The conference "Modernization of the Arab World in the context of similar processes in Russia, the countries of the East and Eastern Europe (initial stage: XIX-early XX centuries)" 1 was held at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences on September 26 - 27, 2006. Employees of scientific institutions and teachers of higher education institutions of Moscow and Kazan took part in its work.

The similarity of modernization processes in the societies of the East and West makes it possible for Orientalists to resort to the method of comparative historical analysis as one of the ways to further consider the topic. This gave rise to the intention to unite the efforts of Orientalists and specialists in the history of Russia and Eastern Europe in the conference.

Opening the conference, Deputy Director of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. A. Isaev pointed out the importance of historical issues of modernization, which directly leads to the issues of modern life in the countries of the East. Differences in the timing and pace of modernization of different Arab countries in Modern times have significantly affected their further development, and at the end of the XX century. determined the degree of their involvement in the processes of globalization.V. A. Isaev noted a number of controversial issues that arise when considering the problems of modernization. Of great importance in studying the processes of modernization, he believes, is the consideration of the problems of the transition state of socio-political structures, the enclave development of advanced ways of life.

In her introductory report, "A few words on the discussion issues of modernization", I. M. Smilyanskaya (IB RAS) addressed the conceptual framework used in the analysis of modernization. She proposed to abandon the widespread and too general idea (which she also adhered to until recently) about modernization as a process of transformation of traditional society into a modern one. She believes that it is more productive to distinguish, if not concepts, then analytical procedures when considering " modernization "as volitional acts that legitimize changes leading to the evolution of the social system from traditional to modern," modernization process "as the real consequences of these volitional actions, and distinguish them from" transformation", i.e., comprehensive change. This distinction makes it possible to more clearly distinguish between the reformer's vision and the forms in which this vision was actually implemented, as well as to understand the nature of interaction between modernizing and non-modernizing traditional structures, which continue their evolution, and sometimes undergo regression.

The next important definition - "Europeanization "(or" Westernization") - indicates that the impetus for modernization was the impact of European institutions and values on the autochthonous society. However, this concept does not convey an idea of the degree of borrowing of these institutions and values and does not reflect the work done by society on the way to their perception and rooting in its culture. The process of" transplantation " of European institutions into Eastern society is quite complex, it includes not only elements of copying, adaptation, synthesis, etc., but also imitation or partial rejection. This alone shows that modernization is not equivalent to Westernization.

1 The immediate need for an exchange of views on this issue arose after the work of the team of authors on the monograph " History of the East. The East in modern times (the end of the XVIII-beginning of the XX century)". Vol. IV. (Kn. 1. Moscow, 2004; kn. 2, Moscow, 2005). The key topic of the volume was the initial stage of modernization of Eastern societies, the analysis of which was difficult due to the unresolved issues of general theory and fragmented research.

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Further, I. M. Smilyanskaya noted the most important, in her opinion, problems that are almost not developed in Russian science. Unlike specialists in the field of European history, including Russia, orientalists are satisfied with a superficial description of the social groups that the reformers relied on. Is it because, with the exception of Japan, in most Eastern countries these groups were formed in the process of modernization reforms? It is obvious that at the initial stage of modernization, the initiative for reforms belonged to the political elite, but already at the end of Modern times, the masses are joining the modern political process (recall the wave of revolutions that swept through the East at the beginning of the XX century). We have limited ourselves to a general knowledge of changes in public consciousness, obtained in the course of studying the enlightenment movement and the religious reformation in the East-the fruits of modernization processes in the field of culture. However, the study of the evolution of the worldview and language of at least an educated part of the population, which was influenced by European values, the formation of rationalistic thinking and the actualization of their cultural heritage, was not continued2, also brought to life by modernization processes.

The general model of the initial period of modernization proposed by I. M. Smilyanskaya as a research technique (see: "Modernization of the Arab world in the context of similar processes in Russia, the countries of the East and Eastern Europe". Abstracts of the conference. Moscow, 2006. pp. 3-5), in her opinion, allows us to determine the main features of this system process, but such a model can bear fruit if it serves as a starting point for developing similar models developed on the materials of individual countries.

In his report "Capitalist modernization in the countries of the East and Russia in the XIX century", A. I. Yakovlev (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences), based on the experience of studying the history of the East and Russia, proposed to consider modernization as a time-limited process of accelerated approximation of non-Western society to the state of capitalist, or industrial, society, already achieved by Western European countries. Thus, he believes, modernization should not be reduced to evolution as a whole. According to A. I. Yakovlev, the main content of modernization is fundamental reforms of revolutionary significance ("revolution from above"), carried out by the authorities in the context of a national crisis or an external challenge in order to overcome the crisis and respond to the challenge, i.e. to achieve a higher level of socio-political, economic and cultural development modeled on the advanced countries of the West. The subject of reform in the course of modernization is the state power, which is the only one capable of providing the stability and material resources necessary for radical changes, as well as carrying out targeted actions to create new public structures and protect them from opponents of reforms. By undertaking partial transformations or improving certain areas of public life ("reforms within the system"), reformers, despite their subjective goals, are involved in a chain of fundamental reforms that ultimately radically change society ("system reform"). According to the speaker, the agrarian reform is becoming the "core" in the course of modernization. The outcome of modernization is not predetermined, and the nineteenth century produced many examples of failed or century-long reforms.

The speaker sees an important difference between the processes of modernization of Russia and the East in the fact that the "reforms of the system" in Russia, in fact, sanctioned changes for which society was already ready. In the East, reforms were more often carried out that initiated transformations that were not generated by the spontaneous development of traditional society. Reforms, rather than revolutions, preserve the most important aspects of the traditional heritage. In conclusion, the speaker noted that in the 19th century, the authorities of Russia and the countries of the East faced a complex three-pronged task of modernization: maintaining the normal life of society, bringing it out of the crisis and carrying out fundamental reforms. In many Eastern societies, the authorities were unable to solve this problem by conducting a "revolution from above", and its solution began in the XX century during popular revolutions.

When discussing the report of A. I. Yakovlev, M. S. Meyer (ISAA at Moscow State University) objected to the speaker's thesis about the pivotal role of agrarian reform in the process of modernization of the Eastern countries. He noted that in the Ottoman Empire, where reforms began in the middle of the XIX century, the solution of the agrarian issue began only in the XX century. If we assume that the meaning of the decision of the agrarian

2 Successful experience in this area was made by L. N. Borokh ("Confucianism and European thought at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Liang Qichao: theory of renewal of the people", Moscow, 2001).

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I. M. Smilyanskaya added that in Russia, the abolition of serfdom contributed to the expansion of the social support of supporters of modernization, but in the Middle East, due to the specifics of feudalism, the abolition of conditional feudal land ownership in the process of modernization, in fact, was not the only way to create a large layer of small land owners. It did not change the rights of the farmer, and the creation of landowners ' land ownership through the de-landization of peasants occurred largely as a result of the agrarian transformations of the modernization era. 3 O. A. Omelchenko (Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences) noted that from a political and legal point of view, reforms in Russia and the East were equally initiated, you didn't authorize conversions.

The report of Z. I. Levin (Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Modernization in a systematic way" was purely theoretical in nature. The speaker proceeded from the position that the life of society is subject not only to "social", but also to "systemic" laws, while public consciousness plays a no less significant role in social processes than the structure of society and the ways of its functioning. By modernization in a broad sense, Z. I. Levin understands the process of changes in individual areas or in the life of the entire society, focused on the highest planetary level of technical and technological development for its time. The modernization of Eastern societies is a process of structural and psychological adjustment that occurs as they are integrated into the world capitalist economy. The speaker believes that the ability of a society to assimilate borrowed innovations arises when it is at the same stage of socio-economic development as the "role model". In this case, modernization is a stage of development, an organic process of updating the social system as a whole. Such a form of modernization could not be realized in the East, since the society here was at a different stage of socio-economic development, and the interaction of the West and the East was an acute confrontation between the "new" and "old". As a result, the speaker states, the movement of the East from the Middle Ages to the present took place in line with its interaction with the colonizing West, which in the conditions of the world capitalist market forcibly imposed on Eastern societies the nature of functioning and, accordingly, specific socio-economic structures, intra-system regulators and the pace of modernization.

Based on these provisions, Z. I. Levin proposed the following periodization of the process of modernization of Eastern societies:

The period from the end of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century was the "prenatal (intrauterine) stage" of modernization, when local elites became aware of the lag of their societies, at least in military terms. The Eastern monarchs were forced to reform the administrative-state and military structures, some within the framework of the policy of isolationism, others opening up to the West;

The mid-19th and early 20th centuries were the initial stages of modernization, i.e., the accumulation of structural elements and regulatory mechanisms characteristic of capitalist society, and the realization by the ruling and intellectual elite of independent (semi-independent) monarchies of the Eastern countries of the need to move from protective modernization to development modernization. In the colonies, which were a structural element of the social organism of the colonial Powers, according to the speaker, this process generally began earlier and took place more intensively.

The characteristic features of the modernization of the East in this period are its forced nature, the formation of a multi-layered structure, Westernized forms of transformation and secularization, concluded Z. I. Levin.

O. A. Omelchenko's report "Eastern European and Eastern models of political and legal development in Modern times (problems of possible interaction)" took the discussion of the topic in a new direction. Based on the results of the evolution of the political and legal systems of most states that have independently developed in Modern and Modern times, the speaker defines the process of political and legal modernization as an evolution towards the formation of a "modern civil and political state".

3 This process is discussed in detail by B. G. Seyranyan in the monograph " Evolution of the Social structure of the Arab East Countries. Land aristocracy in the XIX century-the 80s of the XX century " Moscow, 1991.

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Referring to the periodization of political and legal modernization in Europe, the speaker connects its first wave (the second half of the XVIII century) with the phase of "enlightened absolutism". In Russia, in his opinion, this process has found its classical full expression in changes from the systemic reform of the legal system to the formulation of the doctrine of" legitimate monarchy "(the" Order " of Catherine II) and socio-cultural transformations. The second wave of modernization is the reform of "governmental constitutionalism" (the first quarter of the XIX century). The main task of this period was to improve the organizational structures and mechanisms of functioning of the political and legal system. In reality, this type of modernization was implemented in Bavaria, Saxony, and partly in Prussia, but in Russia the evolution in this direction was stopped by the Decembrist uprising in 1825, after which the monarchy considered constitutional modernization politically dangerous. The third wave of modernization in Russia - the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s - was undertaken, according to the speaker, without any understanding of the general crisis state of statehood (political and legal system) as a whole. They were implemented for administrative and pragmatic purposes to improve certain aspects of public life.

The speaker carefully compared the processes in Western and Eastern societies. He believes that "enlightened absolutism" should be considered a purely European phenomenon, while elements of" governmental constitutionalism "were present everywhere (common features of the modernization model in Egypt during the era of Muhammad Ali, in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period, and in Japan during the"Meiji restoration"). If we consider legal modernization in the aspect of subject activity, it should be recognized that it is inextricably linked with the political ideal as an attitude, with the problem of value orientations. In Russia, the borrowing of European institutions, according to the speaker, was selective with a focus on the political and legal order of the north-west of Europe (England). In China, with a tightly organized bureaucracy of power and a society that has little control over it, the movement towards a European content of legal legality was less pronounced than in the Ottoman Empire. Since, the speaker believes, in the countries of Sharia law in the European sense has never been, then constitutionalism there is a pure borrowing.

During the discussion of O. A. Omelchenko's report, it was noted that the political and legal theme of the report encourages historians-Orientalists to expand the set of criteria when analyzing the problems of modernization. Meanwhile, comparing the East with the realities of Eastern Europe makes it possible to better understand the significance and nature of modernization transformations. I. M. Smilyanskaya agreed with the speaker's statement about the absence of "enlightened absolutism" in the East, but she had great doubts about attributing Muhammad Ali's transformations to "government constitutionalism". In the activity of the latter, it tends to see the manifestation of both despotic (etatization of the means of production at the initial stage) and absolutist forms of government, while the reforms of the Egyptian Khedive Ismail (the second half of the XIX century) really fit into the concept of "government constitutionalism". A. I. Yakovlev did not agree with the belittling of the significance of radical transformations in Russia in the second half of the XIX century., long ago received the name of the Great Reforms in historiography. However, he also believes that due to the strong resistance to change of both the conservative part of the nobility and bureaucracy, and the radical nihilistic part of the intelligentsia, the processes of modernization of Russia were particularly slow in the state-legal sphere. religious and secular legislation-eves.

The next two reports were devoted to the study of the features of the evolution of Islam in Muslim societies that have undergone modernization. In the report "Traditions and innovations in Islam of the XVIII-XIX centuries: some methodological aspects" A. K. Alikberov (Institute of Islamic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) proceeds from the inapplicability of the concept of "modernization" to the evolution of Islam. He is of the opinion that society is being modernized, and religion is adapting to new realities. From his point of view, the terms "reformation" (Islah) or "renewal" (taj'id) are more applicable to the evolution of Islam.

The 18th and 19th centuries were a time of significant changes in Islam, which were expressed primarily in the emergence of the Wahhabi movement and the development of renovationist Sufism. The speaker agrees with the opinion of J. S. Trimingham, according to which the emergence of these movements was not connected with the reaction to the expansion of the West. Going back to the eighteenth century, Trimingham said, they anticipated the need for reform. Under the slogan of fighting sinful innovations-

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In the name of establishing the order of early Islam, which they understood in their own way, the Wahhabis in reality, A. K. Alikberov believes, rejected the traditions that were legitimized by the institute of Ijma. Sufis, on the other hand, gradually expanded the scope of what was permissible, simplified the complex ceremonies of performing religious duties, and adapted the structure, hierarchy, and organizational features of Sufi fraternities to solutions to pressing political problems. Renovationist Sufism penetrated Dagestan in the early 19th century. Numerous documents, including the correspondence of Shamil and Abd al-Qadir, and the manuscripts of the al-Senusiya brotherhood discovered in Dagestan, attest to the links between Sufi movements in the Caucasus and the Middle East, India and North Africa. The evolution of renovationist Sufism in Dagestan was marked by the circumstances of the entry of mountain societies into the Russian Empire and the Shamil movement.

In conclusion, A. K. Alikberov noted that the ability to adapt to the constantly changing conditions of reality is a distinctive feature of Islam, inherent in it from the moment of its birth and formation. As a result, in the 19th century, Islam demonstrated amazing dynamism, flexibility, and a huge mobilization resource.

The starting point for L. R. Syukiyainen's reflections (State University-Higher School of Economics) in the report "Legal reforms in Arab countries in the XIX century: interaction of Islamic and European traditions" is the position that the history of Sharia law has always been characterized by close interaction with other legal systems. In the Middle Ages, Muslim law enriched European law with many institutions and realities (bill of exchange, transfer of debt, regulation of the legal consequences of a maritime accident, legal status of prisoners of war). Muslim law has never been the only valid law in the Muslim world. Therefore, the speaker believes that the widespread perception of European legal institutions by the most developed Arab countries in the 19th century is explained by the peculiarities of Muslim thought itself, which is open to the perception of other people's experience.

Legal reforms have made serious changes in the situation of Muslim law, and have helped transform it from a legal doctrine into a status law. As a result, there have been profound changes in the status of fiqh interpretations and the role assigned to Ijtihad, which has taken on a different meaning. Since that time, the interpretation of laws adopted by Muslim jurists, based on the European legal tradition, as meeting Sharia criteria, has become widespread. The legal reforms carried out so far determine the main trends in the development of modern legal systems.

L. R. Syukiyainen, answering the question why in Muslim countries the reforms were presented as the restoration of the old just order and whether it was just a desire to use Islamic rhetoric to legitimize the reforms or the reformers believed that Islam could find solutions to modern problems, argued that there is no single answer. He drew attention to the fact that the very term Islah, used in Arabic to refer to reform, means "to make acceptable, suitable". For modernists, turning to Islam serves as a cover for change, as adherents of the conservative concept are in favor of preserving the existing order, and fundamentalists are in favor of restoring the old order. Meanwhile, public thought in the Islamic world also seeks answers not in specific Islamic institutions, but in the very principles of Islam. The speaker believes that this particular area is the most relevant, promising and has not exhausted its capabilities, unlike those mentioned above.

The morning session ended with a speech by M. S. Meyer, who questioned the understanding of modernization as a progressive development. He agrees that this was a response to the challenge of the West, but this response was accompanied by the dismantling of the traditional system, which still retained the potentials of its own evolution. In this light, according to M. S. Meyer, modernization can be seen as something other than development. The" recognition " of Europe in the Ottoman Empire began in the 17th century. In the 18th century, many crisis phenomena were identified and the search for ways to overcome them began. He agrees with the periodization of Z. I. Levin, who considers the period from the end of the XVIII century to the middle of the XIX century as "intrauterine". M. S. Meyer drew attention to the fact that when borrowing European institutions, the consequences of this were not taken into account. Political reforms in Europe were designed for mono-national states and were intended for a different type of political system. In the Ottoman Empire, they led to the collapse of a single state. And the success of reform in Japan may be rooted in the mono-national composition of its population. Accepting O. A. Omelchenko's definition of the reforms of Mahmud II and Abdul Majid as a manifestation of

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"governmental constitutionalism", M. S. Meyer clarified its content. In his opinion, in this case it was meant - who will manage the centralized state, the monarch or the new bureaucracy. Zulum in the Ottoman Empire was an attempt to stop the change in the balance of power in favor of officialdom. The failures of modernization in the nineteenth century were largely due to the reformers ' lack of understanding of Western institutions. The success of the reforms was observed only from the beginning of the XX century, when new social relations and a new environment were formed. Turning to the question of differences in the responses of the East to the challenges of the West, M. S. Meyer noted that when applied to the societies of the "Greater Middle East", we should talk not about two, but about three models of development: the path of isolation, colonial modernization and the evolution of the Ottoman type of" independent " states.

The evening session was devoted to the issues of pre-modernization development, a time when the elite of society, often already familiar with European institutions, feeling the crisis state of their state, was looking for a way out in reforming certain aspects of the social system in order to strengthen it. As a rule, these reforms are determined by the logic of the development of traditional society. If they contained European borrowings, then such borrowings were superficial and did not change the nature of the social system (in the Ottoman Empire, the reforms of Selim III - 1789-1807, in Japan, the reforms of the "Tempo period" - 1830-1840, in Burma, the Tarawadi reforms - 1837-1846, etc.).

The discussion of this topic was opened by M. S. Meyer's theses "The XVIII century: the beginning of innovations or the continuation of traditions?", in which he refers to the period when, in his opinion, the superiority of the European powers that formed the core of the capitalist system and pushed the countries of the East to the periphery of this system was quite clearly marked. The new relations between the West and the East gave rise to a stable idea of the decline of Muslim states in Western historiography. Meanwhile, a number of foreign studies and domestic works of recent decades, including M. S. Meyer himself, speak about the restructuring of agrarian relations, urban production and trade that began in the XVIII century, about the evolution of social groups and the political system of the Ottoman Empire. This allowed M. S. Meyer to interpret the processes that took place, contrary to the ideas of stagnation and decline, as the transition of traditional Ottoman society to more mature relations and to assert that this transition was mainly carried out under the influence of internal impulses. This interpretation did not exclude the possibility that the changes had not yet affected the spiritual life. As a result, M. S. Meyer concludes: "The innovations that have emerged in the economy and public institutions over the past century are only the result of the evolution of traditional systems."

Poster presentation by S. F. Oreshkova (IB RAS) " False start of Europeanization of Eastern societies. The reforms of the Crimean Khan Shagin-Giray (1776-1783) " allowed for a new interpretation of some too general judgments about pre-modernization reforms. The speaker reviewed the reforms carried out by Khan Shagin-Giray during the ten-year period of "independence" of the Crimean Khanate, proclaimed by Russia and approved by the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Peace. According to the author, Shagin-Giray's innovations outstripped similar reforms implemented in other Muslim countries. In response to the European challenge, the European-educated Khan tried to centralize government as early as the 1770s. In addition, he intended to create, perhaps even resorting to recruitment, a regular army trained in the European system. S. F. Oreshkova emphasizes: the reform measures came from the khan himself, who hoped to strengthen his power and independence of the khanate. The Russian command was apprehensive about Shagin-Giray's activities. The Russian army only helped to appease the Crimean population, which rose up against the khan, whose policy was devoid of flexibility and consideration of the real situation. As a result, the transformations of Shagin-Giray were not the beginning, but a kind of false start to the Europeanization of the eastern state structure.

A special topic of the report was S. F. Oreshkova's consideration of changes in the principles of Russia's policy in relations with Eastern polities. She convincingly proved the thesis that in an effort to secure her southern territories from Tatar raids, having torn the Crimean possessions away from the Ottoman Empire, Catherine II initially resorted to declaring the independence of the Crimean Khanate, i.e., using a foreign policy act born of the Enlightenment era. S. F. Oreshkova analyzed the reasons for the subsequent inclusion of the Crimean Khanate by the tsarist manifesto of 1783 in structure of the Russian Empire. Since then, according to the report's author, Russia has "given up its ability to speak to the East in its own language."

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international language" (meaning shert treaties, amanats, the use of kinship ties and obligations, double and triple vassalage, etc.). Now it participates in the solution of the Eastern question together with other European powers, making efforts "to return Christian peoples to the bosom of European civilization (sometimes not then and in the wrong form in which they desired it), and with regard to the Islamic peoples, becoming more and more imbued with the spirit of colonialism."

In the report of T. Y. Kobishchanov (ISAA) "Russian Mamluks in Ottoman Egypt" on the basis of unique material, the complex ethno-confessional composition of the Egyptian ruling stratum and the ways of European influence on it were revealed. According to these materials, at the end of the 18th century, there were about 900 Mamluks of Russian origin in Egypt, among whom a large number were soldiers and officers of the Russian army who were captured in two Russo-Turkish wars. Catherine II and her foreign ministry suggested that the ethnic origin of some of the Mamluk elite "potentially determined their pro-Russian sympathies", and this was the basis for the failed attempt during the Russo - Turkish war of 1787-1791 to enter into secret negotiations with the anti-Turkish Mamluk elite.

V. V. Orlov's report "Moulay Slimane's Reforms in Morocco (1811-1822): Originality and borrowing" completed the review of the nature of pre - modernisation reforms in the East. The speaker proposed a new, more complex interpretation of the Alawite sultan's reforms, which differs both from the ideas generally accepted in foreign and domestic literature, and from his own view, according to which Moulay Slimane (1792-1822) tried to reform the state system according to the Wahhabi model in the spirit of the Arabian Saudis. Slimane's efforts were consistent with the critical revision of traditional cultic practices that was widespread throughout the Muslim world as a way out of the deep crisis that engulfed the Muslim world in the eighteenth century.Moulay Slimane sought to restore Islam to its original purity by rejecting all innovations. However, this, according to the speaker, only superficially makes him related to Wahhabis. Moulay Slimane's intention to restore the position of the Maliki madhhab in Morocco spiritually separated him from the Wahhabis. He also significantly differed from the latter in his attitude to the mystical and ascetic teaching in Islam. Moulay Slimane himself belonged to the Nasiriyah Sufi brotherhood, and he was in many ways close to the "Sufi mindset", although his refusal from the traditional paternalistic attitude of the Moroccan authorities towards the leaders of "popular Islam", according to V. V. Orlov, was one of the reasons for the failure of his reforms.

The morning session on September 27 was opened by the reports of G. V. Ibneeva and V. I. Sheremet, who addressed the features of modernization in the multiethnic states of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

G. V. Ibneeva (Kazan State University) in her report "Reforms in the Habsburg Empire and Russia in the second half of the XVIII century" has subjected to a comparative historical analysis the institutional reforms of the "enlightened monarchy" era that are characteristic of Eastern Europe. These reforms were aimed at centralizing management, unifying government bodies, and solving the peasant problem. They were conducted in close connection with the estate policy, and their success, according to G. V. Ibneeva, depended on the flexibility of this policy. She supported O. A. Omelchenko's thesis on the importance of ideological justification of reforms. G. V. Ibneeva believes that the reforms in Russia and Austria-Hungary were based not on the ideas of social contract and natural human rights put forward by French enlighteners, but on ideas about the duties of a citizen in relation to the state, dating back to the German enlighteners (p. Pufendorf). In the modernization policy of Catherine II and Joseph II, the ideas of cameralism were realized - a reasonable structure of the state and regularity, which assumed a broad state intervention in the life of the family and society.

V. I. Sheremet (Institute of Internal Affairs of the Russian Academy of Sciences), in his report "Modernization of the Foreign Policy Department of the Ottoman Empire of the XVIII-early XIX centuries", contradicts the generally accepted idea among the Ottomans about the primary importance of reforming the military - administrative structures of the Ottoman state. Background and traditions " argued that the Ottoman elite, since the time of the reforms of Selim III, was aware of the urgent need to reform the foreign policy department-reis-ul-kutaba (reis-efendi). Unlike the Foreign Ministry in European countries, it was responsible not only for foreign policy relations, but also for the affairs of the Sultan's non-Muslim subjects-

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on. This feature persisted, despite all the transformations, until the collapse of the empire, and only under Kemal Ataturk was the connection between military and foreign policy proper realized, inherent in the states of Europe.

This peculiarity historically developed due to the fact that a significant part of the Ottoman Empire - European Turkey - was, according to V. I. Sheremet, a "civilizational zone of contact" with the Christian West, where the Porte "worked out" foreign policy relations with it and regulated relations with its Christian subjects. In economically more developed European Turkey, where the reform period coincided with the rise of the struggle for liberation, the solution of vital problems occurred through a "reform dialogue". As a result, the lands of European Turkey inhabited by Christians and Muslims, whose socio-cultural community was not lost, became the first and main object of the reform activity of the Porte, during which there was also a search for a balance of interests of the periphery and the center. All this determined the role of the foreign policy department in the state apparatus and the specifics of its evolution.

In the report "Modernization of Japan after the Meiji restoration" E. V. Molodyakova (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) stated that the" Meiji restoration "(Meiji yixing), which she considers possible to define as a" conservative revolution", marked the beginning of a deep transformation of all spheres of society. This transformation was carried out in line with the " modernization and internationalization of the economy, politics, science, and culture." The external premise of the process was the colonial threat, the response to which was the rejection of isolationist policies by the political elite and the perception of European values, which accelerated the process of modernization. The internal prerequisites for modernization were the formation of a national market, the emergence of manufacturing production, a high level of education of the population, the presence of a brilliant political elite-supporters of accelerated modernization, as well as the peculiarities of the Japanese worldview. Referring to the definition of the peculiarities of the Japanese mentality, the speaker noted the high adaptive ability of Japanese people to assimilate elements of another culture, the propensity to solve problems through compromises, based on the fundamental conceptwa ("harmony"), a Japanese pragmatism that allows you to accept useful innovations without compromising traditional values. As a result, the transformation of society took place there without cataclysms, through the perception of new elements that changed as they adapted to the old structure and caused a restructuring of the entire system. All this did not exclude a sharp ideological struggle over the interpretation of the formula "Japanese spirit - Western technique", which took place among the political elite. The political circumstances that favored the reforms were the restoration of imperial power, which became a symbol of national unity.

In the report " When did modernization begin in Tunisia?" M. F. Vidyasova (ISAA) showed that unlike Japan, which successfully implemented the full cycle of reforms of the initial stage of modernization in the second half of the XIX century, Tunisia, where the transformation began earlier than in Japan, passed only the first steps on this path before the loss of independence in 1881. Like a number of Western researchers, the speaker considered it possible to characterize these reforms as Westernization ("exogenous modernization"), since the changes, in her opinion, were limited to the assimilation of military-technical achievements of the West in order to protect the deep foundations of the traditional order. Within the framework of" exogenous modernization " M. F. Vidyasov considers both the proclamation in 1857 of the Fundamental Pact (Ahd al-Aman), which declared the equality of subjects before the law, and the introduction in 1861. the first Tunisian constitution, which legitimized the regime of a limited monarchy, put under the control of the Grand Council. Turning to the characteristics of the intellectual life of Tunis in the late 18th and 19th centuries, M. F. Vidyasova observes elements of the renaissance that emerged outside the direct Western influence (the creation of provincial chronicles, the actualization of Ibn Khaldun's ideas in the works of historians, attempts to present the Tunisian state outside the doctrine of the Muslim Ummah). In this, she ultimately sees the prerequisites for the emergence in Tunisia of the concept of the Tunisian nation, which was fully developed only in the twentieth century in the ideology of the New Dostur party.

Poster presentation by D. R. Zhantiev (ISAA) "The role of Islamic religious institutions in preserving traditional social relations in the Ottoman Empire in the XIX century. (on the example of the Syrian vilayets)" raised the question of how successfully the modernization reforms were implemented in Syria and what hindered their implementation. According to the speaker,

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Until the end of the 19th century, the role of" Europeanized " administrative bodies and educational institutions in Syria was very limited, as was their influence on traditional social relations, where family and kinship relations, the neighborhood and rural community, the Sufi brotherhood, and trade and craft corporations still held strong positions. Traditional Islamic institutions were still the guardians of tradition and the force that held Muslim society together. (In the last quarter of the 19th and early 20th centuries, 75% of Syrian Muslims who completed secondary education were enrolled in religious institutions.) The connection of Islamic institutions with all spheres of life of the Ottoman society, concluded D. R. Zhantiev, allows us to speak about the preservation of the social system that contributed to the maintenance of tradition, which made modernization superficial and secondary.

N. I. Tyapkin (Institute of Social and Political Modernization of the Russian Academy of Sciences) discussed the same topic - on countering traditional institutions of modernization - based on the materials of the family-related organization of China in her report "On the status hierarchy in traditional China (on the problem of socio-political modernization)" (the report is presented in the abstract). She argued that one of the features of traditional Chinese society was a rigid system of status inequality within related groups, which regulated the rights, duties, norms of behavior and relationships of an individual with relatives. With unequal status, relations were built according to the type of "domination and subordination", which led to the authoritarian nature of family and kinship ties and contributed to the immunity of society, especially rural ones, "to the democratic foundations of statehood and the principles of universal equality."

The specific response of traditional societies that preserved the tribal system to the modernization processes taking place in the Middle East was considered in the reports of A. Z. Egorin, N. G. Romanova and M. Vasilenko.

A. Z. Yegorin's report "Peculiarities of Western perception of Senusism in Libya (XIX-XX centuries)" (the text was prepared jointly with G. V. Mironova) described the history of the Senussi brotherhood, founded in the late 1830s-early 1840s by the theorist of pure Islam Muhammad ben Ali al - Senusi. The first Zawiyahs were created by him in Saudi Arabia (1837) and Libya (1843), and by the end of the century the Senussi order managed to establish about 150 Zawiyahs on the Sahrawi land, where the Bedouins lived in a pre-state system, and put large territories of Libya and Sudan under its control. The author noted that the Senussi call to return to the" purity " of the original Islam, the condemnation of wealth and luxury was perceived by the Bedouin population as a call to fight against the Turkish enslavers. The Senussi called for unity in the face of the threat of Western colonialists. Growing in power, the order took control of the caravan routes and slave trade, created a centralized management structure, and established connections with local leaders and Ottoman governors. In response to the increased activity of the Senusians, Europe sent its scientists and scouts to the Sahara. The analysis of their critical reports formed the main part of the report. According to the author, the hostile attitude of the Senussi towards Western values created a sharply negative image of the order among Europeans as the main enemy of Europe and Christianity. With the activities of the Senussi, who united the disparate tribes of the Libyan desert, Libya's movement towards independent statehood began. The Senussi took on the necessary social functions, and after the strengthening of colonial policy, they turned into an independent political force that, together with the tribal leaders, successfully opposed the common enemy. In fact, it was the Senussi, not Turkey or Italy, who initiated statehood and the subsequent modernization process in Libya.

The topic of A. Z. Egorina's report was continued by N. G. Romanova (IB RAS) in the report "Italian and Turkish domination in Libya: myths and reality". In the remote and economically backward Libyan province of the Ottoman Empire, the positive changes that occurred under external influence, according to the speaker, began with the second Turkish rule (since 1856), associated with the Tanzimat reforms, and contributed to the revival of the economic and cultural life of coastal Libya. The growth of missionary activity in France and Italy prompted Turkey in the late 19th century to open its own schools and educational institutions for adults, to establish the first military school and centers for training reservists. Subsequently, the Young Turk revolution intensified the political life of Libya, but the new government, continuing to view Libya only as a means for personal enrichment of officials and siphoning off money through taxes, did not allow sending Libyan-elected deputies to the Turkish parliament. Broad segments of the population rejected the modernization transformations of the central government. Gradually

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under the active influence of the Senussi order, a political opposition began to form from young Arab nationalists in Tripolitania who did not agree with the imperial policy of purging the local population. The actions of Italy, which began its "cultural penetration" into the territory of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica from the 70s of the XIX century. also caused an active rejection of Libyans. Muslims refused to send their children to Italian Catholic schools, and only medical dispensaries were popular. The Italians did not carry out any other vital transformations for Libya. A started in 1911. Italy's war with Turkey thwarted its plans for a peaceful invasion of Libya and further complicated the region's difficult economic situation.

N. G. Romanova's conclusion was as follows: the Senussi religious order turned out to be the only force that can be attributed to the formation of an independent state and a number of socio-political changes in Libya. Libyan society could accept the new only within the limits that did not destroy their traditional foundations. In general, not trusting the Turkish authorities, the local population was wary of any attempts at modernization on the part of Turkey, and even more so on the part of Catholic Italy. But the failures of the colonial policies of Turkey and Italy played a positive role, as they contributed to the growth of political activity and national consolidation of Libyan society.

M. Vasilenko, a post-graduate student of the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences (St. Petersburg), made a poster presentation "Modernization" of the Bedouin world and smuggling (based on the poetry collections of I. Bailey)", based on the materials of the Bedouin poetry of the Sinai Peninsula in the 1970s-1980s, showed the extreme inertia of the Bedouin world, which, thanks to its high functionality, retains its oral poetic a tradition that has hardly existed since the time of Jahiliyyah. Smuggling allowed the Bedouins to adapt to the modernization of the region, but to remain committed to the original way of life. Only the retreat to the cities and the subsequent severance of tribal ties allowed the Bedouin to fit into the modern world, but this was followed by the loss of the meaning of Bedouin poetry for him.

During the discussion of the reports, I. D. Zvyagelskaya (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) shared her observations on the modernization that took place in the context of the clash of two cultures on the territory of Palestine (late XIX-early XX centuries).It expressed its disagreement with the views of those who believe that the Zionist idea included the intention to bring the benefits of European civilization to Arab society in the process of creating a Jewish national home there. Indeed, the Zionist socialists, who were influenced by populism, Tolstoyism, and communist ideas and followed the idealistic principles of their social doctrine, believed that the Arab population would welcome the modern production, infrastructure, and way of life introduced by Jewish immigration. (In reality, at first Jewish immigration brought only small-capitalist and artisanal production and a provincial European city lifestyle.) In Palestine, immigrants found themselves in an unfamiliar environment and were also treated as strangers. Confrontation and disagreement with the Arabs arose not only over land and cultural differences, but also over the definition of identity and the rights to their history and homeland. This was followed by the isolation of the Jewish community and the rejection of foreign culture by the Arabs. Nevertheless, the subsequent difficult experience of mutual communication between the two peoples refutes, according to I. D. Zvyagelskaya, the fatalism of S. Huntington's concept of a clash of civilizations. There was a process of adaptation and gradual acceptance by a significant part of the Palestinians of the model of Israeli modernized society.

F. M. Atsamba, who participated in the discussion, objected to understanding the modernization process only as a perception of European ideas, which was reflected in some reports. She expressed a number of considerations in favor of the existence of internal prerequisites for modernization in the East, and above all in Japan. A. I. Yakovlev emphasized the importance of the reformer's personality and ideas that guided him, demonstrating his thesis on the example of the attitude to the abolition of serfdom of Nicholas I and Alexander II. Both emperors were aware of the need to resolve the issue. However, the first of them was stopped by the consciousness of the impossibility of violating the" sacred property rights " of the landlords and the fear of riots in the event of the liberation of the peasants without land. Alexander II proceeded from the priority of "the good of the state" and therefore decided to reform. A. I. Yakovlev suggested that in the conditions of the weakening of the nobility and the absence of the bourgeoisie as a social stratum, it was the peasantry that could become the mainstay of Alexander II's reform policy, while the bureaucracy served as an instrument of reform.

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I. M. Smilyanskaya supported G. V. Ibneeva's thesis about the political flexibility of the reformer as a key to the success of reforms. She compared Catherine II's decision to allow the Russian nobility to participate in local government with the inclusion of the Ottoman nobility (Ayans) in provincial councils (majlis). in the Ottoman Empire of the Tanzimat period, believing that these measures also led to the strengthening of the social support of the government, which carried out reforms aimed at centralizing management, I. P. Ivanova drew attention to the discrepancies in the definition of modernization and Westernization found in the reports. She believes that for a theoretical breakthrough in understanding the historical processes under consideration, it is necessary to develop a new categorical apparatus. According to I. M. Smilyanskaya, a theoretical breakthrough can be expected as a result of in-depth research work, when new historical material will be brought into circulation by raising new questions and developing new methods. In the meantime, the purpose of the discussion remains to find new approaches and clarify the meaning of the terms used.

The evening session's reports were entirely devoted to colonial modernization, a topic that had already been highlighted in the reports on Libya.

The discussion of this topic was opened with a detailed poster presentation by L. B. Alaev (IB RAS) " Modernization of traditional structures. The colonial version (on the example of British India)". The speaker's starting point was the thesis that the modernization of public relations was not the goal of British policy in India. However, the very fact of the domination of a power with a qualitatively different social system led to changes that neither the British nor the Indians had planned. According to the speaker, British politics in India was determined by the struggle between "utilitarians" who were looking for better ways of governing, and " evangelicals "who sought to preserve the existing social system there, freeing it from" odious " features. The victory of the "Evangelical" course in the first half of the nineteenth century did not lead to a noticeable strengthening of English domination. The British agrarian policy was not crowned with success: the Indian agrarian system did not allow the establishment of bourgeois ownership of land. Even limited social reforms sparked mass protests, becoming one of the reasons for the Sepoy Uprising. Along with the introduction of European principles of law and judicial procedure, the author of the report believes that the development of European-type education in order to train personnel for the colonial administration and create an educated stratum capable of developing Indian culture through Western borrowing and educating the population has become a factor of modernization. However, the local intelligentsia that emerged, according to L. B. Alaev, having joined the official cadres, did not show interest in educating the masses. As a result of the British modernization acts, a "political class" emerged - the intelligentsia, who wanted to participate in the government of the country. These were representatives of the official apparatus (by 1947, Indians made up half of it) and members of representative institutions under the British supreme power.

According to the speaker, reformation processes in Indian religions (the emergence of neo-Hinduism, reformation trends in Islam, Sikhism and Parsiism) were a response to the modernizationist activities of the British. In his opinion, these processes were similar to both the Reformation and Enlightenment in Western Europe, although they had different results. The emergence of secular nationalism was influenced by the acquaintance of the Indian intelligentsia with ancient culture, thanks to research initiated by European Orientalists, as well as due to the unification of India carried out by the British (including on the basis of the English language), and the rise of nationalism in the world. Pointing out the main milestones in the history of the national movement, L. B. Alaev came to the conclusion that the lack of attention of the Indian National Congress to the multi-confessional and multi-caste nature of India, its lack of understanding of the interests of minorities led to the division of British India. Despite the losses that the country suffered during the British rule, modern India, the speaker concluded, owes the colonialists the strengthening of modernization ideas and processes in the country. However, the depth of these processes can be judged by the fact that two-thirds of the population remains unaffected by modernization, and, moreover, at present "not so much 'traditional' India is being eroded as 'modern' India is being traditionalized."

The topic considered on the basis of the materials of India was continued by the report of E. N. Komarov (IB RAS) " The elite model as a form and result of socio-economic and political development in colonial conditions (the example of India)", the advantage of which was the use of statistical material that made it possible to assess the depth of modernization processes. The speaker considers it necessary to take into account the historical background of modernization processes, in particular the socio-economic processes in pre-colonial India, as a result of which certain groups of the propertied strata developed in the country, quickly and early mastering the modern world.

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established banks and joint-stock companies to conduct commercial affairs. According to the speaker, it was only in the 1830s that the British began to understand the need to introduce modern education, which became accessible only to the elite. The broad masses remained trapped in a backward medieval mentality, and in the twentieth century only 9% of people over the age of 15 were literate. The author noted that before the First World War, the number of people who received a modern English education and literate industrial workers was approximately the same - 1 million people each (in the West, this ratio is 1: 10). The colonial impact on India's economy was highly controversial and generally insignificant. Political influence, on the contrary, was very significant (the establishment of modern law, political freedoms and the beginning of quasi-parliamentarism-the election of purely elite quasi-parliamentary institutions with an extremely narrow electorate), which provided first liberal and then democratic national leadership.

In the report "Colonial India:' Loyal natives ' - who are they?" E. Yu. Vanina (IB RAS) drew attention to the fact that the role of quite numerous representatives of those social groups who quite consciously supported the British is often left out of the scope of research. If for the majority of princes and large feudal lords, loyalty to the new rulers was forced, which was confirmed by the uprising of 1857-1859, then representatives of two social strata became the mainstay of British power in India: the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia (mainly from among the Brahmins and Kayasthas) and the merchant class. They formed a staff of native translators, secretaries, clerks to British administrators, became assistants to orientalist scholars, and junior partners in English commercial enterprises. Some of them were disillusioned with the existing feudal order, while others were able to understand and appreciate many of the positive aspects of the socio-political system and culture of Western countries. The sources that have come down to us, reflecting the views of these people, allow us to conclude that they consciously took the side of the colonialists, in whom they saw representatives of a more just social structure. In 1857, these people cheered the victory of the British weapons. They were the first to seek European education and positions in the colonial apparatus, and from their midst emerged the first Indian professors and specialists, the initiators of the national press, and members of the first educational and reform societies. Subsequently, they laid the foundations of the Indian national liberation movement.

V. A. Tyurin (Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) presented the typology of modernization processes that took place during the colonial period in his report "Models of modernization of colonial society: South-East Asia". These models were determined by the level of socio-political development of societies that underwent modernization. In his opinion, modernization was carried out faster in coastal societies that were more open to external influences, especially those with a pre-state system (the Philippines), and in societies with a "military-feudal" social structure (Malaya, East Sumatra, South-West Sulawesi), which were not able to withstand the destructive impact of colonialism on the local cultural heritage. Traditional structures, which the author defines as "bureaucratic-feudal" (Vietnam) and "state-patriarchal" (Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Central and East Java), were more resistant to colonialism. He believes that it was easier to modernize the "bureaucratic-feudal" system, which was most developed for this region, and which was experiencing signs of internal crisis; the process was more difficult in "state-patriarchal" societies. If we classify modernization models taking into account the specifics of the interaction of various religious and ethnic traditional structures and the peculiarities of the colonial policy of the Netherlands, England and France, then, according to V. A. Tyurin, we should talk about the Philippine, Malay, Javanese and Indochinese models of modernization.

L. G. Stefanchuk's report "Some aspects of the initial stage of modernization of the Maori people" is devoted to the experience of modernization of the indigenous population of New Zealand, which was at the stage of pre-state social order at the time of the collision with Western society. In the first half of the 19th century, with the beginning of Maori contacts with Europeans, the attitude towards Paheka (white newcomers) was favorable. The aborigines mastered new tools, new household items, and began to grow crops that were unfamiliar to them. During these years, there was a gradual involvement of them in the commodity economy. Missionaries played a role in modernizing Maori life. After the official proclamation of New Zealand as a British colony in 1840, the unrestrained occupation of Maori lands began. As a result, during the years 1843-1872, the Aborigines tried to defend themselves with weapons in their hands.

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their right to the land that once belonged to them. It was only in the early 1890s that the Young Maori Party was formed, which in 1906 managed to carry out a project on Maori councils that granted Aboriginal people limited local self-government, attempts were made to consolidate Maori lands, and the first loan bank was established.

This report confirmed the general idea of the conference about the complexity and ambiguity of modernization processes in the colonial period. Unlike the population of the "normal" colonies, the Maori of New Zealand have become an ethnic minority living in the same territory as the white majority. Under these conditions, on the eve of the First World War, the initial stage of their modernization was completed.

Subsequent reports described the features of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire aimed at modernizing the suburbs.

Leaving out of the scope of his report "Islam, progress and order in the discourse of military and people's administration in Dagestan (1860-1917)" the characteristics of military and people's administration, V. O. Bobrovnikov (IB RAS) focused on the purpose of this regime, the ways of its development and its role in the imperial policy of Russia. The Russian authorities ' attitude to Islam in Dagestan and the entire Caucasus was determined, the speaker believes, primarily by protective interests and a desire to reduce the cost of maintaining order in the eastern suburbs of the empire. The intention to raise the local population to the level of citizens of the empire and thereby carry out a" civilizing " mission is revealed later. Despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the imperial policy in the Caucasus was the complete integration of the Caucasus Region with the Empire, in order to gradually move from the wartime order to the principles of civil administration, Dagestan was granted temporary judicial and administrative autonomy, without extending the system of muftiats to it, i.e., a regime of indirect military and popular administration was established, According to the speaker, the principle of relying on local Muslim ("popular")organizations was established. government traditions and laws under strict control by Russian officers. Thus, according to V. O. Bobrovnikov, the Russian administration, believing that it preserves the local order, actually constructed a "new Muslim tradition" on the periphery of the empire. Since in Dagestan, as in the entire Caucasus region, many general imperial transformation projects were being tested, an attempt was made, which for various reasons became unsuccessful, to transfer the regime of military-popular administration to the Western Caucasus and Turkmenistan. In fact, the system of power in the Muslim suburbs, the speaker concluded, turned out to be more mosaic than the officials of the imperial administration would have liked.

In the poster report of A. S. Kadyrbaev (Institute of Islamic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "The policy of the Russian Empire in relation to Muslim education in Turkestan", it was noted that, although in the middle of the second half of the XIX century. West Turkestan was experiencing a deep crisis, while Bukhara and Samarkand retained their importance as centers of Muslim theological education and attracted students from both Turkestan and the Muslim regions of Russia. Under the Russian government, the activity of previously abandoned Islamic religious educational institutions in Samarkand was resumed, and madrassas were built in Kokand and Andijan. The Muslim population of Turkestan, with the exception of some nomadic peoples - Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, and Kyrgyz-preferred the Muslim school with its pronounced clerical character rather than the Russian one. The withdrawal of state funding from madrassas and mektebas did not lead, as the Russian authorities hoped, to the extinction of the activities of Muslim traditional schools, since the main source of their existence was waqfs and donations from the local population. After the supreme decree on equalization of the rights of all citizens of the Russian Empire (1905), the author concludes, the state policy towards traditional theological Muslim education has changed radically. If in 1876 it seemed to the Russian authorities that " Russian influence in the East presented a challenge... to break the shackles of Mohammedanism", then already in 1907 the madrasah training course was recognized as "very serious, connected with the real needs of the people's life".

The conference showed new facets of understanding the essence of the ongoing modernization processes and a variety of approaches to their study. Despite the differences in the interpretation of such key concepts as "modernization" and "Westernization", the conference participants agreed on the essence of the process itself: the success of modernization depended on the readiness of society for change; in the East, inclusion in the modernization process was usually forced; once it began, this process took on a systemic character. typical for most countries of the modern world.

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