of that time in the field of military industry did not yet go beyond the manufacturing stage, both armies were armed with smoothbore guns and rifles with a shock-flintlock and bayonet. The information given by P. A. Zhilin indicates that the armament and equipment of the Russian infantry and cavalry were in no way inferior to the French, while the artillery in all its forms was superior to the enemy.

The book is written in a lively, emotional language and is read with relentless interest from beginning to end. It is beautifully designed, provided with maps and illustrations, a detailed bibliography, indexes of names and geographical names.

6 See M. I. Bogdanovich. History of the War of 1813 for the independence of Germany according to reliable sources. T. I. SPB, 1863, p. 2.

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