In the center of Paris is the Invalides ' Home, where Napoleon is buried. Around the marble slab under which his ashes rest, the names of battles are carved: Wagram, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena... Contemporaries and descendants associated these victories with the names of Napoleon and his marshals-Murat, Lannes, Davout, Marmont, Ney, etc. Their careers from ordinary and non - commissioned officers of the Royal Army to generals of the Republic and marshals of the Empire remained an example for the entire French army. "Every soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack" - these words of Napoleon became the motto for many ordinary soldiers of his army. Various memoirs of soldiers of the Napoleonic Army, both generals and officers and soldiers, are imbued with the same faith .1
1 Segment. The march to Moscow in 1812, Moscow, 1911; Caulaincourt A. Napoleon's March to Russia, Moscow, 1943; Lozhye Ts. Diary of a Grand Army officer in 1812.

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This concept was also established in the Napoleonic bourgeois historical literature .2
Let's see what was the true system of promotion of soldiers and officers of the Napoleonic army and how much the rapid career of most of his wards advertised by Bonaparte corresponded to the truth. This is not without interest in elucidating one of the aspects of the process of formation of the bourgeois army in France.

In pre-revolutionary times, the rank and file had no chance of reaching the rank of junior officer. Soldiers of the royal army in the past were mostly impoverished peasants and urban plebs, who, having no means of subsistence, were sold to recruiters for decades of hard service. Only the offspring of bourgeois families could still hope to become officers, but after the royal Ordinance of 1781, this narrow channel was tightly closed due to the requirement to have noble ancestors in at least four tribes. 3 Thus, the class antagonism between the nobles and the third estate was also evident in the army. After the Great French Bourgeois Revolution, the situation changed dramatically. The names of many revolutionary war generals who emerged from the lower ranks are well known. Much less well-known are the legislative measures of the revolution that made possible this path from soldier to marshal. During the Jacobin dictatorship, a number of democratic changes took place in the social aspect of military legislation. 4 The most important achievement of the revolution

it became the right of soldiers to choose their commanders - a fact unthinkable in serf armies. According to the law of February 21, 1793, soldiers chose corporals; two-thirds of the highest officer positions were also elected, and one-third was appointed by the executive branch. "The election of commanders of military units is the civil right of the soldier," declared L. A. Saint-Just on February 12, 1793; "the election of generals is the right of citizens as a whole." 5
Under the Directory, with the changing nature of the war, the army gradually transformed to the right: revolutionary enthusiasm slowly gave way to ambition and nationalism. In this process, a significant role was played by the material interest of military personnel. A change in the quality indicator of the army can not be represented as a one-time event: It was spread over time and spanned the period from Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796-1797 to the beginning of the 19th century. "Meanwhile," A. Sobul noted, " the democratic principles in military institutions were preserved: if the democratic practice of choosing officers and jurors in a military court was abolished, then the reason and, moreover, the bravery of a serviceman turned out to be decisive in the process of being promoted to the rank. Under such conditions, the prospect of officer's epaulettes opened up to the common soldier. But in all this there was a strong admixture of ambition and adventurism. " 6
In the course of the formation of a professional army, the possibility for ordinary soldiers to reach the rank of officer's epaulettes remained, despite many restrictions regarding the democratic traditions of the revolutionary years. Article 61 of the Law of Jourdan-Delbray (dated September 5, 1798) stated that "no Frenchman has the right to an officer's rank if he has not served 3 years as a soldier or non-commissioned officer" 7 . At the same time, the law did not prohibit

M. 1912; Roos G. With Napoleon in Russia. M. 1912; Berthezene. Souvenirs militaires de la Republique et de l'Empire. Tt. I-II. P. 1855; Memoires du sergent Bourgogne (1812 - 1813). P. 1893; Memoires du general Lejeune. P. 1895; Journal de marche du grenadier Pils (1804 - 1814). P. 1892, etc.

2 Thierry A. History of the Consulate and Empire. Vols. 1-5. SPb. 1846-1849; Vandal A. The Rise of Bonaparte. Saint Petersburg, 1905; Taine I. Napoleon Bonaparte, Moscow, 1912; Madeleine L. The French Revolution. Vols. 1-2. Berlin, 1922; Madelin L. La France a l'apogee de l'Empire, P. 1970; ejusd. Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire. Tt. 1 - 16. P. 1937 - 1954; Driault E. L'immortelle epopee de drapeau tricolore. Napoleon le Grand, 1769 - 1821. Tt. 1 - 3. P. 1932.

3 Biryukovich V. The Army of the French Revolution (1789-1794). Moscow, 1943, p. 10.

4 Kiguradze G. S. The French Army at the first Stage of the Great Revolution (1789-1792). Tbilisi. 1982 (in Russian); Bertaud J.-P. La Revolution armee. Les soldats-citoyens et la Revolution francaise. P. 1979.

5 Sobul ' A. Pervaya respublika (1792-1804) [The First Republic (1792-1804)]. Moscow, 1974, p. 145.

6 Soboul A. Le Directoire et le Consulat. P. 1967, p. 34.

7 Sobul A. The First Republic, pp. 283-284; Berriat H. Legislation militaire ou recueil methodique et raisonnee des

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make a soldier an officer if he has shown himself to be a valiant and courageous warrior on the battlefield. In the numerous battles of the Consulate and Empire, the decline in junior officers was significant. Consequently, the rank of junior lieutenant or lieutenant was available to ordinary military personnel. In the future, their promotion to the rank was restricted by the law of May 5, 1805, according to which a non-commissioned officer who served less than two years in his position was not eligible for promotion. This restriction did not apply only to staff officers, since such promotions had to be made with the permission of the emperor .8
The subsequent transformation of Napoleon's policy to the right caused deviations from the Jourdan-Delbray law. The decree of August 2, 1811, further increased the length of service required for promotion to the rank of officer. A soldier could be made a corporal after two years of service, a kaptenarmus after four or five years, and a sergeant after four. All non-commissioned officers, without exception, could become junior lieutenants only after eight years of service .9 These rules were strictly enforced until 1813; exceptions are personal promotions made by Napoleon himself in the case of valor of soldiers or non-commissioned officers on the battlefield. During the Consulate, the army still retained the traditions of revolutionary wars: "The army of the beginning of the Consulate was pro-Jacobin" 10 . Soldiers and officers of the French Republic, who went on foreign campaigns, freed neighboring Italy from feudal oppression. In the minds of ordinary soldiers, Bonaparte's 2nd Italian Campaign was held under the same slogan as before: "Peace to the huts, war to the palaces!". In such a situation, Bonaparte had to take into account the mood of the army and not limit the rank and file in the issue of production in rank.

The campaign of 1800 meant a lot for Bonaparte himself: he had to rehabilitate himself after the unsuccessful Egyptian campaign. Even before the start of the Italian campaign, he tried in every possible way to use the remnants of revolutionary enthusiasm and even attracted foreign emigrants (in particular, Italians) to his army. Based on these positions, he approached the issue of raising the rank of military personnel. For example, on the proposal of the Minister of War A. Berthier to appoint a citizen of Poore as a second lieutenant in the fifth dragoon regiment, Bonaparte, in a decree of February 2, 1800, indicated that "this position should be given to one of the sergeants of the regiment who received an honorary saber in Italy" 11 . In the orders of this period, Bonaparte especially emphasized that if an officer did not show valor on the battlefield, he would not be given the highest rank. Berthier's application for the appointment of Citizen Navera as a battalion commander was refused, not forgetting to explain that "this officer will be sent to the (active. - K. B.) army and at the first case where he distinguishes himself, he will become a battalion commander" 12 .

In principle, the above-mentioned regulations and similar ones were Bonaparte's attempts to use promotion in rank as a stimulating factor: after all, an increase in salaries and various types of salary increases for military personnel depended on promotion. He had no doubt given permission for promotion to those soldiers and officers who had shown loyalty to the Government and distinguished themselves in battle by their bravery. Such faces were set as an example to others. The ambition that Bonaparte had deliberately inspired permeated the entire army. Perhaps no major battle was complete without mass production in chin. Thus, according to the imperial decrees of December 21 and 24, 1805, which followed the Battle of Austerlitz, many brave commanders were promoted to the highest officer rank: J. Rapp, G. -F. Sebastiani, B. Bessier, L.-K. Beaumont et al. 13 . During the Battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812, the battalion commander, a native of Livorno (Italy), staff officer of the Viceroy Eugene C. Del Fante for a clear

lois, decrets, arrets, reglements et instructions actuellements en vigueur sur toutes les branches de l'etat rnilitaire. T. 1. Alexandrie. 1812, pp. 8 - 9.

8 Godechot J. Les institutions de la France sous la Revolution et l'Empire. P. 1960, pp. 604 - 605.

9 Berriat H. Op. cit. T. 2. Alexandrie. 1812, p. 582.

10 Ma del.in L. Du brumaire a Marengo. P. 1938, p. 21.

11 Napoleon I. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier. Publiee par ordre de l'empereur Napoleon III. T. VI. P. 1861. N 4559, p. 113.

12 Ibid., N4560, p. 113.

13 TsGIA of the USSR, f. 549, 1807, d. 361, ll. 32, 34.

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performing a combat mission right on the battlefield was promoted to aide-de-camp to the Viceroy 14 . At the same time, for their bravery, German soldiers and officers (35 in total) from the Württemberg Division, which was part of the 3rd Army Corps, including 7 non-commissioned officers and 23 junior officers, were presented for promotion on September 11, 181215 .

Napoleon resorted to such a means of stimulation and in difficult moments, in order to raise the combat effectiveness of the army. For example, on October 18, 1812, during a review, he received news of the outcome of the Battle of Tarutino. An eyewitness to the events of that day, the regiment commander R.-E. Fezenzak, describes the details of the psychological impact of the emperor on the military: "From the emperor's face, you could see how much he was concerned about this news. He sped up the review, but still assigned officers to all available places and distributed many orders. He needed, more than ever, to use all the means he was so adept at using to get his army to make a supernatural effort. I took advantage of his good humor to reward those of my regiment's officers whose zeal I had experienced in practice; many of them were promoted to the highest ranks. " 16 It is noteworthy that during the campaigns of 1805 - 1807, there was no such need yet: Napoleon did not spoil the full-blooded army, which had not forgotten the traditions of revolutionary wars and had already learned the taste of paid victories. In a letter to his stepson Eugene, Napoleon wrote that he preferred battle-tested officers when advancing through the ranks: "My son, I don't understand why you want to make those brigadier generals who didn't smell gunpowder into divisional generals. It is necessary that real generals participate in the war and earn promotion in rank. " 17
After 1804, with the establishment of the Empire, the assignment of the next military rank or position became even more complicated. Captured papers of the French army, recaptured in 1812 and preserved in the archives of the USSR, make it possible to trace how this situation was implemented in practice 18 . Thus, conscripts of the Revolutionary army (Boyer, Courat, Jacquelin, Minet, Grandidierre, Plic, Pernineau, Flao, Gossmann, Dass, Rossignol, Ginot, Delprat, Zimmer, Mazuyer, etc.) reached the rank of junior officer in Napoleon's army in an average of 19 years of service, while recruits of the Consulate and Empire (Derousse, Giraud, Boehner, Moli, Lelong, Clement, Lesmore) - in 8 years 19 . The campaign of 1812 sharply raised the question of the shortage of officers. There was a rapid promotion of the rank and file through the ranks, and it took on a massive character, as if recalling the revival of the democratic beginnings of the revolutionary wars. However, upon closer inspection, this "lightning-fast" promotion actually occurred after 7-14 years of service. For example, J.-R. Coignet, who served for 14 years and participated in 14 campaigns, a member of the Legion of Honor 20 since 1804, only in 1813 received the rank of captain 21, and F. Grandot, who had been a sergeant in 1805, only became a captain and commander of Squadron 22 in May 1813 . After the campaign in Russia, the shortage of officers in the Napoleonic army did not decrease. For the same reason, promotion in rank and position was somewhat faster and regardless of merit. "A hundred artillery non-commissioned officers," wrote J. P. Blavatsky. Morvan - the same number of corporals, depot instructors, many brigadiers, as well as gendarmes went to the regiments located in Germany as second lieutenants. Almost all of them are old, soldiers who have had some sort of military experience.-

14 The French in Russia. 1812, based on the Memoirs of foreign contemporaries, vol. 1, Moscow, 1912, p. 129; Lozhye Ts. Uk. soch., p. 147-148.

15 TSGVIA USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3605, ll. 36-37.

16 The French in Russia. 1812, based on the Memoirs of foreign contemporaries, vol. 2, Moscow, 1912, p. 115.

17 Sogg. T. XII. p. 1862. N 10057, pp. 548-549; t. IX. p. 1861. N 8550, p. 299.

18 TSGADA, f. 30, 1812, d. 279, ll. 5, 24 - 84, 91 - 97, 148 - 159; TSVIA OF THE USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3604, ll. 32 - 122, 143 - 146, 164, 172 - 179, 185 - 206; d. 3606, ll. 1, 8, 12, 19, 21 - 22, 26, 34 - 37.

19 TSGVIA USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3604, ll. 27, 193; d. 3606, ll. 40, 146, 173, 204.

20 The Order of the Legion of Honor in the Napoleonic era served two functions-it was a reward and a military-political organization of Bonapartists (Bochorishvili K. G. Order of the Legion of Honor under Napoleon I. - French Yearbook, 1981. M. 1983).

21 Larchey L, Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet. P. 1896, pp. 291 - 292.

22 Brice R. La femme et les armees de la Revolution et l'Empire (1792 - 1815). P. S. a., p. 71.

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the opportunity to become an officer, quickly rose in rank. Routier, who took 10 years to reach the rank of non-commissioned officer, became a captain in 15 months. " 23
The acute shortage of the officer corps is reflected in Napoleon's correspondence after 1812. During the campaign of 1813, he promoted old and experienced soldiers to officers, equipping them with one-third of the regimental command staff (two-thirds were represented by young graduates of military schools).24 . These actions are similar in their organizational aspect to the activities in the army (Operation Amalgam), carried out in 1793, during the first years of the French Revolution. But unlike them, in 1813 the masses of soldiers were no longer given the democratic right to choose their commanders; all progress was carried out under the direct control of the Napoleonic administration. An identical pattern was observed in 1814. Class limitations did not allow the French bourgeoisie to make concessions to the masses, and the Emperor Napoleon was already far from General Bonaparte. The slogans of 1793 proved unacceptable in 1813-1814. The decline in the skill level of the Napoleonic army command staff was a logical consequence of the class limitations of Napoleon's military legislation and its practical application in 1798-1814.

The legislation on the army established the legal equality of military personnel, and the order of submission to the next military rank or position was taken into account depending on the length of service and military merit. But in practice, the advantage was given to the offspring of bourgeois families and relatives of the highest command staff. Thus, by a decree of February 18, 1800, C. Berthier, the brother of the Minister of War A. Berthier, was promised that he would receive the rank of General of division after the first battle .25 The same cases were repeated during the presentation to the highest rank of relatives of M. Ney, F.-M. Leclerc, L.-N. Davout and other commanders of the Napoleonic army .26 During Imperial times, this practice was used even by senior officers. According to the decree of October 12, 1812, Sergeant L. Sare was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant on the basis of the petition of his relative, Brigadier General J.-B. Bazancourt, while this soldier was listed in the active army only since 1805 and had no special merits .27 Other appointments were also made in the same way: on October 19, 1812, at the request of Colonel Brew, his brother, Lieutenant of the Naval Service, J. J. Brew, was sent to the United States. Brew was transferred to an infantry regiment under the command of his older brother. On October 21, 1812, J. Bonaparte wrote to the emperor: "I ask Your Majesty for the rank of colonel for Monsieur Bonfou, commander of the squadron, who was wounded in action on September 7 (Borodino-KB)... This officer is my brother-in-law, and I would like to take him into my service." The next day, the request was granted 28 . The request of the cavalry Commander of the 1st Corps, Brigadier General Baron P. Poinsot, was also approved. In his request for promotion to the rank of captain of his adjutant and his son Lieutenant Poinsot, the general pointed out his own services to the emperor (20 years of service in the army) and those of his son (participation in the battles of Ratisbon and Wagram), and also noted that his other two sons were officers In the army, a certain elite was created, a kind of vicious circle of people from bourgeois families.

An effective lever for promotion in the rank was the level of education of a serviceman. Special military schools, polytechnic institutes and universities of the Empire supplied the army with junior officers (non-commissioned officers and junior lieutenants). And if during the Consulate and in the early years of the Empire, Napoleon was relatively favorable to ordinary citizens when entering various educational institutions ,then in the future the transformation of the internal policy of the Empire also influenced the selection of those who wanted to be admitted to special military schools and lyceums. 30 In the archive materials there are

23 Morvan J. Le soldat imperiale (1800-1814). Vol. 2.P. 1904, pp. 435 - 436.

24 Corr. T. XXIV. P. 1868. N 19593, p. 530.

25 Ibid. T. VI. N 4602, p. 135.

26 Tulard J. Napoleon ou le Mythe du sauveur. P. 1977, p. 253.

27 TSGADA, f. 30, 1812, d. 279, ll. 17-20.

28 TSGVIA USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3606, ll. 177-179, 182-183.

29 Ibid., pp. 201-202.

30 Corr. Т. IX. N 8549, р. 299; Napoleon I. Correspondence inedite de Napoleon Ier conservee aux archives de la guerre. T. I. P. 1912. N 150, p. 71.

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applications of various French civil and military officials for admission of their children or relatives to the above-mentioned educational institutions 31 . The petitioners were junior and senior officers, generals, inspection inspectors, senators, etc., but there are NO non-commissioned officers, privates, peasants, or small artisans among them. The reason for this is the high tuition fees. Although the state sometimes took on a certain part of the costs (from one-fourth to three-quarters of the amount), and in extreme circumstances, all the costs of training, 32 this did not change the overall picture: the monetary factor ultimately ensured that the middle and large bourgeoisie priority in admission to higher and special military educational institutions of the Empire. Therefore, in this case, the social base on which the recruitment of officers of the French army was based also narrowed. The Imperial government was interested in increasing the proportion of military school graduates in the army, since they mostly came from the propertied strata of society, which the Bonapartist regime could rely on. If in 1803-1808 the military school of Fontainebleau prepared 500 graduates, then in 1808 - 1815 their number reached 250033 .

Archival materials allow us to trace how the pupils of military schools were promoted to the officer rank and their further fate. Upon graduation, military personnel received the rank of second lieutenant (as evidenced by numerous decrees of Napoleon), 34 while older military personnel needed at least eight years of service experience. As for the graduates of special schools, they did not stay long when advancing to a certain rank. So, by decree of October 15, 1812, after 12 years of service in the army, Gervoy was promoted to the rank of lieutenant, while a pupil of the military school Ponteculan 35 was appointed to his position with the rank of second lieutenant . But this was not the end of the advantage of school children over older military personnel: they advanced through the ranks faster than their comrades-in-arms. So, A.-R.-G. Gay entered the artillery school in 1799, from 1805 he was a lieutenant of the second class, and in 1808 he was a lieutenant of the first, in 1811 he served at the headquarters of the corps artillery as an adjutant to General B. Baltu, and by decree of October 16, 1812 he was promoted to the rank of captain 36 . After completing his studies at Fontainebleau in 1806, M. Devaux became a second lieutenant at the age of 19, in 1813 he rose to the rank of captain, and in 1814 he commanded Squadron 37 . Sh has a similar career. Spotlight. After graduating from the same educational institution in 1803, having passed all military ranks, starting with a second lieutenant, he reached the rank of captain in 1814 .

Thus, two trends were observed in the practice of promoting Napoleon's military personnel. On the one hand, the officer corps was indeed replenished with a large number of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, because this was required by the course of events. The main emphasis was placed on regular military personnel, because they, the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Napoleonic army, were the mainstay of the regime. In practice, the issue of training professional officers was resolved. "If Napoleon managed to get his recruits to go through the battalion school in four weeks," wrote F. A. Schulz. This was possible only thanks to the most excellent cadres. " 39 On the other hand, the class focus of Napoleon's policy did not allow the masses to actively participate in the construction of the country's armed forces, as it was in 1793 - 1794, narrowed the social base of the regime, and put the army at the service of the bourgeoisie. In such a situation, Napoleon's soldiers could not and did not carry the "marshal's baton in their knapsack".

31 TSGADA, f. 30, 1812, d. 266, ll. 12-135; d. 284, part III, l. 164; TSGVIA USSR, f. 440, 1812, d. 363, ll. 1, 3, 4, 6 - 8, 11, 13 - 24.

32 Corr. inedite ... Vol. I. N 702, p. 346.

33 Durieux J. La Dordogne militaire. Generaux et soldats de la Revolution et l'Empire. Bergerac. 1920, pp. 304, 307.

34 TSGADA, f. 30, 1812, d. 279, ll. 85-94; TSGVIA OF the USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3604, ll. 29-31.

35 TSGVIA USSR, f. VUA, 1812, d. 3604, ll. 158-160.

36 Ibid., pp. 161-163.

37 Durieux J. Op. cit, p. 304.

38 Fare Ch. Lettres d'un jeune officier a sa mere, 1803 - 1814. P. 1893.

39 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 7, p. 517.

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