Libya is one of the countries that for several decades brought a fair "headache" to the world community. Being a relatively small state, it was only recently considered one of the centers of international terrorism and did not even try to clear itself of these charges.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Major terrorist attacks organized by the Libyans-explosions in the air of passenger planes, support for "revolutionary" separatist movements, attempts to impose the "Jamahiriya model" on other states, attempts on Libyan emigrants (opponents of the regime)-made Libya a"pariah" country that was for a long time under the yoke of international sanctions.

However, a few years ago, the Libyan leadership suddenly abruptly changed its political course. The facts of terrorist acts were recognized by the country's leaders, and the victims ' relatives were paid substantial compensation. It was also stated that Libya refuses to implement a number of utopian pseudo-socialist policies, transfers its economy to market rails, intends to implement a number of democratic reforms and make peace with the West.

The current political situation in the country is characterized, firstly, by a rather strict internal order, and secondly, by "compliance" in the international arena. An example is the fact that Libya announced a reduction in oil production by 72 thousand barrels per day in order to comply with the corresponding OPEC cartel decision to reduce production by 1.2 million barrels per day. barrels. The implementation of this decision began in November 2006.

However, despite such a sharp "change of course", radical changes in the country's foreign and domestic policy, it is too early to say that the "Libyan riddle" is solved. This is primarily due to the fact that it is very difficult for a European to fully understand the Muslim tradition of perception of history and current events. Only one thing can be predicted for sure: their successors will soon correct the mistakes of M. Gaddafi (and I. Senusi before him), taking as the basis of the national choice a political model constructed from the Sufism of Idris and from the "anarchosyndicalism" of Gaddafi [Yegorin, 2006, p.47].

The interest and loyalty of the West (especially the United States) to Libya has a very brief and universal explanation these days-oil. In other words, for the West, interest in Libyan energy resources comes first, and only then - in Gaddafi and his policies. It can be assumed that, having become a victim of Europe in the first half of the last century and a victim of the United States in the second half of it, Libyans will certainly not accept the role of a political and economic reservation assigned to them by the West, and sooner

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Sooner or later, as the American researcher L. Harris has already pointed out, they will want to "take revenge on the villains" (Harris, 1986, p.83).

Fate determined that in the twentieth century Libyans had to fight hard for their freedom and independence at the cost of many victims. At the same time, only a handful of "great sons of the desert" were destined to turn over the pages of their chronicle of the century, among which history singled out A. Sherif, O. Mukhtar, I. Senusi and M. Gaddafi. All of them were equally adamant in their political activities and, in fact, were under the close attention of the world community for the entire century. At the same time, these famous Libyans, who made the history of their homeland on the political arena and battlefields, were similar and different, stubborn and compliant, strong and powerless before fate and people.

What is the influence of various Libyan political circles on the state's policy? When answering this question, it is necessary to give a brief assessment of the activities of the most prominent representatives of the Libyan political elite.

POLITICAL CIRCLES (RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS)

A. Sherif is rightly credited for being the first leader of the Senussi movement to deeply understand the essence of the nationalist-religious model of Senussiism as a synthesis of Sufism and Wahhabism, suitable for the Libyan reality as a basis for uniting diverse internal groups under the banner of Libyan patriotism to fight against foreign influence. Becoming the head of the Senussi and declaring himself "responsible to Allah and the people," A. Sherif rallied patriotic forces and won a series of brilliant victories over foreign aggressors who claimed to dominate Libya. However, he certainly overestimated himself and his capabilities. He never managed to overcome the tribalist tendencies and separatism of local clans, did not show flexibility in the armed and especially in the political struggle with the "powerful of this world" and clearly missed the opportunity to achieve independence of his country during the First World War, when the international situation favorable for the Libyan liberation movement contributed to this.

O. Mukhtar, the hero of the partisan war in Cyrenaica, whose high-profile military victories alternated with no less high-profile defeats, became an irreconcilable fighter and the actual successor of A. Sherif's cause. However, the economic blockade, de facto isolation from the rest of Libya and the general fatigue of the population did their job: in the late 20s of the last century, it became clear that the Libyans would not win in a guerrilla war.

The long colonial past shaped the conditions in which Libyan leaders were placed when they came face to face with European expansionism. They successfully fought it, but they could not jointly develop a new power structure different from the colonial one, and they had no experience in this regard. The fragmentation of tribes, territories, and civil strife became a serious disease that only an outstanding leader could cure.

It was then that the West and local clans turned to A. Sherif's cousin Emir I. Senusi, the recognized head of the Senussi. It should be noted that I. Senusi condemned the military actions that were conducted before him by A. Sherif, O. Mukhtar and other supporters of the"holy war". This fact could not be overlooked by those who sought to conquer Libya, and those who were tired of endless campaigns and battles. I. Senusi was a master of political compromises with both Western and local contenders for power in Libya. He never got involved in an open fight, did not take risks, preferring to make behind-the-scenes deals. Nevertheless, I. Senusi did not miss the threads of leadership, always kept his hand on the " political bullet-

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se", dodged, tricked, made deals with local feudal lords and Western invaders, and thanks to political resourcefulness managed to gain independence for Libya, becoming the first monarch (!) of the Bedouin state.

During his rule, the unexpected happened in the country: oil was discovered in the bowels of the kingdom, which flowed for export, and billions of dollars in profits that fell on this impoverished country, quickly began to destroy the feudal foundations that fenced off Libya from the outside world. to the rapid development of capitalist relations, to cooperation with the outside world, to cooperation with the capitalist market. The king did not suit the young Libyan bourgeoisie, which was suffering from the bonds of isolationism, and he did not suit the Western trustees of the regime, for whom he had already played a role. Overnight, without firing a single shot, he was overthrown by Libyan officers who called themselves socialists, but in reality wanted to help find their own specific path for a new Libya, overflowing with oil and petrodollars.

The history of Libya after the overthrow of the monarchical regime is not only a chronicle of the formation and strengthening of national - patriotic forces united around their leader, Colonel Gaddafi, but also the history of the complex ideological and political evolution of the revolutionary leadership. The breaking of the old foundations, medieval traditions and religious fetters in the country could not be painless and required consistent strengthening of the social components of the national democratic revolution, creating favorable conditions for positive changes. This took place against the backdrop of a fierce struggle for the mastery of natural resources that were in the hands of foreign multinational corporations, for the redistribution and use of oil rents to increase social well-being and, consequently, expand the support of the regime. A decisive attack on the positions of Western capital and the feudal-aristocratic groups fused with it, while simultaneously respecting the interests of the local bourgeoisie, provided the revolutionary leadership with the support of the majority of the population. This reliance on the local bourgeoisie, mainly small and medium-sized, gave him the opportunity to gain a foothold in power, and then develop his own model of political and socio-economic renewal of society, an alternative to the previous one.

In fact, in the eight years since the overthrow of the monarchy, thanks to the radical efforts of the revolutionary leadership, the Libyan political structure has undergone an unprecedented evolution in the Arab world: from an elite clan-feudal system through the republic to "direct democracy". At the same time, despite the active formation of the institutions of the "Jamahiriya" system and extensive socio-economic transformations, a number of traditional social structures remained relatively stable, which significantly hindered the processes of national consolidation called for by the leaders of the revolution. At first, they clearly underestimated the persistence of regional (provincial) clan-tribal and ethnic ties, the persistence of remnants of blood relations at all levels and in most areas of social organization of society. These connections and relationships continued to exist in hidden forms, and this is probably why their role was poorly understood by researchers of the recent history of Libya. Meanwhile, and we can agree with the British scientists D. Blundy and E. Lycett on this point, the influence of local traditions was already evident at the initial stages of the development of MA. Gaddafi's "third" theory. "Obviously, realizing that the regime needed tribal support," wrote D. Blundy and E. Lycett, "Gaddafi took into account the anachronistic self - consciousness of the Bedouins and laid it in the basis of his political theory" [Blundy and Lycett, 1987, p. 99-100].

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However, the tribal opposition was subsequently destroyed. There was no other organized opposition inside the country, and the external one, which was located abroad, although it was disturbing, did not pose a real threat: after the announcement of a general amnesty in Libya, it practically collapsed. This indicates not so much the Libyan leadership's understanding of the gap between theory and practice, but rather its increased attention to the current political situation in the country, which it very quickly and pragmatically took into account.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the revolutionary leadership had achieved its primary goals: the influence of feudal lords on power was eliminated, dependence on local financiers and foreign capital was overcome, many social barriers were broken, and a model of society based on state capitalism, on privileged groups - the bureaucracy, officers, revolutionary committees, and the nobility of loyal tribes-was created. However, the fact is that the independence and self-activity of the masses has not grown, nor has a new attitude to work been formed. After the overthrow of the monarchy, a number of "revolutions from above" were carried out, but even radical measures did not prevent the enrichment of individuals and entire social groups, i.e. the development of capitalism in the country continued.

During the period under review, along with changes in domestic and foreign policy in Libya (this is now clearly visible), serious changes also took place in the oil business.

OIL SECTOR OF THE LIBYAN ECONOMY

The situation in the Libyan oil and gas sector reflects the general political model of the country's state structure, where all power is concentrated in the hands of Muammar Gaddafi. Despite the fact that he has not held an official position in the Government since the late 1970s, it is he who makes the main decisions both at the highest political level and often at the middle level of the Libyan bureaucracy.

Gaddafi's style of government can be described as controlled and cultivated chaos in state structures, designed to prevent the emergence of political competition. Gaddafi arbitrarily dissolves and re-creates ministries (for example, the Ministry of Energy was disbanded in 2000 and restored in 2004) and regularly rotates the highest ranks of the Libyan hierarchy. It is noteworthy that the leader still seeks to maintain a kind of balance in the main areas of politics and the economy of Libya, duplicating state institutions and appointing people with opposite views and different backgrounds to senior positions.

It is noteworthy that today the main problem of the Libyan National Oil Company (LNOC) is the lack of both material and technical resources and qualified specialists for the design and implementation of contracts. For each contract, it is necessary to create a management structure with the participation of LNCS and approve the work plan, which makes it clear that a state-owned company cannot cope with all contracts.

Along with the LNOC, there are many foreign oil companies operating in the country. It should be emphasized that the presence of foreign companies in the Libyan oil and gas sector was made possible by the lifting of the UN sanctions regime in 2004 and the gradual normalization of relations between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom. Under the new circumstances, foreign oil companies were granted the right to participate in tenders for exploration and development of fields, as a result of which they became holders of licenses for the development of more than forty blocks. However, many businesspeople are wary of the difficulties they face in Libya, starting with the lack of foreign aid.-

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legislation regulating foreign investment, and ending with problems in obtaining a visa, the requirement to hire local managers, etc. [Smirnova, 2005, p. 264].

Since 2004, companies from more than 30 countries have been operating in the country, although today the most favorable conditions are provided to American companies: ConocoPhilips, Marathon and Amerada Hess, members of the Oasis Group, own 49% of LNOC shares. Other major companies include Spain's Repsol, France's Total and Elf Aquitane, Austria's OMV, Switzerland's ABB, and England's LASMO [Yegorin, 2006, p. 46].

In 2007, Russian Tatneft and LNOC announced contracts for the right to explore and develop hydrocarbons at three sites in Libya. The contracts were concluded in accordance with tenders previously won by the Russian company for three sections, including seven blocks with a total area of more than 16 thousand square kilometers. According to the Middle East Institute, the company is working in Libya on block 82 - 4, the development contract for which was signed with LNOC in December 2005. [www.iimes.ru].

It is worth noting that during Vladimir Putin's visit to Libya (April 2008), a memorandum of cooperation was signed between Russia's Gazprom and LNOC. The document provides for establishing cooperation between the two companies in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons both in Libya itself and in other African countries. To simplify the latter task, Gazprom also signed a cooperation agreement with the Libyan-African Investment Fund. Moreover, Gazprom has expressed its interest in participating in the construction of the Libya-Sicily gas pipeline with a capacity of 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year, as well as the Nigeria-Algeria-Europe gas pipeline.

Thus, considering the role that foreign companies play in the oil sector of the Libyan economy, we can conclude that in 2009 the position of American companies in Libya is likely to strengthen. This is primarily due to Gaddafi's growing desire to finally settle relations with the United States and Washington's agreement to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya. Against this background, the future of Russian companies in Libya looks uncertain.

LEVEL OF CORRUPTION AND BUREAUCRACY

Corruption permeated all spheres of life of Libyans long before Gaddafi came to power. It is worth recalling that before the Second World War and during it, until 1943, Libya was an Italian colony. The inhabitants of the country provided significant support to the British in the war against German and Italian troops. As the American researcher L. Anderson points out, the Italians, having received a decisive rebuff from the Libyans in 1911-1931, froze the political and economic development of the colonial structure they created in Libya, and the disparate Libyan leaders tried to preserve the Ottoman administrative structure that did not crumble, not knowing what to replace it with [Afiderson, 1986, p.45].

Libyans, even after the liberation of the country, did not particularly protest when they were ruled by the Anglo-French administration. Yesterday's colonialists gave Libya generous financial support. In response, the grateful monarch (King I. Senusi) began to pursue a frank and rather active pro-Western policy. However, the country was torn apart by internal contradictions, and its elite was mired in corruption. The high level of corruption was in the hands of the ruler, who never got involved in an open fight, did not take risks, preferring to conclude behind the scenes-

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successful transactions. He undoubtedly understood the specifics of the Libyan way of life, based on nepotism and the practice of" feeding " the political elite.

The fact that Libya is a country with a high level of corruption and a "massive" bureaucratic apparatus was primarily due to the specific conditions of the formation of the Libyan society, which was essentially frozen in a clan-tribal structure, and secondly - chiefdom in the absence of deep democratic traditions and a closed lifestyle of the local population.

Muammar Gaddafi was extremely adept at exploiting these Libyan characteristics, and his political demagoguery turned into one of the extreme manifestations of authoritarianism, which actually undermined the masses ' faith in the possibility of building a just socialist society. Moreover, the high level of corruption is due to the fact that Libya is a closed country, and the carriers of "democratic values" do not have sufficient motivation to interfere in the internal life of this country.

The democratic mechanism for governing the country, which was discussed so much before Gaddafi made concessions to the West, was never created. Gaddafi's omnipotence remains unchallenged, and corruption and bureaucracy have not been defeated. Drastic improvements can hardly be expected in this area. However, if in 2003 Libya ranked 118th in the world in terms of corruption, then in 2008, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by the international non-governmental organization for combating corruption Transparency International, it ranked 126th in the world [www.transparency.org].

list of literature

Yegorin A. Riddles of Libyan Politics: Asia and Africa Today. 2006. N° 9.

Smirnova G. Livia na puti liberalizatsii [Libya on the path of liberalization]. Collection of articles. Issue 25. Moscow, 2005.

Anderson L. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya. 1830 - 1980. Princeton, 1986.

Blundy D., Lycett A. Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution. L., 1987.

Harris L. Qaddafi's Revolution and the Modem State. Boulder, Colorado, 1986.

www.iimes.ru

www.transparency.org

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